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 Introduction 
 
I. Context 
 
Human trafficking has of late consistently featured on the global political agenda,1 and 
recognition of the growing dimensions of this criminal activity has been the catalyst for 
a host of legal and policy responses aimed at the prevention of trafficking, the 
prosecution and punishment of traffickers, and more recently for making provisions for 
identifying, assisting, supporting and protecting the victims of this phenomenon.  
        The trade in human beings has flourished as a result of increased economic and 
social integration, and has been facilitated by the ease of movement of workers, capital 
and goods, all of which are aided by increasingly sophisticated global networks of 
communication and transport. One consequence has been the globalisation of certain 
criminal activities, which has generated its own reaction - ‘We are compelled by the 
globalization of crime to globalize law and law enforcement.’2 Under this umbrella of 
globalised law and law enforcement we find the anti-trafficking regime, in the forms of 
international criminal law and international human rights law, which form part of a 
global campaign against modern slavery-related practices.  
        The body of persons engaging in transnational movement includes economic 
migrants – regular and irregular - students, visitors, and asylum seekers. Those entitled 
to enter for non-economic purposes may abuse their status, or those with economic 
objectives may present themselves as being in one or another of the categories. Such 
                                                 
1 Particularly, yet not exclusively, over the past decade or so. This is evident through discussion 
throughout the thesis of the central anti-trafficking instruments adopted at a United Nations, Council of 
Europe and European Union level, within that time period. 
2 U.S. Senator John Kerry, cited in P Andreas and E Nadelmann, Policing the Globe: Criminalization 
and crime control in international relations, (Oxford, New York 2006). 
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persons may be subject to deportation and/or criminal proceedings for breach of 
immigration law or engagement in unlawful activities in the destination State, and will 
have access to, for example, procedural rights as regards deportation or criminal trial.  
        This body of persons involved in transnational movement also includes adult 
female victims of human trafficking for the purpose of sexual exploitation, the latter 
being the chief concern of the thesis. As a system of bespoke rights for trafficked 
victims has been increasingly brought into the anti-trafficking regime,3 the role of 
consent - or lack thereof – in human trafficking has become increasingly important in 
traffick-related debate, and it has become apparent that this element has a significant 
and problematic role to play in terms of establishing who the victims are, and how they 
should be treated. 
        The economic attractions of destination States are a significant motivating factor 
behind the global movement of persons, and the individual choice to migrate (through 
regular or irregular channels). Consequently, the facilitation of illicit, clandestine entry 
into destination States presents a lucrative opportunity for those who can organise it, 
and the varying estimates4 as to the magnitude of this phenomenon and its victims 
indicate that it is a significant international problem which requires an international 
response.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
3 See, Chapter 1, Part II, and Chapter 4, Parts IV - VII for discussion of State obligations as to the 
identification, assistance, support and protection of victims. 
4 See, Chapter 1, Introduction, page 22, for estimates as to the magnitude of this clandestine activity. 
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 II. Distinguishing Trafficking from Smuggling  
 
From the outset, it is necessary to distinguish ‘trafficking’ from ‘smuggling’. Both as 
more typically understood concern the movement of goods rather than people. The 
terms are at times used without consistency but, for the most part, trafficking refers to 
the movement of goods across borders – goods which it is unlawful to possess in the 
destination State, such as guns or drugs. People ‘move’ or ‘migrate’ – legally or 
otherwise – across international borders. Sometimes, however, they are ‘transported’, in 
the same way that ‘goods’ are. This may be attributable to the fact that they are 
regarded (by those who move them) as just that – ‘goods’, ‘commodities’, as was 
clearly the case with the slave trade. If the action taken goes no further than simply 
‘movement’ of said people, even the act of transportation may not necessarily be 
unlawful. More usually, transportation is to avoid restrictions upon movement, such as 
immigration barriers, which can affect refugee applicants, economic migrants, and 
those who have been subject to coercion as to cross-border transportation and 
exploitation. 
        Smuggling is typically characterised by transportation of goods while avoiding 
import charges. ‘Goods’ in this context refers to items which would otherwise be 
lawfully allowed to circulate in the destination State, such as cigarettes or alcoholic 
drinks. The cross-border movement of people cannot be categorised so simply. Where 
possession of these ‘goods’ is unlawful, it is more usual to term the activity 
‘trafficking’, but the terms are not scientific or necessarily mechanically applied and 
there will always be exceptions in the way that they are used. Those who may require 
assistance to be smuggled – refugee applicants, economic migrants – face the obstacle 
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of immigration laws which may include criminal prosecution for breach or attempted 
breach of these laws. Such persons, then need the ‘help’ of smugglers and then may on 
arrival safely present themselves to the authorities if they are refugee applicants, or 
‘disappear’ in the destination State if they are in the latter category of illicit economic 
migrants seeking work. These people have been willingly transported. Those who have 
been taken without consent or whose consent has been obtained through coercion, 
deception, fraud etc have been trafficked. 
        The conditions of the transportation of the two groups may not differ greatly, but 
the conditions in the destination State may. The interests of those involved in the 
transnational trade in humans may go no further than:  
 
... the procurement, in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or 
other material benefit, of the illegal entry of a person into a State Party of 
which the person is not a national or a permanent resident.5  
 
Those who engage in such activity engage, by definition, in the smuggling of humans. 
Those engaging in the illicit movement of persons may, however, have further 
economic interests than those arising from transport alone. They may have a stake in 
the exploitation of the economic activities of the persons whose entry they have 
facilitated – either as a means of recouping the (typically inflated) transportation fare, 
or as a means of additional, sustainable profit, from a human commodity which can be 
used, and sold, many times over.  
                                                 
5 Article 3, Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, Supplementing the United 
Nations Convention against Transnational Organised Crime (adopted November 2000 by United Nations 
General Assembly Resolution A/RES/55/25, entered into force 28 January 2004) (hereafter ‘Smuggling 
Protocol’). 
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        It is usual to talk about the ‘exploitation’ of trafficked persons, meaning something 
beyond mere regulatory irregularity (such as payment below the minimum wage) but 
also to degrading conditions and serious limitations on personal freedom, in extreme 
cases reaching slavery-like practices or servitude. Prominent among such conditions are 
those taken to work in the sex industry, where the evidence is that many (almost always 
woman, sometimes children) are held in subjugation and compelled to engage in 
humiliating and injurious practices at the instigation of those who have trafficked them 
or into whose custody they have been trafficked.6 The traffickers, like the smugglers, 
are driven by the search for profit but the traffickers are motivated by the prospect of 
high profits at relatively low risk. The risk is diminished by the transnational nature of 
the business which makes the investigation and prosecution of trafficking crimes 
especially difficult and requires international cooperation to provide the framework of 
an effective response. 
        The central aspect of the global trade in human beings is clearly economic gain. 
This lucrative business provides ample incentive for traffickers and smugglers to obtain 
persons to transport, exploit, and profit from the exploitation thereof. Humans are 
transported for a variety of purposes, and unlike the inanimate objects noted above, the 
‘commodity’ here i.e. the transported humans, are entitled to certain rights and 
protections. Affected States may, as a result, principally have an interest in combating 
the trade on the basis that cheap labour may distort national labour markets, for 
instance, and also for the purpose of maintaining border integrity. Beyond this is the 
humanitarian objective of combating sexual exploitation of those trafficked or 
smuggled for that purpose. Those who are transported by coercion and exploited are 
                                                 
6 See, for example, R v O [2008] EWCA Crim 2835; Rantsev v Cyprus and Russia (app no. 25965/04) 
[2010]. 
 
 
 5
correctly seen as victims, who ought to be entitled to specific treatment and protections 
that are not accorded to ordinary unlawful economic migrants. In order for anti-
trafficking regimes to be legitimate and adequate, it is necessary for them to take into 
account the needs and interests of victims and not be content with simply establishing 
arrangements for more effective prosecution of traffickers. 
        Due to the transnational nature of smuggling and many instances of trafficking, an 
inherent feature is that both involve more than one, or even several, jurisdictions. 
Furthermore, organised criminal gangs control much of the activity, so that the use of 
criminal law to counteract these activities is highly desirable, while the obstacles to 
dealing with transnational organised crime are substantial. Nonetheless, cooperation 
and agreement between States as to the identification and seriousness of the wrongs and 
an acceptance of cooperative obligations to respond to the transnational criminal 
activity may mean that these obstacles and difficulties can be reduced. It is this 
approach which forms the core of the normative structures presented in the thesis.  
 
III. Defining Human Trafficking 
 
As with all transnational criminal projects, it is necessary to begin with the definition of 
the prohibited conduct which States are obliged to criminalise in their national legal 
systems.7 In order to launch a coherent and cohesive multi-pronged attack on human 
trafficking, particularly one invoking the criminal law, there is need to reach consensus 
as to what human trafficking actually is in a legal sense, so that there is clarity as 
                                                 
7 It may also be necessary to recognise that although the central instruments comprising the international 
legal anti-trafficking regime for the most part appear to provide for situations of purely ‘internal’ 
trafficking as well as those which involves the crossing of international borders, destination States may 
view the identification of conduct taking place wholly within their territory as a matter exclusively for 
them to regulate. This may mean that which sex trade activities and conditions are deemed to amount to 
‘exploitation’ may vary between jurisdictions.  
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regards both the meaning of ‘trafficking in persons’, and the obligations placed on State 
parties to the various agreements and legislation which form the anti-trafficking regime. 
The most recent international legal definition of ‘trafficking in humans’ is provided 
within Article 3 of the United Nations Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish 
Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children (the Trafficking Protocol),8 
and is replicated verbatim in Article 4 of the Council of Europe Convention on Action 
Against Trafficking in Human Beings (the CoE Trafficking Convention).9 More 
recently, this definition has been for the most part replicated verbatim in Article 2 of 
the Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on preventing and 
combating trafficking in human beings and protecting its victims, 2011 (the 2011 
Directive),10 with the additional aspect of specifically including begging as a form of 
‘forced labour or services’. These instruments form the legal ‘anti-trafficking regime’ 
as discussed throughout the thesis, and their respective provisions define human 
trafficking in the following way: 
 
“Trafficking in persons” shall mean the recruitment, transportation, transfer, 
harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or 
other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of 
power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of 
payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over 
another person, for the purpose of exploitation. 
                                                 
8 Article 3, Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and 
Children, Supplementing the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime 
(adopted November 2000 by United Nations General Assembly Resolution A/RES/55/25, entered into 
force 25 December 2003) (hereafter ‘Trafficking Protocol’). 
9 Article 4, Council of Europe Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings and its 
Explanatory Report, (adopted 3 May 2005, entered into force 1 February 2008) Warsaw, 16.V.2005, 
Council of Europe Treaty Series – No. 197 (hereafter CoE Trafficking Convention). 
10 Article 2, Directive 2011/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 April 2011 on 
preventing and combating trafficking in human beings and protecting its victims, and replacing Council 
Framework Decision 2002/629/JHA [2001] OJ L 101/1 (hereafter EU 2011 Directive). 
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Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution 
of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour or services,11 
slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs. 
 
This definition has taken significant and at times controversial steps in clarifying what 
human trafficking is in a legal sense. The definition is comprised of three elements – 
the ‘action’, the ‘means’, and the ‘purpose’ (of exploitation), all of which must be 
present in order for the activity in question to constitute human trafficking. The ‘action’ 
element is characterised by the ‘recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or 
receipt of persons’. The ‘means’ is ‘threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of 
abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability 
or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person 
having control over another person’, and the ‘purpose’ is ‘exploitation’, the meaning of 
which is expanded upon within the provision (above). These terms, of ‘action’, ‘means’ 
and ‘purpose’ will be used throughout the thesis to refer to each component element of 
the tripartite trafficking process. When referring to the definition of human trafficking 
throughout the thesis, this shall always be taken to refer to the abovementioned 
definition unless explicitly stated otherwise.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
11 Here, the EU 2011 Directive includes the words ‘including begging’. 
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 IV. The Role of Consent 
 
The current international legal definition of human trafficking adds the following 
specific caveat that: 
 
The consent of a victim of trafficking in persons to the intended 
exploitation set forth in subparagraph (a) of this article shall be irrelevant 
where any of the means set forth in subparagraph (a) have been used.12 
 
No such qualification was included in early traffick-specific instruments, which tended 
toward defining ‘trafficking in persons’ as transportation of women for the purpose of 
exploitation of prostitution, regardless of any consideration of consent.13 The inclusion 
of a ‘lack of consent’ element in current accepted international legal definition has been 
the subject of much debate,14 and has been the catalyst for this thesis, which comprises 
a theoretical academic enquiry from a legal perspective into the nature and role of 
consent in the transnational trade in women for sexually exploitative purposes.  
        As will be seen, lack of consent plays a pivotal role in the determination of who is 
and who is not a victim of human trafficking, and consequently what rights and 
protections they are or are not entitled to. Consent is a sophisticated and elastic concept, 
which can be perceived in a variety of ways. In stating that consent to exploitation is 
                                                 
12 Article 3(b), UN Trafficking Protocol, Article 4(b) CoE Trafficking Convention, Article 2(4) 2011 EU 
Directive.  
13 Early anti-trafficking legislation is considered at various points in Chapter 2, but see, in particular Part 
I. 
14 See, for example, K Abramson, ‘Beyond Consent, Toward Safeguarding Human Rights: Implementing 
the United Nations Trafficking Protocol’, 44 Harvard International Law Journal, 473; B Balos ‘The 
Wrong Way to Equality: Privileging Consent in the Trafficking of Women for Sexual Exploitation’ 
(2004) 27 Harvard Women’s Law Journal 137; J Doezema, ‘Who gets to choose? Coercion, consent and 
the UN Trafficking Protocol’ (March 2002) Gender and Development, Volume 10 Number 1. 
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irrelevant where the ‘means’ have been employed, the wording of the definition clearly 
recognises the potential for consensual exploitation to take place. This raises various 
matters for discussion, such as the Autonomy v Paternalism debate in the context of sex 
work and exploitation, what constitutes ‘exploitation’, and whether or not sex work is 
inherently exploitative. These matters are dealt with in Chapter 3,15 but it is submitted 
at this point that this thesis recognises that an individual can consent to being exploited, 
and essentially argues that the ‘lack of consent’ requirement creates a false dichotomy 
between consent and coercion, and that this along with the effect of economic 
coercion16 creates a ‘grey area’ category of persons who fall somewhere on the 
spectrum between trafficked and smuggled.  
        When referring to a ‘spectrum’ of trafficking/smuggling or consent/coercion in the 
thesis, it should be noted at this point that this is a descriptive device to help elucidate 
the range of considerations which might go to determining whether or not any 
particular decision (of the victim) might be said to be autonomous but, that in making 
legal determinations – for example - is X a trafficker? Is Y a victim? It will always be 
necessary to come down on one side of the line or the other – has the prosecution 
shown that there was no consent? Can it be shown that the woman did not, in fact, 
consent? There can be no spectrum of convictions, only guilty or not guilty but the 
issue for the thesis is that there might be (and indeed it is argued that there is17) a range 
of victims, of whom the most favoured are victims of trafficking, the next, victims in 
the ‘grey area’ and, those who are perhaps not victims at all i.e. smuggled women sex 
workers.    
                                                 
15 See Chapter 2, Part IV, section D. 
16 See Chapter 2, Part III, section B, subsection iv, for discussion of the role of ‘economic coercion of 
circumstances’ in the making – by a migrant – of the decision to migrate, and what this might mean for 
the migrant.  
17 See Chapter 3, passim. The issue as regards how to legally address these different types of victims is 
more specifically developed in Chapter 3, Part VI, and Chapter 4, Part IX. 
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        The current terminology used in defining human trafficking places great emphasis, 
then, on lack of consent and the presence of some form of coercion, or other ‘means’. 
The ‘lack of consent’ element is therefore a condition precedent to the existence of 
human trafficking, and has the potential to be problematic. If it is to be accepted that 
consent (or lack thereof) is relevant in the context of human trafficking – and therefore 
the trade in women for sold sex  – then this renders it difficult to determine who are, 
and who are not, victims of human trafficking, and leaves those who may have 
‘consented’ (or for whom there is no objective evidence of coercion) in a state of limbo 
– they have been ‘more than smuggled (at least in a moral, if not legal, sense), but less 
than trafficked’. 
        ‘Lack of consent’ and ‘coercion’ are central to the anti-trafficking regimes but 
they are inherently elusive of definition and difficult in terms of application. 
Consideration of both (consent/coercion) will be a central concern of this thesis, 
including the particularly taxing matter of the effect of severe and pressing economic 
circumstances. A proportion of those whose movement is facilitated by people 
smugglers or ‘migration facilitators’ will travel in a fully informed and voluntary 
manner. They may have formed their own expectations about what to expect in the 
destination State. The facilitators may have presented an utterly false view of what the 
prospects will be in the destination State, the typical example being a promise of work 
in, say, the catering trade when in reality the person involved is destined for the sex 
trade. In even more extreme cases, the person will have been taken abroad against her 
will, invariably to severe conditions, typically some form of exploitation.  
        Apart from direct coercion of the individual by a trafficker, there may be ‘coercion 
by circumstances’, particularly economic disadvantage. It is necessary to consider 
whether or not this contextual coercion may amount to pressure of the kind which 
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makes any subsequent transportation trafficking, rather than mere smuggling into better 
economic conditions. In the latter case, the economic coercion will have been central to 
the transaction but, in the former, whether or not there is lack of consent (amounting to 
coercion) may be problematic. The distinction is vital. If there is no ostensible coercion 
(or lack of consent on the part of the person transported) then the person is simply an 
economic migrant without access to the bespoke rights which are available under 
international arrangements applicable to formally trafficked persons.  
        People smuggling is frequently viewed as being of a voluntary nature: 
consequently, smuggled individuals will be liable to removal from the destination State 
due to the voluntary commission of immigration offences, although they may not be 
liable simply for working there. However, a substantial proportion of those transported 
across national and international boundaries will have been transported so that 
(knowingly or not, willingly or not) they may engage in activities in the destination 
State which may be both exploitative and unlawful, such as working in illegal 
conditions (for example, for less than minimum wage, for excessive hours, or in severe 
or dangerous conditions) or to work in the sex trade. 
        Such people are often described as having been trafficked for the purpose of 
exploitation – an example of criminal activity which is defined by reference to lack of 
consent, or at least the presence of ‘coercion’ of some form. This is not without its 
difficulties, particularly with respect to some instances of engagement in the sex trade 
where, as is the case in the UK for example, mere participation in sex work is not 
unlawful, and may be seen by some of those engaged in it as comparable to the lawful 
activities of those who have been smuggled for economic ends (and will be so seen by 
authorities in the destination State). Yet, as will be explained in this thesis, it is in 
practice very difficult to maintain the distinction between prostitution as mere 
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economic activity and prostitution as exploitation (consensual or otherwise) of the 
women involved.  
        The difficulties inherent in maintaining this distinction has particular significance 
in the context of human trafficking, where identifying the existence of consent (of the 
women involved) - to being moved, for what purpose, and in what conditions – is 
difficult. Furthermore, such is the nature of exploitation of women in the sex trade 
(whether or not the women have been transported in order to engage in it) that the 
conditions in which ‘smuggled prostitutes’ may find themselves may be little different 
from those encountered by ‘trafficked prostitutes’. Formally the first category would, 
on the face of it, be seen as acting voluntarily – and would therefore be subject to such 
legal sanctions as any illicit economic migrant - whereas the latter would be seen to 
have been subject to some form of force or coercion and therefore not acting in a fully 
voluntary manner. 
        Treating such women differently may give the appearance of unfairness, save, 
perhaps, from the perspective of a State wanting to maintain border integrity by 
removing those encountered by the authorities. The appearance of unfairness derives 
from the recognition of women who can properly be described as ‘trafficked 
prostitutes’ or victims; persons with human rights and access to specific, bespoke 
protections under the anti-trafficking regime(s), which will in some cases – amongst 
other things - interfere with the right of the destination State to peremptory removal of 
the women unlawfully present in its territory.  
        Even the woman who is willingly smuggled into a country knowing that she will 
take part in the sex trade may not have anticipated how awful her conditions would be. 
It is here that the unfairness of treating such women differently from those who have 
been formally trafficked may be most apparent and most questionable. The question is 
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explored as to whether this category of persons – those who may be tentatively referred 
to as ‘consensually trafficked’ - is to be offered protection beyond the ambit of ordinary 
human rights law.  
        Since isolating real instances of consent or coercion will in some cases be very 
difficult, mistakes and misidentifications will be made. The ‘consensually trafficked’ or 
‘smuggled’ woman will have such human rights protections as apply to her, such as the 
right to a fair trial,18 and protection from removal to a place where a real risk of ill 
treatment exists,19 but she will not have the specific protections conferred upon victims 
by the anti-trafficking regime, such as protection from peremptory removal, or a right 
to assistance and support etc. A State would be able to rely upon its rights to deny the 
extension of these benefits of trafficked women to smuggled ones and it would of 
course be in the State’s interests to classify as many trafficked women as ‘smuggled’ as 
it could. 
        There may be an analogy to be drawn here with the situation of refugee applicants. 
Those who satisfy the criteria of the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 
1951 (Refugee Convention)20 have access to the protections which it confers, as well as 
to any human rights provisions which are relevant to them. Such is the difficulty in 
establishing formal refugee status, so pressing may be the circumstances of some of 
those who cannot do so, that States have been willing to allow a number of such people 
a variety of discretionary remedial concessions on humanitarian grounds, such as 
exceptional rights to remain in their territories.  These concessions do not make their 
beneficiaries ‘refugees’ but are an acknowledgement that the mechanical, standardised 
                                                 
18 Article 6, Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (opened for 
signature 4 November 1950, entered into force 3 September 1953) (hereafter ‘ECHR’). 
19 Article 3, ECHR, and Article 33(1) Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (adopted 28 July 
1951, entered into force 22 April 1954) 189 UNTS 137. 
20 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (adopted 28 July 1951, entered into force 22 April 
1954) 189 UNTS 137 (hereafter ‘Refugee Convention’). 
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application of complex criteria combined with great evidential obstacles – such as 
establishing coercion/lack of consent - can result in genuine ‘hard cases’, which 
discretionary measures can to a degree mitigate without undermining the integrity of 
the refugee regime.  
        A similar humanitarian response to marginal cases of trafficked women, even of 
women who have not formally been trafficked might be appropriate, given the 
circumstances in which women are recruited in to the transportation of and trade in 
humans and the severity of the exploitative conditions in which they find themselves in 
the destination States. It is therefore suggested that Governments may be able to adopt a 
policy parallel to a humanitarian right to remain, as a response to this transnational 
criminal activity which must be seen in its proper context and addressed from a 
perspective which not only aims to criminalise the traffickers, but also to protect their 
victims. 
        Primarily, due to the problematic nature of correctly determining the presence of 
coercion and lack of consent, and secondly due to the fact that there may at times be 
little difference between the conditions experienced by women falling into either 
category, a proposal will be made in this thesis as to how the impact of the reluctance 
of States to concede to much as regards ‘merely’ smuggled prostitutes may be 
mitigated, without the attitude of States undermining significantly the purposes of the 
anti-trafficking regimes. 
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 V. ‘The Thesis’: Structure and Chapter Outlines 
 
This research set out to investigate the legal nature of the trafficking of women for 
sexual exploitation. However, it soon became apparent that consent (or lack thereof) 
had an important part to play in determining who the victims are and how they should 
be treated, and that there are ramifications of inclusion of this controversial element for 
putative victims of trafficking or smuggling for the purpose of exploitation. This is 
what the thesis aims to explore. A Chapter-by-Chapter breakdown of structure and 
content will now follow. 
 
A. Chapter 1: The Contextual and Legal Background 
 
Chapter 1 primarily provides analysis of the ‘push’ and ‘pull’ factors which lead 
individuals to make the decision to migrate, as it is accepted that many trafficking 
situations may at least begin on a voluntary and consensual footing. Prominent source, 
transit and destination countries are identified, as are frequented trafficking routes. 
Furthermore, Chapter 1 discusses the role of organised criminal groups in facilitating 
smuggling and trafficking.  
        The relevant obligations on States to address the trafficking phenomenon in terms 
of prevention, prosecution, punishment and the support and protection of victims are 
outlined, so that those most central to the thesis (i.e. those relating to the treatment of 
victims) may be dealt with in more depth at a later point, in Chapter 4. 
        The basic conditions for a valid consent are analysed, drawing upon and 
discussing various areas of the law where such a notion is employed and thereby paving 
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a pathway for analysis of the specific role of consent in the context of human 
trafficking, undertaken in Chapter 3. 
        Essentially, this Chapter aims to set out the legal and contextual background to 
trafficking activity and the legal nature of consent, in order to provide a basis for 
analysis of specific issues which are central to the thesis and explored in greater detail 
in subsequent Chapters. 
 
B. Chapter 2: Human Trafficking: The Evolution of an International Legal 
Definition 
 
The scope of the legal definition of human trafficking is analysed in Chapter 2 with 
reference to the main anti-trafficking instruments, which form ‘the anti-trafficking 
regime’. Unless stated otherwise, this will always refer to the UN Trafficking Protocol, 
the CoE Trafficking Convention, and the EU 2011 Directive. The analysis in this 
Chapter primarily includes discussion of the ‘action’ element of ‘recruitment, 
transportation….’ etc of the victim, and considers matters such as the requirement and 
legitimacy of border crossing.  
        This is followed by analysis of the more controversial and problematic ‘means’ 
element of trafficking – that of ‘coercion, force…’ etc. Examples and anecdotal 
excerpts are used to elucidate each element of the ‘means’, which are not clearly 
separable. This Part of the Chapter also tests the ambit and scope of the ‘means’ 
element, particularly the limits of ‘coercion’. Human trafficking is contextual, as the 
frequent flow of victims from poorer origin States to richer destination States indicates, 
and following consideration in Chapter 1 of the ‘push’ factors leading to global 
migration (and therefore a proportion of all instances of human trafficking), the effect 
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of ‘economic coercion of circumstances’ (on what might otherwise be deemed consent) 
is considered.  
        From an immigration perspective, this form of coercion does not negate the 
commission of an immigration offence for which the State has a legitimate interest in 
prosecuting the putative victim. It is recognised that States have a legitimate interest in 
immigration control and therefore may be reluctant to adopt an approach which is too 
broad and encompassing. Nonetheless, the argument is made that in the sole context of 
human trafficking, severe pressing economic need may render consent less valid or less 
freely given than otherwise and may, in fact, amount to coercion, particularly where 
traffickers knowingly take advantage of the pressing economic need of putative victims 
in order to recruit them.21 The tentative nature of such an ambitious argument is 
acknowledged and discussed. 
        As regards the ‘purpose’ elements of trafficking (i.e. the manifestations of 
‘exploitation’ as provided for within the definition), human rights law is drawn upon to 
elucidate the meaning of some of the terms used within these instruments. Justification 
for this cross-treaty interpretation is discussed in terms of Articles 31 and 32 of the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (the Vienna Convention),22 and the meaning 
of terms such as ‘slavery’, ‘forced labour’ and ‘sexual exploitation’ are discussed. The 
determination that human trafficking is a tripartite process defined by reference to lack 
of consent leads into the specific discussion in Chapter 3. 
  
 
                                                 
21 This latter point (as regards the trafficker taking advantage of severe economic circumstances affecting 
the victim in the origin State, in order to ‘recruit’ said victim) may constitute ‘abuse of a position of 
vulnerability’ (as included as a ‘means’ aspect of the tripartite trafficking definition) on the part of the 
trafficker. This is discussed in Chapter 2, Part III, section B, subsection v. 
22 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, (Done at Vienna on 23 May 1969, entered into force on 27 
January 1980, in accordance with Article 84(1)) United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1155 (hereafter 
‘Vienna Convention). See, Chapter 2, Part IV, section B for discussion of this issue. 
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 C. Chapter 3: The Role of Consent in Human Trafficking 
 
As has been noted above, this thesis has particular focus on the meaning and effects of 
‘consent’ within and without of a trafficking context, juxtaposed against the meaning of 
‘coercion’ and other ‘means’ related aspects of the legal definition of human 
trafficking, although the approach taken here does not consider these two elements to 
be the only situations. As the detailed analysis undertaken in Chapter 3 will indicated, 
consent/coercion is treated here as a spectrum, as opposed to a dichotomous approach 
which would have the putative trafficked person being deemed to either have consented 
OR have been coerced, as the latter would represent too simplistic a view of this 
complex phenomenon.  
        The intricacies of a valid consent in a trafficking context are considered, as are the 
realities of consent in a trafficking context. Furthermore, this Chapter considers the 
Autonomy v Paternalism approaches taken to sex work, and includes specific 
discussion of sex work as a legitimate form of labour, what constitutes ‘exploitative’ 
labour and also whether sex work is inherently exploitative. The final Parts of the 
Chapter address the effects of the inclusion of a consent element in the trafficking 
definition, and closes with discussion of possible alternatives to the current situation 
which has created a ‘grey area’ between the trafficked and the smuggled sex worker. 
This leads into the final substantive Chapter, which addresses the treatment of victims 
and the effect that the ‘lack of consent’ requirement has here. 
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 D. Chapter 4: The Treatment of Victims  
 
The ramifications of positive or negative identification of an individual as a victim of 
human trafficking are considered in Chapter 4, which evaluates the legal and policy 
issues surrounding the current framework applicable to the identification and treatment 
of victims once discovered in the destination State. The UK is used as a central 
example, following implementation of the requirements of the relevant international 
legal instruments with respect to treatment of trafficked victims.23 The victim-specific 
provisions of the legal anti-trafficking regime are analysed, as is the implementation 
and success or otherwise of these requirements within the UK legislative framework. 
        The thesis argues that there is no clear line which can be drawn between those who 
have been merely smuggled, those who have been trafficked, or those who have been 
‘consensually trafficked’ into a situation of exploitation. As regards the latter, it may be 
possible to argue that although such an individual has not been technically trafficked 
and therefore she may not be protected from the impact of immigration sanctions, she 
may nonetheless be entitled to, for example, protection from peremptory removal, and 
the exercise of prosecutorial discretion as to whether imposing immigration sanction is, 
in individual cases, in the public interest. Chapter 4 closes with recommendations for 
dealing with both trafficked and ‘consensually trafficked’ persons. 
 
 
 
                                                 
23 It should be noted at this point that the UK has announced an intention to opt in to the EU 2011 
Trafficking Directive, but as of yet is not subject to its provisions. 
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 Chapter 1 
The Contextual and Legal Background 
 
Introduction 
 
Human trafficking is an example of transnational activity which is characterised by 
movement, exploitation, and lack of consent.24 Trafficking is of a structural nature – it 
does not come and go in episodes – indeed, the enactment of international anti-
trafficking legislation over the past Century or so indicates that it is an ongoing 
problem. In many instances, human trafficking illustrates the link between migration 
outflow from impoverished regions, and subsequent exploitation of the migrant by 
those involved in the trafficking process. The role of ‘push’ factors - such as economic 
hardship - in the global trade in human beings should not be underestimated, as they 
clearly have a part to play in the continuance of trafficking and exploitative migration-
related activity.  
        Trafficking is contextual, and frequently takes place against a backdrop of poverty 
and lack of opportunity in the origin State. Trafficked women tend to originate from 
countries with unstable economies, or developing countries where the feminisation of 
poverty is evident, and are moved to richer, more stable predominantly Western 
destination countries. The trafficking patterns largely follow south to north and east to 
west flow, although patterns change according to supply and demand - as the demand 
for new, exotic women continues, so does the movement of trafficked victims. The 
                                                 
24 The definition of human trafficking and the role of consent are discussed and developed throughout 
Chapters 2 and 3 respectively. 
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trafficking of women for sexual exploitation constitutes criminal activity which goes far 
beyond smuggling or facilitated migration, to a point where victims are deprived of 
their autonomy and basic rights such as liberty and freedom of movement.  
        This phenomenon is large scale and lucrative. The United Nations (UN) estimates 
that, globally, human trafficking annually nets about $12 billion.25 The International 
Organization for Migration (IOM) estimates the figure to be closer to $31 billion.26 
Estimates as to the magnitude of the human trafficking phenomenon range from 
700,00027 women and children victims of trafficking for sexual exploitation, to several 
million28 victims being trafficked worldwide annually, the latter figure including other 
forms of exploitation.  
         It has been estimated that 120,000 women and children are trafficked specifically 
into Western Europe each year.29 Specific research conducted in 1998 led to an 
estimate that trafficked women both into and within the UK amounted to between 142 
and 1420 per year.30 In 2003, Government estimates envisaged around 4,000 sex 
trafficking victims being present in the UK at any one time.31 These victims will 
originate from different parts of the world, within and without the geographical 
                                                 
25 V Malarek, The Natashas: Inside the new global sex trade (Arcade Publishing, New York 2004) 5. 
26 Some discrepancy between these figures can be explained by the fact that the IOM and the UN do not 
necessarily use the same definitions of ‘trafficking in humans’.  See Chapter 2 for discussion of the legal 
definition of trafficking in humans. 
27 European Commission, Justice and Home Affairs, ‘Trafficking in Women – The misery behind the 
fantasy: from poverty to sex slavery – A comprehensive European Strategy’ 
<http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/news/8mars_en.htm> accessed 23 June 2007. 
28 International Organisation for Migration – however, IOM use a broad definition for human trafficking 
and so their statistics may not be the most reliable. See, <http://www.iom.int/jahia/Jahia/pid/1> accessed 
1 March 2010 
29 See, International Organization for Migration ‘Consequences of Trafficking and Policy Responses’ 
<http://www.iom.int/jahia/Jahia/about-migration/managing-migration/managing-migration-irregular-
migration/consequences-of-trafficking-and-policy-responses> accessed 01 July 2011, and Frank Laczko, 
International Organization for Migration, ‘Human Trafficking: The Need for Better Data’ (November 
2002) <http://www.migrationinformation.org/Feature/display.cfm?ID=66> accessed 01 July 2011. 
30 L Kelly and L Regan, ‘Stopping Traffic: Exploring the Extent of, and Responses to, Trafficking in 
women for sexual exploitation in the UK’, (Imprint London, Home Office 2000) 22. 
31 Joint Committee on Human Rights Twenty-Sixth Report, (Session 2005 – 6) [78/205] 
<http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/jt200506/jtselect/jtrights/245/24507.htm#n109> accessed 01 
July 2011. 
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confines of Europe. Within the European Union (EU), every Member State is affected 
to some degree, be it an origin, transit, or destination State, or a combination thereof. 
One of the main obstacles to effectively combating human trafficking is the prevalence 
and involvement of organised crime groups, coupled with a real lack of cooperation, if 
not coordination, by the relevant enforcement authorities.32  
        Industrialisation, technological advances and globalisation are an advantage to 
traffickers, as new mediums of transportation and communication exist which they can 
draw upon to maintain and expand trafficking networks. Cooperation and 
communication among the international community and affected States is imperative in 
order for a multi-pronged attack on trafficking to be successfully made. Information 
and intelligence needs to be subject to a system of central collection in order for it to be 
analysed and for an effective action plan to be implemented. Harmonised criminal law 
and human rights responses must take account of the need to prevent trafficking, 
prosecute and punish the trafficker, and to protect and provide for the victim. In order 
for trafficking to be tackled effectively, both supply and demand factors need to be 
addressed, as it is these push and pull factors which underpin and facilitate the trade in 
humans. Criminalisation, monitoring mechanisms, and law and policy which addresses 
prevention, prosecution and punishment (of traffickers) as well as that providing for 
support and assistance to victims is all imperative to a successful anti-trafficking 
regime.  
        As noted in the Introduction to the thesis, it is essential from the outset to make the 
distinction between individuals who play no voluntary part in becoming part of the 
global trafficking network, and individuals who elect to enter trafficking networks as a 
method of facilitated migration. There exists a spectrum, along which lie those who did 
                                                 
32 At an EU level, the recent 2011 Directive may go some way toward remedying lack of cooperation and 
coordination between the relevant authorities. See Part II of this Chapter, section A, subsection ii. 
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not consent to any part of the trafficking process; those whose consent was vitiated by 
deception or some other relevant factor; and those who fully consent to facilitated 
migration for the purpose of working in the sex industry, albeit in exploitative 
conditions.33 For completeness, there will also be those who fully consent to the 
facilitated migration process for the purpose of working in the sex industry in 
conditions which cannot be deemed to be ‘exploitative’.34  
        Push and pull factors serve to encourage the migrant to leave their country of 
origin. The ‘push’ comes from various sources which will be considered in due course, 
and the ‘pull’ from the lure of richer countries and the promise of a better future. It 
must be borne in mind that the services of trafficking networks are actually in demand 
by potential migrants and putative trafficking victims; not every trafficked person 
‘falls’ into the hands of traffickers.  
        Aronowitz observes that ‘Often both smuggled and trafficked individuals leave a 
country of origin willingly.’35 Potential migrants may see traffickers as ‘migration 
brokers’,36 or facilitators - agents who aid them in their quest to migrate. Europol state 
that:  
 
The deceit or misrepresentation practiced by the recruiter or trafficker does 
not always have to be the pivotal aspect of the recruitment phase. The mere 
                                                 
33 It is accepted here that consent to sex work – even where it is to be undertaken in exploitative 
conditions – can in some circumstances be valid. This is further discussed throughout Chapter 3. 
34 There is disagreement as to whether or not sex work is inherently exploitative. The position of this 
author is that sex work is not always exploitative, but that conditions surrounding it may render it so. 
These issues are discussed further throughout Chapter 3, Part IV, section D. 
35 A Aronowitz, ‘Smuggling and Trafficking in Human Beings: The Phenomenon, the Markets that drive 
it and the Organisations that promote it.’ (2001) 9 European Journal of Criminal Policy and Research 
163, 164. 
36 A Phizacklea, ‘Migration Theories and Migratory Realities: a Gendered Perspective’ in Danielle Joly, 
International Migration in the New Millennium: Global and Regional Perspectives (Ashgate 2004) 152. 
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offer of a means to leave the country can be enough to secure the 
individuals cooperation.37       
 
        Where the ‘voluntary’ trafficked migrant is concerned (i.e. those who proceed on 
an initially consensual basis), whatever the purpose they are ultimately intended for, 
there is a shared characteristic – all have elected to leave their place or country of origin 
for some reason. The rise in irregular migration services has come about as a result of a 
lack of legal channels for migration.38 Despite the ‘self-generated character of much of 
the migration’39 of today, this does not negate the fact that traffickers are taking 
advantage of those potential migrants. As Ravenstein asserts, ‘none…can compare in 
volume with that which arises from the desire inherent in most men to ‘better’ 
themselves in material respects’.40 The deceptive nature of facilitated migration has the 
potential to paint somewhat of a ‘rosy’ picture for the potential victim – an opportunity 
to increase ones material worth. It is not impossible to envisage consent being given by 
an individual to be transported into a situation of exploitative labour where the 
conditions experienced and pay offered fall below accepted labour standards in the 
destination State, yet still present an improvement on the prospects facing the migrant 
in the origin State. 
        The aim of this Chapter is to provide an overview of the legal and contextual 
background to migration and trafficking-related activity, and the problematic notion of 
consent in the law which is central to the enquiry made by the thesis. Part I will address 
                                                 
37 Europol, ‘Trafficking of Women and Children for Sexual Exploitation in the EU: The Involvement of 
Western Balkans Organised Crime’, Public Version, Crimes Against the Person Unit, 18. 
<http://www.europol.europa.eu/publications/Serious_Crime_Overviews/Western_Balkans_THB_Threat
_Assessment.PDF> accessed 1 August 2007, link no longer live. 
38 A Aronowitz, n 35, 171. 
39 A Wright, Organised Crime (Willan Publishing, 2006) 94. 
40 E G Ravenstein, ‘The laws of migration: second paper’ (1889) Journal of the Royal Statistical Society 
52:2, 286. 
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the underlying economic and social ‘push’ factors acting on the would-be trafficked 
victim and ensuring the continuance of human trafficking with a view to emphasising 
the role of certain factors such as economic hardship (on the part of the migrant) in 
illicit migration and human trafficking. This Part will also look at intra-European 
migration and trafficking patterns, including consideration of frequented trafficking 
routes and prominent source, transit and destination States. Finally, this Part also 
considers the role of organised criminal gangs in illicit migration and human 
trafficking. This Part is necessarily descriptive and illustrative – at least as to context – 
and largely from a European perspective. Even if one were attainable, this Part of the 
Chapter does not set out to provide a full comprehensive account of the trafficking 
phenomenon, the clandestine nature of which precludes such a thing.  
        Part II will specifically address the central State obligations imposed by the 
international legal anti-trafficking regime, which addresses the prosecution and 
punishment of traffickers, prevention of trafficking, and (briefly) the treatment of 
victims41 will be outlined. This sketch represents only a part of trafficking activity; 
sufficient to explain the legal regime, yet the whole picture might indicate that aspects 
of anti-trafficking law may be inadequate as Chapter 4 will discuss as regards 
specifically the treatment of victims. Other aspects of the international legal regime are 
not at all considered irrelevant here, yet they go beyond the ambit of the focus of this 
thesis and so will not be considered further. The corresponding UK legislative 
framework will also be considered.  
        Part II will establish and analyse the basic principles of an integral part of the 
enquiry made within this thesis: that of consent. This discussion will draw upon various 
areas of the law where such a notion is employed, in order to provide an illustration of 
                                                 
41 The treatment of victims is considered in more depth in Chapter 4. 
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problematic nature of determining a valid consent, so that the specific matter of the role 
of consent in human trafficking can be analysed in depth in Chapter 3. 
 
I. Contextual Factors underlying the Continuance of Human Trafficking 
 
This Part will analyse and establish the contextual factors underlying the trafficking of 
women and girls for sexual exploitation. The focus is restricted to Europe, although the 
same factors will be applicable to trafficking patterns beyond these geographical 
confines. The restriction of focus to this geographical region is in the interests of 
continuity and so that limited and specific example may be given to illustrate the points 
made. The underlying causes of this activity are manifold, and tend to work together to 
ensure its continuance. These factors can be analysed within a framework of economic 
and social influences, which shape the market forces of supply and demand which 
arguably lead to some or all instances of global human trafficking today.  
 
A. ‘Push’ Factors in Origin States  
      
Potentially, migration can be seen as ‘an individual, spontaneous, and voluntary act, 
which rests on the comparison between the present situation of the actor and the 
expected net gain of moving, and results from a cost-benefit calculus.’42 According to 
this statement, a potential migrant makes a rational, individual decision to migrate for 
material purposes, with the material rewards being higher than the cost of the migration 
activity itself. 
                                                 
42 J Arango, ‘Theories of International Migration’ in Danielle Joly, International Migration in the New 
Millennium: Global and Regional Perspectives (Ashgate 2004) 18. 
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        Outshoorn states that ‘The dynamics of trafficking are best explained by migration 
theory’.43 Various theories exist which offer explanations for migration44 which are 
amongst other matters largely based upon factors such as wage disparities,45 yet these 
theories were conceived with respect to migration in general as opposed to specifically 
the trafficking of humans; nonetheless, the same ‘push’ factors can be identified. 
Migration is complex and diverse and it varies in forms, motivations and contexts. It is 
a dynamic process, and cannot easily be explained by any one static theoretical 
framework. Human trafficking is just one aspect of this multifaceted global issue. 
Trafficking as a form of migration needs to be seen in its proper individual social, 
historical, cultural and political context. Empirical research can likely tell us much 
more about migration than theory can.46 
        Economic migrants may seek to enter a State lawfully or unlawfully, to undertake 
otherwise lawful or unlawful activities, such as industrial agriculture or prostitution, the 
legality of the latter being dependent upon which State one enters. Some will reach 
their goal alone; others with the aid of migration facilitators, a proportion of whom will 
be trafficked. Either way, as a result of ‘push’ factors in origin States and because the 
economic attractions of certain destination States are high, organised clandestine entry 
is profitable to those who organise it, and there is clearly a demand for their services.  
                                                 
43 J Outshoorn, ‘The Political Debates on Prostitution and Trafficking of Women’, (2005) Social Politics: 
International Studies in Gender, State and Society Volume 12, number 1, 141-155, 143. 
44 See, J Arango, n 42, and A Phizacklea, n 36, where various migration theories are discussed. 
45 Such as ‘neoclassical theory’, the basic premise of which is that it is in wage disparity between state of 
origin and state of destination where the motivation for migration will be found – see, J Arango, n 42. 
46 Discussed in this section, below. See for example J Mertus, ‘Human Rights of Women in Central and 
Eastern Europe’, (Spring 1998) 6 American University Journal of Gender Social Policy & Law, 369; 
GfK Ukraine, ‘Human Trafficking Survey: Belarus, Bulgaria, Moldova, Romania, and Ukraine’, Kyiv, 
Ukraine, December 2006, prepared by GfK Ukraine for the International Organization for Migration. 
<http://www.childcentre.info/projects/traffickin/dbaFile13968.pdf> accessed 1 February 2007; UNICEF, 
UNOHCHR, OSCE, ODIHR ‘Trafficking in Human Beings in South Eastern Europe’, (2004) 25 
<http://www.iom.md/materials/1_traff_human_beings_se.pdf> accessed 3 May 2007. 
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        The same factors influencing the decision to migrate – and therefore having an 
effect on trafficking patterns - are frequently cited by various sources,47 indicating that 
several main themes can be identified. These largely centre on socio-economic 
problems, such as economic difficulty in the origin State, arising as a result of, for 
example, regional conflict, political unrest or economic transition. Gender 
discrimination and gender-based violence often go hand-in-hand with this.48 These 
underlying factors work together to render women in some origin countries particularly 
vulnerable to human trafficking, and the demand for sexual services for sale creates the 
potential for them to be sexually exploited in the destination State.  
        Similarly, a recent IOM survey cited several reasons for the prevalence of human 
trafficking in Belarus. Among these were listed low wages and unemployment, gender 
and ethnic discrimination, and corruption, as well as lack of information concerning 
employment abroad.49 The context in which human trafficking takes place has not gone 
unnoticed in law and policy responses to the phenomenon; for example, the Report of 
the UN Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women, its Causes and Consequences 
in 1994 proposed a definition of human trafficking which recognised that ‘[Trafficking 
is the] illicit and clandestine movement of persons …largely from developing countries 
with economies in transition…’50 thereby specifically recognising the impact of 
economic factors on trafficking patterns. 
        The matters discussed above undoubtedly have an impact on the decision by 
certain women to migrate, which can lead to them falling into the hands of traffickers. 
                                                 
47 Ibid. 
48 See, J Mertus, n 46; GfK Ukraine, n 46; T Obokata, ‘Trafficking of Human Beings as A Crime against 
Humanity: Some Implications for the International Legal System’, International and Comparative Law 
Quarterly (2005), 54, 445 – 458. 
49 GfK Ukraine, n 46, 50.  
50 Report of the Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women, its Causes and Consequences, ‘Further 
Promotion and Encouragement of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Including the Question of 
the Programme and Methods of Work of the Commission Alternative Approaches and Ways and Means 
Within the United Nations System for Improving the Effective Enjoyment of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms.’ (1997) UN Doc E/CN.4/1997/47/Add.4. 
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The root causes of trafficking have been considered by many sources and frequently 
flag up the same factors such as poverty and unemployment.51 Although in the most 
basic sense it can be contended that migration ‘results from the uneven geographical 
distribution of labour and capital’,52 there are further influencing factors in countries of 
origin which are specific to women and therefore have the effect of rendering them 
particularly vulnerable to trafficking and exploitative facilitated migration. 
 
i. Economic Marginalisation: The Feminisation of Poverty 
 
Women in CEE face a higher likelihood of being trafficked for forced into prostitution 
than their Western European or US counterparts. The IOM identifies that trafficking 
arises as a result of the factors outlined above, and – notably – the marginalisation of 
women in origin States.53 Therefore, the root causes of trafficking of any individual for 
any ‘purpose’ are universal up to a certain point, yet beyond this point they become 
gendered as the marginalisation of women exacerbates the other factors. While poverty 
and lack of employment opportunities are issues applicable to male and female 
trafficking victims, it is evident that specific issues tied to structural inequalities within 
origin States also serve to make women victims of this phenomenon. Accordingly, the 
European Commission suggests that women are particularly vulnerable to human 
trafficking as a result of the feminisation of poverty, gender discrimination, and lack of 
education and professional opportunities in the origin state.54  
        Mertus identifies that the transition to a market economy impacted upon women’s 
rights particularly in terms of increased unemployment and non-employment; declining 
                                                 
51 See, European Commission, Justice and Home Affairs, n 27. 
52 J Arango, n 42, 18 . 
53 GfK Ukraine, n 46. 
54 European Commission, Justice and Home Affairs, n 27. 
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levels of income and increased poverty; overt job discrimination and continued 
occupational segregation; and a surge of traditional attitudes toward gender roles.55 
Indeed, ‘A continuous ideological thread of feminist theory through time and across 
continents is the common understanding that male power is linked to the subjugation 
and servitude of women in the home.’56  
        Following the collapse of the socialist regimes after 1989 in Eastern Europe, 
women’s hopes for improved and equal rights may indeed have come into fruition in 
some areas of life, but not all. Discrimination was and is still a huge factor in 
some/many parts of CEE. There has been a decline in employment - Mertus states that 
‘in the Russian Federation and in other Commonwealth of Independent States 
countries, an estimated 70% - 80% of women are unemployed.’57 Lower income and 
increased poverty hit women the hardest as they were already the lowest paid anyway.    
        Mahoney observes that discrimination and inequality is often embedded in the 
national laws; it is perpetrated by society and made acceptable by law.58 Consequently, 
‘The movement of women within countries and across frontiers is usually a result of 
their unequal bargaining power and vulnerability to exploitation.’59 The feminisation of 
poverty corresponds with the feminisation of migration from some States. Women’s 
work, if they can get it, is unlikely to have the same status as men’s work and therefore 
comes with less pay, and less rights.  
         Gender discrimination and job segregation are exemplified in various ways – 
advertisements can request men for higher positions and women for secretarial 
                                                 
55 J Mertus, n 46, 371. 
56 K Mahoney, ‘Theoretical Perspectives on Women’s Rights and Strategies for their Implementation’, 
Brooklyn Journal of International Law 21(3): 799-856, 800. 
57 J Mertus, n 46, 379. 
58 K Mahoney, n 56, 799. 
59 Report of the Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women, its Causes and Consequences, (1994) 
U.N. ESCOR E/CN.4/1997/47/Add.4 Commission on Human Rights, 53rd Session, Provisional Agenda 
Item 9(a), at 19 <http://www.awf.or.jp/pdf/h0010.pdf> accessed 11 Jan 2007. 
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positions. Words may feature in advertisements for female occupations which imply 
that the applicant must be sexually available.60 This demonstrates unequal social sexual 
policy. CEE women may be well educated, but receive less return on their education as 
a result of discrimination. In Moldova, for example, although women on the whole 
receive the same level of training as men, it is reported that they comprise 68% of the 
unemployed,61 and those employed tend to receive unequal pay when compared to their 
male counterparts, when doing the same job. This obvious discrimination has a 
devastating effect upon the female population, and serves to act as a significant ‘push’ 
factor influencing the supply of migrants and trafficking victims. 
        A United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM)62 report 
demonstrates that women’s employment levels in Eastern Europe seriously fell during 
the transition to a market economy; a 40% decline was noted in some countries. The 
biggest unemployment problem is with young women in CEE – it is less difficult for 
older women to find employment due to the skills which they possess. Statistics 
confirm the problem of unemployment amongst young women.63 These disadvantages 
create a renewable source of disillusioned young females which is ideal for the sex 
trafficking market.   
 
 
 
 
                                                 
60 J Mertus, n 46, 383. 
61 This was reported by 28% of Bulgarian women assisted by IOM Sofia from March 2000 – August 
2001, see UNICEF, UNOHCHR, OSCE, ODIHR, ‘Trafficking in Human Beings in South Eastern 
Europe’, n 46, 25. 
62 United Nations Development Fund for Women, Biannual Report 2000: ‘Le Progrés des femmes à  
traverse le monde’. 
63 In Romania, for example, the likelihood of unemployment for women aged 15 – 24 is twice that of 
men – see International Labour Office Yearbook of Labour Statistics 1993; ILO World Labour Report 
1994, cited in J Mertus, n 46, 383. 
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 ii. Violence against Women 
 
Empirical research conducted in CEE flags up the main problem areas identified by 
women in that region,64 which include poor economic conditions and discrimination in 
employment, and, violence against women. Such factors demonstrate the disadvantaged 
position of women in some CEE States, compared to that of their male counterparts. 
Structural inequalities can be well ingrained.  
        In 1998 – 2001, research was undertaken among migrant domestic workers in 
London who were questioned as to their motivations for migrating.65 The prime 
motivators for migration included the improvement of family welfare or children’s 
education. In some cases, the behaviour of the husband was a motivating factor i.e. if he 
drank excessively, or indulged in womanising, as well as the economic motivation 
resulting from lack of earnings on the part of the husband.66 Domestic violence can also 
be a motivating factor.67 
        Europol recognise many of the same factors influencing migration choices as those 
considered above: ‘Unemployment or lack of employment opportunities, poverty, 
gender, racial or ethnic discrimination, escaping persecution, domestic violence or 
abuse and the perception of increased opportunities elsewhere.’(Emphasis added)68 In 
Moldova, for example, violence against women, sexual or otherwise, has increased 
                                                 
64 J Mertus, n 46, 371. 
65 A Phizacklea, n 36, 131. 
66 Morokvasic includes the desire to escape marital problems among suggested female migration 
motivations, alongside economic incentives, family unity, and opportunities for more social 
independence.  See M Morokvasic, ‘Birds of Passage are also Women…’ (1984) International Migration 
Review, 18(4), 886 – 907, 896. 
67 H Konrad, ‘Trafficking in Human Beings – the Ugly Face of Europe’, (2002) 13 Helsinki Monitor 260, 
260. 
68 Europol, n 37, 4. 
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alongside the economic decline, along with alcoholism and prostitution.69 Violence 
against women - within and without of a domestic setting – which is perpetuated by or 
tolerated within a society, is clearly a significant influential factor on migration choices. 
        Konrad provides the following analysis as regards the prevalence of trafficking for 
sexual exploitation: 
 
… the unequal economic development of different countries; mass 
unemployment in many countries of origin, but also inequality, 
discrimination and gender-based violence in our societies, the prevailing 
market mechanisms; the patriarchal structures in the source and destination 
countries; the demand side including the promotion of sex tourism in many 
countries of the world, the mindsets of men, etc. – the primary root-cause is 
poverty, most particularly among women.70 (Emphasis added) 
 
        The abovementioned issues confirm that the motivations of female migrants, who 
potentially become victims of human trafficking, are based upon more than simply 
material hardship, although this is undeniably a central factor. The combined factors 
considered make them vulnerable to ‘migration brokers’ and traffickers. Social and 
economic marginalisation, often in a society which permits discrimination or even 
violence against women, cultivates a climate which encourages and facilitates human 
trafficking. These oppressive conditions also contribute to making it harder to isolate 
exactly what part consent (or lack of it) has played in the decision to migrate. 
 
 
                                                 
69 UNICEF, UNOHCHR, OSCE, ODIHR, ‘Trafficking in Human Beings in South Eastern Europe’, n 46, 
25. 
70 H Konrad, n 67, 263. 
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 B. Intra-European Migration and Trafficking Patterns 
 
i. Permeability of Borders 
 
Since the late 1980’s, CEE has seen a significant rise in migration flows, particularly if 
we include those who are not moving for the purpose of permanent residence.71 
Migration increased following the collapse of communist rule, and an east to west 
migratory flow became prevalent within Europe.72 Newly liberalised migration policies 
within CEE have facilitated border crossing, which may have transformed CEE into an 
ideal geographical location for trafficking networks to use, as countries of origin, 
transit, and destination.  
        Okolski73 attributes the problem of migrant trafficking in Europe to two main 
political trends. Primarily, the opening up of the former socialist countries to population 
movements, as the aftermath of the collapse of communism in Europe. This highlights 
the issue of ‘intra-EU’ trafficking, whereby victims who legally enjoy free movement 
rights may still be trafficked within the EU. Secondly, Okolski identifies the closing of 
Western European borders to migrants coming from the South as an underlying cause 
of human trafficking. He asserts that in order to reach an effective solution to the 
problem of migrant trafficking, both segments of the continent must counteract it, and 
ultimately a common European migration policy is needed which includes uniform 
external borders.74  
                                                 
71 M Okolski, ‘New Migration Movements in Central and Eastern Europe’, in Danielle Joly, 
International Migration in the New Millennium: Global and Regional Perspectives (Ashgate 2004) 36. 
72 Ibid 36. 
73 Ibid 51. 
74 Ibid. 
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        Common border policy may indeed serve to counteract human trafficking, but 
alone it is insufficient. It would make transit more difficult for trafficking networks 
perhaps to a large extent, but it fails to take into account various factors. Primarily, in 
some origin, transit or destination States, authorities can be complicit in the trafficking 
market,75 either turning a blind eye, or taking bribes of money or sexual favours from 
the victims themselves. Further, no amount of common border policy can negate the 
economic and social factors underlying human trafficking from the origin side, and the 
demand for the services that sex trafficking provides on arrival in the host state.  
        The advent of both the EU and the Schengen Agreement76 has somewhat altered 
the face of intra-EU migration, consequently having an effect on those trafficked within 
these territories. The Schengen Agreement takes free movement of persons to a new 
level, with member States promising to gradually abolish common border checks. 
Smartt suggests that this freedom facilitates human trafficking once inside the 
Schengen zone,77 as stringent border checks are often cited as an effective anti-
trafficking measure.78 Alternatively, it can be argued that border regulation serves to 
push the transportation of victims to a more clandestine level,79 so we are presented 
with somewhat of a catch-22 situation.  
        The UK has opted out of Schengen for the time being, and therefore chooses to 
retain control over intra-EU movements of people affecting its borders. If territorial 
borders the world over were eradicated then victims would not need to search for the 
clandestine help of traffickers or ‘migration brokers’, yet, the practicalities of 
                                                 
75 See, Part I, section C, subsection iii, below. 
76 The Schengen Agreement was signed on 14 June 1985. 
77 U Smartt, ‘Human Trafficking: Simply a European Problem?’ European Journal of Crime, Criminal 
Law and Justice, (2003) Vol. 11/2, 164 –177, 164. 
78 The intention of the Schengen Agreement was to eradicate all internal borders, which renders 
movement of human beings much easier once within Schengen territory. Those circulating within 
Schengen countries will not be subject to stringent passport checks. 
79 See, for example, A Kalaitzidis, ‘Human Smuggling and Trafficking in the Balkans: Is it Fortress 
Europe?’ 5 Journal of the Institute of Justice and International Studies 1 (2005), 7. 
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eradicating borders renders such measures implausible. Attempts at creating ‘Fortress 
Europe’ have failed to result in sufficient scrutiny at borders, as it is estimated that one 
third of non-EU nationals resident within the EU are illegally present.80 There is 
evidence that Schengen visas have been found in the possessions of organised criminal 
groups,81 and it may be that these visas were intended for use in trafficking and 
smuggling operations. 
        It is estimated that there is upward of 4 million undocumented migrants circulating 
in the EU today.82 Estimates as regards human trafficking affecting the EU range up to 
400,000 human beings trafficked yearly into Member States.83 These are telling figures, 
yet problematic for several reasons: primarily, it is extremely difficult to get a realistic 
statistical picture of such clandestine activity; secondly, the reliability of the estimate 
made depends on the definition of ‘human trafficking’ that is applied.84 This, coupled 
with lack of tools to collate information about international human trafficking, renders 
the collection of reliable statistics even more of a difficult issue.  
        On the one hand, hardened immigration policies for third country migrants have 
created a rise in routes for irregular migration and asylum applications. Kalaitzidis 
states that ‘The EU actions have … forced the hands of the potential immigrants and 
drove [sic] them deeper in the hands of smugglers and traffickers.’85 On the other hand, 
once inside the EU, there can be increased ease of movement. It has been stated that 
‘the EU has a dismal record of preventing human trafficking within its borders which 
                                                 
80 See B Ghosh, Huddled Masses and Uncertain Shores, IOM, (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, The Hague, 
London and Boston 1998) for further discussion of this matter. 
81 A Aronowitz, n 35, 176. 
82 U Smartt, n 77, 164. 
83 Ibid 165. 
84 For discussion of the definition of human trafficking, see, Chapter 2. 
85 A Kalaitzidis, n 79, 7. 
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has greatly increased since the collapse of the Soviet Union and has taken a particularly 
virulent form since the collapse of Yugoslavia.’86  
        Immigration law and policy may differ between the countries involved, thus 
affecting the status of the trafficked victim.87 Traffickers’ knowledge about local 
factors such as weaknesses in border or immigration control is used to their 
advantage.88 The increased ease of movement once inside the EU coupled with this 
knowledge means that the patterns and routes continually shift. Aronowitz considers 
the effect of the ease of intra-EU movement on trafficking and states that ‘[w]ith the 
frequent rotation between countries of young women smuggled into the European 
Union, it is becoming more and more difficult to determine which are the transit and 
which are the destination countries.’89 
        The EU has specific run programmes such as STOP and STOP II, through which 
funding was provided for the purposes of combating trafficking.90 STOP II covered 
activities such as ‘Training, exchanges and work experience placements, studies and 
research, meetings and seminars, dissemination of the results obtained under the 
programme.’ Clearly, a multi-national approach is needed which takes into account the 
role to be played in source, transit and destination countries which are affected by 
trafficking patterns. EU free movement policies create trafficking opportunities, yet on 
                                                 
86 Ibid 9.  
87 However, the EU 2011 Directive may go some way toward reconciling this issue among Member 
States. 
88 International Organization for Migration, ‘Migrant Trafficking and Human Smuggling in Europe: A 
Review of the Evidence with Case Studies from Hungary, Poland and Ukraine.’(Geneva, Switzerland: 
IOM, 2000). 
89 A Aronowitz, n 35, 166.  
90 The aim of these programmes was to ‘… develop, implement and evaluate a European policy in this 
area; encourage and strengthen networking and practical cooperation such as the exchange and 
dissemination of information, experience and good practice, and the improvement and adaptation of 
training and scientific and technical research; give particular attention to participation in the projects 
developed by this programme of the public or private organisations, institutions or associations 
concerned in the applicant countries; step up of cooperation with third countries and the competent 
regional and international organisations.’ See European Commission, Justice and Home Affairs ‘STOP II 
- to help prevent and combat trade in human beings and all forms of sexual exploitation’ < 
http://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/funding/expired/stop/funding_stop_en.htm> accessed 01 July 2011. 
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the other hand its integrated structure may provide a more effective means of 
responding to organised crime. 
 
ii. Prominent Source, Transit and Destination Countries 
 
There has been a shift in source countries of victims trafficked into the EU and Western 
European countries. Throughout the 70’s, and 80’s, the women were largely of South 
American and Thai origin. Throughout the 90’s, trafficked women came increasingly 
from Eastern Europe.91 Women from in and around Europe are logistically a more 
desirable commodity to traffick in and around the region than those from further afield, 
simply because they are located more conveniently in a geographical sense and 
therefore will be cheaper and easier to procure and move. The recent UK Project 
Acumen Report92 found that of the 2,600 women identified by the investigation as 
‘trafficked’, 1,300 were from China and the remainder were predominantly from 
Eastern Europe and Thailand. Although trafficking victims clearly originate from a 
wide range of places, a Europol report estimates that 90% of the traffick victims in the 
EU originate from CEE.93 A Council of Europe source indicates that in Europe, 78% of 
female victims of trafficking are sexually exploited, in various forms of prostitution.94 
One might assume that the remainder are subject to other forms of exploitation such as 
domestic servitude.  
                                                 
91 See First report of the Dutch National Rapporteur: ‘Trafficking in Human Beings’ Table 4.1. 
Registration data relating to reports of (possible) victims of THB over the period 1992 -2000 (2000) 49.   
92 Project Acumen: ACPO Migration and Associated Matters, ‘Setting the Record: The trafficking of 
migrant women in the England and Wales off-street prostitution sector’ (August 2010) 
<http://www.acpo.police.uk/documents/crime/2010/201008CRITMW01.pdf> accessed 20 Dec 2010. 
93 Europol, n 37. 
94 Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly, ‘Campaign against trafficking in women’, Doc. 9190, 7 
September 2001, Committee on Equal Opportunities for Women and Men, Rapporteur: Mrs Lydie Err, 
Luxembourg, Socialist Group, 
<http://assembly.coe.int/Documents/WorkingDocs/doc01/EDOC9190.htm> accessed 12 July 2007. 
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        Okolski notes that a strong migration ‘outflow’ is visible as regards Albania, 
Belarus, Moldova, Bulgaria, and Ukraine, as well as outflow to a lesser extent being 
observed in Hungary, the Czech Republic, Croatia, Russia, Poland, Romania, Lithuania 
and Slovakia.95 To some extent trafficking affects every CEE state, but IOM have 
identified known countries of origin,96 as have Interpol and Europol,97 and the same 
source countries are frequently cited and for the most part match those where a 
significant migration outflow has been noted.98 Notable external origin areas and 
countries have also been identified,99 indicating the scale of the trafficking 
phenomenon and the wide geographical variety of origin countries. 
                                                
        As regards the UK as a destination state, Europol reports that ‘[m]ost trafficked 
prostitutes come from the Balkans and former Soviet Union, or from the Far East, 
especially China or Thailand.’100 This matches the findings of the recent Project 
Acumen Report.101 It is clear from the information provided above that different 
sources identify the same origin countries. The countries which are mentioned time and 
time again have similar stories to tell, and exhibit the socio-economic ‘push’ factors 
identified earlier in this Chapter. 
        States are ‘transit States’ because they are strategically placed along trafficking 
routes. Romania, Bulgaria, and Moldova frequently feature as transit States.102 The 
Balkan region has become a pivotal hub for trafficking activity within Europe. Further 
 
95 See M Okolski, n 71, 42. 
96 These include Czech Republic, Hungary, Latvia, Poland, Slovakia, the Ukraine, Albania, Romania, 
Bulgaria and Russia - see International Organization for Migration 
<http://www.iom.int/jahia/jsp/index.jsp>  accessed 10 Jan 2009. 
97 These are Romania, Bulgaria, Belarus, Russian Federation, Moldova, Ukraine, Albania, Armenia, 
Serbia and Montenegro, and Croatia. At the time of publishing of the Europol Report, Serbia and 
Montenegro had not yet become separate republics. The separation occurred in June 2006. See Europol, 
n 37, 15.  
98 See M Okolski, n 71, passim. 
99 These include Africa, Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean, and the Middle East – in a broad sense, 
then, many of the countries of the world have been identified as sources countries. See First report of the 
Dutch National Rapporteur, n 91, 49. 
100 Europol, n 37, 15. 
101 Project Acumen, n 92, 5. 
102 Europol, n 37, 33. 
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to this, there is some indication that victims of trafficking originating from Asia, the 
Middle East and Africa are being transported via this region.103 Poland also constitutes 
an important transit country, particularly as regards women trafficked from Romania, 
Bulgaria, and former Soviet States. The Lithuania – Belarus shared border is a favourite 
‘back door to the west’,104 as it forms a convenient point for illegal border crossing. 
Other notable transit States include Hungary, Romania, Austria, Germany, Serbia and 
Montenegro.105 All of these countries serve as gateways to Western Europe. 
        The Western parts of Europe are predominantly - although not exclusively - 
countries of destination. The organisation ‘End Child Prostitution, Child Pornography 
and the Trafficking of Children’ (ECPAT) estimates that up to 120,000 female victims 
are smuggled into Western Europe each year and forced to work as prostitutes.106 The 
main destination countries for trafficked victims in Europe are Austria, Belgium, 
France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Spain, and the UK.107 This highlights the 
trend of largely east to west and south to north, or south to south flow of victims.  
        Most typically, one might assume that women are trafficked from poorer States to 
richer western States. To a large extent this is true, yet it is not always the case. Where 
there is demand for a sex trade, there will be trafficked victims.108 Specific research 
conducted in 1998 led to an estimate that trafficked women both into and within the UK 
amounted to between 142 and 1420 per year.109 On the face of it, this estimate might 
appear to be low, but sources are contradictory and the recent perceived ‘failure’ of 
                                                 
103 Ibid 26. 
104 U Smartt, n 77, 170. 
105 Europol, n 37, 16.  
106 U Smartt, n 77, 168. 
107 Europol, n 37, 5. 
108 See L Brussa, ‘Survey of Prostitution, Migration and Traffic in Women: History and Current 
Situation’, (European Union, EG/PROST (91) 2) 43. 
109 L Kelly and L Regan, n 30, 22. 
 41
Pentameter 2110 to uncover traffickers in the UK111 could imply that the figure of 
trafficked victims is lower than anticipated (or simply that the operation was something 
other than a success). This wide range confirms the problematic nature of obtaining 
reliable evidence about the extent of human trafficking; further, this estimate may have 
even at the time fallen short of the real figure. In 2003, Government estimates 
envisaged around 4,000 sex trafficking victims being present in the UK at any one 
time,112 which conflicts with the figures mentioned above and compounds the issue of 
unreliability of data relating to this clandestine activity. 
        Countries where there is a demand for an active sex trade, and where the sale of 
sex is most lucrative for traffickers, are most likely to be destination countries. 
Brussa113 identifies consumer demand as a central underlying factor affecting the 
continuance of the sex trade, and also the knock-on effect that this demand has upon the 
traffickers, who see and exploit the opportunity for economic gain. They need products 
or commodities to satisfy the consumer demand, and where better to delve than into a 
renewable pool of resources: that of economically and socially marginalised women 
who have sought the aid of a ‘migration broker’ (or trafficker) to facilitate their 
economic migration. Trafficking and prostitution are highly gendered; there is demand 
by men for a supply of women. 
                                                 
110 The Pentameter 2 website states that ‘Pentameter 2 (UKP2) aims to rescue and protect victims of 
trafficking for sexual exploitation and to identify, disrupt, arrest and bring to justice those involved in 
criminal activity.’ <http://www.pentameter.police.uk/>accessed 3 January 2010. 
111 Conflicting opinions exist as to the success or otherwise of Pentameter 2. See, for example, UK 
Human Trafficking Centre, ‘United Kingdom Pentameter 2, Statistics of Victims recovered and Suspects 
arrested during the operational phase’, which cites 15 convictions for trafficking offences secured as a 
result of the operation, full document available at <http://www.soca.gov.uk/about-
soca/library/doc_download/122-uk-pentameter-2-statistics.pdf> accessed 01 July 2011, and see also, 
Nick Davies, ‘Inquiry fails to find single trafficker who forced anybody into prostitution’, Guardian, (20 
October 2009) <http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2009/oct/20/government-trafficking-enquiry-fails> 
accessed 20 October 2009. 
112 Joint Committee on Human Rights Twenty-Sixth Report, n 31, para. 81. 
113 See, L Brussa, n 108, 43. 
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        This demand can be created by the residents of the host country, seasonal visitors, 
or international presence. Traffickers are led by market forces, which may include 
‘seasonal’ markets, driven largely by tourism, or major events such as the 2012 
Olympics in London.114 Human trafficking has also occurred in the backdrop of 
conflict, such as in the war-torn region of the former Yugoslavia. In this context, human 
trafficking has been labelled a crime against humanity.115  
         During the Yugoslav war, Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) reported 
that 50% of the clientele in Bosnia and Herzegovina were internationals; mainly 
soldiers.116 In Macedonia, international presence is linked to prostitution and trafficking 
increases in the area, yet local police claim that the sex trade in the area is mainly 
funded by domestic sources.117 Similarly, international presence in Kosovo is, 
according to NGOs, a real factor influencing the presence of trafficked women. Kosovo 
force soldiers and United Nations Interim Administration Mission (UNMIK) 
international police officers have been suspected as being involved.118  
        Local NGOs state that prior to this international presence, prostitution and 
trafficking were not considered to be commonplace. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, it is 
estimated that 70% of all profits from prostitution come from internationals.119 Thus, 
one can see the effect of international presence – be it of soldiers or holidaymakers - 
upon the sex trade and therefore trafficking. This can be contrasted with the situation in 
southern Asia, where the clientele have been reported to be largely of domestic 
                                                 
114 See, for example, Stewart Tendler, ‘Sex Trafficking and Illegal Workers Threaten Olympics’ The 
Times (24 March 2007). 
115 See, T Obokata, n 48. 
116 UNICEF, UNOHCHR, OSCE, ODIR, ‘Trafficking in Human Beings in South Eastern Europe’, n 46, 
65. 
117 Ibid. 
118 Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, ‘Minutes from October 18 Trafficking Round 
Table Meeting’, (OSCE, Priãtina, 22 October 2001). 
119 UNICEF, UNOHCHR, OSCE, ODIR, ‘Trafficking in Human Beings in South Eastern Europe’, n 46, 
65.  
119 Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, n 118. 
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origin.120 Accordingly, it can be seen that traffickers draw from the resources in the 
origin States and use these resources to supply the demand, wherever it happens to be at 
the time.121 With trafficking for sexual exploitation featuring consistently on the 
political agenda of late, the employment of demand sanctions as a method of combating 
prostitution and sex trafficking is not an unexpected move.122 
 
iii. Popular Trafficking Routes 
 
Different sources identify similar routes frequented by traffickers. It seems fairly safe to 
say at this point that no European country is left untouched by the human trafficking 
phenomenon. The expansion of the EU has also allowed for multiple new points of 
entry and departure into various countries to appear, thus facilitating the opening up of 
new routes.    
        Notable identified trafficking routes include; the Balkans Route,123 the Eastern 
Route,124 the Central European Route,125 the Eastern Mediterranean Route,126 and the 
North African or Southern Route.127 The documentation of these routes indicates that 
specific regions are highly active as regards human trafficking. The Balkans Route, for 
example, is one of the most well known, and is used for a variety of organised crime 
activities. The IOM estimates that the numbers trafficked into and through the Balkan 
                                                 
120 See, L Brown Sex Slaves: The Trafficking of Women In Asia (Virago Press, 2001). 
121 Furthermore, residents of developed States may travel to developing States for the purpose of 
purchasing sexual services. 
122 See Part 2, section A, subsection iii, below, for discussion of the use of demand sanctions as a 
preventative measure. 
123 This route runs from the Balkans into Slovenia, Hungary, and Greece. 
124 This route from Russia and Belarus into Poland. 
125 This route from the Far and Middle East, and former Soviet states, and moved on via Slovakia and the 
Czech Republic and Hungary, on to Western Europe. 
126 This route runs through Turkey into Bulgaria and Romania. 
127 According to this route, victims are taken from Africa into Spain, Italy, and Malta. 
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region annually may exceed 170,000 people,128 although use of varying definitions of 
‘human trafficking’ render the validity of such statistics questionable.129 
        While it may be generally appropriate to refer to the routes using these terms, it 
cannot be taken as given that these are the only routes used, or that these routes are 
fixed. They provide guidance as to the more popular channels used by traffickers, yet it 
must be borne in mind that traffickers are resourceful so that where one route or part 
thereof may be blocked, other routes and methods of transport will quickly be found. 
This will of course depend upon the level of sophistication of the traffickers and 
trafficking networks involved. Ultimately, it can be said that: 
 
… it would be simpler and far more accurate to identify that traffickers will 
seek to use whatever routes offer the best chances of a risk-free passage and 
this will obviously change according to many circumstances, not least of 
which is the law enforcement with regards counter trafficking tactics & 
action.130  
 
        Traffickers employ all available transport methods in order to move their victims 
from place to place along trafficking routes. They will use highly clandestine modes of 
transport if necessary, and in turn, the policing of borders and passes are sometimes 
very difficult to maintain adequately. As well as air travel, traffickers will operate via 
land or water; for example, the border between Serbia and Bosnia-Herzegovina is partly 
                                                 
128 IOM, ‘Applied Research and Data Collection on Trafficking in Human Beings to, through and from 
the Balkan Region’, (IOM 2001). 
129 As mentioned previously, the use of different definitions of ‘traffick in persons’ tends to yield 
different results – the IOM definition has a wider scope than the definition which is provided within the 
UN Trafficking Protocol, the CoE Trafficking Convention, and the 2011 EU Directive. Therefore these 
figures may include other types of migrant which do not necessarily fit the definition provided within the 
latter instruments.  
130 Europol, n 37, 17. 
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made up by a river. Depending upon the time of year, the Drina River can be crossed 
either on foot or by way of a short boat journey. Policing the entire length of this area is 
difficult, and so traffickers and their victims can all too easily slip through the net. 
Some popular routes into the EU taken by sea include those from Albania, Morocco, or 
Tunisia.131 These routes enter Southern Europe; Italy has at times served as an active 
gateway for traffick victims in transit, often destined for neighbouring Albania. 
However, the Adriatic Sea has been subject to law enforcement activity, and as a result 
of good co-operation between the two countries, the main transport method between the 
two – by speedboat – has been largely affected. The presence of Guardia di Finanza 
naval service officers is responsible for bringing this activity down to a minimum. A 
considerable number of law enforcement officers were deployed for this purpose.132  
        Since this intervention has restricted the use of this method, it is reported that ‘the 
more usual method is through the misuse of Schengen visas issued by EU States in 
country or occasionally across the land border between Greece and Albania.’133 
Policing of this border is difficult because it is long and mountainous. Movement across 
land is a method commonly employed by traffickers into and through Europe. 
Transport by air is more difficult because of the requirement of travel documents, as is 
the use of official border crossings by land. The ability to obtain such documents will 
depend upon the level of sophistication of the traffickers, and the level of involvement 
of corrupt officials. Trafficking and illicit migration is frequently facilitated by 
organised criminal gangs, the influence of which will now be discussed. 
 
 
                                                 
131 U Smartt, n 77, 173. 
132 Interforza, Guardia di Finanza. 
133 Europol, n 37, 32. 
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 C. The Influence of Organised Crime 
 
Brussa identifies various reasons for the continual rise in trafficking, including 
principally ‘[t]he enormous profitability of exploiting women as prostitutes motivating 
individuals and organized crime networks to engage in the trade in women.’134 The 
involvement of organised crime groups is increasingly identified as a factor influencing 
trafficking activity. As Scarpa observes: 
 
… there are some differences between slavery of the past centuries and the 
new slavery-like practices of our time, insofar as the latter ones are 
characterised by very low purchase costs, very high profits for the exploiter, 
surplus of potential slaves and irrelevance of ethnic differences.135 
 
Accordingly, it seems clear that the modern forms of exploitation such as human 
trafficking are driven by economic motives on the part of the trafficker(s). In turn, 
organised crime groups (OCGs) prey on the economic and/or social vulnerability of the 
putative trafficked victim. In the Explanatory Memorandum to the Proposal for the 
recent EU Trafficking Directive (which is now in force136), it is recognised that: 
 
Social vulnerability … is used by international organised crime networks to 
facilitate migration and subsequently severely exploit people by use of 
force, threat, coercion, or various forms of abuse such as debt bondage. In 
                                                 
134 L Brussa, n 108, 42. 
135 S Scarpa, Trafficking in Human Beings: Modern Slavery (Oxford 2008) 5. 
136 EU 2011 Directive, n 10. 
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fact the high level of profits generated is a major underlying driver. The 
demand for sexual services and cheap labour is a concurrent driver.137 
 
        The role of OCGs in human trafficking - in Europe and globally - is facilitated by 
globalisation. Improved methods of communication and travel enhance the 
opportunities for involvement and financial gain. Lack of deterrent renders trafficking 
activity low-risk, and substantial profits render it high return. Trafficking has not in the 
past been perceived as tantamount in severity to other organised crime activities, yet 
this perception is changing as it has become increasingly evident that OCGs are a 
significant factor in the continuance of the trafficking phenomenon on a global scale. 
Their modus operandi is to establish links with collaborators in origin countries in order 
to recruit new sex workers. Migration patterns can serve to mask trafficking activity. 
        We are left in no doubt about the lucrative nature of this activity, which is 
described as ‘one of the most lucrative organised crime activities generating a global 
multibillion dollar a year income.’138 Malarek suggests that a trafficked woman can 
bring in an amount up to $250,000 per year.139 The same organised crime groups 
indulge in various activities including drug and arms trafficking, and money laundering, 
so the revenue generated from all of the above will be used interchangeably to fund 
other illegal and clandestine activities. If financial gain is accepted as the primary 
motivation for organised crime activities, then trafficking is an ideal medium; not least 
because of the low risks, but because the trafficked victim can be sold again and again. 
Drugs and guns are much more rapidly expendable. Trafficking victims, however, can 
be sold to customers multiple times and finally on to other traffickers; once consumers 
                                                 
137 Explanatory Memorandum to the Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on preventing and combating trafficking in human beings, and protecting victims, repealing 
Framework Decision 2002/629/JHA, (COM (2010) 95 Final) at 1.2. 
138 Europol, n 37, 4. 
139 V Malarek,  n 25, 13. 
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demand new products, the supplier must find a way to meet this demand – one victim is 
sold on and new victims are bought, creating a sustainable business and profit.  
        Europol state that among the most prevalent OCGs are groups originating from 
Albania, Bulgaria, Lithuania, Nigeria, Romania, and the Former Yugoslavia.140 Italian 
prosecutors state that Albanian, Nigerian, and Chinese criminal gangs essentially 
dominate trafficking and the slave trade in Italy.141 Chinese criminal groups apparently 
play a large part in trafficking eastern European women and girls into Britain. Small 
Polish gangs are evident, with Polish and Czech gangs being prevalent in Spain. 
Turkish gangs operate prostitution cartels in Germany.142 Some gangs recruit directly 
from refugee centres. 
        Warnath observes that ‘Trafficking of women and children is not a new problem 
… what is new is the growing involvement of organised crime and the increasing 
sophistication of its methods.’143 Europol144 identifies some of the factors indicating a 
high degree of organisation among traffickers, such as the simultaneous movement of 
different nationalities on the same transport - moving large numbers of people over 
long distances is likely to be logistically difficult and therefore requires a high degree 
of organisation. Patterns of trafficking, using numerous methods and stop off points, 
have been identified,145 which compound the difficulty of combating this clandestine 
phenomenon. Lack of a coordinated strategy between European States may be a factor, 
although the recent EU 2011 Directive may go some way toward addressing this issue. 
                                                 
140 Europol, n 37, 4. 
141 US/Italy bilateral working group on ‘Trafficking Women’, (Report of July 1999). 
142 U Smartt, n 77, 172. 
143 Warnath, S., ‘Trafficking of women and children: The future direction of United States Policy: Report 
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63. 
144 Europol, ‘General Situation Report 1996 – 1997: Illegal Immigration.’ (The Hague, The Netherlands: 
Europol, File No. 2562-52, 1999). 
145 See M Okolski, n 71, passim. 
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         Kalaitzidis asserts that transnational OCGs are wholly responsible for the huge 
growth in irregular migration.146 This may hold some truth in that OCGs largely play 
the part of facilitators of irregular migration; they allow the decision to migrate to 
become a reality for those who could otherwise have not achieved it. Such 
organisations have been subject to considerable international scrutiny since before the 
turn of the century, as the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized 
Crime (Organized Crime Convention)147 indicates. The Organized Crime Convention is 
a reaction to an already exiting and rapidly growing and evolving problem; OCGs are 
responsible for much more than simply irregular migration - drug smuggling and 
money laundering are activities also on the agenda, to name a few. Indeed, OCGs have 
been described as potentially being ‘more organised than the law enforcement agencies 
themselves.’148 
 
i. What Constitutes an OCG? 
 
The UN Trafficking Protocol is annexed to the Organized Crime Convention, making 
clear the links between organised criminal activity and human trafficking. An OCG 
may in a general sense be taken to mean any number of criminals working in 
association. This is ultimately too broad for legal purposes. Definitions of organised 
crime have been offered by various sources.149 Article 3 of the Organized Crime 
Convention offers the following definition:150 
                                                 
146 A Kalaitzidis, n 79, 1. 
147 United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, (adopted  November 2000 by 
United Nations General Assembly Resolution A/RES/55/25, entered into force on 29 September 2003) 
(hereafter ‘Organized Crime Convention’). 
148 Europol, n 37, 25. 
149 The Council of the European Union in a Joint Action 1998 adopted the following definition: ‘Within 
the meaning of this joint action, a criminal organisation shall mean a structured association, established 
over a period of time, of more than two persons, acting in concert with a view to committing offences 
which are punishable by deprivation of liberty or a detention order of a maximum of at least four years or 
 50
 For the purposes of this Convention:  
(a) “Organized crime group” shall mean a structured group of three or more 
persons, existing for a period of time and acting in concert with the aim of 
committing one or more serious crimes or offences established in 
accordance with this Convention, in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a 
financial or other material benefit… 
 
The terms ‘Serious Crime’151 and ‘Structured Group’152 are elaborated upon within the 
Article. The Council of Europe in 2001 adopted essentially the same definition in a 
Recommendation.153 Further guidance has been offered by a mechanism intended to 
assist EU Member States in describing organised crime.154 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
a more serious penalty, whether such offences are an end in themselves or a means of obtaining material 
benefits and, where appropriate, of improperly influencing the operation of public authorities.’ Article 1 
of Joint Action of 21 December 1998 adopted by the Council on the basis of Article K.3 of the Treaty on 
European Union, on making it a criminal offence to participate in a criminal organisation in the Member 
States of the European Union (1) (98/733/JHA) <http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:1998:351:0001:0001:EN:PDF> accessed 11 June 
2007. 
150 Article 3, Organized Crime Convention, n 147. 
151 Article 3(b) provides that ‘“Serious crime” shall mean conduct constituting an offence punishable by a 
maximum deprivation of liberty of at least four years or a more serious penalty’. 
152 Article 3(c) provides that ‘“Structured group” shall mean a group that is not randomly formed for the 
immediate commission of an offence and that does not need to have formally defined roles for its 
members, continuity of its membership or a developed structure’. 
153 Council Of Europe, ‘Recommendation Rec. (2001) 11 of the Committee of Ministers to Member 
States concerning guiding principles on the fight against organised crime’, (adopted by the Committee of 
Ministers on 19 September 2001 at the 765th meeting of the Ministers’ Deputies). 
154 Council of the European Union, 6204/2/97 ENFOPOL 35 REV 2, (Brussels, 21 April 1997). 
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 ii. The Structure of Organised Crime Groups and ‘Trafficking Networks’ 
 
Traffickers, however organised, would be unlikely to identify themselves as OCGs – it 
is the law enforcement agencies that give them this label. The actual traffickers are 
likely to be supported by subsidiaries, who may be involved in various parts of the 
process such as supply of documentation to validate the status of the victim in that host 
country, or even the identification and recruitment of potential victims. These 
subsidiaries, together with the traffickers, form ‘trafficking networks’.155 The criminal 
groups involved range from high level, international networks, to amateur small group 
networks, or even individuals. Trafficking networks may involve hierarchical 
organisations, or others who are in some way affiliated e.g. family members. Europol 
identifies the following levels or styles of trafficker:156 amateur or low level 
traffickers;157 small group or medium level traffickers;158 and international or high 
level networks,159 indicating that there is a hierarchy of ‘types’ of trafficker. 
                                                
        A typology of a/the trafficker was developed by Shelley,160 which sub-divides 
‘traffickers’ into categories: Natural Resource; Violent Entrepreneur; and Traditional 
Slavery with Modern Technology. Shelly expands upon each category somewhat. The 
 
155 Europol, n 37, 12 – 13. 
156 Ibid 12. 
157 Amateur or low level traffickers are likely to be individuals who provide an occasional service. They 
will be based in the origin state – their home state – and will aid with the recruitment and trafficking of 
their own nationals. They may work for larger networks, and will have the potential to ‘graduate’ through 
the ranks. They are likely to receive a one-off payment as opposed to directly partaking in trafficking 
related profits. Europol, n 37. 
158 Small group or medium level traffickers will have established links with other similar groups or 
persons, and are likely to be cross border in operation and have some level of permanence. They will be 
involved in every stage of the trafficking process and will receive direct profits. These profits will come 
from the sale or exploitation of victims. Europol, n 37. 
159 International or high level networks have the ability to conduct the entire operation. They will have 
contacts in origin, transit, and destination states and can handle large numbers of victims at once. The 
profits are likely to be reinvested in arms sales, drugs and legitimate business ventures. Europol, n 37. 
160 Louise Shelly, ‘Statement to the House Committee on International Relations Subcommittee on 
International Terrorism, Nonproliferation and Human Rights’, (June 25, 2003) 
<http://wwwc.house.gov/international_relations/108/shel0625.htm> accessed 1 January 2006 
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Natural Resource groups are primarily Russian Mafia, who are essentially involved for 
the purpose of short term gain, with no particular regard for the sustainability of the 
business as such. They will take advantage of opportunities in order to make ‘here and 
now’ profits. Characteristically, they will be largely unconnected with the victim and 
the geographical area of origin. The second category - that of Violent Entrepreneur - 
operates heavily in the Balkans, particularly Albania and Former Yugoslav States. 
These are invested parties,161 in that they are more heavily involved and looking for 
long term gain, and are fully prepared to use violent means to achieve their end. The 
final category - Traditional Slavery with Modern Technology - is mainly associated 
with Africa, particularly Nigeria. The individuals trafficked by these groups are often 
found for sale in the red light districts of northern Europe. 
        It is evident that the vast majority of traffickers form part of a network as opposed 
to working alone.162 In order for the process to run smoothly, many parties may be 
involved along the way to conduct different parts of the operation. Reported patterns of 
involvement vary from source to source,163 but it seems clear that traffickers are 
capable of establishing a strong degree of integration, as they will effectively work 
alongside traffickers of other nationalities in order to secure their profits. Evidently, this 
is a business which does not discriminate as regards business partners. Further to this, 
corrupt State officials have been known to be complicit in the trafficking and illicit 
migration process, as will be discussed below. 
 
 
 
                                                 
161 Ibid. 
162 Europol, n 37, 13. 
163 See UNICEF, UNOHCHR, OSCE, ODIHR, ‘Trafficking in Human Beings in South Eastern Europe’, 
n 46, 37, and Europol, n 37. 
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 iii. The Corruption of State Officials 
 
The corruption of State officials and law enforcers is a factor which serves to 
undermine efforts to combat trafficking. Corruption will play a significant part in 
preventing prosecution of traffickers, and ensures the continuance of OCG activities. 
Indeed, ‘As law enforcement personnel and government officials become more corrupt 
and members of the crime groups gain more influence, the line between the state and 
the criminal networks starts to blur.’164 Matters such as turning a blind eye at border 
controls further the low risk environment and facilitate the transnational nature of 
trafficking and the cross border criminality of the trafficking networks. La Strada 
Ukraine165 states, as regards the problematic nature of tackling the trafficking 
phenomenon, that ‘[c]omplacency on the part of government and law enforcement 
officials is as much to blame as financial difficulties.’166  
        Many Eastern European OCGs are almost impenetrable as a result of corruption, 
coupled with a high level of sophistication, or close ethnic and cultural ties. It is 
reported that corruption and complicity by law enforcers in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
for example, is commonplace, where the police directly and indirectly facilitate human 
trafficking.167 Their involvement can go as far as part-ownership of clubs and brothels, 
or as guards, informants, and clients, as well as involvement in the provision of false 
documents for trafficked victims.  
                                                 
164 D M Hughes, ‘The ‘Natasha’ Trade: The Transnational Shadow Market of Trafficking in Women’, 
Special issue of Journal of International Affairs; In the Shadows: Promoting Prosperity or Undermining 
Stability? (Spring 2000) Vol. 53, No. 2, 625 – 651, 633. 
165 La Strada Ukraine describes itself as ‘a non-governmental organization in Ukraine with a bi-
directional goal: working to prevent trafficking in women and helping the victims of trafficking’, see, 
<http://www.brama.com/lastrada/about.html> accessed 12 December 2008. 
166 Lily Hyde, Women’s groups battle sex slavery, Kyiv Post, 23 January 1998. 
167 Europol, n 37, 28.  
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        Brussa identifies ‘Lack of an effective international regime for collecting data, 
providing information and penalizing organized international trafficking networks, 
ensuring that the problem remains hidden’168 as one of the central reasons for the 
continual rise in trafficking. Ultimately, OCGs are able to continue their activities due 
to a number of significant factors. There is a lack of effective law enforcement, made 
worse by corruption. Prosecution rates for trafficking offences in the UK are not overly 
impressive.169 Further to this, there may be a lack of effective procedures for support 
and protection of trafficked persons.170 
        There is a well-established sex industry in Europe, which is not going to disappear. 
This sex industry needs workers in order for OCGs to continue to make money, and the 
well-established links and networks between OCGs in Europe and the EU have 
ensured, at least for the time being, that the needs of consumers are fully met. However, 
OCGs are, of course, operating unlawfully and are now subject to greater vigilance than 
ever before as a result of the raised profile of their activities and the recognition that 
more efficient responses are needed to combat these transnational criminal 
organisations. 
        Human trafficking is clearly a multi-faceted and highly problematic phenomenon. 
The complex underlying ‘push’ and ‘pull factors’, which mirror the market forces of 
supply and demand require a coordinated response which aims to prevent, prosecute 
and punish those responsible for trafficking activity, as well as to provide support and 
protection to individuals who have been trafficked. 
                                                 
168 L Brussa, n 108, 42. 
169 In the period 2009 - 2010, 106 prosecutions were secured for human trafficking offences. See Mr 
Hanson, Written Answers to Questions, Hansard HC, Column 935W (30 March 2010). Also see, for 
example, UK Human Trafficking Centre, ‘United Kingdom Pentameter 2’ n 111, and See also Nick 
Davies, n 111. 
170 This issue will be discussed further throughout Chapter 4. 
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        This Chapter has so far evaluated the underlying factors relevant to the 
continuance of human trafficking. This evaluation has included consideration of 
(largely economic) ‘push’ factors which may account for a potentially significant 
proportion of trafficking situations, which, at least at its beginning is on a voluntary 
(and therefore consensual) basis, so far as the person being transported is concerned. 
Further, other relevant issues such as the role played by organised criminals has been 
considered. These (and other) agents play a central role in the trafficking of women for 
sexual exploitation, whether it starts as an apparently voluntary agreement or as 
outright kidnapping for the purpose of forced sex work – the latter situation perhaps 
better reflecting how trafficking is typically perceived. This Chapter now turns to 
consideration of the relationship between transnational law criminal law and human 
rights, and will go on to outline and provide an overview of the obligations placed upon 
States by the international legal anti-trafficking regime. 
 
II. Transnational Criminal Law and Human Rights 
 
As is the case with respect to many transnational criminal activities, States have found 
that recourse to criminal sanctions, however desirable, is extremely difficult without 
modifications to the substantive criminal law, including the creation of extraterritorial 
offences, and elaborate cooperation between national investigatory and prosecution 
authorities of States. Establishing each of these transnational regimes has to take into 
account its particular characteristics but they have factors in common. One of those 
features, which of course applies to all criminal law and procedure, not just 
transnational law, is the relevance of human rights law – both as imposing certain 
specific duties on States, even with respect to private action (like the activities of 
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organised crime) and for the protection of victims, on the one hand, and for providing 
the framework for criminal investigation and fair trials for those suspected of offences 
under the transnational regime. 
        The aim of anti-trafficking legislation is to combat trafficking through imposing 
criminal responsibility on the traffickers and obligations on the state both to prevent 
and punish traffickers, and to provide for protection and support of victims with respect 
for their human rights. One element in the response of States to trafficking is to 
criminalise the activities of those who engage in trafficking, partly as a mark of the 
seriousness of the impact of trafficking on the women caught up in it,171 and partly due 
to the transnational nature of trafficking activity. With respect to the latter, the 
prospects of a wholly national, effective, criminal response may be remote due to 
jurisdictional restrictions and the need for criminal cooperation between affected 
States.172 Where there is conduct wholly within one State (i.e. where ‘internal’ 
trafficking occurs) and defendants are found it may be possible to proceed against them 
under the ‘ordinary’ criminal law,173 without needing to go into the complications of 
trafficking prosecutions. 
        Provided that an adequate anti-trafficking regime is in place, the State in question 
has fulfilled its human rights obligations up until the point where the putative victim is 
discovered in the destination State. Consequently, another element of the response to 
trafficking has been explicit recognition of the ‘special position’ of the victims of 
human trafficking. What this means is that due to the non-consensual nature of human 
                                                 
171 It should be noted at this point that trafficking is not restricted to the exploitation of women for paid 
for sex. However, the latter situation provides the framework of enquiry for this thesis. 
172 Although the EU 2011 Directive could go some way toward resolving some of these issues – see 
section A, subsection i, below. Matters relating to jurisdiction are specifically discussed, within that 
subsection, on page 65. 
173 In the United Kingdom, for example, provisions exist which target activity which can take place either 
as part of or independently from human trafficking – one such example being the criminalisation of 
‘controlling prostitution for gain’, contrary to Sexual Offences Act 2003, s 53. 
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trafficking, these women should not be treated as mere illegal immigrants, subject to 
peremptory removal processes and/or criminal proceedings for immigration174 (or some 
other175) offences committed as a result of having been trafficked.  
        This may have a purely humanitarian basis but can be reinforced by the ordinary 
human rights obligations of the destinations States – the trafficked women may have 
suffered inhuman treatment or have been subjected to slavery-like practices or forced 
labour,176 which might include protection against return to a jurisdiction where there is 
a real risk that the same thing could happen to them again. The obligations of States 
under the anti-trafficking regime include positive actions, such as effective criminal 
prosecution of the individuals involved, the engagement of the victims in the criminal 
process etc. Where criminal proceedings may properly be taken against the victims, 
their vulnerability must be taken into account in determining what constitutes a fair 
trial.177 
        The interrelation between international criminal law and human rights law is 
central to the anti-trafficking regime.178 The following sections will set out the 
international legal regime outlining the obligations placed upon States. The relevant 
legal provisions of the relevant UN, Council of Europe, and EU instruments will be 
considered. Aspects of the legal regime which are central to the enquiry made in this 
thesis – namely the definition of human trafficking,179 the role of consent,180 and the 
treatment of ‘victims’181 -  are considered in greater detail in subsequent Chapters. 
                                                 
174 See Chapter 4, Part VI, section A, for discussion of R v O [2008] EWCA Crim 2835 
175 See R v LM [2010] EWCA Crim 2327; [2011] 1 Cr. App. R. 12; [2011] Crim. L.R. 425, discussed in 
Chapter 4, Part VII. 
176 See Chapter 2, passim, for detailed discussion of the meaning of these terms as aspects of 
‘exploitation’ as a ‘purpose’ element of human trafficking. 
177 See, Chapter 4, Part VII, for discussion of prosecutorial discretion as regards offences committed by 
individuals who might be trafficked victims. 
178 See, Chapter 2, Part IV, section B, for discussion of this issue. 
179 See, Chapter 2 for full discussion of the international  legal definition of human trafficking 
180 See, Chapter 3 for full discussion of the role of consent in human trafficking. The basic principles of 
consent are outlined at a later point in this Chapter (Part III, below), in order to introduce and define the 
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 A. The International Criminal Regime – State Obligations 
 
This section serves to outline the principal features of the main international 
instruments which deal with trafficking as a transnational criminal matter. The object is 
not to produce a comprehensive account of these provisions, but to indicate and outline 
the structure of the regimes, the main obligations placed upon States by these regimes, 
and to identify those issues which will be treated in some detail later in the thesis.182 
 
i. Criminalisation, Prosecution and Punishment of Traffickers 
 
The legal and policy responses to human trafficking are paramount to making 
destination States into hostile environments for traffickers and organised criminal 
networks to operate. The transnational nature of human trafficking demands an 
international response. This has come notably from the United Nations, the Council of 
Europe, and the European Union, all of which have recently183 produced instruments 
aimed at strengthening measures to prevent and combat human trafficking.  
       In 2000, the UN Trafficking Protocol was adopted.184 The UN Trafficking and 
Smuggling Protocols are annexed to the UN Organized Crime Convention, which 
requires Parties to criminalise the following: participation in an OCG;185 the laundering 
                                                                                                                                                        
concept of consent, and to provide a basis for further analysis of this concept specifically within the 
context of human trafficking in Chapter 3. 
181 See, Chapter 4 for full discussion of provisions and practice relating to assistance to and support of 
victims. 
182 Notably, the thesis will treat in detail the provisions relating to the treatment of victims and the effect 
that the consent/coercion spectrum has upon determining who is and who is not a ‘victim’, and how they 
should be treated. 
183 I.e. over the past decade or so. 
184 UN Trafficking Protocol, n 5. 
185 Article 5. 
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of proceeds of crime;186 corruption (of public officials);187 and the obstruction of 
justice.188 In the UK, organised crime is defined as ‘those involved, normally working 
with others, in continuing serious criminal activities for substantial profit, whether 
based in the UK or elsewhere’.189 The Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 2005 
established a Serious Organised Crime Agency (SOCA), whose functions include 
preventing and detecting serious organised crime.190 A National Crime Agency has 
recently been proposed to replace SOCA191 which ‘will include a dedicated Border 
Police Force with the aim of combating organised crime — including human trafficking 
— more effectively at the border.’192  
        The Trafficking Protocol was the first international instrument concerned with 
combating human trafficking, and has paved the way for subsequent instruments with 
comparable aims to be drafted. To date, the Protocol has 117 parties.193 The central 
aims of the Protocol are to prevent and combat human trafficking, to protect and assist 
victims with full respect for their human rights, and to promote State cooperation in 
achieving these objectives.194  
        Article 3 provides the definition of human trafficking, which is reproduced in the 
Introduction to this thesis.195 The Article goes on to say that consent (to the intended 
                                                 
186 Article 6. 
187 Article 8. 
188 Article 2. 
189 Serious Organised Crime Agency, ‘Organised Crime Groups’, 
<http://www.soca.gov.uk/threats/organised-crime-groups> accessed 01 Jan 2011. 
190 Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 2005, s 2. 
191 See Home Office, ‘Policing in the 21st century: reconnecting police and the people’ July 2010 
<http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/publications/consultations/policing-21st-century/policing-21st-full-
pdf?view=Binary> accessed 01 July 2011, and BBC News ‘SOCA: Highs and Lows of Serious 
Organised Crime Agency’ (8 June 2011) <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/mobile/uk-13681317>  accessed 
01 July 2011. 
192 Home Office, ‘Home Office Defends Position on Human Trafficking’ 31 August 2010 
<http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/media-centre/news/trafficking-directive> accessed 01 July 2011. 
193 United Nations Treaty Collection 
<http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=IND&mtdsg_no=XVIII-12-a&chapter=18&lang=en> 
accessed 03 March 2011. 
194 Article 2. 
195 See, Introduction, Part III. 
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exploitation) is irrelevant where any of the ‘means’ to implement the transportation and 
exploitation of people set out in the above paragraph are employed, but that it is not 
necessary to prove that any of those means were employed where a child is concerned, 
a child being any person under eighteen years of age. The elements of the 
abovementioned definition (and therefore the offence of trafficking) are analysed in 
depth in Chapter 2. 
        In order to effectively combat trafficking, criminalisation of trafficking activity is 
needed. State parties are called upon by the Trafficking Protocol to criminalise human 
trafficking where: perpetrators acted with intent; acted as accomplice; or played an 
organisational or directorial role in the commission of the trafficking offence.196  
        More recently, the Council of Europe drafted the Convention on Action against 
Trafficking in Human Beings.197 To date, the Convention has 43 parties.198 Concerned 
with prevention and prosecution as well as victim protection, the CoE Trafficking 
Convention replicates verbatim the definition of human trafficking and many of the 
obligations contained within the UN Trafficking Protocol - but it goes further in some 
respects.199  
        The CoE Trafficking Convention has broader scope of application than the UN 
Trafficking Protocol as the former only applies (unless stated otherwise) ‘where those 
offences are transnational in nature and involve an organized criminal group’.200 The 
CoE Trafficking Convention, however, applies 'to all forms of trafficking in human 
beings, whether national or transnational, whether or not connected with organised 
                                                 
196 Article 5. 
197 CoE Trafficking Convention, n 9. 
198 Chart of signatures and ratifications available at  
<http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ChercheSig.asp?NT=197&CM=1&DF=&CL=ENG> 
accessed 22 Feb 2011. 
199 Most notably in terms of the provisions concerning the treatment of victims – see Chapter 4, Part IV, 
for fuller discussion of this issue. 
200 Article 4. 
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crime.’201 Article 31 establishes matters relating to jurisdiction, in requiring States to 
adopt legislative or other measures to establish jurisdiction over trafficking offences 
committed within and without the territory of the State.202  
        Article 18 provides a solid obligation as regards measures to establish trafficking 
activity as criminal conduct at a domestic level. Unlike the Trafficking Protocol, which 
remains silent on the issue of criminal sanctions beyond actual criminalisation of 
human trafficking, the CoE Trafficking Convention makes specific mention of sanction 
in Article 23(1) in stating that:  
 
Each Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be 
necessary to ensure that (trafficking offences) are punishable by effective, 
proportionate and dissuasive sanctions. These sanctions shall include, for 
criminal offences established in accordance with Article 18 when 
committed by natural persons, penalties involving deprivation of liberty 
which can give rise to extradition. 
 
The European Convention on Extradition203 and the European Arrest Warrant204 use 
potential sentencing as part of the definition of extradition offences and it is, then, 
necessary that trafficking and associated offences be at least so punishable in order to 
use the criminal cooperation mechanisms of the European systems.205 Article 23 of the 
                                                 
201 Article 2. 
202 Article 31 requires that jurisdiction be established where the offence is committed ‘in its territory; or 
on board a ship flying the flag of that Party; or on board an aircraft registered under the laws of that 
Party; or by one of its nationals or by a stateless person who has his or her habitual residence in its 
territory, if the offence is punishable under criminal law where it was committed or if the offence is 
committed outside the territorial jurisdiction of any State; against one of its nationals.’ 
203 European Convention on Extradition (signed 13 Dec 1957, entered into force 18 April 1960).  
204 See Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA of 13 June 2002 on the European arrest warrant and 
the surrender procedures between Member States [2002] OJ L 190/1. 
205 Article 2 of the European Convention on Extradition envisages sentencing of at least 12 months, and 
the European Arrest Warrant applies ‘where a final sentence of imprisonment or a detention order has 
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CoE Trafficking Convention also addresses the applicability of sanctions to legal 
persons,206 confiscation of proceeds of crime in this context, and ‘the temporary or 
permanent closure of any establishment which was used to carry out trafficking in 
human beings’.207 
        Aggravating circumstances are addressed in Article 24 which identifies these as 
where:  
 
… the offence deliberately or by gross negligence endangered the life of the 
victim; the offence was committed against a child; the offence was 
committed by a public official in the performance of her/his duties; the 
offence was committed within the framework of a criminal organisation.208  
 
The Article does not specify the sanction or consequences of aggravated offences, 
beyond stating that the abovementioned offences shall be ‘regarded as aggravating 
circumstances in the determination of the penalty’,209 thereby calling for more severe 
penalties where such offences are committed. 
        Combating human trafficking has also consistently featured high on the EU 
agenda in recent years, with law and policy adopted over the past decade indicating a 
                                                                                                                                                        
been imposed for a period of at least four months’ and ‘for offences punishable by imprisonment or a 
detention order for a maximum period of at least one year’. See Summary to Council Framework 
Decision 2002/584/JHA, ibid. The summary goes on to state that ‘If they are punishable in the issuing 
Member State by a custodial sentence of at least three years, the following offences, among others, may 
give rise to surrender without verification of the double criminality of the act: terrorism, trafficking in 
human beings…’ 
206 Article 23(2). 
207 Article 23(3). 
208 Article 24 (a) – (d). 
209 Article 24. 
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clear intention to do just that.210 Article 5(3) of the EU Charter of Fundamental 
Rights211 even provides for explicit prohibition of trafficking in human beings.212  
        In July 2002, a Council Framework Decision (the 2002 Framework Decision) on 
combating trafficking in human beings was adopted,213 addressing human trafficking 
for sexual and labour exploitation. The 2002 Framework Decision included provisions 
which defined human trafficking (and the aiding and abetting thereof214) as an act to be 
prohibited and punishable by Member States215 through use of ‘proportionate and 
dissuasive criminal penalties’.216  
        The most recent EU legislation comes in the form of the 2011 Directive,217 which 
replaces the abovementioned Framework Decision. The initial UK response 
demonstrated a reluctance to opt in to this Directive, claiming that there would be ‘No 
benefits for the UK’.218 Unsurprisingly, this decision was criticised.219 Subsequent to 
the text of the Directive being finalised, the UK Government has, however, indicated an 
intention to opt in.220 
                                                 
210 See European Commission website: ‘Fight against Trafficking in Human Beings’ 
<http://ec.europa.eu/anti-trafficking/index.action> accessed 1 Sept 2010. 
211 See Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union [2000] OJ C364/01, reprinted [2010] OJ 
C83/389 <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/charter/pdf/text_en.pdf> accessed12 June 2011, Implemented 
by the Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the 
European Community, signed at Lisbon, 13 December 2007 (2007/C 306/01). 
212 Article 5. 
213 Council Framework Decision 2002/629/JHA of 19 July 2002 on combating trafficking in human 
beings [2002] OJ L 203/1 
214 Article 2. 
215 Article 1 
216 Article 3. This Article goes on to provide examples of aggravating circumstances which would call for 
a custodial sentence of no less than 8 years, such as the use of serious violence or involvement with 
organised crime 
217 EU 2011 Directive, n 10. 
218 Home Office, n 192. 
219 See, for example, CARE, ‘EU Directive ON Human Trafficking: Why the Government Should Opt 
In’ 
<http://www.care.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2011/02/EU-Directive-on-Human-Trafficking-Why-the-
UK-should-opt-in-7-Feb-2011.pdf> accessed 25 March 2011. 
220 See Parliamentary Business, ‘MPs debate EU Directive on Human Trafficking’ UK Parliament 
website 10 May 2011 <http://www.parliament.uk/business/news/2011/may/trafficking-in-human-
beings/> accessed 11 May 2011, where it was stated that the European Scrutiny Committee 
recommended in a report that the UK Government should opt in, and Damien Green stated that ‘...the 
[European Scrutiny] Committee acknowledged that the objective of preventing and combating trafficking 
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        The 2011 Directive reconciles discrepancies between Member State law in terms 
of prevention and prosecution (of trafficking and traffickers) as well as protection and 
treatment of victims of trafficking221 - the latter is outlined below and specifically 
discussed in Chapter 4.222 Substantive criminal law provisions build upon the matters 
covered by the 2002 Framework Decision, and include prohibiting and making 
punishable the acts provided within the definition of human trafficking, provided in 
Article 2 (which is phrased in almost exactly the same terms as the UN Trafficking 
Protocol and CoE Trafficking Convention223) by a maximum of at least 5 years 
custodial sentence.224 The 2011 Directive also provides for aggravating circumstances 
on the part of the trafficker which are punishable by a maximum of at least 10 years 
custodial sentence.225 Inchoate offences are also punishable.226 
        A welcome move under the Directive is the establishment of jurisdiction over 
Member State nationals or residents who commit trafficking offences outside of their 
                                                                                                                                                        
cannot be sufficiently achieved by member states alone and can, by reason of both its scale and effects, 
be better achieved by action at EU level. Our intention to opt in is consistent with that view.’ – See, 
Home Office, (Minister of State of Immigration, Damian Green) ‘EU Directive on Human Trafficking – 
Written Ministerial Statement’ (22 March 2011) <http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/publications/about-
us/parliamentary-business/written-ministerial-statement/eu-direct-human-trafficking-wms/> accessed 22 
March 2011, and European Scrutiny Committee report ‘Trafficking in Human Beings’, 9 March 2011, 
<http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201011/cmselect/cmeuleg/428-xxii/42805.htm> accessed 
24 March 2011. 
221 See European Commission website: ‘Fight against Trafficking in Human Beings’ 
<http://ec.europa.eu/anti-trafficking/index.action> accessed 1 Sept 2010. 
222 Specific legislation includes Council Directive 2004/81/EC of 29 April 2004 on the residence permit 
issued to third-country nationals who are victims of trafficking in human beings or who have been the 
subject of an action to facilitate illegal immigration, who cooperate with the competent authorities [2004] 
OJ L 261/19, which is discussed in Chapter 4, Part I, section A. 
223 The definition provided within the EU 2011 Directive replicates almost verbatim the UN Trafficking 
Protocol definition, yet goes further with regard to the ‘purpose’ element in that it includes ‘begging’ as 
an example of forced labour or services. 
224 As required by Article 4, EU 2011 Directive. 
225 Article 4 covers aggravating factors, which are where: the offence was committed against a victim 
who was particularly vulnerable, which, in the context of this Directive, shall include at least child 
victims; the offence was committed within the framework of a criminal organisation within the meaning 
of Council Framework Decision 2008/841/JHA of 24 October 2008 on the fight against organised crime 
[2008] L 300/42; the offence deliberately or by gross negligence endangered the life of the victim; the 
offence was committed by use of serious violence or has caused particularly serious harm to the victim. 
226 Article 3 requires ‘Inciting, aiding, abetting and attempting’ to be made punishable by States. 
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country of nationality or residence.227 A separate EU Directive provides for prosecution 
and punishment of employers of illicit third-country national where the employer is 
aware of the victim’s status as trafficked.228   
        The UK response has been to criminalise human trafficking and related activity 
with a veritable plethora of offences, so that the elements of the internationally 
accepted definition of human trafficking are fragmented across different provisions. 
Various provisions were enacted and repealed229 so that at present many of the central 
provisions relating to sex trafficking are found in the Sexual Offences Act 2003 (SOA 
2003).  
        Trafficking into, within and out of the UK are criminalised by sections 57 – 59 
SOA 2003. According to these provisions, A commits an offence if he facilitates the 
entry, travel within, or departure from the UK of B, and A intends to or believes that 
another is likely to do something which would constitute a ‘relevant offence’, the latter 
being primarily (although not exclusively)230 an offence under Part 1 of the SOA 
2003.231 Part 1 has broad reach, including offence ranging from rape232 to controlling 
prostitution for gain,233 and due to the sheer magnitude of ‘relevant offences’ contained 
within that Part, it seems that simplified, consolidatory legislative measures would not 
be unwelcome. A further trafficking offence is provided within s.4 of the Asylum and 
                                                 
227 Article 10. 
228 Directive 2009/52/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 June 2009  providing for 
minimum standards on sanctions and measures against employers of illegally staying third-country 
nationals,  OJ  L 168/24. 
229 Such as the offence of ‘Trafficking in Prostitution’, found in s.145 of the Nationality, Immigration and 
Asylum Act 2002 and repealed by Sexual Offences Act 2003 ( hereafter ‘SOA’) (Schedule 7) as of as of 
1 May 2004 [SI 874 (2004)]. 
230 SOA 2003, s 60 also includes as ‘relevant offences’: ‘an offence under section 1(1)(a) of the 
Protection of Children Act 1978 (c. 37); an offence listed in Schedule 1 to the Criminal Justice (Children) 
(Northern Ireland) Order 1998 (S.I. 1998/1504 (N.I. 9)); an offence under Article 3(1)(a) of the 
Protection of Children (Northern Ireland) Order 1978 (S.I. 1978/1047 (N.I. 17)), or anything done 
outside England and Wales and Northern Ireland which is not an offence within any of paragraphs (a) to 
(d) but would be if done in England and Wales or Northern Ireland.’ 
231 SOA 2003, s 60. 
232 SOA 2003, s 1. 
233 SOA 2003, s 53. 
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Immigration (Treatment of Claimants) Act 2004, which addresses facilitation of entry 
or arrival into the UK of an individual, coupled with non-consensual exploitation of 
said individual. All of the aforementioned offences include a lack of consent element, 
save in the case of minors. The penalty for a trafficking offence under national law 
ranges from a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum, to a custodial sentence not 
exceeding 14 years.234  
        People smuggling offences are dealt with elsewhere in the UK legislative 
framework,235 and are characterised by illicit facilitation of movement of an individual. 
The maximum penalty for smuggling offences is a 14 year custodial sentence. 
Consequently, there is on the face of it potentially no difference as to the sanction to be 
applied to traffickers and smugglers prosecuted in the UK, although severity sentencing 
may vary to reflect the severity of the offence in individual cases. Further to this, the 
ultimate sanction in a trafficking case will vary according to whether (and which of) 
any of the ‘relevant offences’ is also committed.  
        Bespoke operations have been undertaken in the UK, such as Pentameter and 
Pentameter 2, aimed at locating and arresting traffickers operating here and rescuing 
their victims. Operation Pentameter 2 reportedly led to 15 convictions for trafficking 
(with or without other related offences), although the report from the UK Human 
Trafficking Centre236 which provides these statistics does not specify whether those 
convictions were for trafficking for sexual or labour exploitation. The report treats sex 
                                                 
234 SOA 2003, ss 57(2), 58(2) and 59(2). 
235 Immigration Act 1971, s 25 (substituted by the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002, s143) 
creates an offence of assisting unlawful immigration (known as facilitation) and also covers acts 
previously dealt with under the old offence of ‘harbouring’. Immigration Act 1971, s 25A (also 
substituted by the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002, s143) creates an offence of knowingly 
facilitating the arrival or entry of another into the UK for gain, coupled with knowledge or reasonable 
cause to believe that the individual is an asylum seeker. Immigration Act 1971, s 25B(1) of that Act (also 
substituted by the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002, s143) addresses assisting entry into 
the UK in breach of deportation of exclusion order. Immigration Act 1971, s 25B(3) of that Act provides 
for assisting entry/remaining of an excluded person. 
236 See, UK Human Trafficking Centre, n 111. 
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trafficking and labour trafficking separately in terms of the amount of reported victims 
of either form of exploitation,237 yet convictions for trafficking offences are listed 
under a generic heading. Conflicting opinions exist as to the actual success (or 
otherwise) of this operation.238 Nonetheless, the criminal law anti-trafficking provisions 
in the UK clearly have had some reach in terms of prosecution and punishment for 
trafficking offences, as decided cases indicate.239 
                                                
        Prohibition and prosecution are, of course, only part of the picture. Preventative 
measures and effective monitoring mechanisms are undoubtedly a valuable aspect of 
the anti-trafficking regime. The following section will consider such measures as are 
envisaged by the main anti-trafficking instruments. 
 
ii. Prevention and Monitoring 
 
The UN Trafficking Protocol requires that States take measures to prevent human 
trafficking and re-victimisation, such as ‘research, information and mass media 
campaigns and social and economic initiatives’.240 Cooperation with NGOs and other 
relevant bodies is called for in implementing such measures. 
        The Trafficking Protocol also calls for action by origin States to ‘alleviate the 
factors that make persons, especially women and children, vulnerable to trafficking, 
 
237 164 victims were identified for sexual trafficking and 5 for labour trafficking, potentially indicating 
the prevalence of sex trafficking in the UK, although not conclusively probative. See UK Human 
Trafficking Centre, ‘United Kingdom Pentameter 2, Statistics of Victims recovered and Suspects arrested 
during the operational phase’, n 111, which cites 15 convictions for trafficking offences secured as a 
result of the Operation. 
238 See, for example, UK Human Trafficking Centre, n 111, and also Nick Davies, n 111. 
239 See, for example, Attorney General's Reference (Nos.37, 38 and 65 of 2010), Re [2010] EWCA Crim 
2880; [2011] Crim. L.R. 336; (2010) 108(2) L.S.G. 18; Times, February 24, 2011; R. v Maka (Shaban) 
[2005] EWCA Crim 3365; [2006] 2 Cr. App. R. (S.) 14; Attorney General's Reference (No.6 of 2004), Re 
Also known as: R. v Plakici (Luan) [2004] EWCA Crim 1275; [2005] 1 Cr. App. R. (S.) 19; (2004) 148 
S.J.L.B. 541. 
240 Article 9 (2). 
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such as poverty, underdevelopment and lack of equal opportunity’.241 Noll242 asserts 
that the relevant factors such as poverty and lack of education which exacerbate the risk 
of human trafficking are in fact themselves human rights violations. However, 
Piotrowicz recognises that:  
 
… it nevertheless remains the case that the State has not done the 
trafficking. The fear of having one’s social and economic rights violated 
might also suffice to make someone vulnerable to other threats but it is a 
big leap from there to the point where the State is responsible for the 
criminal acts of another. To make a tort analogy, is not the damage too 
remote?243 
 
        Further to these requirements, the Trafficking Protocol addresses the issue of 
cooperation and training of law enforcement and immigration officials, as well as other 
relevant authorities, in terms of the exchange of information to help determine whether 
individuals attempting to cross international borders are either traffickers or victims of 
trafficking. The Protocol states that ‘[t]he training should also take into account the 
need to consider human rights and child-and gender-sensitive issues’.244 Information 
exchange regarding the types of travel documents used by traffickers and trafficked 
persons, and the methods and means used by OCGs to recruit and transport victims 
such as the routes used etc, is also envisaged.245  
                                                 
241 Article 9 (4). 
242 G Noll, ‘The Insecurity of Trafficking in International Law’, in Globalization, Migration and Human 
Rights: International Law Under Review, 343, 353 (Vincent Chetail ed., Bruylant, Bruxelles 2007). 
243 R Piotrowicz, ‘The Legal Nature of Trafficking in Human Beings’, Intercultural Human Rights Law 
Review, Vol. 4, 2009, 179, 184 – 5. 
244 Article 10(2). 
245 Article 10(1). 
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        Similarly, the CoE Trafficking Convention goes beyond prosecution and 
punishment of traffickers, and also has a provision relating to origin State action 
regarding the reduction of vulnerability of the putative victim.246 According to this 
provision, States are called upon to take measures to prevent and combat human 
trafficking through coordination between the relevant bodies responsible for combating 
human trafficking, as well as strengthening polices and prevention programmes, 
through ‘…research, information, awareness raising and education campaigns, social 
and economic initiatives and training programmes, in particular for persons vulnerable 
to trafficking and for professionals concerned with trafficking in human beings.’247  
        A monitoring mechanism is provided for within Article 36, whereby a Group of 
Experts against trafficking in human being (GRETA)248 and the Committee of the 
Parties249 will help to ensure effective implementation through the provision of periodic 
reports relating to the implementation measures adopted by each party and the adoption 
of recommendations with respect to the implementation measures taken or yet to be 
taken. These recommendations are not binding upon the State party in national or 
international law. 
                                                 
246 Article 5(2) states that ‘Each Party shall establish and/or strengthen effective policies and programmes 
to prevent trafficking in human beings, by such means as: research, information, awareness raising and 
education campaigns, social and economic initiatives and training programmes, in particular for persons 
vulnerable to trafficking and for professionals concerned with trafficking in human beings.’  
247 Article 5(2). 
248 Described in the Explanatory Report to the CoE Trafficking Convention as ‘a technical body, 
composed of independent and highly qualified experts in the area of Human Rights, assistance and 
protection to victims and the fight against trafficking in human beings, with the task of adopting a report 
and conclusions on each Party’s implementation of the Convention.’ See Explanatory Report to the CoE 
Trafficking Convention, para 354, <http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/Reports/Html/197.htm> 
accessed 01 July 2011.  
249 Described as ‘a more political body, the Committee of the Parties, composed of the representatives in 
the Committee of Ministers of the Parties to the Convention and of representatives of Parties non-
members of the Council of Europe, which may adopt recommendations, on the basis of the report and 
conclusions of GRETA, addressed to a Party concerning the measures to be taken to follow up GRETA’s 
conclusions.’ See Explanatory Report to the CoE Trafficking Convention, para 354, ibid. 
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        The EU 2011 Directive includes similar prevention-based provisions,250 and calls 
for action such as:  
 
… information and awareness raising campaigns, research and education 
programmes, where appropriate in cooperation with civil society 
organisations, aimed at raising awareness and reducing the risk of people, 
especially children, becoming victims of trafficking in human beings.251 
 
Training for those likely to come into contact with putative victims is called for, so that 
said individuals can adequately identify and deal with trafficked persons.252 
        Establishment of national monitoring mechanisms such as National Rapporteurs253 
(or ‘equivalent mechanisms’) by Member States is required by Article 19 of the 
Directive. The ‘equivalent mechanism’ in the UK is the Inter-Departmental Ministerial 
Group on Trafficking, whose duties have included monitoring progress on the UK 
Action Plan on Tackling Human Trafficking,254 and the implementation of the CoE 
Trafficking Convention. 
        Measures intended to have further preventative effect are currently under 
consideration in the guise of the UK Human Trafficking (Border Control) Bill 2010 – 
2011, which aims to ‘require border control officers to stop and interview potential 
                                                 
250 Article 18. 
251 Article 18(2). 
252 Article 18(3). 
253 Article 19 provides that the role of the Rapporteur would include carrying out assessments of trends in 
trafficking in human beings, gathering statistics, and measuring the results of anti-trafficking actions, and 
produce regular reports. 
254 See Home Office and Scottish Executive, ‘UK Action Plan on Tackling Human Trafficking’ (March 
2007) <http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/documents/human-traffick-action-plan?view=Binary> accessed 4 
January 2008. 
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victims of trafficking notwithstanding entitlements under European Union law to free 
movement of persons; and for connected purposes.’255 
         Measures to discourage the demand for the product of exploitation of trafficked 
persons are encouraged by the Trafficking Protocol,256 the CoE Trafficking 
Convention,257 and the EU 2011 Directive.258 Legislation aimed at reducing the 
demand for sold sexual services has been enacted in several countries over the last 
decade or so, including the UK, and will be discussed in the following section. 
                                                
 
iii. Prevention through Demand Reduction Measures 
 
As the demand for the purchase of commercial sex continues and increases so will the 
supply of local sex workers, trafficked sex workers, and migrant workers who choose to 
migrate for the economic purpose of sex work. Preventative measures envisaged by the 
relevant legal instruments frequently touch upon the issue of addressing the demand for 
sexual services.      
        Article 6 of the CoE Trafficking Convention suggests that demand sanctions may 
be considered by States, by requesting that:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
255 See Parliamentary Business, Bills and Legislation, ‘Human Trafficking (Border Control) Bill 2010 – 
2011’ <http://services.parliament.uk/bills/2010-11/humantraffickingbordercontrol.html>  accessed 01 
June 2011. 
256 Article 9(5). 
257 Article 6. 
258 Article 18(1) and (4). 
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 To discourage the demand that fosters all forms of exploitation of persons, 
especially women and children, that leads to trafficking, each Party shall 
adopt or strengthen legislative, administrative, educational, social, cultural 
or other measures…259  
 
The UN Trafficking Protocol has a similar provision.260 The CoE Convention also 
specifically calls for consideration by Parties of the criminalisation of use of the 
services provided by the object of exploitation (i.e. the trafficked person) where there is 
knowledge of the individual’s status as trafficked.261 Similarly, the EU 2011 Directive 
states that ‘Member States shall take appropriate measures, such as education and 
training, to discourage and reduce the demand that fosters all forms of exploitation 
related to trafficking in human beings’,262 and also specifically calls for consideration 
by Member States of the criminalisation of use of the services of the trafficked person 
where there is knowledge of her status as trafficked.263  
        The Explanatory Memorandum to the Proposal for the EU 2011 Directive 
highlights the potentially controversial nature of such measures in stating that:  
 
The issue of introducing a specific obligation to criminalise clients who 
knowingly use sexual services from a trafficked person was controversial 
                                                 
259 Article 6. 
260 Article 9(5) targets the demand aspect, and requires that ‘States Parties shall adopt or strengthen 
legislative or other measures, such as educational, social or cultural measures, including through bilateral 
and multilateral cooperation, to discourage the demand that fosters all forms of exploitation of persons, 
especially women and children, that leads to trafficking.’ 
261 Article 19. 
262 Article 18(1). 
263 Article 18(4). 
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among stakeholders. Several MS (Member States) pointed out that in any 
case such a provision should not be binding.264  
 
Accordingly, the provision is not binding. This continues the theme of addressing sex 
work in a trafficking context without prejudice as to how individual countries or 
Member States choose to address it.265 
        Current legislative examples in various States have taken the form of criminalising 
the purchase of sexual services. The UK response was to enact the Policing and Crime 
Act 2009, section 14 of which contains a strict liability offence which criminalises the 
purchase of sexual services from an individual who is forced, coerced, or deceived into 
providing them.266 The proposed use of demand sanctions such as these, although part 
of a larger overarching UK action plan to combat human trafficking,267 was at least 
initially based upon a Swedish model, where the purchase of sold sex has been 
criminalised since 1999.268 The Swedish model does not require the existence of force, 
coercion etc – it constitutes an outright prohibition in any circumstances.  
        Finland has also adopted a nuanced model. In 2006, an amendment was made to 
the Finnish Penal Code which criminalised the purchase of sexual services from victims 
of pimping or trafficking. The original proposals behind the Finnish legislative 
                                                 
264 See Explanatory Memorandum to the Proposal for the 2010 Directive, at 2.1.2 
<http://ec.europa.eu/anti-trafficking/download.action?nodeId=24dad5a5-7144-4331-9f4c-
64c6509764e2&fileName=EC+Proposal+for+a+Directive+on+combating+trafficking+COM+2010_95_
en.pdf&fileType=pdf> accessed 30 Dec 2010. The Directive is now in force – see, n 10, above. 
265 The terms ‘sexual exploitation’ and ‘exploitation of prostitution’ are not defined within the trafficking 
definition, as discussed in Chapter 2, Part IV, section C. 
266 Policing and Crime Act 2009, s 14. 
267 Home Office and Scottish Executive, ‘UK Action Plan on Tackling Human Trafficking’, n 254. 
268 The Swedish Law Prohibiting the Purchase of Sexual Services, 1998: Law (1998:408) Prohibition of 
the Purchase of Sexual Services; Lag ou förbund mot köp av sexuella tjänster (1998): Dem som mot 
ersattning skaffar sig en tillfällig sexuell förbindelse, doms – om inte gärningen är belagd med straff 
enligt Brottsbalken – för köp av sexuella tjänster till böter eller fängelse i högst sex månader. För försök 
döms till ansvar enligt 23 kap. Brottsbalken, now enshrined in the Swedish Penal Code. 
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amendments were to adopt a Swedish-style blanket criminalisation, but these proposals 
were rejected.  
        In light of these recent legislative responses to the demand for sold sex, a question 
to be determined is as to whether certain ways of managing prostitution do have an 
effect on demand of such significance that it distorts trafficking patterns, and whether 
such measures are proportionate in terms of the negative side effects that they may 
bring. The reasons for introducing such measures as demand sanctions might not 
always be trafficking related but their effectiveness might be relevant to anti-trafficking 
strategies.  
        The Swedish model was not conceived as an anti-trafficking measure. Some 
sources report that the Swedish law has had a positive effect as regards combating sex 
trafficking into Sweden,269 and that it is no longer an attractive destination for 
traffickers:270 ‘In conversations recorded during crime investigations, pimps/procurers 
and traffickers have expressed frustration about setting up shop in Sweden and 
attracting customers who are willing to buy their women in prostitution.’271 However, 
some commentators say that there is no conclusive evidence for this,272 and sceptics 
might suggest that the effect of the Swedish Law may only have been to divert the 
problem elsewhere. The UK model – in force since April 2009 – has yet to result in any 
                                                 
269 In the 2003 and 2004 reports, The Swedish National Rapporteur for Trafficking in Women at the 
National Criminal Investigation Department noted that the Swedish Law has had positive effects as 
regards combating trafficking, see Justis- og Politidepartementet ( Ministry of Justice and the Police) 
‘Purchasing Sexual Services in Sweden and the Netherlands:  Legal Regulation and Experiences, An 
abbreviated English version, A Report by a Working Group on the legal regulation of the purchase of 
sexual services’ (Issued on 8 October 2004)  
<http://www.regjeringen.no/upload/kilde/jd/rap/2004/0034/ddd/pdfv/232216-
purchasing_sexual_services_in_sweden_and_the_nederlands.pdf> accessed 01 July 2011. 
270 G Ekberg, ‘The Swedish Law the Prohibits the Purchase of Sexual Services: Best Practices for 
Prevention of Prostitution and Trafficking in Human Beings’, Violence against Women (October 2004) 
Vol. 10 No. 10, 1187 – 1218, 1199. 
271 Ibid, 1200. 
272 Ibid. 
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convictions.273 Supply prohibition in the absence of effective demand limitation may in 
fact only encourage smuggling/trafficking by introducing a ‘smugglers’ premium’ in 
the increased price of the illicit good or service.  
        There are clearly principled reasons for targeting the demand for sexual services, 
including the protection of women from sexual exploitation274 within and without of a 
trafficking context, on the basis that there is no real consent of the woman or that the 
position of the trafficked prostitute is a form of slavery. On the face of it, these reasons 
point to eradication, particularly with respect to the trafficked prostitute. Nonetheless, 
there may be undesirable side-effects of the UK demand sanction legislation,275 such as 
the potential for such legislation to adversely affect those who are most vulnerable – the 
sex workers themselves, and the potential lack of deterrent effect of such legislation. 
Full discussion of this matter goes beyond the ambit of this thesis. 
        The pertinent issue as regards consent of trafficked persons in respect of demand 
sanction laws such as those imposed in the UK is that they do not avoid similar issues – 
it is still necessary to determine that the sex worker is, in fact, coerced or forced and not 
operating consensually, therefore necessitating the distinction between ‘sex worker’ 
and ‘victim’, and the distinction between the purchaser as just that, or as a criminal. 
The connection with ‘consent’ arises in two further ways – if the sex trade is legalised 
and regulated, the position of the prostitute may be improved, so ‘consent’ is rendered 
easier to imagine and accept - in the Netherlands, ‘voluntary prostitution is regulated to 
make conditions more transparent.’276 If, on the other hand, prostitution is severely 
condemned and policed, it will be driven underground and the position of the prostitute 
                                                 
273 Statement by Timothy Hand, Crown Prosecution Service Representative, (Personal Communication, 
February 2011). 
274 J Outshoorn, n 43, 141. 
275 See J Elliott, 'Criminalising the Purchase of Sexual Services: The Use of Strict Liability as a Form of 
Risk Management?' in K Doolin, J Child, A Beech and J Raine (eds) Whose Criminal Justice: State or 
Community? (Waterside 2011). 
276 Justis- og Politidepartementet, (Ministry of Justice and the Police) n 269, 27. 
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will become more vulnerable, which is arguably the effect that demand sanctions 
have.277 
        The following section will outline both the human rights and bespoke anti-
trafficking legislative framework applicable to victims of trafficking. 
 
B. The International Human Rights Regime and the Treatment of Victims – State 
Obligations 
 
The practice considered in this thesis is predominantly European and the term ‘human 
rights’ in the main refers to the law and practice under the European Convention on 
Human Rights (ECHR)278 (which is binding on all the States concerned). In some 
cases, it is necessary to take into account other human rights agreements, such as the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR);279 therefore, other such 
instruments will be referred to at times. 
 
i. Human Rights Obligations 
 
Although human trafficking is sometimes referred to as a breach of the human rights of 
the trafficked person, it is worth noting from the outset that trafficking does not 
necessarily involve such a breach.280 A conviction for trafficking would not depend 
upon demonstrating any such breach.  
        Human rights obligations are addressed to States, whereas trafficking per se 
involves criminal acts carried out by private actors. The State has obligations under 
                                                 
277 See J Elliott, n 275. 
278 ECHR, n 18. 
279 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 
23 March 1976) 999 UNTS 171 (hereafter ‘ICCPR’). 
280 See R Piotrowicz, n 243, 184 – 5. 
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human rights law to have in place adequate measures – legislative or otherwise – to 
ensure that individuals are protected from human rights abuses which may occur as a 
result of being or having been trafficked, such as being subjected to inhuman or 
degrading treatment281 or slavery and its related practices or forced labour.282 
Consequently, violations where the immediate cause of the damage is the act of a 
private person (and therefore a non-state actor) arise from the failure of the State to act 
– to prevent the violation, to provide an effective remedy for the violation, or in some 
cases, to provide for the criminalisation of the private conduct of traffickers and 
effective investigations into suspected trafficking offences. Further to this, human 
rights obligations may arise with respect to how victims must be treated once they are 
discovered in the host State and have escaped the control of their traffickers.283 
        The human rights framework relating to victims of human trafficking is simply 
that which is applicable to any human being in need of certain types of protection, and 
includes, for example, protection of those who - if returned to the origin State - face a 
real risk of ill-treatment amounting to human rights violations. These human rights 
obligations overlap with the requirements of the trafficking instruments (discussed 
below and in Chapter 4) but are further protected by the possibility of national and 
international legal action to challenge State action or inaction. Trafficked persons may 
therefore have recourse to protections under Article 3 of the ECHR or Article 33(1) of 
the Refugee Convention.284 As discussed in Chapter 4,285 the applicable standard here 
                                                 
281 Provided within Article 3 ECHR, and discussed in depth in Chapter 4, Part VIII, section B. 
282 See, for example, Siliadin v France (app no. 73316/01) [2005] ECHR 545, R v Tang [2008] HCA 39 
(28 August 2008) 142, Rantsev v Cyprus and Russia (App no. 25965/04) [2010], Hadijatou Mani Koraou 
v The Republic of Niger [2008] ECW/CCJ/JUD/06/08, OOO et al v Commissioner of Metroploitan 
Police [2011] EWHC 1246 QB. The applicable human rights provisions with respect to slavery, forced 
labour, and practices related to slavery are discussed in depth in Chapter 2, Part IV, section D. 
283 See Chapter 4, Part VIII, for discussion of this issue. 
284 Refugee Convention, n 20. 
285 See, Chapter 4, Part VIII, section B. 
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is that laid down in Soering,286 namely ‘where substantial grounds have been shown for 
believing that the person concerned, if extradited, faces a real risk of being subjected to 
torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment in the requesting 
country.’287 It has been established that application of this principle now extends 
beyond extradition.288  
        Such obligations arise in the context of victims of human trafficking because of 
the context of some cases which arise in practice. These include the possibility of 
threats and reprisals (from traffickers) on return (of the victim) to the origin State, the 
potential for re-trafficking, or even serious ill-treatment due to social ostracism from 
the individual’s community as a result of the woman having worked in prostitution.289 
        Aside from the rights and protections conferred by ordinary human rights law, 
there are specific aspects of the anti-trafficking regime which offer nuanced and 
bespoke rights and protection to victims of human trafficking. These will be outlined in 
the following section, and discussed in greater depth in Chapter 4. 
 
ii. The Treatment of Victims 
 
The applicable framework regarding the provision of support, assistance and protection 
to victims of human trafficking includes adoption of measures to identify, protect and 
rehabilitate victims once discovered in the destination State, and provide for victims to 
remain in the territory of that State where necessary and appropriate, as well as relevant 
provisions relating to repatriation.  
                                                 
286 See, Soering v UK (1989) 11 E.H.R.R. 439. 
287 Soering, para 91. 
288 See, for example, Cruz-Varas v Sweden (1992) 14 E.H.R.R. 1. 
289 See, Chapter 4, Part VIII, passim. 
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        The Trafficking Protocol offered very little by way of obligations to provide any 
specific rights or protections to victims of human trafficking, in stating that Parties may 
‘consider implementing measures to provide for the physical, psychological and social 
recovery of victims of trafficking in persons’290 (Emphasis added). Such measures 
could, according to the Protocol, include access to accommodation and counselling. 
States are asked to consider issuing temporary residence permits291 while giving 
consideration to humanitarian and compassionate factors.292 Consequently, the Protocol 
imposes no solid obligation on Parties to adopt any measures which are favourable in 
terms of victim protection. 
        The CoE Trafficking Convention, however, requires more, primarily calling for 
the provision of a recovery and reflection period of at least 30 days in situations where 
there are ‘reasonable grounds’ to believe that an individual is a victim of trafficking.293 
The UK currently provides a period of 45 days, which could be extended in certain 
circumstances.294 When this period has passed and an individual has been positively 
identified as a victim of human trafficking, a residence permit should be granted either 
where a victim is cooperating in criminal proceedings or an investigation, and/or, where 
provision of the permit is deemed necessary owing to the ‘personal situation’ of the 
trafficked victim.295  
        A lack of clear implementing legislation as regards this matter in the UK is 
apparently attributable to the fact that domestic policies such as that of Discretionary 
                                                 
290 Article 6(3).  
291 Article 7(1). 
292 Article 7(2). 
293 Article 13. 
294 Home Office ‘Impact Assessment of Ratification of the Council of Europe Convention on Action 
against Trafficking in Human Beings’ (6 October 2008) 5 
<http://www.ialibrary.berr.gov.uk/ImpactAssessment/?IAID=da0f3cecd6214381bef9e9514cb46afd> 
accessed 10 May 2010. 
295 Article 14. 
 80
Leave are already considered sufficient to meet this requirement.296 The matter is 
arguably not so clear cut, as the discussion in Chapter 4 will indicate.297 Where a 
residence permit is granted in the UK, it will be for a minimum of one year.298  
        States are required to protect the identity and private life of victims,299 and to 
provide assistance in terms of providing accommodation and medical treatment, and 
access to counselling and interpreters etc.300 Further obligations include providing 
access to legal assistance and free legal aid, as well as to compensation from the 
perpetrators.301 The ‘possibility’ of States ‘not imposing penalties on victims for their 
involvement in unlawful activities, to the extent that they have been compelled to do 
so’ is addressed in Article 26, but it is not framed in terms of a solid obligation for any 
State to do so.302 
        Paramount to securing access to the abovementioned benefits is correct and timely 
identification of victims. Article 10 of the CoE Trafficking Convention provides for the 
development of identification procedures and the training of relevant officials to 
execute these procedures. Previous UK victim support efforts were minimal, and 
include the Poppy Project.303 Following ratification of the CoE Trafficking Convention, 
the UK has in place a ‘National Referral Mechanism’ (NRM). Under this mechanism, 
indicators are used by front-line professionals to help identify putative victims, before 
referring their details on to a designated Competent Authority304 who are charged with 
making a decision as to whether there are ‘reasonable grounds’ to believe that the 
                                                 
296 Home Office, n 294, 6. 
297 See Chapter 4, passim. 
298 Home Office, n 294, 6. 
299 Article 11. 
300 Article 12. 
301 Article 15. 
302 See Chapter 4, Part VII, for further discussion of this issue. 
303 The Poppy Project is funded by the Office for Criminal Justice Reform (reporting to the Ministry of 
Justice) and offers accommodation and support to female victims of trafficking. This project has played a 
valuable role in identifying and supporting victims of human trafficking. See The Poppy Project, 
<http://www.eaves4women.co.uk/POPPY_Project/POPPY_Project.php> accessed 21 March 2010. 
304 In the case of the UK, these are the UK Borders Agency and the UK Human Trafficking Centre. 
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individual has indeed been trafficked.305 The Anti Trafficking Monitoring Group has 
concluded that the UK NRM has thus far been somewhat problematic.306 This merits 
further discussion, which will take place in Chapter 4.  
        The EU 2011 Directive makes some provision for the support, assistance and 
protection of victims, and states that more rigorous protection of victims’ rights is one 
of its major objectives.307 Assistance must be given before, during and for an 
appropriate time after criminal proceedings have concluded (which can continue in any 
case without involvement of the victim308) so that victims may have access to the rights 
laid down in the 2011 Directive and Framework Decision 2001/220/JHA, the latter of 
which relates to the standing of victims in criminal proceedings.309 
        Access to assistance under the 2011 Directive depends upon a ‘reasonable-grounds 
indication’310 that the individual in question is a victim of trafficking. As with the CoE 
Convention, a mechanism for victim identification must be established,311 and 
‘assistance and support’ is to include comparable measures to those required under the 
CoE Convention – accommodation, counselling etc.312 Victims are to have access to 
legal counselling and representation,313 and are to be subject to a risk assessment to 
determine the level of protection needed and whether, say, a witness protection 
programme or similar is necessary.314  
                                                 
305 Home Office, n 294, 5.  
306 See The Anti Trafficking Monitoring Group, ‘Wrong Kind of Victim? One year on: An analysis of 
UK measures to protect trafficked persons’ (June 2010) 
<http://www.antislavery.org/includes/documents/cm_docs/2010/a/1_atmg_report_for_web.pdf> accessed 
01 July 2011.  
307 EU 2011 Directive, Preamble, para 7. 
308 Article 9 
309 Council Framework Decision 2001/220/JHA of 15 March 2001 on the standing of victims in criminal 
proceedings [2001] OJ L 82/1. 
310 Article 11. 
311 Article 11(4). 
312 Article 11(5).  
313 Article 12(2). 
314 Article 12(3).  
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        Rather than including specific provisions regarding residence permits – temporary 
or otherwise – the 2011 Directive instead points to Council Directive 2004/81/EC April 
2004 on the residence permit issued to third-country nationals who are victims of 
trafficking in human beings or who have been the subject of an action to facilitate 
illegal immigration, who cooperate with the competent authorities,315 and Council 
Directive 2004/83/EC of 29 April 2004 on minimum standards for the qualification and 
status of third country nationals or stateless persons as refugees or as persons who 
otherwise need international protection and the content of the protection granted.316 
Consequently, the issuance of residence permits becomes a possibility either where the 
victim is cooperating in criminal proceedings where the State is trying to obtain a 
prosecution against the traffickers, or where there is need for such a permit on the basis 
of refuge or subsidiary protection. 
        Article 8 of the 2011 Directive also provides for non-application of penalties to 
victims who have committed criminal acts as a result of having been trafficked, 
although this is not a clear obligation as tentative language is used in that the Article 
states that Member States are asked to take ‘… necessary measures to ensure that 
competent national authorities are entitled not to prosecute … ’.317(Emphasis added). 
The UK currently has in place two Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) Protocols which 
provide for prosecutorial discretion as regards offences committed by victims as a 
result of having been trafficked.318 
                                                 
315 Council Directive 2004/81/EC of 29 April 2004 on the residence permit issued to third-country 
nationals who are victims of trafficking in human beings or who have been the subject of an action to 
facilitate illegal immigration, who cooperate with the competent authorities  [2004] OJ L 261/19. 
316 Council Directive 2004/83/EC of 29 April 2004 on minimum standards for the qualification and status 
of third country nationals or stateless persons as refugees or as persons who otherwise need international 
protection and the content of the protection granted [2004] OJ L 304/12. 
317 See Chapter 4, Part VII, for further discussion of this matter. 
318 Crown Prosecution Service, ‘Prosecution of Defendants Charged With Offences Who Might Be 
Trafficked Victims’ and ‘Prosecution of Young Defendants Charged With Offences Who Might Be 
Trafficked Victims’ <http://www.cps.gov.uk/legal/h_to_k/human_trafficking_and_smuggling/> accessed 
01 July 2011. 
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        The provisions of the various instruments comprising the legal anti-trafficking 
regime clearly aim for a multi-faceted attack on trafficking and illicit facilitated 
migration. Those most central to the inquiry made by the thesis are the definition of 
‘human trafficking’, which raises the issue of ‘coercion’ or ‘lack of consent’ of the 
person transported and, secondly, the consequent provisions relating to the assistance 
and support to be offered to victims, the correct identification of whom depends upon 
their having being coerced, forced, and therefore ‘lack of consent’ etc. The question 
arises about the relationship between coercion and the lack of consent of any potential 
victim. It has been/will be submitted that ‘coercion’ ought not be understood solely as 
the forcible overriding of any wish of the woman (amounting to kidnapping into 
exploitation in another country). However, identifying the circumstances when the 
treatment of the woman and the context in which she makes any decision such that we 
may say that she has been ‘coerced’ is problematic. 
        It is useful here to reiterate the dual aspect of the definition of human trafficking – 
it may be used as a basis of criminal liability but it may also be used for collateral 
purposes, such as indicating when the various cooperation obligations apply or for 
identifying who is a victim. One’s first reaction would likely be in favour of identical 
interpretations (of the definition of trafficking) whenever a question of interpretation 
arose, especially where all or any of them had been given domestic effect in those 
terms, but that would be to concede, for instance, that the stricter requirements of the 
criminal law would prevail over the broader humanitarian objectives of identifying 
victims. 
         To elaborate upon this point - in practice, we know that it is very unlikely that any 
question of interpretation will arise other than in a domestic forum (or by a domestic 
body). These days, national courts often (though not always) use the Articles of the 
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Vienna Convention on interpretation,319 which they regard as being customary 
international law, whenever they are faced with the interpretation of a treaty. They are 
also, of course, bound by domestic law, not just principles of interpretation but other 
principles and rules, one of which, is the principle of legality – that a criminal 
defendant is entitled to have the law setting out the offence with which he is charged 
interpreted strictly in his favour.  
        One can easily imagine that a defendant to a criminal charge of trafficking will 
allege that the women consented to being transferred and exploited and so there was no 
trafficking offence. He would argue that ‘consent’ covered all circumstances other than 
direct coercion (of which, he would say, there had been none). A transported woman 
would want to argue that she had been trafficked in the widest range of circumstances 
and that she was a trafficked victim. She would want to say (and she would not have 
any presumptions in her favour as a criminal defendant would) that she had not 
consented – that she had been deceived, driven by press of economic circumstances, 
could not have consented to the appalling conditions amounting to a slavery like 
practice etc. 
        There is a conflict between the standards of the criminal law and the humanitarian 
objective of identifying victims who are to be protected. One solution would be to 
adopt the same understanding in both sets of cases, which would have to be the 
criminal standard, at the expense of some possible ‘victims’. Another would be to say 
that, even for criminal purposes, the definition of trafficking clearly envisages an 
absence of consent in a wider range of circumstances than direct coercion and, even for 
establishing criminality, it is for a court to examine whether or not there was consent by 
the women in this case, and where there was not there would be the criminal offence of 
                                                 
319 Articles 31 and 32. 
 85
trafficking and the transported women would be victims. The latter may be the 
preferable solution. The third possibility is that we use a different test to determine who 
is a trafficker and who is a victim. This might serve both criminal and humanitarian 
purposes but could easily lead to confusion and might not be too popular with 
destination States, which would have both to prosecute more traffickers and protect 
more victims.  
        Where women are smuggled but not trafficked because of difficulties - legal and 
evidential - about establishing that there was not consent, then – as will be argued in 
Chapter 4 - States should, even if they are not obliged to, consider treating women who 
have endured oppressive, exploitative conditions short of slavery-like practices as 
‘victims’, in the same way that discretionary powers are sometimes used with respect to 
failed refugee applicants. Clearly, the variety of interests covered by the trafficking 
definitions do not lead to simple interpretative solutions.           
        Consideration of the consent/coercion spectrum in this thesis approaches the 
question through consideration of the ‘lack of consent’ of the woman, making it clear 
that no automatic conclusions are to be drawn that lack of consent equates with 
coercion. The following section will introduce the notion of consent, providing a 
platform for further analysis in Chapter 3 of the difficulties of this already flexible 
concept when considered specifically within the context of human trafficking. 
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 III. Consent in the Law 
 
As stated by George Fletcher, ‘No idea testifies more powerfully to individuals as a 
source of value than the principle of consent.’320 Valid consent serves to act as a 
‘procedural justification’ for the doing of ‘something’, to someone or someone’s 
property.321 On the face of it, then, the doing of ‘something’ is defensible provided the 
conditions for a valid consent (as to the doing of ‘something’) are present.322 Yet, as 
will be argued throughout this thesis, not only is correct determination of a valid 
consent inherently problematic in an exploitative facilitated migration and trafficking 
context, but also that there are limits to the justificatory scope of consent.  
        In basic terms, consent can be defined as ‘subsisting, free and genuine agreement 
to the act in question’.323 Determining lack of consent is difficult324 and specifying and 
determining the scope of the conditions for a valid consent is no mean feat. 
Nonetheless, the following section intends to do just that, and will set out and analyse 
the basic conditions for a valid consent, and what can vitiate or invalidate consent. 
Further analysis of the role of consent specifically in a human trafficking/exploitative 
facilitated migration context will be undertaken in Chapter 3. 
 
 
 
                                                 
320 G P Fletcher, Basic Concepts of Legal Thought, (Oxford, Oxford University Press 1996) 109. 
321 D Beyleveld, and R Brownsword, Consent in the Law, (Hart Publishing, 2007) 125 
322 Ibid. 
323 The Law Commission, Consent in Sex Offences: A Report to the Home Office Sex Offences Review, 
(1998), para 2.12. 
324 As indicated by the UK experience as regards low conviction rates for rape. The amount of reported 
rapes which end in conviction currently stands at approximately 6% - see ‘The Stern Review’, 
Government Equalities Office 2010 
<http://www.equalities.gov.uk/pdf/Stern_Review_of_Rape_Reporting_1FINAL.pdf>  accessed 01 
August 2010. 
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 A. The Requirements of a ‘Valid’ Consent  
 
If a valid consent must indeed be ‘subsisting, free and genuine agreement to the act in 
question’,325 then the issues to be analysed here can be categorised as follows: the 
consent must be freely given; it must be informed; the consenting agent must have the 
capacity and understanding as regards that to which she is consenting; and the consent 
must subsist at the time of the act consented to. These issues will now be addressed. 
 
i. Consent must be ‘Freely’ Given 
 
An ostensible consent is not necessarily an authentic consent unless it is freely given 
and is therefore the product of unforced choice.326 Drawing the line between forced and 
unforced choice is not always necessarily simple.327 A defining characteristic of 
‘forced’ choice is the application of external force which bears negatively on the 
generic interests of the consenting party.328 As typically understood, this external force 
would be exerted by the party to whom the consent is to be given. Whether external 
force can come from other sources will be discussed at a later point in this thesis.329 
        In the ordinary sense of the word, ‘free’ consent can be defined as ‘voluntary 
agreement to or acquiescence in what another proposes or desires; compliance, 
concurrence, permission.’330 In a Report on Consent in Sex Offences, the Law 
                                                 
325 The Law Commission, n 323, para 2.12. 
326 D Beyleveld, and R Brownsword, n 321, 126. 
327 Research conducted into sexual relationships and rape in prison indicates in particular how 
problematic correct determinations of consent/lack thereof can be within a coercive environment. See, for 
example, Human Rights Watch, ‘No Escape: Male Rape in U.S. Prisons’, 
<http://www.hrw.org/legacy/reports/2001/prison/index.htm> accessed 22 May 2011. 
328 D Beyleveld, and R Brownsword, n 321, 126. 
329 See Chapter 2, Part III, section B, subsection iv. 
330 Oxford English Dictionary Online, Additions Series <http://www.oed.com/> accessed 01 Feb 2006. 
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Commission stated that ‘The essence of consent … is agreement to what is done.’331 
The Report goes on to state that agreement must be ‘free and genuine’ in order for it to 
qualify as consent,332 and that ‘consent should be defined as a subsisting, free and 
genuine agreement to the act in question’.333 ‘Coercion’, ‘pressure’, and ‘influence’334 
may all demonstrate a different level of interference with free consent, yet all have the 
potential to vitiate it. 
        Under the UK Sexual Offences Act 2003, one has consented ‘if he agrees by 
choice, and has the freedom and capacity to make that choice.’335 In a recent Report 
concerning consent in the context of rape, the Scottish Law Commission proposes that 
consent should be defined as ‘free agreement’. This definition accepts that agreement 
can be given in situations where it is not ‘real’, ‘full’, or ‘valid’;336 and it follows that 
such an agreement would not qualify as valid consent. Consent must be ‘free from the 
influence or opinion of others’.337 Indeed, ‘every consent involves a submission, but it 
by no means follows that a mere submission involves consent.’338  
        Beyleveld and Brownsword recognise that: 
 
… determination of whether ‘consent’ has been given ‘freely’ is doubly 
complex: first, we need a stable and defensible conception of ‘free’ action; 
and secondly, employing this conception, we need to be able to interpret 
actions with some confidence as ‘free’ or otherwise.339 
                                                 
331 The Law Commission, n 323, para 2.9  
332 Ibid, para 2.10 
333 Ibid, para 2.12 
334 D Beyleveld, and R Brownsword, n 321, 131. 
335 SOA 2003, s 74, also see, The Crown Prosecution Service, ‘Sexual Offences Act 2003’ 
<http://www.cps.gov.uk/legal/s_to_u/sexual_offences_act/> accessed 01 Jan 2010. 
336 See, Scottish Law Commission, Report on Rape and Other Sexual Offences: Report on a reference 
under section 3(1)(e) of the Law Commissions Act 1965, (Scot Law Comm No 209, 2007) para 2.38.  
337 D Beyleveld, and R Brownsword, n 321, 12. 
338 R v Olugboja [1981] All ER 443, at p. 448, quoting Coleridge J in Day [1841] 9 C&P 722 
339 D Beyleveld, and R Brownsword, n 321, 12. 
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         In the most basic sense, where a choice is made against one’s will, the ‘choice’, 
so-called, does not constitute freely given consent. This may be too simplistic a formula 
as because where either a choice is made as a product of outright coercion, or where a 
choice must be made between undesirable alternatives, each constitutes an influenced 
choice but the consequence, vitiating consent, is not necessarily the same in each case. 
Further, in neither situation could it be said that the will of the consenting agent was 
overborne; more that the choice was influenced – by external factors - albeit to 
potentially different degrees.  
        The former situation – that of outright coercion, such as threat of physical force - 
is more clearly capable of invalidating or vitiating consent, whereas the latter less 
clearly does so. As Philips observes, ‘…it is difficult to imagine what a society would 
be like in which a person would invalidate a consent simply by showing that she was 
placed in a position having to choose between unattractive alternatives.’340 Every day, 
choices are made which result in an undesirable outcome but in the absence of a more 
agreeable alternative. It is difficult to view such choices as ‘free’, but it is impractical to 
view such choices as being made wholly without consent. It follows from this that even 
consent which is legally considered to be valid comes in varying degrees and shades of 
grey. It is not difficult to argue that direct coercion vitiates consent sufficient to render 
it invalid. The effect of more indirect forms of coercion on consent is more difficult to 
categorise – that which is ‘persuasive’ may not uniformly be considered coercive – in 
fact it may in some situations simply be deemed to be a material consideration to be 
taken into account (by the consenting individual) when making a decision. 
                                                 
340 M Philips, ‘Are Coerced Agreements Involuntary?’ (1984) Law and Philosophy 3, 133-45, 140. 
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        Clearly, overt forms of coercion such as force or violence may invalidate consent 
where there is no legal justification for the force, as any agreement cannot be 
considered to be ‘freely’ given. Further, psychological forms of coercion may 
invalidate consent – even where there is no overt threat.341 The specific ‘means’ (such 
as coercion) through which consent may be invalidated in the context of human 
trafficking for sexual exploitation will be considered in depth at a later point in this 
thesis.342 
 
ii. Consent must be ‘Informed’ 
 
As stated in the District of Columbia Court of Appeal case Canterbury v Spence, ‘[t]rue 
consent to what happens to one’s self is the informed exercise of a choice, and that 
entails an opportunity to evaluate knowledgeably the options available and the risks 
attendant upon each.’343 This statement was made in the context of medical treatment, 
yet the basic premise has further reach than purely a medical context. Is it possible to 
achieve a fixed point on a spectrum of what qualifies as ‘informed’? This may be 
conceptually and evidentially difficult. There is no settled legal meaning of the term 
‘informed consent’,344 and accordingly the standard may vary according to context. 
Nonetheless, one cannot escape the fact that a valid consent must be an informed 
consent. It is, therefore, necessary to consider what qualifies as informed, which will 
involve consideration of various different areas of the law where informed consent may 
be treated differently. 
                                                 
341 See, for example, Olugboja [1981] All ER 443, where the rape victim submitted to sexual intercourse 
through fear, without the defendant using force or making any threats or violence. 
342 See Chapter 2. 
343 464 F 2d 772 (DC Cir 1972). 
344 M Jones, ‘Informed Consent And Other Fairy Stories’, (1999) Medical Law Review 1999.7(103) 1. 
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        In order for consent to operate as a procedural justification for doing 
‘something’,345 the consenting individual must know what she is consenting to. Early 
domestic case law in the UK seemed to indicate that consent could operate as a defence 
even where the consenting party was unaware of, for example, the fact that she would 
be exposed to an incidental risk of injury.346 Subsequent case law347 took a different 
approach – in order for a person to give a valid consent, they must know the ‘nature and 
quality’ of that to which they are consenting. This indicates that consent to a particular 
something does not equate to consent to incidental ‘extras’, the risk of which the 
consenting agent was unaware and therefore uninformed – nonetheless, the consent to 
the original ‘action’ remains valid – the principle here is simply that the consent does 
not extend beyond the exact particulars of the ‘action’.348      
        Deception as to the act consented to unquestionably invalidates consent.349 Where 
information is withheld which would be considered material and important to the 
decision making process (of the consenting agent), any consent given to the specified 
act cannot be considered to be informed. This in turn would mean that there was no 
valid consent – it was vitiated; damaged; no longer subsisting. The seriousness of the 
outcome is therefore linked to the importance placed upon valid consent. Implied 
consent may be sufficient for minor risks, but not risks of a serious magnitude.350  
                                                 
345 D Beyleveld, and R Brownsword, n 321, 5. 
346 Notably in R v Clarence [1888] 22 QBD 23, the court determined that the wife’s consent to sex also 
extended to any incidental risk of injury which arose from having consensual sex; namely, catching 
gonorrhoea. 
347 Such as R v Dica EWCA Crim 1103, [2004] QB 1257. This case involved consent to sexual 
intercourse, but not to the transmission of HIV, the presence of which in the defendant the victims were 
unaware. 
348 See, for example, R v B [2006] EWCA Crim 2945, where the court held that the complainant’s 
consent to sexual intercourse was not invalidated by her ignorance of the Defendant’s status as 
HIV positive, so there could be no rape on that basis. 
349 See, for example, R v Williams [1923] 1 KB 340, where a choirmaster was found guilty of rape where 
he had sexual intercourse with a girl to whom he was giving singing lessons, under the pretence that her 
breathing was not quite right and that he had to perform an operation to enable her to produce her voice 
properly. 
350 Implied consent is not likely to often be a factor in trafficking cases, and therefore will not be further 
discussed here. 
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        It is clearly complex to determine what qualifies as informed when the information 
relates directly to the agreement. It is useful here to look to other areas of the law which 
employ a notion of informed consent. The notion of ‘free and informed’ consent is 
specifically mentioned and elaborated upon in the Council of Europe’s Convention on 
Human Rights and Biomedicine,351 and requires that the individual concerned be given 
‘appropriate information as to the purpose and nature (of the intervention) as well as its 
consequences and risks.’(Emphasis added)352  
        The Explanatory Report to that Convention emphasises the autonomy of the 
patient and makes clear reference to restraining ‘the paternalistic approaches which 
might ignore the wish of the patient.’353 The Report builds on this by emphasising the 
importance of presenting the information clearly to the patient, using terminology that 
she can understand, which she can use to weigh up the necessity and usefulness against 
the potential risks. In a medical context, it has been stated that ‘...once the patient is 
informed in broad terms of the nature of the procedure which is intended, and gives her 
consent, that consent is real.’354  
        Jones states that ‘[t]he underlying ethical principle of informed consent is that one 
should respect the patient’s autonomy: the capacity to think, decide and act on one’s 
own thoughts and decisions freely and independently.’355 The ability to make such 
decisions depends on information about the chosen course of conduct, and the ability to 
assess this information, ‘i.e. the capacity to act autonomously.’356 The EU Charter on 
fundamental rights includes in Article 3 the right to integrity of the person, and 
                                                 
351 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Dignity of the Human Being with regard to the 
Application of Biology and Medicine: Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine (adopted 4 April 
1997, entered into force 1 Dec 1999, Oviedo, 4. IV.1997, Council of Europe Treaty Series – No. 164). 
352 Article 5. 
353 Explanatory Report to the Council of Europe’s Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine, para 
34. 
354 Chatterton v Gerson [1981] Q.B. 432. 
355 M Jones, n 344, 8. 
356 Ibid. 
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paragraph 2 specifically states that ‘In the fields of medicine and biology, the following 
must be respected in particular: the free and informed consent of the person concerned.’ 
Clearly, where physical and mental integrity is concerned, a high standard of free and 
informed consent may be required.  
        That there is social utility in medical intervention in the majority of cases is 
undisputed here. There is long-standing debate between legal and medical professionals 
as to the correct approach to informed consent in a medical context357 - understandably 
so where self determination and bodily integrity are concerned. Whether or not one 
agrees with a paternal stance of ‘Doctor knows best’, it is possible to sympathise with 
the origins of such an argument. The autonomy of the consenting agent where 
exploitation is the act consented to is a difficult matter which merits further discussion 
– this will be revisited in Chapter 3 with specific focus on trafficking for sexual 
exploitation. 
        The notion of informed consent features to varying extents in aspects of family 
law, and contract law – the examples used here are not mutually exclusive. For 
example, before an adoption order can be made, all persons with parental responsibility 
or guardianship must ‘freely, and with full understanding of what is involved, agree(s) 
unconditionally.’358 Clearly, pressure from, for example, an adoption agency 
invalidates ‘freely’ given consent. Consent could not be considered to be ‘informed’ if 
adoption was agreed to on the basis of a fundamental mistake, such as in Re M (A 
Minor) (Adoption)359 where a father agreed to an adoption of his child by his ex wife 
and her husband, yet unbeknown to him his wife was in fact terminally ill, and died 
shortly after conclusion of the adoption. The missing information would have been 
material to the decision making of the father, therefore his consent could not be 
                                                 
357 See, for example M Jones, ibid, and D Beyleveld, and R Brownsword, n 321. 
358 J Herring, Family Law, (Longman, Pearson Education Limited 2001) 542. 
359 [1991] 1FLR 458. 
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considered to be informed. Furthermore, informed consent in this context concerns 
close personal relationships and persons in need of care and protection (i.e. children) 
and, therefore, it is desirable to ask for a high standard of informed consent in terms of 
all facts which may be material to the decision making of the consenting agent. 
                                                
        Similarly, consent to marry can be rendered voidable by ‘duress, mistake, 
unsoundness of mind or otherwise’.360 Mistake in particular goes toward the notion of 
informed consent – yet the categories of mistake capable of invalidating consent to 
marriage (and therefore rendering a marriage voidable, but not yet void) are limited. 
Primarily, there may be mistake as to the identity of the partner to be married,361 and 
secondly there may be mistake as to the nature of the ceremony.362 In neither situation 
can the consent given be considered to be informed. Fraud or misrepresentation which 
lead to a mistake can also invalidate consent and render a marriage voidable. 
        Furthermore, where marital separation is concerned, consent orders may be made. 
If parties have reached agreement prior to the making of a consent order, then the court 
will hold a contested hearing and then take the agreement into account.363 Although 
there is a strong presumption in each case that the court will implement the 
agreement,364 it is recognised that ‘there could be some circumstances when a party 
should not be bound by their agreement: namely where there was duress, undue 
influence, unforeseen circumstances, or injustice.’365 In particular, the category of 
‘unforeseen circumstances’ goes toward the validity of consent in that it cannot be 
considered to be ‘informed’ in that instance. As with the abovementioned example, 
 
360 Article 16(2) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1984 (adopted 10 December 1948 UNGA 
Res 217 A(III) ( hereafter ‘UDHR’) states that ‘Marriage shall be entered into only with the free will and 
full consent of the intending spouses.’ 
361 See for example Militante v Ogunwomoju [1993] 2FCR 355. 
362 J Herring, n 358, 51, and see for example Valier v Valier [1925] 133 LT 830. 
363 See Edgar v Edgar [1980] 2 FLR 19 CA. 
364 Although the court should still consider all the circumstances of the case: Smith v Smith [2000] 3 FCR 
374. 
365 J Herring, n 358, 207. 
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these areas of the law concern personal relationships and therefore inherently sensitive 
issues. Consequently, a high standard of informed consent may be called for. Because 
the situations above involve intense relationships and significant interventions of a 
personal kind, the reality of consent seems particularly important. It may not be quite so 
crucial in economic matters, such as are regulated by the law of contract. 
        A choice to enter a contract must be an informed choice, in that ‘[t]he background 
informational obligations must be discharged, and so on.’366 The rules for informed 
consent in contract law ‘function … to ground procedural justification in relation to the 
agreement reached.’367 Consent in a contractual sense may be invalidated (in that the 
contract may be invalidated) by, for example, mental incapacity, duress,368 or undue 
influence. Bix notes that:  
 
There is too much at stake – to those seeking to enter agreements as well as 
to third parties – to set the bar too high too often on contractual consent. 
Among other problems, making too many commercial transactions subject 
to serious challenge on consent/voluntariness grounds would undermine the 
predictability of enforcement that is needed for vibrant economic 
activity.369  
 
        Transactions which are purely commercial contracts for ‘goods’ are more at ‘arm’s 
length’ when compared to the abovementioned different aspects and areas of law where 
                                                 
366 D Beyleveld, and R Brownsword, n 321, 178. 
367 Ibid, 179. 
368 Duress occurs where ‘where the doctrinal rule allows a party to void a contract if it can show an 
appropriate combination of wrongful threat on the part of the other contracting party, and a lack of 
reasonable alternatives to entering the contract on its own part.’ See B Bix, The Ethics of Consent: 
Theory and Practice, A Wertheimer, Franklin G, Miller (eds) Forthcoming, Minnesota Legal Studies 
Research Paper No. 08-36, 2, 7, See also H Beale (Ed), Chitty on Contracts 30th edition: Volume 1 - 
General Principles (Sweet & Maxwell ltd 2008) 7. 
369 B Bix, ibid, 5. 
 96
some form of informed consent doctrine is invoked, such as marriage or adoption, and 
is less likely to concern personal relationships or bodily integrity in the way that 
medical intervention, certain family law matters, and exploitative sex work can do. 
Where the relationship between the transported woman and the trafficker is of an 
economic nature, we might want not to impose too strict a standard of consent,370 were 
it not for the sometimes awful consequences which may befall those caught up in the 
trafficking environment. 
        On the one hand, ‘consent, in terms of voluntary choice, is – or, at least, appears to 
be or purports to be - at the essence of contract law.’371 Yet, In a contractual sense, a 
judge may find that even in the absence of (full) consent, a transaction should be 
enforced, and vice versa:372 ‘the level or kind of consent that might be sufficient to 
ground enforcement in one type of situation may not be sufficient in another.’373 
        Undue influence may be particularly pertinent to the discussion of informed 
consent here. As stated succinctly by Beale, ‘[t]he equitable doctrine of undue influence 
is a comprehensive phrase covering cases in which a transaction between two parties 
who are in a relationship of trust and confidence may be set aside if the transaction is 
the result of an abuse of the relationship.’374 The doctrine is necessarily broad - Lord 
Chelmsford LC stated in Tate that ‘[t]he courts have always been careful not to fetter 
this useful jurisdiction by defining the exact limits of its exercise’.375 In 1887, Lindley 
LJ asked ‘Is it that it is right and expedient to save persons from the consequences of 
their own folly? or (sic) is it that it is right and expedient to save them from being 
                                                 
370 See, Chapter 3, Part I, for discussion of the identified requirements of a valid consent specifically 
applied in the context of human trafficking. 
371 B Bix, n 368, 1. 
372 Ibid, 2. 
373 Ibid, 5. 
374 H Beale (Ed), Chitty on Contracts 30th edition: Volume 1 - General Principles (Sweet & Maxwell ltd 
2008) 56. 
375 Tate v Williamson (1866) L.R. 2 Ch.App. 55, para 61. See. also Winder (1940) 3 M.L.R. 97; Royal 
Bank of Scotland v Etridge (No.2) [2001] UKHL 44, [2002] 2 A.C. 773 para 6. 
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victimised by other people?’376 Clearly, there is an issue as regards how informed one 
has to be within the context of undue influence. 
        Where there is an allegation of undue influence, it is necessary to show that the 
influenced party acted with ‘free’ and ‘informed’ consent. In Etridge, (a combined 
appeal of eight cases) which is a central case here, a wife sought to challenge a 
transaction into which she had entered on the basis of her husband's undue influence, 
but, ‘their relationship did not fall within a special category of case where an 
irrebuttable presumption of trust and confidence arose.’377 Lord Nicholls – with the 
support of the other lordships – referred in that case to ‘the taking of unfair 
advantage’,378 ‘misuse’ of influence,379 and ‘abuse of trust and confidence’.380 Undue 
influence may occur not only where the defendant pressured the claimant or subjected 
her to excessive persuasion, ‘but also it seems if the defendant abused the claimant's 
trust by making a decision for her rather than allowing her to make her own 
decision.’381  
        The reasoning of the court in Etridge can be summarised thus:  
 
Where a wife proposed to charge her interest in the matrimonial home in 
favour of a bank as security for her husband's indebtedness or the 
indebtedness of his company, her solicitor would have to explain the nature 
and consequences of the transaction and the seriousness of the risk 
                                                 
376 Allcard v Skinner (1885) 36 Ch D 145, at p. 182. 
377 Royal Bank of Scotland v Etridge (No.2) [2001] UKHL 44; [2002] 2 A.C. 773. 
378 Ibid, para 8. 
379 Ibid, para 9. 
380 Ibid, para 10. 
381 H Beale (Ed), n 374, 56. 
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involved, but he would not have to be satisfied that the wife was free of 
undue influence.382  
 
And, apparently:  
 
The most that a bank could be expected to do, was to take reasonable steps 
to satisfy itself that the practical consequences of the proposed transaction 
had been clearly explained; the decision whether to proceed with the 
transaction or not had to rest with the wife and it was not a solicitor's role to 
intervene and attempt to prevent the transaction even if it was thought not to 
be in her best interests.383  
 
Therefore, if the wife is not fully informed as to the particulars, and accordingly she 
cannot be said to have consented in an ‘informed’ manner, she may still be held to the 
contract. It was stated in that case that:  
 
In holding the balance fairly between the vulnerability of the wife who 
relies implicitly on her husband and the problems for financial institutions 
asked to accept a secured or unsecured surety obligation from her for her 
husband's debts, it has not been assumed that in the ordinary case the wife 
would necessarily be separately advised at all, or that even in probable 
undue influence cases the lender should make the taking of separate advice 
a condition, irrespective of its quality: see the O'Brien case [1994] 1 AC 
180. That balance preserves the economic value of residential property as 
                                                 
382 Royal Bank of Scotland v Etridge (No.2) [2001] UKHL 44; [2002] 2 A.C. 773, Case analysis, 
Westlaw UK. 
383 Ibid. 
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security for lending purposes for small businesses and protects wives in 
appropriate cases.384  
 
This ‘balance’ referred to is morally if not legally questionable, and the lack of a 
requirement for separate and full advice for the wife is open to criticism – her consent 
cannot be considered to be fully informed if she does not have all the facts, particularly 
where there may be a substantial risk of financial loss. However, such economic loss 
due to lack of informed consent is still – although morally questionable – at more of an 
‘arm’s length’ nature than in some other areas of the law where an informed consent 
doctrine is applied. Clearly, different types of consent agreements create different types 
of relationships, in which cases the standard or notion of informed consent may be 
treated differently.  
        Knowledge – as to the act consented to - is the key element here as regards 
informed consent. The cases considered in this section show an important aspect of the 
consent inquiry – it goes to the nature of the decision-making, not to its quality. The 
question is not, ‘Was that a good or bad decision?’ but, ‘Was that decision reached 
freely and on an informed basis?’ We should try to avoid too easily saying a woman did 
not consent because things (perhaps foreseeably) turned out badly. If a consenting agent 
has sufficient information to understand what she is consenting to and to weigh up the 
merits or otherwise of the act, she has the tools to make a decision which can be 
considered to be consensual and informed. Yet, ‘[t]he significance of consent to an 
individual, and to the society that must decide whether to give effect to it, depends on 
the circumstances in which it is elicited.’385 The importance of this statement will 
                                                 
384 Etridge (No.2) (n 377) 790. 
385 P H Schuck ‘Rethinking Informed Consent’ (1994) Yale Faculty Scholarship Series, Paper 2765, 906. 
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become clearer throughout the discussion of informed consent in the context of human 
trafficking which will take place in Chapter 3. 
 
iii. Capacity and Understanding 
 
The consenting agent must have the capacity to give consent, and to understand that to 
which she is consenting. Essentially, a person – in any context - ‘will not have had the 
capacity to agree by choice where their understanding and knowledge were so limited 
that they were not in a position to decide whether or not to agree.’386 Beyleveld and 
Brownsword provide some insight here: 
 
If the conditions for an authentic consent are that it is given freely and on an 
informed basis (however these conditions are interpreted), then the logic is 
that the specification of a ‘subject of consent’ – that is, one having the 
relevant capacity (or competence) to consent – will reflect these conditions. 
This means, first, that a person with a capacity to consent will be capable of 
forming their own judgements and making their own decisions free from 
the influence or opinion of others; and, secondly, that such a person will be 
able to understand and apply the information that is material to their 
decision.387 
 
This clearly relates to mental capacity to understand and process information, and to 
use the information when making an informed decision. Where mental capacity to do 
                                                 
386 P Rook Q.C and R Ward, Rook and Ward on Sexual Offences: Law and Practice (3. rd. Ed, Sweet & 
Maxwell, 2003), at para 1.94. 
387 D Beyleveld, and R Brownsword, n 321, 12. 
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so is lacking, consent cannot be considered to be valid. Adults may be assumed to have 
the capacity to consent, but this can be rebutted.388  
        As regards minors (those under 18 years of age, according to UK law),389 the basic 
position is that the capacity of those aged under 16 to consent to, say, sexual 
intercourse, is not legally recognised.390 There is however a somewhat nuanced 
position in medical law terms, as the principle of ‘Gillick Competence’391 indicates. It 
is undisputed here that there is a sound basis for legal restrictions as regards the 
recognition of capacity of minors to consent – such measures are protective. 
 
iv. The Timing of Consent 
 
The timing of consent is a relevant factor when determining a valid consent. In a 1998 
Report the Law Commission stated as regards this matter that: 
 
… an agreement to an act should not be regarded as a consent to that act 
unless it is subsisting at the relevant time. If what is relied on is past 
agreement, this will mean both (a) that, when previously given, the 
agreement must have extended to the doing of the act at that later time, and 
(b) that it must not have been withdrawn in the meantime.392 
 
                                                 
388 This point was made by Butler-Sloss LJ in the context of medical treatment in Re MB (Medical 
Treatment) [1997] 2 FLR 426. 
389 Family Law Reform Act 1969, s.1. 
390 SOA 2003, s.10. 
391 The elasticity of consent in terms of legal acceptance of capacity to consent is demonstrated by the 
1985 Gillick case in the United Kingdom where a Lords majority ruled upon the potential capacity of 
under 16s to make their own decisions about medical treatment - See Gillick v West Norfolk and Wisbech 
Area Health Authority [1985] 3 All ER 402. 
392 The Law Commission, n 323, para 2.11. 
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This clearly indicates that consent to the doing of ‘something’ must exist at the time of 
the act. As a basic principle, then, consent can be withdrawn at any time. UK domestic 
case law has confirmed this in the specific context of consent to sexual intercourse.393 
Similarly, in a medical law context, consent can be withdrawn even after the signing of 
a consent form. This position is more desirable than any alternative, as to hold an agent 
to a past consent would in some situations clearly be unacceptable (save, for example, 
where a binding contract had been entered). 
        
Conclusion 
 
Human trafficking continues as a result of a melting pot of factors which link supply 
and demand. It is clear that the factors underlying the continuance of this activity in 
Europe - and worldwide - are many, and rest largely, although not exclusively, on 
poverty and lack of opportunity. The supply side is maintained through factors which 
are largely economic and gender-based; the economic marginalisation of women in 
impoverished regions, and the discrimination and lack of access to basic rights suffered 
by the same women. These various factors serve to ensure that a continual source of 
migrants is available to be smuggled, trafficked, or ‘consensually’ trafficked for the 
purpose of exploitation. Whether the individuals involved have in fact been smuggled, 
trafficked, or something in between the two, it seems clear that as long as these ‘push’ 
factors exist, and as long as the demand for sold sex exists, there will be a global 
business in sex trafficking and facilitated migration for the purposes of working in the 
sex trade. 
                                                 
393 See Kaitamaki v R [1984] 3 WLR 137 (PC) where it was confirmed that a person may withdraw 
consent to intercourse at any time, including whilst intercourse is taking place. 
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        These ‘push’ factors, however, do not work alone to perpetuate exploitative illicit 
migration. The economic and social factors underpinning this activity are exacerbated 
by the presence of OCGs who see an opportunity for financial gain caused by the 
demand for sold sex in certain countries. The demand ensures a continuous search for 
more potential victims, whether these victims are recruited through kidnap, deception, 
or other means. Corruption within law enforcement institutions also plays a significant 
part, as does border control, and increased ease of travel and communication as a result 
of globalisation. The evidence indicates that although routes and transit countries can 
be identified at given times, the routes will continually change in response to their 
discovery and any subsequent interruption of trafficking activities.  
        A comprehensive strategy to combat human trafficking needs to come from all 
angles. These many and varied factors require a variety of legal and non legal 
responses, ranging from a legislative response which criminalises the traffickers, to 
measures geared toward prevention in countries of origin, transit, and destination. It is 
clear that a multi-pronged attack is necessary, which involves not only the 
criminalisation of traffickers and protection of victims, but international cooperation 
and coordination on what action to take. The legal anti-trafficking regime outlined in 
Part II of this Chapter indicates an increasing willingness by affected States to take part 
in a coordinated and effective international (and national) response to the trafficking 
phenomenon; thereby strengthening the anti-trafficking regime and moving ever closer 
to as unified a system as possible -  a system which not only provides for prosecution 
and punishment of traffickers, but also prevention of trafficking activity and the 
provision of support, assistance and protection to victims. 
        Sex trafficking is an example of serious non-consensual exploitation, which sees 
the perpetrators taking advantage of some of the most economically marginalised 
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sections of society. Either way, the empirical evidence considered throughout this 
Chapter suggests that many of the individual migrants concerned at least embark upon 
their journey on a consensual basis; consenting to work in the sex trade, consenting to 
migrate and work in the sex trade, or initially consenting to the trafficking process with 
consent being rendered ineffective by deception or some other form of ‘means’. 
        The concept of consent is clearly central to determinations of who is, and who is 
not, a victim of human trafficking. These issues, therefore, are central to the inquiry 
made by this thesis and justify the focus on consent and victims of trafficking for 
exploitative facilitated migration. Although State obligations beyond solely those 
relating to victims are an integral part of the anti-trafficking regime, they are not central 
to this thesis and therefore will not be covered any further than they have been in this 
Chapter. 
        This Chapter has examined the contextual and legal background to human 
trafficking, including consideration of the ‘push’ factors underlying the continuance of 
human trafficking, and the influence of organised crime. The international anti-
trafficking regime has been outlined, as have the obligations placed upon States by said 
regime, as well as the elements of the regime which are persuasive rather than 
obligatory.394 Furthermore, the notion of consent, which is integral to the enquiry made 
by this thesis, has been introduced and defined, and considered in a variety of legal 
contexts so that those which most aid the detailed analysis of the role of consent in 
human trafficking in Chapter 3 can be referred back to and drawn upon further.  
                                                 
394 For example, where Article 6(3) of the UN Trafficking Protocol asks that Parties ‘consider 
implementing measures to provide for the physical, psychological and social recovery of victims of 
trafficking in persons’ (Emphasis added). See Part II, Section B, subsection ii, of this Chapter, above. As 
the discussion in that subsection indicates, the more encompassing provisions of the CoE Trafficking 
Convention – which the UK has ratified – place more solid obligations upon State Parties as regards 
victim support, assistance, and protection, as does the EU 2011 Directive, to which the UK Government 
has indicated an intention to opt in. 
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        Now we know what States must do, it is necessary to examine what trafficking is 
in a legal sense,395 which will in turn pave the way for discussion of why the issue of 
consent396 is so fundamentally important if adequate protection of vulnerable parties 
and victims is to be successfully achieved.397 For criminal cooperation and human 
rights compliant measures to be possible, it has been necessary to reach legal consensus 
as to exactly what human trafficking consists of. This transnational activity requires 
transnational response, the starting point for which is an internationally agreed 
definition of what constitutes ‘trafficking in humans’. This will now be discussed in 
Chapter 2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
395 Discussed in Chapter 2. 
396 Discussed in Chapter 3.  
397 Discussed in Chapter 4. 
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Chapter 2 
Human Trafficking: The Evolution of an International Legal 
Definition 
 
Introduction 
  
Trafficking activity has prompted a variety of concerns and a variety of responses on 
international and national levels. Initial concerns States might have about unlawful 
entry itself into their territory are exacerbated by matters of national border security, the 
connections with organised crime, and the highly exploitative purpose of trafficking. 
Economic globalisation and the breaking down of political and geographical borders 
have facilitated labour migration in recent years. Migrants – regardless of gender - are 
increasingly seeking the means to move in order to work in a more lucrative and 
economically stable environment, in order to improve their standard of living. This 
myriad of people may have crossed international borders legally or illegally, they may 
be working in the destination State legally or illegally, and they may have other or 
additional reasons for doing so than work alone.  
        Some will have fully anticipated and consented to what is in store for them, while 
others will have been deceived about the manner in which their transport will be 
arranged or the nature of their prospective employment on arrival in the host state. It is 
necessary to ask what exactly it is about these differing processes and objectives which 
makes some of them ‘trafficking’ in the legal sense. As will be discussed throughout 
this Chapter, various international anti-trafficking and anti-slavery instruments have, 
over the past century, used differing and changing definitions and frameworks of 
 107
understanding as to exactly what constitutes ‘trafficking in persons’. The definition of 
human trafficking has evolved over time. The current position is represented in the 
various instruments outlined in Chapter 1.398  
        As has been explained, at the beginning of this century, the UN Trafficking 
Protocol provided us with a comprehensive definition which has been adopted in 
subsequent anti-trafficking instruments. Following two years of negotiations at the UN 
Centre for International Crime Prevention in Vienna, the Protocol was signed by over 
80 Countries in December 2000. This represents the first globally accepted definition of 
‘trafficking in persons’, with the same definition reproduced verbatim in the recent CoE 
Trafficking Convention,399 and almost the same in the recent EU 2011 Directive,400 
(which varies only through the explicit inclusion of ‘begging’ as a form of exploitation 
– specifically under the umbrella of ‘forced labour’ - sufficient to make transportation 
for this purpose ‘trafficking’).  
        The definition provided by these instruments is of a more detailed and technical 
nature than those previously offered, extending the ‘purpose’ element of human 
trafficking and raising the matter of the relevance of consent (or lack thereof) of the 
victim. Because it is central to the discussion in this Chapter, it is useful to replicate the 
definition here, with the minor variation provided within the EU 2011 Directive being 
included in brackets. Accordingly, ‘Trafficking in persons’ is: 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
398 See Chapter 1, Part II, section A, subsection i, which addresses the three main instruments considered 
throughout this thesis – the UN Trafficking Protocol, the CoE Trafficking Convention, and the EU 2011 
Directive, which form the legal ‘anti-trafficking regime’. 
399 Article 4. 
400 Article 2. 
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 The recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, 
by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of 
abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of 
vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to 
achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the 
purpose of exploitation. 
Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution 
of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour or services, 
(including begging) slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the 
removal of organs….. 
 
        The definition goes on to state that consent (to the exploitation) is irrelevant where 
any of the means set out in the above paragraph are employed, and that it is not 
necessary to prove that any of those means were employed where a child is concerned, 
a child being any person under eighteen years of age.401 
        Human trafficking can therefore be broken down into three elements: the ‘action’ 
of recruitment, transportation etc, the ‘means’ of coercion of force etc, and the 
‘purpose’ - that of ‘exploitation’ - which is expanded upon by a non-exhaustive list of 
what may constitute ‘exploitation’. Therefore, trafficking is, by definition, a tripartite 
process, and all the elements of the definition must be present in order for activity to 
come within the scope of the definition.    
        The aim of this Chapter is to analyse - in greater detail than previously done in the 
thesis - exactly what trafficking is according to current internationally accepted legal 
                                                 
401 The notion of consent in the specific context of human trafficking raises a multitude of problems and 
issues which merit in-depth discussion; consequently the role of consent in human trafficking will be 
dealt with in a subsequent Chapter – Chapter 3. 
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definition. This will be achieved through tracing the development of legal definitions of 
trafficking and evaluating these definitions in terms of the three elements outlined 
above; the ‘action’, ‘means’, and ‘purpose’. Part I serves to give a very brief overview 
of the development of the relevant instruments addressing trafficking and slavery over 
the past hundred years, to show how we have reached the definition in use today. Part II 
discusses the first element mentioned above: the ‘action’, and its component parts. In 
Part III, the ‘means’ element of trafficking will be analysed. Part IV will deal with the 
final element of the process: the ‘purpose’ of ‘exploitation’.  
 
I. Frameworks of Understanding: The Changing Face of ‘Trafficking’ 
 
Human trafficking has, for the most part, been dealt with by specific instruments and/or 
provisions specifically targeting trafficking, allowing for wider and less technical 
notions of ‘exploitation’ to be caught by the anti-trafficking instruments, rather than 
being subsumed by anti-slavery legislation. Some of these anti-trafficking instruments 
merely contain prohibitions402 others contain a specific definition of ‘trafficking in 
persons.’403  
        This is without doubt the correct approach, for to simply equate trafficking and 
slavery is incorrect and provides an incomplete picture of the scope of trafficking. 
Anyway, the slave trade is the correct analogy, as opposed to slavery. For the purposes 
of this discussion, it must be accepted that slavery goes beyond formal slavery (that is a 
status – one persons being owned as property by another - identified and permitted by 
                                                 
402 Such as The Convention on the Elimination of All forms of Discrimination Against Women 
(CEDAW), 1980, Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 14. (Opened for signature in 1980, entry into force in 
September 1981), Article 6, and the Convention on the Rights of the Child, (adopted and opened for 
signature, ratification and accession by General Assembly resolution 44/25 of 20 November 1989, 
entered into force 2 September 1990), Article 35. 
403 Such as the three main instruments (the UN trafficking Protocol, the CoE Trafficking Convention, and 
the EU 2011 Directive) which form the anti-trafficking regime which is discussed throughout the thesis. 
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law) to include de facto slavery, the treatment of one person by another, private person 
which, while being illegal in national law, does not have the effect of altering the legal 
status of the victim, simply creating conditions analogous to those of one who is held as 
a slave.  
        Secondly, trafficking, and the slave trade, are both processes, but the elements of 
these processes differ at points. Slavery may be a ‘purpose’ element of either process - 
that is to say, it can occur as an end result of each (and clearly must be for anti-slave 
trade instruments). The definition of trafficking, however, goes much further than anti-
slavery legislation in that it envisages a broad spectrum of activities which constitute 
the ‘exploitation’ which can occur as an end result (or ‘purpose’) of the trafficking 
process, such as slavery-like practices and forced labour. This kind of exploitation, 
combined with elements of movement of people and their control through ‘means’ such 
as coercion, constitutes human trafficking as currently understood. 
        The purpose of this discussion for the thesis is to establish so far as is possible the 
scope and parameters of trafficking activity, and its parallels with slavery (one of the 
commonly accepted characteristics of which is that a person may not consent to be 
made a slave and, of increasing importance, with respect to which States accept positive 
obligations to protect the victims). This will be done in order to provide a broader 
framework of understanding of the existence and evolution of the different types of 
human exploitation (consensual and non-consensual) which have become increasingly 
prevalent in recent years as a result of the recognition of trafficking activity, and the 
development of a definition of human trafficking. This will in turn facilitate detailed 
analysis of the role of consent within that framework, to be discussed in Chapter 3.  
        The earliest trafficking-specific instruments preceded the League of Nations 
Convention to Suppress the Slave Trade and Slavery, 1926 (1926 Slavery 
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Convention).404 The move to address sex trafficking began with the International 
Agreement for the Suppression of the ‘White Slave Traffic’ of 18 May 1904 (1904 
Agreement),405 which was primarily concerned with Governmental coordination of 
information concerning ‘the procuring of women or girls for immoral purposes abroad’. 
Subsequently, the International Convention for the Suppression of the ‘White Slave 
Traffic’ (1910 Trafficking Convention)406 was signed on 4 May 1910. The preamble 
speaks of suppression of the activity known as ‘White Slave Traffic’ - the application 
of these early instruments merely to the ‘slave traffick’ of white people reflected the 
concern at the time over European women being recruited and exported for work in 
brothels.407 
        A lack of definitional clarity in early instruments means that the term ‘trafficking’ 
was to an extent used without discrimination; the meaning of the term was complicated 
by use of the terminology ‘white slave traffic’ in the 1904 Agreement and the 1910 
Trafficking Convention, which heavily implies a cross over between the slave trade and 
the process of trafficking. Notably, the 1910 Trafficking Convention explicitly uses the 
word ‘slave’ in the Convention’s title, yet does not refer to ‘slave’, ‘slavery’ or ‘slave 
trade’ in the definition provided in Article 1,408 thereby raising somewhat of a question 
mark as to the suitability of the use of ‘slave’ in the title. 
                                                 
404 League of Nations Convention to Suppress the Slave Trade and Slavery (Signed at Geneva on 25 
September 1926, into force 9 March 1927, in accordance with article 12) 60 LNTS 253, Registered No. 
1414. 
405 International Agreement for the Suppression of the ‘White Slave Traffic (18 May 1904, entered in to 
force 18 July 1905) 35. stat. 1979, 1. LNTS. 83 (hereafter ‘1904 Agreement’). 
406 International Convention for the Suppression of the "White Slave Traffic" (May 4, 1910) 211 Consol. 
T.S. 45, 1912 GR. Brit. T.S. No. 20 (hereafter ‘1910 Trafficking Convention’), as amended by Protocol 
Amending the International Agreement for the Suppression of the White Slave Traffic, and Amending 
the International Convention for the Suppression of the White Slave Traffic (May 4 1949) 2 U.S.T. 1999, 
30 U.N.T.S. 23 (entered into force June 21, 1951). 
407 C H Hauge, ‘Prostitution of Women and International Human Rights Law: Transforming Exploitation 
into Equality’ (1995) 8 New York International Law Review 23, 34.  
408 Article 1 of the 1910 Trafficking Convention provides the following definition: ‘Whoever, in order to 
gratify the passions of another person, has procured, enticed, or led away, even with her consent, a 
woman or girl under age, for immoral purposes, shall be punished, notwithstanding that the various acts 
constituting the offence may have been committed in different countries’. Article 2 replicates the 
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        Further trafficking-specific legislation came into existence in 1933, when the 
International Convention on the Suppression of the Traffic in Women of Full Age 
(1933 Trafficking Convention)409 was signed. The instrument had the effect of 
extending pre-existing treaties to women of full age who had been trafficked, even with 
their consent. This Convention, drafted after the Slavery Convention, moved away from 
that employed in earlier trafficking Conventions, and avoided terminology such as 
‘slave’ and ‘slavery’.410 
        The abovementioned traffick-specific treaties were consolidated in 1949 with the 
enactment of the Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Persons and of the 
Exploitation of Prostitution of Others, 1949411 (1949 Trafficking Convention) which 
drew upon the language used in the 1910 Trafficking Convention.412 Prostitution was 
considered legal under the 1949 Convention, thus the emphasis was taken away from 
the perceived immorality of prostitution and prostitutes, and placed upon punishment of 
those responsible for the trafficking. 
        Ordinary dictionary definitions give a representation of how the term ‘trafficking’ 
was/is viewed in a non-legal sense, according to popular understanding. In the 
narrowest sense, trafficking is defined as ‘the transportation of merchandise for the 
                                                                                                                                                        
definition to an extent, but takes it further by doing away with the statement ‘even with her consent’ and 
instead including a list of ‘means’ which must be proven to have been employed by the trafficker: ‘by 
fraud, or by means of violence, threats, abuse of authority, or any other method of compulsion’. 
409 International Convention on the Suppression of the Traffic in Women of Full Age (11 October 1933, 
entered into force 24 August 1934) 150 L.T.S. 431 (hereafter ‘1933 Traffic Convention’). 
410 Article 1 of the 1933 Traffic Convention provides the following definition: ‘Whoever, in order to 
gratify the passions of another person, has procured, enticed or led away even with her consent, a woman 
or girl of full age for immoral purposes to be carried out in another country, shall be punished, 
notwithstanding that the various acts constituting the offence may have been committed in different 
countries.’ 
411 Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Persons and of the Exploitation of Prostitution of 
Others (approved by General Assembly resolution 317(IV) of 2 December 1949, entered into force 25 
July 1951) (hereafter ‘1949 Trafficking Convention’). 
412 Article 1 of the 1949 Trafficking Convention contains the following definition: ‘The Parties to the 
present Convention agree to punish any person who, to gratify the passions of another: (1) Procures, 
entices or leads away, for purposes of prostitution, another person, even with the consent of that person; 
(2) Exploits the prostitution of another person, even with the consent of that person.’ 
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purpose of trade’,413 with the object of trafficking being ‘saleable commodities’.414 The 
key, with regard to human trafficking, is in the word ‘commodities’; trade being done 
in objects or products which could be bought and sold, and ultimately disposed of, at 
the will of those involved in the commerce. Some non-legal definitions go further, 
referring to trafficking as ‘[to] deal or trade in something illegal’,415 thereby implying 
exchanges of a covert and clandestine nature, a form of trade which could be applied 
equally to drugs, arms, humans or other relevant subjects.  
        The term has historically been applied to the buying and selling of humans. 
Writings from the early 17th Century refer to ‘[t]hose which made it a trafficke to buy 
and sell slaves’,416 thus making a link between the trade in slaves and use of the term 
‘trafficking’. Historical use of the word also demonstrates a link between trafficking 
and migrant prostitutes: ‘These traffickes, these common truls I mean, walke 
abroad.’417 This perceived link follows the same route as early traffick-specific legal 
instruments, which assumed that the paradigmatic trafficked victim would be a female 
who was kidnapped, transported across the globe, and forced in to prostitution or sex 
work.  
        Since the drafting of early legal instruments, the word ‘traffick’ has, in legal fora, 
consistently been applied to the movement of a person from one location to another for 
the ‘purpose’ of some form of exploitation. Early traffick-specific instruments limited 
their application to situations of sexual exploitation, or specifically, the exploitation of 
prostitution of another. It may be this perceived link with prostitution and sexual 
exploitation which has led to trafficking law developing separately from that which 
                                                 
413 Oxford English Dictionary Online, Additions Series <http://www.oed.com/> accessed 01 Sept 2006. 
414 Oxford English Dictionary Online, Additions Series <http://www.oed.com/> accessed 01 Sept 2006. 
415 Online Dictionary provided by Oxford University Press <http://www.askoxford.com> accessed 01 
Sept 2006. 
416 Oxford English Dictionary Online, Additions Series <http://www.oed.com/> accessed 01 Sept 2006. 
417 Ibid. 
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specifically addresses the slave trade and labour law. The legal definition of today 
supersedes early examples. For example, various different ‘means’ of acquiring the 
victim are envisaged, ranging from outright kidnapping to more covert means such as 
the use of deception or other forms of coercion.418 The scope of the ‘purpose’ element 
of human trafficking has been developed to include many more forms of ‘exploitation’ 
than solely that of a sexual nature.419  
        The justification for drawing comparisons between trafficking and slave trade 
provisions throughout this Chapter is based upon the fact that both are clearly linked, in 
that they provide examples of non-consensual movement of persons coupled with 
human exploitation and control. Some commentators refer to human trafficking as 
contemporary slavery, or the new slave trade.420 This is resisted here as a 
comprehensive proposition on the basis that ‘exploitation’ sufficient for trafficking 
does not always amount to slavery (even in extended understandings of it), although it 
certainly can do in certain circumstances.421  
        The point is that trafficking may, either in a philosophical sense or in popular 
understanding, represent a modern form of slavery and those engaged in the process be 
regarded as slave traders, but that in a legal sense it also goes further because it includes 
different types of exploitation (though including slavery, sensu stricto) between which 
distinctions can be made (albeit not always easily422). Trafficking can be said to be 
                                                 
418 Discussed in Part III, below.  
419 See, Part IV, below. 
420 See: Prosecutor v Kunarac, Kovac & Vukovic, Case No. IT-96-23-T & IT-96-23/1-A, Judgment 118 
(June 12, 2002) at 536; S Scarpa, n 135, 4; F Gold, ‘Redefining the Slave Trade: Current Trends in the 
International Trafficking of Women’, (2003) 11 University of Miami International & Comparative Law 
Review 99, who refers to human trafficking as ‘the twenty-first century’s slave trade’ at 100; L Kelly and 
L Regan, n 30, and the ‘Miami Declaration of Principles on Human Trafficking’ (2006) 1 Intercultural 
Human Rights Law Review, 11, which states that human trafficking is ‘a human rights violation that 
constitutes a contemporary form of slavery’. 
421 This is discussed in Part IV, section D, subsection iii, below. 
422 See, for example, Allain, who is critical of the ECtHR in Rantsev for not adequately engaging with the 
distinction between different types of human exploitation such as slavery and servitude - J Allain, 
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‘based’ upon slavery, but trafficking in not synonymous with the slave trade, the only 
‘purpose’ of which was slavery. Non-consensual exploitation is clearly a central 
defining characteristic of trafficking activity; the ‘purpose’ is always exploitation of 
some form, and this element breaks down in to the non-exhaustive forms outlined 
within the definition which seems to envisage a spectrum of exploitative activities; the 
condition of slavery being the most serious. 
        The remainder of this Chapter will examine in detail the component parts of the 
trafficking definition; those of the ‘action’, ‘means’, and ‘purpose’. 
 
II. The ‘Action’ 
 
A. Evolution of the ‘Action’ Element 
 
The three elements of ‘action’, ‘means’ and ‘purpose’ have become more clearly 
defined as the legal definition of trafficking in humans has evolved. The first part of the 
process, the ‘action’, is evident both in the current definition of the slave trade 
contained in the 1926 Slavery Convention - in that instrument, the ‘action’ is 
constituted by ‘capture, acquisition or disposal’423 - and in the 1910 Trafficking 
Convention, where the ‘action’ element remains the same for women over or under age, 
and can be identified as ‘procured, enticed, or led away…’ This terminology is of a 
different nature to that used in the 1926 definition of the slave trade. The language of 
the Slavery Convention is more in keeping with the characteristic of ownership which 
                                                                                                                                                        
‘Rantsev v Cyprus and Russia: The European Court of Human Rights and Trafficking as Slavery’ (2010) 
Human Rights Law Review 10:3, 546 – 557. 
423 Article 1(2) of the 1926 Slavery Convention (n 404) states that ‘The slave trade includes all acts 
involved in the capture, acquisition or disposal of a person with intent to reduce him to slavery; all acts 
involved in the acquisition of a slave with a view to selling or exchanging him; all acts of disposal by 
sale or exchange of a slave acquired with a view to being sold or exchanged, and, in general, every act of 
trade or transport in slaves.’ 
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is central to slavery as a ‘purpose’ element of the slave trade, and accordingly implies a 
more solid degree of permanence through use of terms such as ‘disposal’.  
        The terms ‘procurement’, ‘enticement’ and ‘led away’, as used in the 1910 
Trafficking Convention, carry implications of a more tentative and coercive nature; the 
use of persuasion and trickery, which will be examined further at a later point as 
regards the ‘means’ element of the trafficking process.424 Although trafficked victims 
may frequently be viewed as possessions or commodities by the trafficker(s) or at least 
the ultimate recipient of the victim, this does not necessarily always constitute 
‘ownership’ in the sense that slavery and the slave trade implies.425 The terminology 
used for both definitions, but that of the slave trade in particular, implies a restriction 
upon movement and therefore a deprivation of liberty. The terminology used by the 
1910 Trafficking Convention is more in keeping with old-fashioned ideology, which 
saw ‘innocent’ women being led astray and introduced into prostitution. 
        The language of the 1910 Trafficking Convention was replicated in Article 1 of 
the Convention for the Suppression of the 1949 Trafficking Convention. The definition 
and the instrument were subject to some criticism426 and it has now been superseded by 
the definition contained within the three main legal instruments considered throughout 
this thesis.427 
        The ‘action’, ‘means’ and ‘purpose’ elements of trafficking are clearly visible in 
the definition featuring in the more recent instruments, i.e. the UN Trafficking Protocol 
                                                 
424 See Part III of this Chapter. 
425 See, J Allain ‘The Parameters of ‘Enslavement’ in International Criminal Law’ (2009) Symposium on 
the New Development of International Criminal Law, Beijing China; J Allain, ‘The Definition of Slavery 
in International Law’ (2009) Harvard Law Journal, Vol. 2 No. 2; J Allain, ‘R v Tang: Clarifying the 
Definition of ‘Slavery in International Law’ (2009) Melbourne Journal of International Law 246; J 
Allain, ‘Rantsev v Cyprus and Russia: The European Court of Human Rights and Trafficking as Slavery’ 
(2010) Human Rights Law Review 10:3, 546 – 557. 
426 The European Parliament labelled the 1949 Traffic Convention ‘obsolete and ineffective’ as a result 
of the lack of emphasis on coercion and deception: see Resolution on Trafficking in Human Beings 
[1996] OJ C 032, P. 0088, A4-0326/95. 
427 I.e. the UN Trafficking Protocol, the CoE Trafficking Convention, and the EU 2011 Directive. 
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etc. The definition appears to be based on definitions of the slave trade but is tailored 
and expanded specifically to address human trafficking. The ‘action’ element in the 
current definition can be identified as ‘recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring 
or receipt of persons’. 
        ‘Recruitment’ can be elaborated upon, but mainly with direct reference to the 
‘means’ aspect of trafficking,428 as the subjects of trafficking are frequently recruited 
through, for example, a fraudulent job advertisement or a false promise from someone 
they trust.  
        ‘Transportation’ and ‘transfer’ can take many forms, from legitimate border 
crossing to the use of totally covert means; one account provided by a particular 
trafficked victim describes use of a type of canoe which is undetectable by radar.429   
        The inclusion of ‘harbouring’ illustrates that those retaining the subject in any way 
play just as guilty a part in the process as those who acquired the subject in the first 
place, as do those who ‘receive’ the subject. Once again, the terminology of the 
trafficking definition implies that action of a less forceful nature than that intimated 
within the Slavery Convention may suffice, illustrating the potential differences of 
degree between the different ‘purpose’ elements of trafficking envisaged by the 
trafficking definition, to be discussed later.430  
        Along a similar vein, the language of the current internationally recognised 
trafficking definition seems to be supportive of an ‘Autonomy’431 perspective than that 
used in early traffick-specific or slavery-specific instruments. This, coupled with the 
                                                 
428 See Part III of this chapter for a discussion of the ‘means’ element of human trafficking 
429 Francis Loncle, ‘Eastern Europe Exports Flesh to the EU: The Natasha Trade’, Le Monde 
Diplomatique, (December 2001). 
430 The terminology used in the trafficking definition makes it clear that that it is possible to consent to 
exploitative activity, but that any instance of the ‘means’ shall render the consent irrelevant. The 
‘Autonomy v Paternalism’ perspectives (as to consent to sex work) are discussed in Chapter 3, Part IV, 
section A et seq. 
431 Discussed in Chapter 3, Part IV, section A.   
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inclusion of a ‘means’/lack of consent element, indicates changing frameworks of 
understanding of human trafficking, and may also (speculatively) indicate recognition 
of increased consensual economic migration432 to, say, work in the sex trade. 
 
B. ‘Transportation’  
 
i. The Requirement of Border Crossing 
 
Modern disputes over trafficking definitions include the issue of whether international 
borders must be crossed in order for the activity to constitute trafficking.433 This part of 
the process constitutes part of the ‘action’ element. The definition of ‘slave trade’ in the 
1926 Slavery Convention did not make explicit mention of the necessity to cross 
international frontiers; thus one might assume that a slave might be acquired and sold 
within the same country, and that such activity might still constitute ‘trade’ within the 
meaning of the Convention. Restricting the Convention to purely cross-border 
situations would not be in the interests of effectiveness of eliminating slavery. 
        Regarding trafficking, the instruments drafted within the early twentieth century 
appeared to incorporate an element of international border crossing. The 1904 
Agreement relates to the ‘procuring of women or girls for immoral purposes abroad.’ 
Article 3 of the Agreement specifically refers to repatriation, which indicates that cross-
border activity was envisaged when the Agreement was drafted. The 1910 Trafficking 
Convention does not specifically state that borders must be crossed, although it does 
state that perpetrators ‘shall … be punished, notwithstanding that the various acts 
                                                 
432 Potentially through illicit channels, thereby engaging the legitimate interests of the State as regards 
protecting border integrity. 
433 F Gold, n 420, 103. 
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constituting the offence may have been committed in different countries’,434 and it also 
envisages extradition of perpetrators.435 
        The ambit of the 1933 Trafficking Convention was confined solely to international 
trafficking of women of full age, even with their consent, from one country to another, 
thereby establishing a need to cross international borders in order for the crime to 
constitute trafficking. Evidently, ‘a state could therefore conceivably tolerate on a 
national level what it condemns and seeks to prevent at an international level’.436 This 
statement should not, however, be accepted as given. The reality of the situation is 
perhaps more likely to be that States would deal with purely internal situations 
according to the relevant domestic legislation regarding sexual offences, assuming this 
is what is meant by ‘immoral purpose’, and assuming that States had such legislation in 
place at the time. It was the international aspect of trade in humans which was seen as 
the problem and targeted accordingly. 
        The 1949 Trafficking Convention does not openly further this trend of requiring a 
cross-border element. No explicit or implicit mention is made of the need for 
international borders to be crossed in order for the activity to qualify as trafficking. 
Subsequent proposed definitions took this further; a coalition of Non Governmental 
Organisations (NGOs) named the Human Rights Caucus437 referred to the ‘action’ 
element within its definition as ‘[The] recruitment, transportation within or across 
borders, purchase, sale, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons’. Similarly, the 
International Organisation for Migration (IOM) defines the ‘action’ element of 
                                                 
434 Article 2. 
435 Article 5. 
436 UNHCHR, D Weissbrodt and Anti-Slavery International, ‘Abolishing Slavery and its Contemporary 
Forms’, (2002 United Nations New York and Geneva) HR/PUB/02/4, 19. 
437 Members of the Human Rights Caucus include: International Human Rights Law Group, Foundation 
Against Trafficking in Women, Global Alliance Against Traffic in Women, Asian Women’s Human 
Rights Council, La Strada, Ban-Ying, Fundacion Esperanza, Foundation for Women, KOK-NGO 
Network Against Trafficking in Women, Women’s Consortium of Nigeria, Women, Law & 
Development in Africa (Nigeria). 
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trafficking as when ‘A migrant is illicitly engaged (recruited, kidnapped, sold etc) 
and/or moved, either within national or across international borders’.438  
        Article 4 of the UN Trafficking Protocol reverts back to the pre-1949 position and 
states that the offences must be ‘transnational in nature’. The transnational nature of the 
Trafficking Protocol illustrates the international dimension of trafficking, as did the 
1933 Trafficking Convention, and recognises the potential for the trafficking process to 
take place through a chain of people across international borders, and, therefore to 
involve transnational organised crime.  
        Article 2 of the CoE Trafficking Convention explicitly states that both national 
and transnational trafficking is caught by the definition, and goes further in stating that 
no connection with organised crime is necessary, which seems to be a deliberate 
attempt to distance itself from the more restrictive terms of the Trafficking Protocol. 
The involvement of international OCGs features as a central concern of the Trafficking 
Protocol, the transnational element of which renders it inapplicable to purely internal 
situations. To do so is to render it less effective, as both purely internal situations, and 
situations where an already trafficked person was recruited again and moved on within 
one country, would fall outside of this definition, and thus be left to be addressed only 
by national law.  
        The EU 2011 Directive makes specific provision as regards Member States 
establishing jurisdiction over trafficking offences where ‘the offence is committed in 
whole or in part within their territory’,439 thereby indicating that even wholly internal 
trafficking falls within the scope of the Directive. Similarly, UK domestic legislation 
enacted to address human trafficking – the Sexual Offences Act 2003 – contains 
                                                 
438 International Organization for Migration ‘Trafficking in Migrants, IOM Policy and Responses’ 
Working Paper  (March 1999). 
439 Article 10(1)(a). 
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provisions which specifically refer to trafficking for sexual exploitation into,440 
within,441 and out of442 the UK.  
        Instances of ‘internal’ trafficking are reported.443 However, that which may be 
termed ‘intra-state’ or ‘internal’ trafficking/non-consensual exploitation may frequently 
result in a remedy which lies in the hands of the State in question applying its national 
criminal law. That the State may deal with such cases according to national law may 
well have been (and still be) the usual situation. It is the attractiveness of foreign 
markets, the resulting profits, the disparity between economic conditions between 
States and the ease of transportation which have facilitated and even encouraged the 
transnational trade. However, States have seldom agreed on the need to deal with ‘intra-
national’ or ‘internal’ trafficking/non-consensual exploitation, save where the activity 
reaches the standards of serious human rights violations, such as slavery and its related 
practices. 
 
ii. Legality of Border Crossing 
 
It is made clear in the Explanatory Report to the Council of Europe Trafficking 
Convention that entry of trafficked persons into a State’s territory need not specifically 
be illicit.444 Legal border crossing and lawful presence on national territory therefore do 
not negate a finding of human trafficking under the CoE Trafficking Convention. The 
UN Trafficking Protocol is silent as to whether lawful entry would be outside the 
offence of trafficking, and the Travaux do not elaborate upon this point. The EU 2011 
                                                 
440 SOA 2003, s. 57. 
441 SOA 2003, s. 58. 
442 SOA 2003, s. 59. 
443 UNICEF, UNOHCHR, OSCE, ODIHR, ‘Trafficking in Human Beings in South Eastern Europe’, n 
46, 116. 
444 Explanatory Report to the CoE Trafficking Convention, n 248, para 80. 
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Directive makes no mention of limitations regarding the legality of border crossings – 
this is logical as requiring illicit entry into a State would render the Directive 
inapplicable to any EU nationals or residents who were then trafficked within the EU.  
        The issue of the legality of border crossing is one of the elements of this activity 
which distinguishes trafficking from smuggling of humans. The latter is defined by 
Article 3 of the Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, 
Supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organised Crime 
(Smuggling Protocol)445 as:  
 
… the procurement, in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or 
other material benefit, of the illegal entry of a person into a State Party of 
which the person is not a national or a permanent resident… 
 
 The terminology used clearly requires international border crossing, and illegal entry 
into the host state. Smuggling is, therefore, a matter of facilitation of illegal migration. 
It is simply constituted by an ‘action’, without the need for any subsequent ‘means’ or 
‘purpose’ to constitute the offence, in contrast to the definition contained within the 
Trafficking Protocol.446 
        The inclusion of lawful border-crossings within the concept of trafficking has 
practical advantages, as it includes the trafficking of those who have lawfully entered a 
State. These differences between trafficking and smuggling underpin the purposes of 
the separate regimes – one is aimed at combating the facilitation of illicit border 
crossings, the other is aimed at combating exploitation, and accordingly recognises that 
                                                 
445 Smuggling Protocol, n 5. 
446 A separate ‘purpose’ of financial gain can be seen in the definition of smuggling, but this purpose is 
divorced from any context of using the smuggled individual for gain beyond payment for getting them 
from A to B. 
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even those legally present on the soil of a destination State may have been brought 
there to be subjected to exploitation. 
 
C. The ‘Action’ – Some Conclusions 
 
In establishing what trafficking actually is according to legal definition, it is made 
apparent by the trafficking definition that legality or otherwise of border crossing is not 
a problematic issue here. The inclusion of a transnational aspect in the Trafficking 
Protocol illustrates the recognition of the international dimension of this phenomenon. 
The trafficking of humans is an activity which frequently involves the crossing of 
international borders, and the Trafficking Protocol exists to supplement a Convention 
which targets transnational organised crime; activity which is, by definition, cross-
border in nature. The inclusion of activity which does not cross international borders 
makes trafficking law more applicable and effective, to address many situations of 
exploitative coercive movement of persons. This ensures that ‘human trafficking’ 
includes those bought and sold within a State, although in reality cases of ‘internal’ 
trafficking may be dealt with according to national law. 
        The ‘action’ element of trafficking, although of a broader nature than its slave-
trade counterpart, has not been subject to extensive change as the definition has 
evolved, predominantly a result of its being the least problematic element of the 
trafficking process in definitional terms. The language ‘recruitment, transportation…’ 
etc is sufficiently drafted to cover any acquisition of a person. The broader language 
used when compared with that of slave trade provisions, suggests an ‘action’ of a 
potentially less immediately forceful nature and therefore wider reach. The ‘action’ 
element of trafficking carries implications of what is to come; the underhandedness and 
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trickery employed by the trafficker which comprises the second element of the process: 
the ‘means’, which in turn qualifies the action and makes it part of human trafficking as 
distinguishable from the slave trade per se. This element will now be discussed. 
 
III. The ‘Means’ 
 
A. Evolution of the ‘Means’ Element 
 
The ‘means’ follows on from the ‘action’, and refers to the manner in which the action 
is executed - for example, a person is ‘recruited’ (action) through ‘force’ (means) for 
‘exploitation’ (purpose). Both international trafficking and slavery legislation provide 
respective definitions which contain a ‘means’ element, although they differ somewhat 
in nature. The ‘means’ element of the slave trade, as contained in the 1926 Slavery 
Convention, is constituted by ‘all acts involved’ in the ‘capture, acquisition or disposal’ 
of the subject. Through the inclusion of ‘every act of trade and transport in slaves’, the 
definition covers the reduction of free men into slaves, and the movement, 
transportation, or sale etc. of those already enslaved.  
        As regards human trafficking, the ‘means’ element is more specific and is the most 
controversial element. Trafficking instruments have at times embraced and at times 
shied away from the inclusion of specific means within their definitions. The 1910 
Trafficking Convention imposed a requirement for various ‘means’ to have been 
employed where the woman in question is over age447 - these means were ‘by fraud, or 
                                                 
447 ‘Over age’ refers to women over twenty completed years of age, as stated in the Final Protocol to the 
1910 Trafficking Convention, n 406. 
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by means of violence, threats, abuse of authority, or any other method of 
compulsion’.448 
        This differential treatment, dependant on age, is fairly in keeping with the habitual 
distinction between those who were perceived to be immoral women – prostitutes – and 
pure and innocent women who were involuntarily brought into this market, the aim of 
the relevant legislation being to police the prostitutes rather than the traffickers. The 
terminology used i.e. ‘any other method of compulsion’ has the potential for wide 
construction, and would have reached a whole variety of ways of bringing pressure on 
to the victims. Unquestionably, it would be unreasonable to allow consent from those 
under age - minors should not be deemed capable of consenting to such activity - yet, 
by requiring that something extra in the case of older females, this instrument impliedly 
introduced the issue of consent, or lack thereof.  
        The ‘means’ element entirely disappeared with the introduction of the 1949 
Trafficking Convention, which was, until fairly recently, the main instrument to combat 
sex trafficking as it was perceived at the time. The 1949 Convention was highly 
criticised for its lack of a ‘means’ element and it was evidently felt that the drafting of a 
future instrument should focus on coercion. Since then, almost every suggested 
definition after the 1949 Convention has included a list of means, such as those 
provided within the definition of trafficking contained in the UN Trafficking Protocol, 
the CoE Trafficking Convention, and the EU 2011 Directive. To reiterate, these are:  
 
… by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of 
abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of 
                                                 
448 Article 1. 
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vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to 
achieve the consent of a person having control over another person…449 
 
Some of the terms used within the provision are ambiguous, and are open to differing 
interpretations. Opinion from certain sources is that the definition would be problematic 
if incorporated into domestic law in its current state.450 Notably, the UK implementing 
legislation of anti-trafficking measures looks little like the international definition, as 
the different offences potentially comprising human trafficking are dealt with by a 
series of different provisions which ultimately do the same job.451  
        In its (Unofficial) Annotated Guide to the Complete UN Trafficking Protocol (the 
Guide), the International Human Rights Law Group suggested a definition which it 
deemed suitable for inclusion in domestic legislation as it avoids confusing and 
ambiguous language: ‘Trafficking in persons shall mean the recruitment, transportation, 
transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by any means, for forced labour or services, 
slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs’452 The terms 
‘forced labour or services’ are intended to include prostitution in this context.453  
                                                 
449 UN Trafficking Protocol, Article 3, CoE Trafficking Convention, Article 4, EU 2011 Directive Article 
2. 
450 See, A D Jordan ‘Annotated Guide to the Complete UN Trafficking Protocol’ (May 2002, Updated 
August 2002) Ann D. Jordan Director, Initiative Against Trafficking in Persons, International Human 
Right Law Group, 9. 
451 Trafficking into, within and out of the UK are criminalised by sections SOA 2003 ss 57 - 59. 
According to these provisions, A commits an offence if he facilitates the entry, travel within, or departure 
from the UK of B, and A intends to or believes that another is likely to do something which would 
constitute a ‘relevant offence’, the latter being primarily (although not exclusively) an offence under Part 
1 of the SOA 2003, such as, for example, controlling prostitution for gain (s53). SOA, s 60 also includes 
as ‘relevant offences’: ‘an offence under section 1(1)(a) of the Protection of Children Act 1978 (c. 37); 
an offence listed in Schedule 1 to the Criminal Justice (Children) (Northern Ireland) Order 1998 (S.I. 
1998/1504 (N.I. 9)); an offence under Article 3(1)(a) of the Protection of Children (Northern Ireland) 
Order 1978 (S.I. 1978/1047 (N.I. 17)), or anything done outside England and Wales and Northern Ireland 
which is not an offence within any of paragraphs (a) to (d) but would be if done in England and Wales or 
Northern Ireland.’ 
452 A D Jordan, n 450, 7. 
453 Ibid. 
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        The Guide goes on to state that the ‘means’ aspect of the trafficking is not 
important; the process of moving the person (action) and the subsequent exploitation 
(purpose) are the key aspects. The drafters of the UN Trafficking Protocol – and those 
of the instruments replicating the definition - evidently did not share this view, as the 
inclusion of an extensive list of means demonstrates. It is this aspect which differs so 
greatly in comparison to the 1926 Slavery Convention definition of the slave trade.  
        It is evident from the wording of the latter that particular means of ‘capture, 
acquisition or disposal’454 were not envisaged; the requisite means was constituted by 
‘all acts involved’455 in capturing, acquiring or disposing of the subject. This statement 
is comparable to ‘by any means’, as contained in the above-mentioned trafficking 
definition proposed by the International Human Rights Law Group. The inclusion of a 
specific list of ‘means’ in the current definition muddies the waters from the 
perspective of identifying victims, as in a technical sense a specific ‘means’ may have 
to be identified to have been used against the victim in order for the putative victim to 
be deemed to have been trafficked. Where no such objective proof (of, say, coercion) is 
evident, this renders correct victim identification inherently problematic.456 
        Each element of the ‘means’ aspect as included within the UN Trafficking 
Protocol will now be considered in more depth. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
454 Article 1(2) League of Nations Convention to Suppress the Slave Trade and Slavery (Signed at 
Geneva on 25 September 1926, into force 9 March 1927, in accordance with article 12) 60 LNTS 253, 
Registered No. 1414.  
455 Ibid. 
456 See Chapter 4, Part VI, for discussion of the mechanism for victim identification. 
 128
 B. ‘By means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of 
fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability’ 
 
i. Threat, Force, Coercion and Abduction 
 
Although deceptive means such as false adverts for employment (discussed below457) 
are frequent methods of recruitment used by traffickers, less subtle ways of recruitment 
are also identified.458 These include kidnap or abduction; use of force or coercion in the 
form of actual violence or the threat of violence, the involvement of family members in 
recruiting the victim, and drug and alcohol addiction. Some women and girls report 
being kidnapped; 20% of cases assisted by IOM Sofia459 in March 2000 – August 2001 
were recruited this way.460 
        Coercion, and what exactly amounts to coercion, is a problematic element of the 
‘means’ aspect of human trafficking. To coerce is to ‘persuade (an unwilling person) to 
do something by using force or threats; to obtain (something) by such means.’461 
According to the ordinary meaning of the word, factors which lead to a state of duress 
or compulsion could be included. Logical construction of the term would mean that 
coercion in the context of trafficking would solely include methods directly employed 
by the trafficker(s). A recent UK human trafficking case recognised coercion where 
                                                 
457 See section ii, below. 
458 UNICEF, UNOHCHR, OSCE, ODIR, ‘Trafficking in Human Beings in South Eastern Europe’, n 46, 
7. 
459 As stated on the IOM website, ‘IOM Sofia offers information and advice regarding the legal regime, 
labour legislation, rights and responsibilities for employers and employees, and on mechanisms of 
support in cases of abuse, travelling abroad safely, possibilities for legal migration and immigration 
legislation and procedures as well as raising awareness on risks of irregular migration.’ See 
<http://www.iom.int/jahia/Jahia/bulgaria> accessed 01 June 2011  
460 UNICEF, UNOHCHR, OSCE, ODIR, ‘Trafficking in Human Beings in South Eastern Europe’, n 46, 
52. 
461 Oxford English Dictionary (Oxford University Press, Second Edition 2003). 
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there was ‘some evidence of threats and inhuman treatment and restriction of the 
women's liberties and confiscation of their passports.’462 There is clearly the potential 
for broad scope and construction here. 
        It seems that psychological coercion is to be included within the scope of the term, 
which could potentially come about through threats, intimidation or bullying. In United 
States v Jimenez-Calderon463 the trafficked women were not allowed to leave the house 
or even speak to each other, and were subjected to psychological coercion through 
threats and ill treatment. Nonetheless, the US’s Trafficking Victim’s Protection Act of 
2000 (TVPA),464 although criminalising the use of any form of psychological coercion 
to compel labour, has received some criticism. Kim states that:  
 
… the TVPA’s open-ended prohibition on non-physical and non-violent 
coercion does not provide further guidance on the exact range of coercive 
tactics sufficient to meet the legal standard. Hence, while recognized as a 
key component of human trafficking, courts and legislatures have yet to 
define the legal dimensions of psychological coercion—leaving its scope 
ambiguous, and ultimately, difficult to enforce. The legal uncertainty of 
psychological coercion has the additional, graver consequence of 
marginalizing a class of coerced trafficked workers who might otherwise be 
eligible for protection and immigration relief under the TVPA.465 
 
                                                 
462 Regina v Lorenc Roci, Vullnet Ismailaj [2005] EWCA Crim 3404. 
463 United States v Jimenez-Calderon, 135 Fed. Appx. 562 (3d Cir. 2005). Indicted 9/26/02, Sentenced 
8/7/03 & 5/4/04, D. New Jersey. 
464 Trafficking Victim’s Protection Act of 2000, Public Law 106 - 386 - Oct. 28, 2000. 
465 See K Kim, ‘The Coercion of Trafficked Workers’, Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Law 
and Society Association, Renaissance Chicago Hotel, Chicago, IL, May 27, 2010.  
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Psychological coercion, and exactly what it amounts to, suggests a potentially broad 
spectrum of tactics ranging from ‘strong’ to ‘weak’ pressure. The more easily dealt 
with cases will concern ‘strong’ forms of psychological coercion, which may also be 
‘threats’ and therefore be caught by the trafficking definition in any case. Yet, there 
will be cases of a weaker nature where the degree of psychological coercion is less 
severe.466 
         Accounts provided by trafficking victims further illustrate this method (i.e. of 
psychological coercion): 
 
(A) man came to the house and I refused to entertain him. My friend said 
that if I did not do it she would tell my family that I was a prostitute and 
that our family would be shamed in the village.467 
 
Coercion of this form - through threats to reveal the nature of the employment to the 
family or community – can be a powerful tool because in some societies a sex worker 
would be rejected and considered to be ‘spoilt’ or ‘ruined’, and therefore unable to 
marry, or even to reintegrate with their community. This has the effect of alienating the 
victim from their place of origin, which keeps them under the control of the traffickers. 
       Physical force is a tool commonly employed by the traffickers. In United States v 
Rojas468 the defendants lured the victims, all women, from Mexico into the US on the 
promise of legitimate employment. On arrival in Atlanta, the women - at least one of 
whom was a minor - were forced to have sex with numerous men every night, through 
use of force in the form of physical violence and threats. Many of the terms used can be 
                                                 
466 For example if the threats/coercion are of an economic nature.  
467 L Brown, n 120, 110. 
468 United States v. Rojas, 356 F.3d 876, 879 (8th Cir. 2004) Indicted 1/28/04, Convicted 4/2004 & 
8/27/04, Sentenced 11/23/04, N.D. Georgia. 
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illustrated by way of reference to accounts of experiences provided by trafficked 
victims. Empirical research conducted by Brown provides many examples, such as the 
following, which demonstrates the use of physical force: ‘My husband let his friends 
use me and they gave him money. At first I refused but then he would beat me. He was 
pleased with me when I earned money for him.’469  
        Clearly, the use of direct or indirect force and varying types of violent and non-
violent coercion all feature as elements of human trafficking. The following section will 
consider some of the more non-violent types of ‘means’ – those of deception and fraud.  
 
ii. Deception and Fraud 
 
Many accounts provided by trafficked victims include details about the promise of a 
legitimate border crossing and employment of a specified nature upon arrival in the 
destination State, yet in reality the victim may be subject to illicit entry into the 
destination State and forced to work as a sex worker or some other form of labourer – a 
reality far from that which was promised. Such deception can render a situation of 
facilitated migration one of human trafficking. There can be a fine line between the 
two.  
        Europol state that: 
 
The majority of identified trafficking cases involve women and girls who 
had no idea that they would be forced to work in the sex industry. Those 
females that are aware or have some suspicion that they will be prostituted 
also suffer in that the conditions they work in probably bear no relation to 
                                                 
469 L Brown, n 120, 74. 
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what was explained to them by the trafficker or pimp, with the amount of 
money they are allowed to keep being the main issue.470  
 
There are ample anecdotal instances of such deceptive practice.471 Brown provides an 
account of a fifteen-year-old Cambodian girl who came from an extremely poor family. 
She met a woman who appeared to be very rich and who promised her employment, yet 
she was deceived about the nature of her employment: 
 
There was woman who sometimes came to our village. She was rich with 
jewels and beautiful clothes and she said she could find good jobs in the 
city for some of us girls. I wanted to go with her so when she came back I 
went for an interview with some others. There were two men with her and 
they asked us lots of questions. I was really happy because they chose me 
and two others to get jobs. We left the next day in a taxi and we went to 
Phnom Penh. We thought we were going to work in a shop but instead they 
sold all of us to different brothels.472 
 
An IOM study reveals further examples of such deception: 
 
When I arrived in Luxembourg a couple of young men were waiting for me. 
They took me to the club where I was supposed to work as a waitress. I 
showed the director my contract but he just shook his head and had me 
thrown out. I realized with horror that I’d been deceived … Outside a car 
pulled up, a man spoke to me in Russian and I was forced inside … I was 
                                                 
470 Europol, n 37, 33. 
471 See, L Brown, n 120. 
472 Ibid, 90. 
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taken to a locked brothel; it was like a prison. I was beaten and raped. Then 
I was forced to serve 10 to 15 clients a night … I tried to escape to the 
Kyrgyz Embassy. I was caught and punished.473 
 
        Kelly474 draws upon examples from an IOM study which indicate the difficult 
technical nature of determining certain aspects of trafficking, and uses ‘deception’ as an 
example. The following case study is cited: 
 
A young woman was studying in Tashkent and living in a hostel. A woman 
she did not know said that she was recruiting girls for summer jobs in the 
Israeli sex industry. When the young woman arrived she worked for several 
months and received no payment. When she raised this, her pimp 
(“balobay”) said she had been earning a percentage all along, but that he 
had been saving it for her. After eight months, she was picked up by the 
police for overstaying her visa. Her pimp promised to bring the money she 
was owed (9,000 Euros) to the jail. He never came and she wants to return 
to claim her money, but has been told by the Israeli authorities that if they 
pick her up again they will prosecute her.475 
 
This account indicates initial consent, invalidated by deception. If the intention not to 
pay was always present, the consent was never valid as it could not be considered to 
                                                 
473 International Organization for Migration, ‘Trafficking in Women and Children from the Kyrgyz 
Republic’ (Irina, Case Study 6) (November 2000) 26 
<http://iom.ramdisk.net/iom/images/uploads/Kyrgyzstan_Report%20on%20Trafficking_2000_En_10710
70736.pdf> accessed 30 Nov 2008. 
474 See International Organization for Migration ‘Fertile Fields: Trafficking in Persons in Central Asia’ 
(A report prepared by Liz Kelly, Child and Woman Abuse Studies Unit, London Metropolitan University 
April 2005). 
475 Ibid, 67 – 68. 
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have been informed476 - one of the central requirements for a valid consent. As regards 
the abovementioned case study, Kelly notes that whether or not trafficking has occurred 
depends upon whether one can infer that there was deceit about earnings and the 
intention to pay, as there is no deception with respect to the nature of the ‘work’.477 
Therefore, it is necessary to determine what the individual must consent to, and at what 
point consent must be given in order for it to be valid. This is further discussed in 
Chapter 3.478  
        The Travaux Preparatoires to the UN Trafficking Protocol479 remain silent on the 
issue of deception. The Explanatory Report to the CoE Trafficking Convention 
provides little elaboration, stating that ‘[f]raud and deception are frequently used by 
traffickers, as when victims are led to believe that an attractive job awaits them rather 
than the intended exploitation.’480 As the Explanatory Report to that Convention 
indicates, the clearest form of deception occurs in relation to the nature of the work to 
be undertaken.481 Newspaper advertisements for waitresses, nannies, or similar act as 
the initial part of the recruitment of the victim, and once passports have been handed 
over, the victim will find themselves in a very difficult position. These victims may be 
very reluctant to approach the authorities for help, due to their status as an illegal 
migrant worker or their mistrust of the authorities. The IOM documents numerous 
examples of passports and travel documents being confiscated, a method of control 
employed by many traffickers.482 
                                                 
476 Informed consent is discussed in Chapter 1, Part III, section A, subsection ii, and in Chapter 3, Part I. 
477 International Organization for Migration, n 474, 68. 
478 See Chapter 3, Part I. 
479 United Nations General Assembly ‘Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Elaboration of a 
Convention against Transnational Organized Crime on the work of its first to eleventh sessions, 
Addendum, Interpretative notes for the official records (travaux preparatoires) of the negotiation of the 
United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and the Protocols thereto’ (2000) UN 
Doc A/55/383/Add.1. 
480 Explanatory Report to the CoE Trafficking Convention, n 248, para 82. 
481 Ibid. 
482 International Organization for Migration, n 473, 24. 
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        The UN Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women, its Causes and 
Consequences identifies two main patterns of trafficking for the purpose of prostitution. 
These are the ‘two step’ and ‘one step’ methods. 483 The ‘two-step’ pattern has in the 
past been more common, and targets those women already working in prostitution, in 
order to recruit them so that they may be trafficked abroad. The ‘one-step’ pattern 
targets women and girls in their homes and villages to be trafficked for prostitution. 
This method frequently involves someone approaching the victim or her family, and 
deceiving them, for example, as to the nature of employment which they are offering 
the girl/woman in question. The latter method is more aggressive, and becoming 
prevalent as the demand for younger women increases as a result of, for example, fear 
of AIDS.484 In some societies, daughters may be sold by their families,485 and will 
often have no inkling as to the fate which is to befall them.486  
                                                
        Traffickers react to law enforcement measures, and take advantage of the freedom 
of movement within certain areas such as the EU. As new markets are identified, 
recruitment methods are adapted accordingly. Although there is frequently an 
awareness of the dangers of human trafficking, potential victims are not always willing 
to accept that they could actually be at risk. Interestingly, research by Europol finds that 
well-educated, urban dwelling Ukrainians are more likely to be trafficked.487 An IOM 
 
483 See Report of the Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women, its Causes and Consequences, 
(1994) United Nations Economic and Social Council E/CN.4/1997/47/Add.4 Commission on Human 
Rights, 53rd Session, Provisional Agenda Item 9(a) 
<http://www.unhchr.ch/Huridocda/Huridoca.nsf/0/043c76f98a706362802566b1005e9219?Opendocume
nt> accessed 01 July 2011. 
484 International Organization for Migration, ‘Slavic women trafficked into slavery’, Trafficking in 
Migrants Quarterly Bulletin (Geneva, Switzerland, May 1995) 
<http://www.iom.ch/IOM/Publications/books_studies_surveys/MIP_traff_women_eng.htm> accessed 01 
Sept 2005. 
485 UNICEF, UNOHCHR, OSCE, ODIR, ‘Trafficking in Human Beings in South Eastern Europe’, n 46, 
52. 
486 This is likely to be less of an issue in CEE in terms of ‘routes’ into the sex traffick market; economic 
and discriminatory factors are more of an issue, or a cause, as regards CEE women falling into this 
market – see, Chapter 1, Part I, section A. 
487 Europol, n 37, 18. 
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survey488 conducted in Ukraine posed various questions to Ukrainian women, including 
whether it would be acceptable to work in the sex industry abroad. None of the women 
consulted said yes. They were also asked whether a job as a dancer or stripper would be 
acceptable. Some of them said yes, which indicates that the deceptive naming of jobs 
such as ‘entertainer’ can play an important part in the recruitment process.  
        Varying methods of recruitment are reported by victims of trafficking, but 
common themes emerge from these, almost always involving deception of some sort. 
Europol identify the following recruitment methods:489 false offer of employment; false 
representation of declared sex work; false promise of marriage or some other form of 
approach by a ‘lover boy’ (this method is frequently reported in Kosovo); and false 
allegation of criminal conduct and subsequent debt bondage, i.e. once the migrant is 
settled into their new employment, they are falsely accused of some crime such as theft 
of money from the employer, and forced into prostitution in order to repay the fictitious 
debt. A recent domestic case involving a Romanian father and son trafficking team 
provides a clear example of deception being used to recruit the women, who, like many 
before them, believed that the job offers of ‘waitress’ or ‘entertainer’ were 
legitimate.490 
        Recruitment methods reported by Moldovan women are various and include:491 
direct contact, whereby the victims or their families and peers are approached by 
traffickers; the use of newspaper advertisements; tourist agencies which offer migration 
services – some are legitimate, others are not; job agencies, many unlicensed, some 
                                                 
488 International Organization for Migration, ‘Slavic women trafficked into slavery’, n 484. 
489 Europol, n 37, 19. 
490 BBC News ‘Romanian Father and Son found guilty of sex trafficking’ (18 January 2011) 
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-12221632>  accessed 18 Jan 2011. 
491 UNICEF, UNOHCHR, OSCE, ODIHR ‘Trafficking in Human Beings in South Eastern Europe’ n 46, 
25. 
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offering illegal work, some run by organised crime groups; and marriage agencies, a 
less popular medium.  
        In Romania, victims report recruitment methods including false promises of 
legitimate work, as well as more realistic offers of work in the sex industry. Bulgarian 
victims report similar methods, including the use of deceptive advertisements – in fact, 
56% of cases assisted by IOM Sofia in March 2000 – August 2001 were recruited this 
way.492 It is also reported that sex workers are sometimes directly approached, and girls 
– especially Roma – are sold by their families.493  
        Bulgarian victims report that the majority of recruiters originate from Bulgaria and 
Albania, and are mostly - although not exclusively - men. False promises of work is 
also reported as the most commonly used method of recruitment by traffickers in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, and also Serbia, where the main motivation behind migration is 
reported to be economic gain.494 Research from 2001 found that many Serbian women 
did not expect to work in the sex industry,495 demonstrating a real lack of education 
about the dangers of trafficking. Adverts for entertainers or housekeepers are a popular 
medium in Montenegro.496 Data collected by IOM between November 1999 and 
December 2005 provides insight into the frequency or popularity of the 
abovementioned methods. Recruitment by a stranger or a friend was among those most 
commonly reported, with family involvement being among the least commonly 
reported.497 
                                                 
492 Ibid, 52. 
493 Ibid. 
494 Ibid, 64. 
495 Report on a Survey; ‘Voice to Victims of Sexual Exploitation in Serbia’, (Beosupport 2001), cited in 
UNICEF, UNOHCHR, OSCE, ODIR ‘Trafficking in Human Beings in South Eastern Europe’, n 46, 87.   
496 UNICEF, UNOHCHR, OSCE, ODIR ‘Trafficking in Human Beings in South Eastern Europe’ n 46, 
87. 
497 See IOM Counter Trafficking Database <http://www.iom.int/jahia/Jahia/pid/748>  accessed 01 July 
2011. 
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        A worrying and growing trend is that women are increasingly being used in the 
recruitment process in source countries.498 Some of these women will have become 
involved as a result of prior participation in organised crime, and others will have 
previously been trafficked themselves at some point, but have found their way into the 
‘admin’ side of things; once women have been involved in the sex industry, their life 
choices become much more limited, and so they may be enlisted to recruit new victims. 
The problems arising from the use of females in the recruitment process are obvious – 
the female recruiter is used as ‘bait’. Potential female migrants may be more likely to 
trust another woman.  
        It is possible that many potential migrants will be so keen to leave for a better life 
that they will go regardless of who the recruiter is, yet the inclusion of females in the 
recruitment process will ensure that as many persons as possible are recruited in order 
to be sexually exploited. Statistics from the Dutch National Rapporteur suggest that of 
those suspects arrested in 2002 – 2003, one quarter were female.499 Bosnia-
Herzegovina in particular has a bad track record in this respect – Europol report that in 
2004, almost 60% of identified recruiters were women.500 They were all of Bosnian 
nationality and the victims described them as friends. It has also been reported that in 
Serbia and Montenegro, couples have been used in the recruitment process.501 These 
worrying accounts and trends all indicated that deception and abuse of trust all feature 
heavily in the trafficking phenomenon. 
 
 
 
                                                 
498 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime ‘Global Report on Trafficking in Persons’ (February 
2009) 6 <http://www.unodc.org/documents/Global_Report_on_TIP.pdf> accessed 01 July 2011.  
499 Europol, n 37, 19. 
500 Ibid, 30. 
501 Ibid. 
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 iii. Debt Bondage 
 
Although not explicitly mentioned within the trafficking definition, it is commonly 
accepted that debt bondage is another means of retaining control over the trafficked 
person.502 It features heavily in many accounts provided by victims, which indicates 
that this method is frequently employed by those involved in the trafficking process.503 
       This practice is defined by the Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of 
Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Institutions and Practices similar to Slavery, 1956, 
(Supplementary Slavery Convention)504 as: 
  
… the status or condition arising from a pledge by a debtor of his personal 
services or of those of a person under his control as security for a debt, if 
the value of those services as reasonably assessed is not applied towards the 
liquidation of the debt of the length and nature of those services are not 
respectively limited and defined.505 
 
        Debt bondage as a ‘means’ aspect of trafficking would likely fall under the 
overarching umbrella of ‘other forms of coercion’ used for the purpose of controlling 
and exploiting the victim. This relatively commonplace strategy is illustrated by the 
following account, provided by a Filipina woman:  
                                                 
502 See L Brown, n 120, passim, which provides many accounts of trafficked victims who have been 
subjected to exploitation and control through debt bondage. 
503 Ibid. 
504 Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Institutions and 
Practices Similar to Slavery (Adopted by a Conference of Plenipotentiaries convened by Economic and 
Social Council resolution 608(XXI) of 30 April 1956 and done at Geneva on 7 September 1956, entered 
into force 30 April 1957) (hereafter ‘Supplementary Slavery Convention). 
505 Article 1. 
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 We were sent into a big compound surrounded by high fences and it was 
very heavily guarded. There were three houses in the compound and all 
were filled with other Filipina who looked at us. We were told that we had 
to work in a club so that we could pay back our airfare and the money that 
the club owner had paid for us. We had to entertain the client because how 
else could we pay back the debt? 506 
 
iv. ‘Other forms of Coercion’ – The Limits of Coercion 
 
The body of persons who are trafficked or smuggled are unlikely to come from affluent 
backgrounds, where choice of, and access to, education and employment is abundant 
and free from the constraints of gender discrimination. The flow of traffick victims 
typically moves from east to west; essentially from poorer States to richer western 
States. Persons from an economically impoverished state or area may have an effective 
lack of opportunity when it comes to education or employment, particularly if they are 
female, and therefore no effective ‘choice’. Such an oppressive situation might result in 
making the decision to be trafficked, but it cannot easily be said that the woman ‘freely 
chooses’ her fate. After all, ‘it’s better to go and earn money to spend than to stay home 
and starve.’507 In 1994, a definition offered by the UN General Assembly 
acknowledged the potential role of economic hardship in the trafficking process: 
‘[Trafficking is the] illicit and clandestine movement of persons …largely from 
                                                 
506 L Brown, n 120, 115. 
507 S Skrobanek et al, The Traffic in Women: Human Realities of the International Sex Trade (London: 
Zed Books 1997) 91. 
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developing countries with economies in transition…’508 According, the potential for 
recognition of ‘economic coercion of circumstances’ as a form of ‘means’ will now be 
discussed. 
        On the face of it, it is legitimate to recognise that ‘we do not treat an ostensible 
consent as invalidated simply because the agent was faced with a choice between 
unattractive options.’509 Nonetheless, the role of extreme economic hardship in 
migration and trafficking situations should not be underestimated, as it has clearly a 
bearing on the decision to enter a migration/trafficking situation (and therefore has a 
bearing on the consent of the decision maker). Indeed, full consent requires a rational 
and autonomous agent - ‘[t]he scope for self-determination afforded to the 
disempowered is radically reduced ... by informal mechanisms that render certain 
choices too costly – financially, socially, or personally – to be realistic options.’510 
        The Proposal for the recent EU 2011 Directive recognised that: 
 
Social vulnerability is arguably the principal root cause of trafficking in 
human beings. Vulnerability derives from economic and social factors such 
as poverty, gender discrimination, armed conflicts, domestic violence, 
dysfunctional families, and personal circumstances such as age or health 
conditions or disabilities. Such vulnerability is used by international 
organised crime networks to facilitate migration and subsequently severely 
exploit people by use of force, threat, coercion, or various forms of abuse 
such as debt bondage. In fact the high level of profits generated is a major 
                                                 
508 Report of the Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women, its Causes and Consequences, (1994) 
U.N. ESCOR E/CN.4/1997/47/Add.4 Commission on Human Rights, 53rd Session, Provisional Agenda 
Item 9(a), at 19 <http://www.awf.or.jp/pdf/h0010.pdf> accessed 11 Jan 2007. 
509 D Beyleveld, and R Brownsword, n 321, 126. 
510 V E Munro, ‘Constructing Consent: Legislating Freedom and Legitimating Constraint in the 
Expression of Sexual Autonomy’, (2008) 41 Akron L. Rev 923, 930. 
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underlying driver. The demand for sexual services and cheap labour is a 
concurrent driver.511 (Emphasis added) 
 
Nonetheless, some commentators are critical of the ‘victim’ stereotype. Murray holds 
that women are well aware of the terms and nature of their work when they opt to enter 
trafficking-related situations, and that ‘false promises’ are rare.512 Others are of a 
similar opinion; that trafficking typically involves women who voluntarily migrate to a 
country which is more economically prosperous than their origin state.513 Clearly, there 
is a tension between how these women – trafficked and smuggled sex workers – are 
perceived by different bodies or persons. 
        Beyleveld and Brownsword note that: 
 
… as relationships become less guided by paternalistic considerations or by 
status and, correspondingly, more guided by notions of individual freedom 
and right, the importance of consent will be increasingly voiced.514 
 
Accordingly, if we are to follow an ‘Autonomy’ stance and recognise the ability and 
right to contract oneself into exploitative sex work (which this thesis does), then it is of 
utmost importance that true consent is present. Due to the elasticity of the notion of 
                                                 
511 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on preventing and combating 
trafficking in human beings, and protecting victims, repealing Framework Decision 2002/629/JHA, 
(COM (2010) 95 Final) at 1.2. 
512 See A Murray, ‘Debt Bondage and Trafficking: Don’t Believe the Hype’, in Doezma J. and 
Kempadoo K. (eds).  Global Sex Workers: Rights, Resistance and Redefinition. (Routledge, New York 
1998). 
513 See, for example, NV Demleitner, ‘The Law at a Crossroads: The Construction of Migrant Women 
Trafficked into Prostitution’, in Kyle, D. and Koslowski, R. (eds) Global Human Smuggling: 
Comparative Perspectives, (The Johns Hopkins University 2001) 257, 264. Similarly, empirical research 
conducted in Birmingham where police were interviewed regarding their thoughts on trafficked women 
found that the prevailing attitude was that they had consented (source: Statement by Sarah Garrat, 
Personal Communication on 14 February 2008, following research conducted by the Asylum and 
Immigration Research Team, Birmingham, into the treatment of victims of human trafficking once 
discovered in the destination state). 
514 D Beyleveld, and R Brownsword, n 321, 3. 
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consent,515 valid consent – particularly in a coercive environment such as that of sex 
work – is problematic to determine. Consequently, and somewhat paradoxically, then, a 
paternal and protectionist stance which requires a high standard of informed consent in 
order for the autonomous decision of the sex worker to be recognised as valid, is 
perhaps needed.516 
        This tension merits enquiry into the motivations for consent. As Bhaba asks: ‘How 
should coercion be characterised? Does someone with a gun to their head consent to 
hand over money when robbed? Most would say no.’517 Such a choice is ‘tainted by 
compulsion, undesirableness (in the sense that neither option is desirable) and 
threat.’518 Bhaba goes on to consider this analogy in a migration context, and asks 
whether ‘persecution, destitution, and … prolonged family separation constitute “guns” 
to the head’.519 As regards different types of pressure and graduations of forced choice, 
it has been stated that:  
                                                
 
At one end of a spectrum, the pressure applied may be characterised as 
‘strong’ while, at the other end, the pressure applied may be characterised 
as ‘weak’. Operating with such a construct, we might characterise the 
gunman’s threat to life as ‘strong’, threats to property (unless life-
threatening) as less strong, and threats of a purely economic nature as 
relatively ‘weak’.520  
 
 
515 Discussed in Chapter 1, Part III, and throughout Chapter 3. 
516 This argument is developed in Chapter 3, Part IV. 
517 J Bhabha, ‘Trafficking, Smuggling and Human Rights’, (March 2005) Migration Information Source: 
Special Issue on Migration and Human Rights 
<http://www.migrationinformation.org/Feature/display.cfm?id=294> accessed 21 August 2007. 
518 D Beyleveld, and R Brownsword, n 321, 128. 
519 J Bhabha, n 517. 
520 D Beyleveld, and R Brownsword, n 321, 139. 
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This reflects the more orthodox criminal law position, which would hold that 
‘economic coercion of circumstances’ – although material to making a decision - does 
not invalidate consent. Coercion or compulsion as typically perceived would come 
directly or indirectly from another person.521 Yet, it is clearly possible that someone 
who makes the choice to migrate in order to work in exploitative conditions is doing so 
simply as the result of a lack of other, meaningful or preferable choices, or perhaps due 
to a severe lack of options and dire economic circumstances. 
        Domestic and international prostitution debates highlight the difficult economic 
backgrounds of many who work in this profession.522 This can likely be applied to 
many trafficking victims of all kinds: male and female, sex worker or labourer of 
another kind. Consent can be seen through an overly generic lens; it does not come with 
uniform ease or quality, and individual situations may not always be taken into account. 
Beyleveld and Brownsword consider the effect of external pressure which is applied by 
a person (or ‘agent’) to the consenting party, and state that ‘[a]ssuming that the external 
force or pressure is a causative factor in the choice made, this is the ideal-typical case 
of forced choice by reason of external pressure.’523 Can this be transplanted into a 
context where either a) the pressure comes from circumstances rather than an ‘agent’, 
or b) where the agent indirectly takes advantage of the circumstances but perhaps does 
                                                 
521 Ibid, 127. 
522 See, J Doezma, ‘Forced to choose: Beyond the voluntary v. forced prostitution 
Dichotomy’, in Doezma J. and Kempadoo K. (eds) Global Sex Workers: Rights, Resistance and 
Redefinition (Routledge, New York, 1998); L L Lim, ‘Whither the sex sector? Some policy 
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Asia (International Labour Office 1998); J Outshoorn n 43; N Lacey ‘Beset by boundaries: the Home 
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(NacMillan Press, London, 1999); Justis- og Politidepartementet ( Ministry of Justice and the Police) 
‘Purchasing Sexual Services in Sweden and the Netherlands:  Legal Regulation and Experiences, An 
abbreviated English version, A Report by a Working Group on the legal regulation of the purchase of 
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523 D Beyleveld, and R Brownsword, n 321, 137. 
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not directly apply external pressure? The former situation will now be addressed; the 
latter will be discussed in the subsequent section.524 
        The majority of the ‘means’ listed in the trafficking definition would largely be 
seen as threats or actions coming directly from the trafficker, but, ‘coercion’ or 
‘abuse…of a position of vulnerability’ have the potential to be more broadly 
interpreted. Full consent requires the actor to be fully autonomous. If the conditions for 
a valid consent require ‘free agreement’,525 then ‘an agreement secured by duress will 
not suffice.’526 Could, for example, the potentially broad scope of the term ‘coercion’ 
include ‘economic coercion of circumstances’; i.e. the making of the choice to be 
trafficked, motivated by severe economic hardship, as opposed to coercion coming 
directly from the trafficker? This matter may have specific implications for the consent 
debate.  
        Several commentators support the position that ‘economic coercion’ should be 
included in the generic meaning of ‘coercion’ in the context of international trafficking 
instruments.527 The Supreme Court of India in 1982 conceded that ‘force’ in the context 
of ‘forced labour’ could feasibly not only include physical force but also ‘compulsion 
arising from hunger or poverty, want and destitution.’528 (Although once again, the 
compulsion would be linked to the ‘owner’, so to speak, as opposed to coming from 
circumstances independent of any compulsion from a  human being). If it is to be 
accepted that trafficked victims come ‘largely from developing countries with 
economies in transition…’529 then consideration must be given to ‘economic coercion’ 
                                                 
524 See subsection v, below. 
525 Scottish Law Commission, n 336, para 2.10. 
526 The Law Commission, n 323, para 2.10.  
527 K Hyland, ‘Protecting Human Victims of Trafficking: An American Framework’, (2001) 16 Berkeley 
Womens Law Journal, 29, 49, also see J Bhabha, ‘Reforming Immigration Policy: Start by protecting 
rights, not borders’, Boston Review Summer, (2005). 
528 People’s Union for Democratic Rights and others v Union of India and others [1983] 1 S.C.R. 456. 
529 Definition offered by the Report of the Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women, its Causes 
and Consequences, ‘Further Promotion and Encouragement of Human Rights and Fundamental 
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as an issue potentially vitiating consent, but bearing in mind that the circumstances of 
the particular incident will be decisive. 
        Spector notes that:  
 
The radical feminist sees the prostitute who appears to “consent” to 
prostitution as so affected by systematic gender oppression that her choices 
are distorted – and even her sense of self shaped – by it. Whereas the liberal 
believes in the individual’s ability to transcend her oppressive 
circumstances somewhat by making a rational decision to do the best she 
can, considering. And to choose to do the best one can, considering, is to be 
free.530 
 
Liberal ‘Autonomy’531 advocates do not see poverty as coercive, but more a factor to 
be taken into account when making an informed decision to improve one’s material 
worth. Yet, if one’s economic situation is so dire that one feels impelled to make a 
certain choice, then that choice is automatically characterised as coercive,532 although 
perhaps insufficiently for the purposes of the trafficking definition. Repeated 
involvement in trafficking could also be taken as evidence of the prevalence of 
‘economic coercion’ in the decision to be trafficked, or at least to enter a situation of 
exploitative facilitated migration. Deportation or repatriation into a destitute and 
                                                                                                                                                        
Freedoms, Including the Question of the Programme and Methods of Work of the Commission 
Alternative Approaches and Ways and Means Within the United Nations System for Improving the 
Effective Enjoyment of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.’ (1997) UN Doc 
E/CN.4/1997/47/Add.4, at 19, 
<http://www.unhchr.ch/Huridocda/Huridoca.nsf/0/043c76f98a706362802566b1005e9219?Opendocume
nt>  accessed 14 Feb 2008. 
530 J Spector, Prostitution and pornography: Philosophical debate about the sex industry (Stanford 
University Press 2006) 426. 
531 The autonomy v paternalism debate as regards sex work will be discussed in Chapter 3, Part IV, 
section A et seq. 
532 See J Bhabha, n 517 
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hopeless situation may not be the most desirable option from the perspective of the 
trafficked person, who may still be making more money in exploitative conditions in 
the host state than they would in destitute conditions at home.  
                                                
        If ‘coercion’ is to be accepted to include economic coercion of circumstances, then 
this would considerably narrow the band of people who could be deemed to have given 
consent in a trafficking context. Economic coercion arguably renders the nature of the 
consent damaged; i.e. consent given in these circumstances cannot necessarily be 
equated to free will, or ‘free agreement’.533 Munro notes that:  
 
... critics have identified a tendency in certain strands of liberal theory to 
analyse social problems by removing actors from their everyday 
environment, stripping them of the characteristics and relationships that 
influence their choices, and placing them in a sterile legal world where 
complex dilemmas are resolved by detached models of distributive justice 
and invocation of self-interested and conflict-oriented claims.534 
 
As has been demonstrated,535 trafficking or facilitated migration for the purpose of 
sexual exploitation (or exploitation per se) is contextual and involves coercive factors 
such as poverty and lack of opportunity for economic gain. These factors influence the 
choices and the ‘consent’ of those who opt to migrate or enlist the services of a 
trafficker/smuggler. Consequently, any consent given here should be viewed in its own 
context as opposed to being applied as an abstract conception or standard of consent. 
 
533 See Law Commission, n 323 and also Scottish Law Commission, n 336, which endorsed the same 
definition of consent as ‘free agreement’. 
534 V E Munro, n 510, 928. 
535 See, Chapter 1, Part I, section A. 
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        ‘Coercion’ as a ‘means’ element of human trafficking features to varying extents 
in the domestic legislation of Council of Europe member States who have ratified the 
CoE Trafficking Convention. The provisions contained within the Convention have 
been implemented into the domestic criminal codes, or similar, of the ratifying 
countries. Albania, for example, ratified the Convention on 6 February 2007, and 
Article 110/a of the Criminal Code defines ‘trafficking in persons’ as:  
 
The recruitment, transport, transfer, hiding or reception of persons through 
threat or the use of force or other forms of compulsion, kidnapping, fraud, 
abuse of office or taking advantage of social, physical or psychological 
condition or the giving or receipt of payments or benefits in order to get the 
consent of a person who controls another person, with the purpose of 
exploitation of prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, 
forced services or work, slavery or forms similar to slavery, putting to use 
or transplanting organs, as well as other forms of exploitation.536 
 
The English Translation of the Croatian Criminal Code, Article 178(2), envisages the 
following ‘means’: 
 
Whoever, by force or threat to use force or deceit, coerces or induces 
another person to go to the state in which he has no residence or of which 
he is not a citizen, for the purpose of offering sexual services upon 
payment, shall be punished by imprisonment for six months to five years.537 
                                                 
536 Criminal Code of the Republic of Albania, Article 110/a, English translation provided by 
legislationline.org, a legislative database published and maintained by the OSCE Office for Democratic 
Institutions and Human Rights, available at <http://www.legislationline.org/> accessed 03 March 2009.  
537 Criminal Code of Croatia, Article 178(2), English translation provided by legislationline.org, ibid. 
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 The relevant legislation in Cyprus envisages the following ‘means’: 
 
Force, violence or threats…fraud….abuse of power or other kind of 
pressure to such an extent so that the particular person would have no 
substantial and reasonable choice but to succumb to pressure or ill-
treatment 538 
 
None of these excerpts seem to clearly envisage economic coercion as being included 
in the ‘means’ element of human trafficking; the ‘means’ elements most clearly include 
direct measures coming from the trafficker, as opposed to from external circumstances. 
On the other hand, none of the provisions are phrased so as to explicitly exclude 
economic coercion. 
        In considering the potential to argue in favour of the recognition of ‘economic 
coercion of circumstances’ in a migration and trafficking context, one might look to 
drawing parallels with other areas of the law; most notably that relating to ‘duress of 
circumstances’, such as can be seen in the UK legal approach.539 As Simester and 
Sullivan note, ‘…it would be unacceptably Draconian to punish persons who have 
acted to avoid catastrophic harm to themselves, to those to whom they feel attached or 
feel responsible.’540 However, the force of the terminology used – ‘catastrophic harm’ – 
indicates that this principle is not easily transferable into a situation which is not 
necessarily readily recognised as reaching that standard. In an ‘economic coercion of 
circumstances’ context, such as is being explored here, the ‘harm’ caused by severe 
                                                 
538 Law No. 3(1) of 2000, Combating of Trafficking in Persons and Sexual Exploitation of Children, 
English translation provided by legislationline.org, ibid. 
539 See, for example, A P Simester, J R Spencer, G R Sullivan and G J Virgo, Simester and Sullivan’s 
Criminal Law: Theory and Doctrine, (Hart Publishing, 2010) 734. 
540 Ibid, 725. 
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economic circumstances may be more difficult to categorise as comparably catastrophic 
to a threat of imminent death or serious harm caused directly or indirectly by another 
human being.  
        The domestic case law relating to duress of circumstances still indicates that the 
motivating factor comes from another person, albeit somewhat indirectly.541 That is to 
say, the commission of an offence by A can be linked to some form of threat made by 
B. The threat need not be to A;542 neither need it be dependent upon the commission by 
B of any specific offence, or indeed any offence.543 A threat made by a person which 
creates circumstances which lead A to commit an offence, is still somewhat different to 
the situation where A commits an offence due to pre-existing circumstances which are 
not attributable in any way to a person, such as severe economic circumstances. 
        A problem with any acceptance of economic coercion of circumstances as 
sufficient to constitute ‘coercion’ as part of the ‘means’ element of trafficking is that 
what is to be included in or excluded from this category is a matter of degree. At what 
point is one sufficiently poor to be deemed to have been economically coerced? 
Economic hardship may be suffered which does not go far enough to constitute 
economic coercion in this context. Is financial difficulty sufficient, or does one have to 
be on the brink of starvation? The latter may constitute ‘catastrophic harm’ but not in 
the way intended by orthodox criminal law. Can it be assumed that one has been 
economically coerced based upon their country or area of origin, or does determination 
of this matter merit enquiry into individual circumstances? We are presented here with 
a potentially broad spectrum, and the practicalities of determining such issues are likely 
to be arduous.  
                                                 
541 See Willer [1986] 83 Cr App R (CA), Conway [1989] QB 290 (CA) and Martin [1989] 1 All ER 652 
(CA). 
542 Martin [1989] 1 All ER 652 (CA). 
543 See Willer [1986] 83 Cr App R (CA), Conway [1989] QB 290 (CA). 
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          It is recognised here that inclusion of ‘economic coercion of circumstances’ as a 
form of ‘coercion’ for the purposes of human trafficking is a very ambitious argument – 
this form of coercion may considered to be too ‘at arm’s length’. This is not to argue 
for States to accept the commission of ‘legalised immigration offences’, simply to ask 
that trafficking and smuggling be seen in their proper economic and social context, as 
economic hardship at home will, as has been argued, frequently feature at the beginning 
of the smuggling/trafficking chain.  
        This issue has to be approached very tentatively: as Kennedy recognises, ‘If we 
cut back the rules far enough, we would arrive at something like the state of nature – 
legalized theft.’544 Beyleveld and Brownsword ask: 
 
… what do we say about those all-too-familiar cases where agents who are 
in extreme or necessitous circumstances are tempted by financial 
inducements or other forms of incentive to enter into deals which they 
would not seriously contemplate were it not for their indigent or exiguous 
circumstances? Are we seriously suggesting that such agents – say, organ 
sellers in the Third World or surrogate mothers or plea-bargaining 
defendants in the First World – thereby make unforced choices and give 
valid consents to the bargains into which they enter? Of course, we are not 
suggesting any such thing. The most that we are saying is that such 
transactions cannot be impugned simply because the choice made by the 
needy agent was given in response to an external element having a positive 
bearing on the agent’s interests.545 
 
                                                 
544 D Kennedy, ‘Distributive and Paternalist Motives in Contract and Tort law, with Special Reference to 
Compulsory Terms and Unequal Bargaining Power’ (1982) 41 Maryland Law Review 563, 582. 
545 D Beyleveld, and R Brownsword, n 321, 135. 
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Consent in the face of ‘economic coercion of circumstances’ is morally, if not legally, 
suspect. Yet, this may not be enough to invalidate consent as a matter of law – the 
tenacity of this argument must be acknowledged – ‘the mere fact that the consent was 
induced by positive pressure does not equate to a forced choice.’546 
        To revisit the conditions for a valid consent which were analysed above,547 can 
consent given in the face of extreme economic coercion of circumstances be considered 
to be freely given? Arguably, it cannot. Yet, to recognise this as a factor comparable to 
direct coercion from a trafficker, capable of vitiating consent, is asking for an extension 
– although not a wholly unprincipled one – of the criminal law. Realistically this would 
not be accepted by States, which have a legitimate interest in protecting their borders 
against those individuals whom the States will simply view as economic migrants. 
Inclusion of ‘economic coercion of circumstances’ as a type of ‘coercion’ seems, 
therefore, to be somewhat of a tenuous concept, although inclusion of this category 
would benefit potentially vulnerable people and would go toward supporting the notion 
of consent as completely ‘free agreement’.548 
        It is submitted here that two counter-propositions on the duress of circumstances 
question may be made. First, it is clear that duress of this kind is not ordinarily a 
defence to the criminal law and so would not protect the ‘trafficked’ victim from 
criminal liability with respect to immigration offences in the absence of specific, 
trafficking-related exceptions. Further, distress of economic circumstances is precisely 
what border security is designed to protect against – the movement of economic 
                                                 
546 Ibid, 136. 
547 Chapter 1, Part III. 
548 The definition suggested by the Law Commission, n 323, para 2.10.  
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refugees. There is no evidence in general that States regard such people as other than 
illegal immigrants, susceptible to peremptory removal.549 
        This section has attempted (yet admittedly not succeeded) in sketching out a prima 
facie case for the extension of ‘coercion’ to include ‘economic coercion of 
circumstances’ so that the broadest possible notion of ‘coercion’ is used, which would 
clearly be of the most benefit to putative victims. Nonetheless, economic factors may 
simply be considered a material factor which influence the decision making process of 
the smuggled/trafficked person, and therefore this is insufficient to invalidate consent. 
Physical pressure or duress would likely be viewed more sympathetically than personal 
economic or financial pressure.550  
        Where the trafficker takes advantage of the ‘victim’s’ dire economic 
circumstances, this may arguably qualify as coercive in that it constitutes ‘abuse of a 
position of vulnerability’, as included as a ‘means’ element of human trafficking in the 
internationally accepted definition. This will now be explored. 
 
v. Abuse of a Position of Vulnerability         
 
As has been established, the current trafficking definition ‘extends beyond conventional 
criminal law notions of coercion and duress, or even of fraud and deception, to include 
exploitation by abuse of social or cultural authority or of a position of vulnerability.’551 
It seems clear - from the above discussion and the wording ‘force or other forms of 
coercion’ within the trafficking definition - that trafficking can occur without the means 
                                                 
549 A point which will be argued later  is that States sometimes make exceptions to the removal policy 
with respect to specific individuals (not technically refugees) on humanitarian grounds, and that a case 
may be made for something similar for smuggled women or ‘consensually trafficked’, on a case-by-case. 
See, Chapter 4, Part IX, section B. 
550 D Beyleveld, and R Brownsword, n 321, 143. 
551 B E Hernandez-Truyol, and J E Larson ‘Sexual Labour and Human Rights’, (2006) 37 Columbia 
Human Rights Law Review, 391 – 445, 432. 
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of any actual physical force, i.e. psychological coercion may well suffice. The 
terminology ‘position of vulnerability’ in the definition is uncertain, because a situation 
amounting to just that could be brought about by a variety of factors and circumstances. 
Perhaps the most obvious example would be where a member of a certain family or 
community is told what to do by a family member, or influential member of the 
community. If it is culturally unacceptable for the subject to do otherwise, the result is 
that they are effectively compelled to obey.  
        Abuse of a position of power or vulnerability or authority552 can be illustrated by 
reference to the case of Larissis and Others v Greece,553 where a military officer was 
accused of proselytising those who were his subordinates. The thrust of the case against 
him was that ‘the accused took advantage of the trust inherent in the relationship 
between a subordinate and a superior.’554 Accordingly, his conviction for proselytising 
was not an unjustified interference with his right to practice his religion under Article 9 
ECHR. It is not inconceivable that a putative traffick victim could be subject to 
pressure in a similar way. 
        The UN Trafficking Protocol requires signatory States to try to alleviate factors 
that make persons, especially women and children, vulnerable to trafficking, such as 
poverty, underdevelopment and lack of equal opportunity.555 This could be construed to 
mean that poverty, economic difficulty and gender discrimination constitute positions 
of vulnerability, as used within the trafficking definition. Such circumstances leave the 
individual open to abuse by the trafficker, who may take advantage of such a situation 
                                                 
552 The Europol Convention States that ‘“traffic in human beings” means subjection of a person to the 
real and illegal sway of other persons by using violence or menaces or by abuse of authority or intrigue, 
especially with a view to the exploitation of prostitution, forms of sexual exploitation and assault of 
minors or trade in abandoned children.’ (Emphasis added) See ‘Europol Convention: Consolidated 
version’ 
<http://www.aedh.eu/plugins/fckeditor/userfiles/file/Protection%20des%20donn%C3%A9es%20personn
elles/Europol_Convention_Consolidated_version.pdf> accessed 23 June 2011. 
553 Larissis and Others v Greece (App nos. 23372/94, 26377/95, 26378/94) (1998) ECHR 13. 
554 Larissis, ibid, para 15. 
555 Article 9. 
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when recruiting potential victims, and use the economic vulnerability of the victim as a 
tool of persuasion. Accordingly, the knowledge of the trafficker (as to the ‘victim’s’ 
position of vulnerability) would be relevant here.  
        Although economic hardship may be a factor in many instances of trafficking, the 
wording of the Interpretative Notes for the Official Records (travaux preparatoires) of 
the negotiation of the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized 
Crime and the Protocols thereto556 appear to imply abuse coming more directly from 
the trafficker, as opposed to the trafficker taking advantage of a situation which already 
exists (such as economic hardship), although broad interpretation could lead to an 
alternative reading. We know from the travaux to the Trafficking Protocol that the 
phrase ‘abuse of a position of vulnerability’ is, from the perspective of the victim, 
‘understood to refer to any situation in which the person involved has no real and 
acceptable alternative but to submit to the abuse involved.’557  
        This elaboration provides little explanation or qualification of the meaning of the 
phrase in question, which is open ended. Is the trafficker to be held responsible for a) 
the economic situation of the would-be victim, or b) the taking advantage thereof? As 
to the first point, indeed he cannot be. As to the second point, the trafficking definition 
potentially has scope to include this. ‘Force’ can be treated as ‘power-play on the part 
of the intervening agent that is designed to elicit the consent of the target agent.’558 This 
is what takes place where the trafficker abuses the position of (economic and social) 
vulnerability of the victim.       
                                                 
556 United Nations General Assembly ‘Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Elaboration of a 
Convention against Transnational Organized Crime on the work of its first to eleventh sessions, 
Addendum, Interpretative notes for the official records (travaux preparatoires) of the negotiation of the 
United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and the Protocols thereto’ (2000) UN 
Doc A/55/383/Add.1. 
557 Ibid, 63. 
558 D Beyleveld, and R Brownsword, n 321, 131. 
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        The CoE Trafficking Convention Explanatory Report provides further illumination 
on the terminology: 
 
By abuse of a position of vulnerability is meant abuse of any situation in 
which the person involved has no real and acceptable alternative to 
submitting to the abuse. The vulnerability may be of any kind, whether 
physical, psychological, emotional, family-related, social or economic. The 
situation might, for example, involve insecurity or illegality of the victim’s 
administrative status, economic dependence or fragile health. In short, the 
situation can be any state of hardship in which a human being is impelled to 
accept being exploited.559 (Emphasis added) 
 
As made explicit in the excerpt, the Explanatory Report to the CoE Trafficking 
Convention recognises that vulnerability may be, among other things, social or 
economic.560 The Report goes on to state that a wide range of means, coming directly 
from the trafficker, must be contemplated, including ‘abusing the economic insecurity 
or poverty of an adult hoping to better their own and their family’s lot.’561 Similarly, as 
regards the national definitions of human trafficking considered above,562 reference to 
‘taking advantage of social … condition’ in the Albanian Criminal Code seems to 
indicate that the trafficker taking advantage of the victim’s dire economic 
circumstances could suffice as a more direct ‘means’ or form of coercion. Indeed, ‘[t]he 
lack of viable economic alternatives that makes people stay in an exploitative work 
                                                 
559 Explanatory Report to the CoE Trafficking Convention, n 248, 83. 
560 Ibid.  
561 Ibid, 84.  
562 See subsection iv, pp 147 – 148, above. 
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relationship does not in itself constitute forced labour though it may constitute a 
position of vulnerability as defined by the Palermo Protocol.’563   
        The phrase used in the Travaux to the Trafficking Protocol564 is replicated 
verbatim in the text proper of the EU 2011 Directive,565 as opposed to in any preamble, 
Travaux, or explanatory reports. This sets the Directive apart from the other two main 
instruments considered throughout this thesis, and is significant in that it brings the 
issue of ‘abuse of a position of vulnerability’ more to the forefront of the discussion of 
the scope of the ‘means’ capable of invalidating consent here. The 2002 EU Framework 
Decision also included specific mention, in the text proper, of the meaning of ‘abuse of 
a position of vulnerability’, using largely the same terms.566 The preamble to the EU 
2011 Directive states that ‘factors that could be taken into account when assessing the 
vulnerability of a victim include, for example, gender…’ thereby expanding upon 
previous instruments which have largely concentrated on other criteria as to what 
constitutes ‘vulnerability’, such as social or economic vulnerability. However, as the 
discussion in Part I of Chapter 1 indicated, such criteria (i.e. lower social or economic 
status linked to gender) are frequently not mutually exclusive. 
        Accordingly, these explanations (as to the meaning of ‘abuse of a position of 
vulnerability) imply that a person may be vulnerable as a result of lack of economic 
opportunity or financial difficulties, or being rejected by their community for one 
reason or another. Consequently, they may be particularly vulnerable to persuasion or 
veiled coercion from traffickers and smugglers, and therefore agree to be transported 
                                                 
563 B Andrees, International Labour Organization, ‘Forced Labour and Human Trafficking: Handbook for 
labour inspectors’ (International Labour Office 2008) 13 <http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---
ed_norm/---declaration/documents/publication/wcms_097835.pdf> accessed 11 April 2011. 
564 That abuse of a position of vulnerability is ‘understood to refer to any situation in which the person 
involved has no real and acceptable alternative but to submit to the abuse involved’ - see UN Doc 
A/55/383/Add.1, n 479. 
565 Article 2(2). 
566 Article 1(c). 
 158
and exploited in some manner. This indicates abuse of a position of vulnerability at an 
early, almost pre-trafficking stage – the beginning of the chain.  
        The recent Project Acumen report, compiled by the Association of Chief Police 
(ACPO), recognised ‘economic reasons’ to be a prevalent ‘operational indicator’ as 
form of ‘recruitment by abuse of a position of vulnerability’ in trafficking amongst the 
sample of migrants used, thereby indicating abuse of economic vulnerability right at the 
start of the trafficking chain.567 In terms of abuse of a position of vulnerability in this 
context, the abuse or coercion would be based upon the lure of money to be made, 
rather than the threat of money to be withheld. For various reasons, including the fact 
that the abuse took place in the country of origin, it may be difficult to show objective 
proof of abuse of a position of vulnerability in this context. This category of ‘means’ 
may be meant to be reserved for more arguably clear cut cases such as those outlined in 
the opening paragraph to this section – the exertion of abuse and/or control by a 
community leader, for example. 
        With respect to those victims already in another country than that of their origin - 
perhaps as a result of already having been trafficked or having been moved part way 
along the trafficking chain, abuse of a position of vulnerability may include various 
factors to be taken into account. These factors include: the victim being far from home; 
potentially on the wrong side of the immigration law in the destination state; not being 
a native speaker of the language of that state; and being reliant upon economic gain for 
survival just as any person might. The potential for broad construction of this term 
means that it may be capable of encompassing situations where an otherwise ‘smuggled 
prostitute’ becomes a ‘trafficked prostitute’ due to the imposition of ‘economic 
coercion’ on the part of the trafficker when in situ.  
                                                 
567 Project Acumen, n 92, 27. 
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        An example of UK domestic case law is useful here to illustrate the application 
(by an agent) of external pressure of an economic nature in order to coerce sex workers 
to take on more work than they were happy to. In R v Moir (Sharon Carol)568 the 
defendant had run an escort agency primarily from her home. She had approximately 
350 women on her books, and on any given day there were 10 to 12 women working. 
The agency retained a third of the sum paid by customers. Moir continued to maintain 
that she was unaware that the women were having sex with customers and said they 
were merely being paid for their time. She argued that there was no evidence of force or 
coercion of the women, and maintained that those involved in the use of the brothel had 
done so voluntarily.  
        While there was no evidence of physical force or coercion, in passing sentence the 
judge had emphasised the economic coercion used by Moir to force the women to 
work, by denying them future work if they refused a customer at the end of a shift. 
Therefore, Moir used the threat of withholding money in order to indirectly coerce the 
girls to work. Yet, this case shows recognition of the role of economic factors in 
coercive practices, and lends weight to the ‘abuse of a position of vulnerability’ 
argument which is advanced here, albeit more clearly supporting the argument as 
regards those already in the destination State. 
        The divide between consent and the various ‘means’ elements of the trafficking 
definition, such as coercion, is not clear and absolute, and whether or not a position of 
vulnerability encompasses circumstances of economic hardship or extreme poverty 
remains to be tested. Coercion is not present in every exploitative situation, yet it 
becomes necessary to show lack of consent in trafficking cases. If a person feasibly has 
                                                 
568 [2007] EWCA Crim 3317. 
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no other options, then the exploitative situation becomes coercive.569 Yet, coercion is 
clearly not the sole ‘means’ element provided within the trafficking definition – the 
issue is whether there is/was a lack or free and informed consent on the part of the 
victim. 
         An example of abuse of a position of vulnerability can be found when examining 
the mail order bride industry. It has been suggested that the position of mail order 
brides has come to ‘strongly resemble the international trafficking of women’.570 This 
industry promotes the commodification of women through offering catalogues of 
potential brides who can be purchased by the (predominantly western) male consumer. 
These women will frequently have joined such agencies as a result of social pressure to 
marry, or financial hardship through lack of opportunity for economic gain.571 Once the 
opportunity to marry has been bought by the consumer, the women will be transported 
from their country of origin, frequently economically impoverished countries such as 
the Philippines, and subjected to conditions which in some circumstances amount to 
sexual exploitation or involuntary servitude.572 
        On strict application of the terms of the trafficking definition, one can conclude 
that the ‘action’ of ‘recruitment, transportation….’ has been satisfied. One could argue 
that the women or girls consented through joining the agency. This could be 
counteracted through asserting abuse of a position of vulnerability, if taking advantage 
of her economic hardship is to be so deemed. If the bride is effectively used as a 
domestic servant, does this then amount to trafficking? The answer to this question is 
‘possibly’, as there is evidence573 to suggests that some mail-order brides do indeed 
                                                 
569 J Bhabha, n 517.  
570 D R Lee, ‘Mail Fantasy: Global Sexual Exploitation in the Mail-Order Bride Industry and Proposed 
Legal Solutions’, (1998) 5 Asian Law Journal 139, 141. 
571 Ibid, 143. 
572 Ibid, 140. 
573 See, ‘Bride Trafficking Unveiled’ 9 May 2011, CurrentTV. 
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experience levels of exploitation by their ‘husbands’ once in the destination State which 
may reach the trafficking threshold, and furthermore it could be argued that that some 
of these brides may not be truly informed as to what they are consenting to.574  
        Nonetheless, not all such brides will experience situations which could be classed 
as sufficiently coercive or exploitative for the purpose of the trafficking definition. 
Consequently, although the mail-order bride industry may objectively be seen as 
inherently exploitative, this industry per se will not be caught by the technical 
trafficking definition,575 yet individual cases might.576 
 
C. The ‘Means’ – Some Conclusions 
 
The development of the ‘means’ aspect of the trafficking process has been far from 
smooth. The introduction of this element in the earliest trafficking instruments, and the 
subsequent disappearance of it with the 1949 Trafficking Convention, demonstrated a 
lack of consensus as to what trafficking actually is in a legal sense. The fact that the 
1949 Convention was so strongly criticised for its lack of ‘means’ rendered inevitable 
the reintroduction of this element in future international standards.  
        The main point of tension with the ‘means’ element as it stands today in the 
trafficking definition is a result of a lack of case law - the separate ‘means’ or forms of 
coercion are yet to all be fully interpreted. A wide range of ‘means’ is contemplated, 
                                                 
574 Ibid. 
575 Similarly, mail order brides may not fall within the scope of Article 1(c)(i) of the Supplementary 
Slavery Convention which relates to a woman being promised for marriage by a third party in return for 
some form of payment of consideration, as the Article states that the woman must be ‘without the right to 
refuse’. Although women who join mail order bride agencies may have done so because they feel backed 
into a corner as a result of lack of opportunity for economic gain in their home states, in the sense of the 
definition provided by the Supplementary Slavery Convention they theoretically retain the right to refuse 
any particular offer. Theory may not translate easily into practice here, however. 
576 On this topic, see J Jones, ‘Trafficking Internet Brides’ Information & Communications Technology 
Law, Vol. 20, No. 1, March 2011, 19–33. 
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which ‘reflect differences of degree rather than … nature’.577 The ‘means’ identifies the 
deceptive and at times purely brutal methods of recruiting and retaining control over the 
victim employed by the trafficker. The coercion element is what distinguishes human 
trafficking from exploitative migration of a lesser form; i.e. where one consents to 
migrate into a situation of exploitative employment.578  
        The (Unofficial) Annotated Guide to the Complete UN Trafficking Protocol579 is 
misplaced in making the assertion that the ‘means’ element is not important; for 
without the ‘means’, there is no trafficking. One who trafficks a human being who is 
deemed capable of choice cannot be treated in the same fashion as one who trafficks an 
inanimate object.580 The distinction must be made between the agent who kidnaps his 
victim, and the agent who aids a person in his migration into exploitative 
circumstances. This illustrates the fact that, where human beings are concerned, 
responsibility must be apportioned accordingly. If no physical force or other relevant 
form of coercion is employed, then the ‘agent’ who would otherwise be labelled a 
trafficker is perhaps no more than a facilitator in the exploitative migration process, or 
perhaps a perpetrator of serious exploitation which, due to the presence of or 
appearance of consent, falls below the standard of ‘human trafficking’.  
        The final element of the trafficking definition – the ‘purpose’ – will now be 
analysed. 
 
 
                                                 
577 Explanatory Report to the CoE Trafficking Convention, n 248, 84. 
578 See Chapter 3, Part IV, section E, for discussion of consent to harm and/or exploitation. 
579 A D Jordan, n 450, 7. 
580 See for example The Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Their 
Parts and Components and Ammunition, supplementing the United Nations Convention against 
Transnational Organized Crime (adopted June 2001 by United Nations General Assembly Resolution 
A/RES/55/255) which defines illicit trafficking as: ‘the import, export, acquisition, sale delivery, 
movement or transfer of firearms….’ thus demonstrating only an ‘action’ element. 
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 IV. The ‘Purpose’ 
 
A. Evolution of the ‘Purpose’ Element of Trafficking 
 
The ‘purpose’ of trafficking is that which the trafficked victim is ultimately to be used 
for. This element is clearly evident in both slave trade and trafficking definitions. The 
‘purpose’ element of the former was ultimately to reduce the victim to, and to hold the 
victim in, a state of slavery as defined in the 1926 Slavery Convention. The explicit 
scope of the ‘purpose’ element of the trafficking definition is much wider in 
comparison, as human are trafficked for ‘exploitation.’ 
        Contemporary definitions of human trafficking include forced labour and even 
slavery as a ‘purpose’ element of trafficking, as well as sexual exploitation and the 
exploitation of prostitution. The latter were the sole ‘purpose’ elements envisaged by 
earlier traffick-specific instruments. Until the 1949 Trafficking Convention, the subject 
of trafficking was specified as involving either a woman or a child. That Convention 
altered the terminology so that the terminology was gender neutral and the subject was 
a trafficked ‘person’. The most recent accepted definition of ‘trafficking in persons’ 
extends the ‘purpose’ element, so that it may be much more encompassing in terms of 
the potential subjects of trafficking and the types of coerced exploitation experienced. 
According to the definition, one is trafficked, through the relevant ‘action’ and ‘means’: 
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 … for the purpose of exploitation. Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, 
the exploitation of the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual 
exploitation, forced labour or services, slavery or practices similar to 
slavery, servitude or the removal of organs.581  
 
        The Explanatory Report to the CoE Trafficking Convention states that ‘[n]ational 
legislation may therefore target other forms of exploitation but must at least cover the 
types of exploitation mentioned as constituents of trafficking in human beings.’582 The 
Explanatory Report observes that the types of exploitation included in the definition are 
broad because ‘criminal activity is increasingly diversifying in order to supply people 
for exploitation in any sector where demand emerges.’583 Evidently, the ‘purpose’ 
element hinges on ‘exploitation’ or at least the intention to exploit. Consequently, a 
broad interpretation – and therefore a broad scope of the reach of the trafficking 
definition – may be possible. 
 
B. The Interrelation of Treaty Obligations – Interpretation of the ‘Purpose’ 
 
The wording of the trafficking definition used within the main instruments discussed 
throughout this thesis raises some issues with regard to interpretation of the ‘purpose’ 
element, which is broadly ‘exploitation’, with the definition going to give an 
inexhaustive list of what this may comprise. Aust states that ‘treaties … are the product 
                                                 
581The trafficking of human organs goes beyond the ambit of this thesis and therefore will not be 
considered here 
582 Explanatory Report to the CoE Trafficking Convention, n 248, 85. 
583 Ibid, 86.  
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of negotiations leading to compromises to reconcile, often wide, differences.’584 
Accordingly, unclear or undefined wording may be the product of concessions made in 
order to secure signatures and ratifications.  
        As will be discussed,585 some terms of the trafficking definition have been 
deliberately left undefined.586 Others, however, directly reproduce the wording used in 
various international human rights treaties - forced labour or services, slavery or 
practices similar to slavery, and servitude.587 These terms are not defined within the 
instruments comprising the international anti-trafficking regime, and so we must look 
elsewhere. As a point of common sense, since both the UN and CoE have drafted 
human rights treaties which pre-date their respective anti-trafficking instruments and 
use the same terms (such as ‘slavery’ etc), it would seem logical on the face of it that 
these terms would be intended to have the same meaning. However, whether these 
terms and concepts are so readily interchangeable so that they might have the same 
meaning in both criminal and human rights law instruments, is not a matter so 
simplistically disposed of and therefore merits further discussion. 
        To the very greatest extent, judicial interpretation of the relevant texts will be 
carried out by national courts (though it should not be overlooked that interpretation by 
officials will be a necessary step before any proceedings begin – their conclusions may 
or may not be upheld by the courts). The Explanatory Report to the CoE Trafficking 
Convention explicitly states that:  
 
                                                 
584 A Aust, Modern Treaty Law and Practice, Second Edition (Cambridge, 2007) 184. 
585 See section C, below. 
586 For example, specificities regarding the defining of prostitution and the exploitation thereof, and 
‘sexual exploitation’, were deliberately avoided, due to a lack of uniform approach to addressing 
prostitution between States. These terms are therefore ‘without prejudice’ as to how the domestic law in 
different States deals with prostitution. 
587 The various human instruments addressing these specific rights will be discussed at a later point in 
this Chapter – see section D, below. 
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 It was understood by the drafters that, under the Convention, Parties would 
not be obliged to copy verbatim into their domestic law the concepts in 
Article 4, provided that domestic law covered the concepts in a manner 
consistent with the principles of the Convention and offered an equivalent 
framework for implementing it.588  
 
Consequently, the terms used to elucidate the minimum standards of ‘exploitation’ 
envisaged by the legal anti-trafficking regime may vary between contracting parties, 
particularly where sexual exploitation is concerned. Yet, some concepts such as slavery 
and servitude may have more settled (or conversely, more disputed589) meanings due to 
their definition in legal instruments, as well as their interpretation and application 
through case law. These meanings and definitions will be brought out throughout the 
discussion in the latter part of this Chapter. 
        The legal anti-trafficking regime raises the issue of the interrelation between treaty 
obligations arising under different instruments – those which address criminal law, and 
those which address human rights law. Although the terminology for parts of the 
‘purpose’ element of human trafficking and the forms of ‘exploitation’ provided therein 
are clearly borrowed from international human rights law, this would mean that, in 
principle, one could not be binding as to the meaning of the other. State criminal law – 
be it of national or international origin – must, in its interpretation, take into account the 
human rights obligations of the State. To do anything less is to run the risk of 
discordance and lack of harmony between national law and human rights obligations. 
For example, failure by a State to criminalise torture could lead to that State being 
                                                 
588 Para 70. 
589 See for example, the various writings of J Allain, who is at times critical of the interpretation and 
application of the specificities of ‘slavery’ or ‘servitude’ in case law – see J Allain, n 425. 
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unable to impose punishment for conduct by private actors, while itself being subject to 
obligations relating to non-torture under its human rights obligations. Such a situation 
would be incomprehensible and ineffective in combating the very problems identified.  
        It is increasingly so that the interpretation of international treaties is done so with 
regard to other international obligations of the parties concerned. The quest for 
coherence in a decentralised international system is a strong motivating factor, as such 
an approach both provides a means of reducing the chances of States facing 
incompatible obligations, and also increased likelihood of coordinated and coherent 
strategies to combat international problems such as human trafficking. In the fields of 
international criminal law and human rights, the impact of other obligations – explicit 
or implied – is undeniable. There is, however, a principle of treaty interpretation which 
is of increasing importance, and is located in Part III,590 Section 3591 of the Vienna 
Convention,592 specifically in Articles 31 and 32. The principles embodied in those two 
articles have been held by the International Court of Justice to reflect customary 
international law.593       
        Article 31 of the Vienna Convention states as a general rule of interpretation that 
‘[a] treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to 
be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and 
purpose.’ Interpreting a treaty according to its object and purpose encapsulates ‘the 
duty of giving effect to the expressed intention of the parties, that is, their intention as 
expressed in the words used by them in the light of the surrounding circumstances.’594 
(Emphasis in the original) The object and purpose of one of the main anti-trafficking 
instruments – the CoE Trafficking Convention, is stated as the following:  
                                                 
590 Part III of the Vienna Convention deals with ‘Observance, Application and Interpretation of Treaties’. 
591 Part III, section 3 of the Vienna Convention deals specifically with ‘Interpretation of Treaties’. 
592 Vienna Convention, n 22. 
593 Libya v Chad [1994] ICJ Reports 6, para 4. 
594 A McNair, Law of Treaties, (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1961) 365. 
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 … to prevent and combat trafficking in human beings, while guaranteeing 
gender equality; to protect the human rights of the victims of trafficking, 
design a comprehensive framework for the protection and assistance of 
victims and witnesses, while guaranteeing gender equality, as well as to 
ensure effective investigation and prosecution; to promote international 
cooperation on action against trafficking in human beings.595 
 
The text of the EU 2011 Directive (although not a treaty, yet a relevant instrument to 
the discussion since it uses almost entirely the same definition of trafficking) makes it 
clear that it shares the abovementioned objectives,596 thus clearly pointing to human 
rights standards by referring specifically to them.  
        The ‘context’ referred to in Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention is elaborated 
upon in subsection (2), and includes preamble and annexes, as well as ‘any agreement 
relating to the treaty which was made between all the parties in connection with the 
conclusion of the treaty’597 and ‘any instrument which was made by one or more parties 
in connection with the conclusion of the treaty and accepted by the other parties as an 
instrument related to the treaty.’598 The scope of these provisions may include, for 
example, ‘primary criteria’599 to interpretation such as explanatory reports.600 To 
interpret and elucidate the terms used within the CoE Trafficking Convention, for 
example, the Explanatory Report to that Convention refers specifically to the main 
international human rights instruments for the purposes of defining certain terms used 
                                                 
595 Article 1. 
596 See EU 2011 Directive, n 10. 
597 Article 31(2)(a). 
598 Article 2(b). 
599 A Aust, n 584, 187. 
600 A Aust, ibid, 191. 
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within that Convention, such as forced labour,601 slavery602 and servitude.603 This 
indicates that these terms are intended to be interpreted according to the meanings 
given by the human rights and labour instruments referred to.604 The preamble of that 
Convention also specifically refers to the point that ‘trafficking in human beings may 
result in slavery for victims…’, and that trafficking ‘constitutes a violation of human 
rights and an offence to the dignity and the integrity of the human being’, thereby 
invoking the language of internationally accepted human rights instruments from the 
outset. 
        Also poignant for the purpose of the discussion here, though, is Article 31(3) of 
the Vienna Convention which states that when interpreting the terms of treaties, not 
only should the context be taken into account but, according to subsections (a) – (c) 
respectively, also ‘any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the 
                                                 
601 Para 89 of the Explanatory Report to the CoE Trafficking Convention (n 248) states that although the 
Convention does not define ‘forced labour’, nonetheless ‘there are several relevant international 
instruments, such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Article 4), the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights (Article 8), the ILO Convention concerning Forced or Compulsory Labour 
(Convention No.29), and the 1957 ILO Convention concerning the Abolition of Forced Labour 
(Convention No.105)’. Para 90 of the Explanatory Report goes on to state that ‘Article 4 ECHR prohibits 
forced labour without defining it. The drafters of the ECHR took as their model the ILO Convention 
concerning Forced or Compulsory Labour (No.29) of 29 June 1930, which describes as forced or 
compulsory “all work or service which is exacted from any person under the menace of any penalty and 
for which the person has not offered himself voluntarily”.’ Para 92 goes on to recognise that forced 
services is not to be distinguished from forced labour, citing Van der Müssele v. Belgium (judgment of 23 
November 1983, Series A, No.70, paragraph 37) as authority for this position. 
602 Para 93 of the Explanatory Report to the CoE Trafficking Convention (n 248) states that ‘Slavery is 
not defined in the Convention but many international instruments and the domestic law of many 
countries define or deal with slavery and practices similar to slavery (for example, the Geneva 
Convention on Slavery of 25 September 1926, as amended by the New York Protocol of 7 December 
1953; the Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Institutions and 
Practices similar to Slavery of 7 September 1956; the ILO Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention 
(Convention No.182))’. 
603 Paragraph 95 of the Explanatory Report to the CoE Trafficking Convention (n 248) states that ‘The 
ECHR bodies have defined “servitude”. The European Commission of Human Rights regarded it as 
having to live and work on another person’s property and perform certain services for them, whether paid 
or unpaid, together with being unable to alter one’s condition (Application No.7906/77, D.R.17, p. 59; 
see also the Commission’s report in the Van Droogenbroeck case of 9 July 1980, Series B, Vol. 44, p. 
30, paragraphs 78 to 80). Servitude is thus to be regarded as a particular form of slavery, differing from it 
less in character less than in degree. Although it constitutes a state or condition, and is a “particularly 
serious form of denial of freedom” (Van Droogenbroeck case, judgment of 24 June 1982, Series A, 
No.50, p.32, paragraph 58), it does not have the ownership features characteristic of slavery.’ 
604 See n 601, n 602, and n 603, above. 
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interpretation of the treaty or the application of its provisions’,605 ‘any subsequent 
practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties 
regarding its interpretation’606 and ‘any relevant rules of international law applicable in 
the relations between the parties.’607  
        As regards the second point relating to ‘subsequent practice’ in subsection (b), 
there is clear evidence in certain case law of human rights standards being applied in 
human trafficking cases.608 The third abovementioned point relating to subsection (c), 
i.e. ‘any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the 
parties’, is particularly pertinent here, as it would indicate that regard may be had to 
pre-existing international law, and also to contemporary law.609 Simply put, Article 
31(3)(c) ‘identifies the different circumstances in which the interpreter may use matter 
from the body of law outside the treaty.’610 Yet, ‘the formulation eventually adopted 
offers no guidance for its modern application.’611 The meaning and exact scope of 
‘relevant rules of international law’ is undefined, but the unqualified nature of the 
terminology might strongly suggest that treaties are to be included.612 As Gardiner 
notes:  
                                                 
605 Article 31(3)(a). 
606 Article 31(3)(b). 
607 Article 31(3)(c). 
608 See Rantsev v. Cyprus and Russia (app no. 25965/04) [2010], although, as stated in the judgment at 
H30(d), ‘It was not necessary for the Court to identify whether the treatment about which the applicant 
complained constituted “slavery”, “servitude” or “forced and compulsory labour”. It found that 
trafficking itself, within the meaning of art.3(a) of the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish 
Trafficking in Persons, especially Women and Children (“the Palermo Protocol”) and art.4(a) of the 
Council of Europe Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings (“the Anti-Trafficking 
Convention”) fell within the scope of art.4’ Allain has notably been critical of the ECtHR’s approach in 
that case – see, J Allain, ‘Rantsev v Cyprus and Russia: The European Court of Human Rights and 
Trafficking as Slavery’ (2010) Human Rights Law Review 10:3, 546 – 557, 546, where the author states 
that ‘(w)ith the determination of the Court that obligations emanating from Article 4 of the ECHR come 
into play because trafficking is based on slavery, the Court reveals itself as not having truly engaged with 
the legal distinctions that exist between these two concepts’. 
609 A Aust, n 584, 195, also see, C McLaughlan ‘The Principle of Systematic Integration and Article 
31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention’ (2005) International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 54: 279-320. 
610 R Gardiner, Treaty Interpretation, (Oxford 2008) 250. 
611 Ibid, 256. 
612 Ibid, 262. 
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 Even though not hierarchical, or invariably to be applied sequentially, the 
general rule in Article 31 is conceptually clear: progression from terms to 
context, though any agreements at the time of conclusion of a treaty, to 
subsequent agreements, subsequent practice, and thence to relevant rules of 
international law.613 
 
The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has notably been sensitive to this 
principle of interpretation. This is exemplified in its application of the meaning of 
‘slavery’ as being that provided within the 1926 Slavery Convention in recent 
trafficking cases such as Rantsev,614 and similarly in Siliadin615 where the ‘Other 
International Conventions’ part of the ‘Relevant Law’ section of the judgment referred 
to the 1926 Slavery Convention616 and the Forced Labour Convention.617  
        Article 32 of the Vienna Convention further provides that where it is necessary to 
confirm the meaning of terms resulting from the application of Article 31, or where the 
interpretation according to Article 31 leads to a meaning which is ambiguous, obscure, 
manifestly absurd or unreasonable, then ‘[r]ecourse may be had to supplementary 
means of interpretation, including the preparatory work of the treaty and the 
circumstances of its conclusion.’ This could therefore include Travaux Preparatoires 
and/or interpretative notes to the Travaux, where they exist.618 Materials such as 
Travaux are dealt with by Article 32 of the Vienna Convention since they are not 
                                                 
613 Ibid, 251. 
614 Rantsev v. Cyprus and Russia [2010] (application no. 25965/04). 
615 Siliadin v France – (app no. 73316/01) [2005] ECHR 545 (26 July 2005). 
616 1926 Slavery Convention, n 404. 
617 Forced Labour Convention (adopted June 28 1930, entered into forced 1 May 1932) 39 U.N.T.S. 55, 
ILO CR 155. 
618 See, for example, UN Doc A/55/383/Add.1, n 479. 
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‘primary criteria’619 for interpretation. Nonetheless, Article 32 provides for the use of 
materials to ‘confirm’ meanings borne of Article 31 interpretation, or, if there is 
‘ambiguity’ or ‘manifest absurdity’ such as is referred to above, recourse to 
supplementary materials620 under Article 32 may be used to ‘determine’ the meaning of 
a treaty provision as opposed to simply having a confirmatory role.621 
        The interpretative notes to the Trafficking Protocol give less explicit signposting, 
although direct reference to the Supplementary Slavery Convention of 1956,622 is made 
in the context of the potential for illegal adoption to fall within its scope. 
        The EU 2011 Directive weaves an interpretational path which leads us to 
recognised human rights instruments, in stating that: 
 
This Directive respects fundamental rights and observes the principles 
recognised in particular by the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union and notably human dignity, the prohibition of slavery, 
forced labour and trafficking in human beings, the prohibition of torture and 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment…623 
 
Thus, the Directive points us to the human rights standards laid down in the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights (The EU Charter), which has a specific provision relating to 
slavery, forced labour, servitude and trafficking.624 The Charter in turn states that: 
                                                 
619 A Aust, n 584, 187. 
620 Aust states that this section may include ‘other treaties on the same subject matter adopted either 
before or after the one in question which use the same or similar terms.’ See A Aust, n 584, 200. 
621 A Aust, 584, 197. 
622 Supplementary Slavery Convention, n 504.  
623 EU 2011 Directive, (n 10) Preamble, para 33. 
624 Article 5 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights deals with prohibition of slavery and forced 
labour, and states that: 1. No one shall be held in slavery or servitude. 2. No one shall be required to 
perform forced or compulsory labour. 3. Trafficking in human beings is prohibited.’ Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union [2000] OJ C364/01, reprinted [2010] OJ C83/389 
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/charter/pdf/text_en.pdf> accessed 11 June 2011. 
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 This Charter reaffirms … the rights as they result, in particular, from the 
constitutional traditions and international obligations common to the 
Member States, the Treaty on European Union, the Community Treaties, 
the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms … and the case-law of the Court of Justice of the 
European Communities and of the European Court of Human Rights.625 
 
Consequently, to interpret the terms enshrined in the trafficking definition contained 
within the EU 2011 Directive, we are pointed to the EU Charter, and through that to 
other sources – international obligations, ECHR rights, and ECtHR jurisprudence.  
        Due to the increasing importance of the interpretational rules laid down in Part III, 
Section 3 of the Vienna Convention, coupled with the direct and indirect signposting 
from the anti-trafficking instruments, it appears that it is possible to draw upon pre-
existing international human rights instruments in order to interpret the meanings of 
some of the terms used within the trafficking definition. With respect to each ‘purpose’ 
element of trafficking, then, the obligations of States under the relevant human rights 
treaties and instruments may be used to interpret, elucidate and supplement obligations 
arising under the trafficking instruments. This activity can then be criminalised and the 
needs and rights of victims better identified and protected. Further, these treaties help 
identify the obligations of States who are not party to the specific anti-trafficking 
instruments. 
                                                 
625 Preamble, Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, ibid. 
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        The following sections of this Chapter will deconstruct and analyse the specific 
and non-exhaustive forms of exploitation provided within the definition of human 
trafficking. 
 
C. Sexual Exploitation and the Exploitation of the Prostitution of Others 
 
Many traffick-specific instruments include ‘sexual exploitation’ and ‘the exploitation of 
prostitution’ as ‘purpose’ elements of trafficking. Certain of these instruments – even 
fairly recent ones - solely envisage sexual exploitation or prostitution as the ‘purpose’ 
element of human trafficking.  
        The Council of Europe has seen a fair amount of recent activity in the fight against 
trafficking. Recommendations concerning trafficking626 and the sexual exploitation of 
children and young adults627 have been issued, as well as the commencement of 
projects to support regional action to combat trafficking. In a Recommendation in 2000, 
the Committee of Ministers offered the following definition of human trafficking, 
which notably only envisaged sexual exploitation as a ‘purpose’ element of trafficking: 
 
… the procurement by one or more natural or legal persons and/or the 
organisation of the exploitation and/or transport or migration – legal or 
                                                 
626 Council of Europe Committee of Ministers, Recommendation R (2000)11 adopted by the Committee 
of Ministers of the Council of Europe to member states on action against trafficking in human beings for 
the purpose of sexual exploitation; Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly, Recommendation 1325 
(1997) on traffic in women and forced prostitution in Council of Europe member states; Council of 
Europe Parliamentary Assembly, Recommendation 1523 (2001) on domestic slavery; Council of Europe 
Parliamentary Assembly, Recommendation 1526 (2001) on a campaign against trafficking in minors to 
put a stop to the east European route: the example of Moldova; Council of Europe Parliamentary 
Assembly, Recommendation 1545 (2002) on a campaign against trafficking in women 
627 Council of Europe Committee of Ministers, Recommendation R (91) 11 adopted by the Committee of 
Ministers of the Council of Europe on Sexual exploitation, pornography and prostitution of, and 
trafficking in, children and young adults; Council of Europe Committee of Ministers, Recommendation 
R (2001)16 adopted by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe to member states on the 
protection of children against sexual exploitation. 
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illegal – of persons, even with their consent, for the purpose of their sexual 
exploitation, inter alia, by means of coercion, in particular violence or 
threats, deceit, abuse of authority or of a position of vulnerability.628 
 
         The Council of Europe clearly has a human rights based agenda. The 
Recommendation states that trafficking is offensive to human dignity, and constitutes ‘a 
violation of human rights.’629 Although not specifically stated by the definition offered, 
trafficking was at this point seen by the Council of Europe as an issue predominantly 
affecting women and girls.630 This position still holds true to an extent, as although not 
limited expressly to women and girls in its applicability, the recent CoE Trafficking 
Convention directly replicates the definition of trafficking provided by the UN 
Trafficking Protocol which targets trafficking of humans ‘especially women and 
children’.631 The recent EU 2011 Directive furthers this trend by referring to ‘the 
gender-specific phenomenon of trafficking and that women and men are often 
trafficked for different purposes.’632  
         Aside from the excerpt from the Recommendation (above), other examples exist 
of definitions solely inclusive of sex work, or specifically prostitution. Southern Asia, 
for example comprises a pivotal hub of trafficking activity. It was concluded at the 
ninth South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) summit that the 
feasibility of a regional Convention should be explored. This culminated in the 
Convention on Preventing and Combating Trafficking in Women and Children for 
                                                 
628 Council of Europe Committee of Ministers, Recommendation R (2000)11 adopted by the Committee 
of Ministers of the Council of Europe to member states on action against trafficking in human beings for 
the purpose of sexual exploitation, Appendix, at I.1. 
629 Ibid, Preamble.  
630 Ibid, Appendix, at II.2. 
631 UN Trafficking Protocol, n 8. 
632 EU 2011 Directive, n 10, Preamble, para 3. 
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Prostitution (SAARC Convention).633 Article 1(3) provides a definition of 
trafficking,634 which puts minimal emphasis on consent, and restricts the ‘purpose’ 
element of this regional Convention to prostitution. 
        The terms used within the UN Trafficking Protocol, the CoE Convention and the 
EU 2011 Directive - ‘the exploitation of the prostitution of others’ and ‘sexual 
exploitation’ - are clearly broader than just referring to ‘prostitution’, and are left 
wholly undefined by the instruments. Today, both remain undefined by international 
law. Both the Interpretative notes for the Travaux Preparatoires to the Trafficking 
Protocol and the Explanatory Report to the CoE Trafficking Convention indicate that 
these terms are addressed solely in the context of trafficking in persons, and that this is 
‘without prejudice to how States Parties address prostitution in their respective 
domestic laws,’635 reflecting the varied and contrasting views on this matter which are 
held from State to State.  
        During negotiations, over one hundred country delegations had input into the UN 
Trafficking Protocol, and between them were unable to reach agreement upon 
definition of these two terms; consequently, the decision to leave them undefined was 
the only viable route to progress. The main reasons behind the disagreement were the 
differing policies and laws to be found within many countries as regards adult sex 
work. As with so many treaties, compromise was necessary in order to obtain 
signatures and ratification.  
        All delegations were in agreement that trafficking involves slavery, servitude, and 
forced labour, but the meaning of sexual exploitation lacks international consensus. The 
                                                 
633 South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation Convention on Preventing and Combating 
Trafficking in Women and Children for Prostitution (Done at Kathmandu on 5 January 2002). 
634 Article 1(3) provides that ‘‘Trafficking’ means the moving, selling, or buying of women and children 
for prostitution within and outside a country for monetary or other considerations with or without the 
consent of the person subjected to trafficking…’ 
635 UN Doc A/55/383/Add.1, n 479, 64. 
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compromise allows the individual governments of each delegation to treat voluntary 
adult sex work in the way that it sees fit. Reaching this compromise was not an easy 
process; some delegates and NGOs felt that even legal and voluntary adult prostitution 
should be categorised as a ‘purpose’ element of trafficking, and lengthy debate ensued. 
The notion that voluntary or non-coerced participation in labour of any form is 
trafficking was rejected by the majority of those involved.636  
        The institutions of the EU have taken part in some substantial action in the fight 
against trafficking, including the funding of certain initiatives such as the STOP637 and 
Daphne638 programs. The European Commission have noted that action to combat 
human trafficking was restricted because of ‘the lack of common definitions of crime, 
incrimination, and sanctions.’639 In 2001, Communications were sent from the 
Commission to the European Council and the European Parliament concerning the 
subject of human trafficking. The Commission issued a proposal for a Framework 
Decision on combating human trafficking,640 which contained trafficking definitions. 
What is particularly interesting about the definitions proffered is that sexual 
exploitation and labour exploitation are addressed separately. Article 1 addresses labour 
exploitation in the following way: 
                                                 
636 A D Jordan states that ‘While such work can be abusive and exploitative, it is only trafficking if it 
amounts to the internationally recognised human rights violations of forced labour, slavery, or servitude.’ 
See A D Jordan, n 450, 8. 
637 STOP was launched as an incentive and exchange programme to support public officials and NGOs in 
their actions to combat human trafficking and the exploitation of children. This programme was adopted 
by the Council of the European Union in November 1996. See EUROPA Press Releases ‘Prevention and 
fight against trafficking in human beings – A European strategy since 1996’ 
<http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/02/191&format=HTML&aged=0&la
nguage=EN&guiLanguage=en> accessed 17 Aug 2007. 
638 This programme was conceived with a view to raising public awareness regarding violence and sexual 
exploitation and abuse against women and children. Daphne has a broader scope than STOP because it is 
not solely aimed at victims of trafficking. See EUROPA Press Releases ‘Prevention and fight against 
trafficking in human beings – A European strategy since 1996’ 
<http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/02/191&format=HTML&aged=0&la
nguage=EN&guiLanguage=en> accessed 17 Aug 2007. 
639 Commission communication on combating trafficking in human beings, the sexual exploitation of 
children and child pornography [2001] OJ C 357/11.  
640 Proposal for a Council Framework Decision on combating trafficking in human beings [2001] OJ C 
62 E/324. 
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 Each Member State shall take the necessary measures to ensure that the 
recruitment, transportation or transfer of a person, including harbouring and 
subsequent reception and the exchange of control over him or her is 
punishable, where the fundamental rights of that person have been and 
continue to be suppressed for the purpose of exploiting him or her in the 
production of goods or provision of services in infringement of labour 
standards governing working conditions, salaries and health and safety… 
 
Article 2 contains the definition for addressing sexual exploitation: 
 
Each Member States shall take the necessary measures to ensure that the 
recruitment, transportation or transfer of a person, including harbouring and 
subsequent reception and the exchange of control over him or her is 
punishable, where the purpose is to exploit him or her in prostitution or in 
pornographic performances or in production of pornographic materials… 
 
These definitions include at least some qualification as to what constitutes labour 
exploitation and sexual exploitation, and are therefore less open-ended than other 
instruments referred to. Although these definitions do not specify slavery as a ‘purpose’ 
element of human trafficking, they do use comparable language to that used in the 1926 
Slavery Convention: reference to ‘the exchange of control over him or her’ is 
reminiscent of ‘The status or condition of a person over whom any or all of the powers 
attaching to the right of ownership are exercised’.641  
                                                 
641 1926 Slavery Convention, (n 404) Article 1(1). 
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        In a Recommendation, the Council of Europe viewed sexual exploitation as a 
‘purpose’ element of trafficking as a form of slavery.642 The overlaps between human 
trafficking and the slave trade are apparent, but, similarly to labour exploitation, it is 
not universally accepted that sexual exploitation in the context of trafficking is a form 
of slavery, as it does not in every instance display the ownership characteristics to the 
extent that the status of slavery does. Therefore, although sex trafficking may in some 
or even many cases result in slavery, it does not in every case. However, trafficking in 
persons constitutes exploitation of a serious form, and consequently warrants specific 
criminal sanction. 
        As mentioned above, ‘exploitation’ is the key. The African [Banjul] Charter on 
Human and Peoples' Rights, adopted June 27, 1981643 (African Charter), for example, 
does not specifically use the language ‘traffick’ or ‘trafficking’, but instead refers to 
‘exploitation’ and ‘slavery’ in Article 5.644 One might infer that human trafficking 
would be caught by this definition. The Article incorporates rights which are generally 
treated separately in international and regional treaties. The African Charter, however, 
makes no mention of forced or compulsory labour, which is explicitly addressed by the 
central anti-trafficking instruments discussed throughout the thesis. The wording of the 
Article makes the correct distinction that ‘exploitation’ is not to be equated with 
‘slavery’, for although ‘slavery’ is always ‘exploitation’, the reverse is clearly not the 
case. The terminology ‘[a]ll forms of exploitation’ might be read to include sexual 
exploitation. 
                                                 
642 Council of Europe Committee of Ministers ‘Recommendation R (2000)11 adopted by the Committee 
of Ministers of the Council of Europe to member states on action against trafficking in human beings for 
the purpose of sexual exploitation’ (Adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 19 May 2000, at the 710th 
meeting of the Ministers’ Deputies). 
643 The African [Banjul] Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (adopted 27 June 1981, entered into 
force 21 October 1986). 
644 Article 5 states that ‘Every individual shall have the right to the respect of the dignity inherent in a 
human being and to the recognition of his legal status. All forms of exploitation and degradation of man 
particularly slavery, slave trade, torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment and treatment shall be 
prohibited.’ 
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         Overall, the relevant anti-trafficking instruments provide very little illumination 
as to the parameters of what may actually constitute ‘sexual exploitation’. The 2002 EU 
Framework Decision included specific mention in the text of ‘exploitation of the 
prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, including in 
pornography.’645 The 2011 Directive does not include this qualification, and gives no 
guidance as to what constitutes ‘sexual exploitation.’ The Explanatory Report to the 
CoE Convention refers to various other Council measures to combat sexual 
exploitation646 (which largely apply to children), and provides minimal illumination as 
to what might constitute sexual exploitation, in referring to ‘… sexual exploitation … 
in the form of pornography, prostitution, sexual slavery, sexual tourism and trafficking 
in human beings…’647 thereby creating somewhat of a circular definition. 
        Domestic (UK) cases involving trafficking frequently invoke more than one legal 
provision;648 consequently a case concerning trafficking for sexual exploitation in the 
UK may include, for example, the offence of trafficking (s57 – 59 SOA 2003) coupled 
with the offence of controlling prostitution for gain (s53 SOA 2003).649  
        One might assume that, provided that a requisite standard of ‘exploitation’650 is 
met, any work651 of a sexual652 nature may be capable of constituting sexual 
                                                 
645 2002 EU Framework Decision, (n 213) Article 1(d). 
646 Such as Council of Europe Committee of Ministers, Recommendation R (91) 11 adopted by the 
Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on Sexual exploitation, pornography and prostitution 
of, and trafficking in, children and young adults’ (Adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 9 
September 1991 at the 461st meeting of the Ministers' Deputies), and Council of Europe Committee of 
Ministers, Recommendation R (2001) 16 adopted by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of 
Europe to member states on the protection of children against sexual exploitation’ (Adopted by the 
Committee of Ministers on 31 October 2001 at the 771` meeting of the Ministers Deputies). 
647 Council of Europe Committee of Ministers, Recommendation R (2001) 16, ibid. 
648 This is because domestic anti-trafficking law is scattered across a plethora of provisions – see Chapter 
1, Part II, section A, subsection i. 
649 See, for example, R v Nualpenyai (Atchara) [2010] EWCA Crim 692. 
650 See Chapter 3, Part VI, section B, where a definition of exploitation offset against accepted labour 
standards in the destination State is proposed. 
651 Whether or not sex work constitutes a legitimate form of labour will be discussed in Chapter 3, Part 
IV, section B. 
652 What exactly constitutes ‘sexual’ in this context is unclear, but one might look for guidance in, for 
example, Section 78 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 which states that: ‘For the purposes of this Part 
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exploitation – prostitution, lap dancing, pornography, etc. The terms were clearly left 
broad for a reason, as social and cultural variants may determine certain activities as 
inherently or not remotely sexual in nature. The same may be said of ‘exploitation’ – 
that which is considered exploitative clearly varies between countries; this is evident in 
the many and varied approaches to prostitution taken within the legislative frameworks 
of these countries.653 
 
D. …Forced Labour or Services, Slavery or Practices Similar to Slavery, Servitude… 
 
It has been established that current international legal definition of human trafficking 
includes the ‘purpose’ elements of forced labour, slavery, and servitude as examples of 
‘exploitation’. Accordingly, Pitorowicz observes that ‘While not all slavery involves 
(trafficking in human being), (trafficking in human beings) will almost always involve 
slavery or slavery-like practices’.654 These elements warrant further exploration. 
 
i. Elucidating Some Elements of the ‘Purpose’ – The International Legal Framework 
     
Forced labour is addressed and defined in various instruments, of which the 
International Labour Organization (ILO) has drafted several. This practice is not 
defined by the three main anti-trafficking instruments considered in the thesis; the 
definition remains that provided by the ILO Conventions. The Forced Labour 
                                                                                                                                                        
(except section 71), penetration, touching or any other activity is sexual if a reasonable person would 
consider that— (a) whatever its circumstances or any person’s purpose in relation to it, it is because of its 
nature sexual, or (b) because of its nature it may be sexual and because of its circumstances or the 
purpose of any person in relation to it (or both) it is sexual.’ 
653 In Sweden, for example, prostitution is seen as violence against women an inherently exploitative, 
therefore criminal sanction is aimed at the purchaser of sexual services. This can be contrasted with the 
regulated sex sector which can be seen in operation in the Netherlands.  
654 R Piotrowicz, n 243, 179. 
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Convention, 1930655 requires State Parties to agree to work towards eradicating the 
existence of forced labour practices. Article 2 defines ‘forced or compulsory labour’ as 
‘all work or service which is exacted from any person under the menace of any penalty 
and for which the said person has not offered himself voluntarily.’ Forced labour is not 
further defined by the Trafficking Protocol, CoE Trafficking Convention, or the EU 
2011 Directive.656 As regards ‘forced services’, the Explanatory Report to the CoE 
Trafficking Convention indicates that ‘[f]rom the standpoint of the ECHR … there is no 
distinction to be made between the two concepts.’657 Potentially, then, ‘services’ could 
be read to include sex work. 
        Similarly, as regards the Abolition of Forced Labour Convention, 1957,658 Article 
1 requires that ILO members who ratify the Convention undertake to ‘suppress and not 
to make use of any form of forced or compulsory labour.’ The applicability of the 
Forced Labour Convention to situations of human trafficking is questionable and would 
require developmental interpretation, as the Convention does not at any point 
specifically use the language ‘trafficking’, neither does it specifically include 
prostitution or sex work under the overarching term of ‘forced labour’. Sexual and 
labour exploitation in the context of trafficking are dealt with separately in many 
instruments. A definition proposed by the Organization for Security and Co-operation 
in Europe (OSCE) makes no explicit mention of sex work at all.659  
                                                 
655 Forced Labour Convention (adopted June 28 1930, entered into forced 1 May 1932) 39 U.N.T.S. 55, 
ILO CR 155. 
656 Paragraph 11 of the preamble to the EU 2011 Directive, for example, points directly to the 1930 ILO 
Convention No. 29 concerning Forced or Compulsory Labour. Also see Part IV, section B of this 
Chapter on the interrelation of treaty obligations. 
657 Explanatory Report to the CoE Trafficking Convention, n 248, 92.  
658 Abolition of Forced Labour Convention, (adopted 25 June1957, entered into force 17 January 1959) 
320 U.N.T.S. 291. 
659 A definition offered by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe ‘Supplementary 
Human Dimension Meeting on Human Trafficking: Final Report’, Vienna, 18-19 March 2002 defines 
human trafficking as ‘All acts involved in the recruitment, abduction, transport (within or across 
borders), sale, transfer, harbouring, or receipt of persons, by the threat or use of force, deception, 
coercion (including abuse of authority), or debt bondage, for the purpose of placing or holding such 
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        Hernandez-Truyol and Larson660 propose that prostitution should be studied under 
a labour paradigm i.e. as an exercise of the right to work, even though it (may) contain 
elements of servitude. Although addressing both issues within the same definition, the 
trafficking definition continues the trend of separating prostitution from forced labour. 
This will continue to be the case unless ‘sexual labour’661 is globally recognised as a 
legitimate form of labour. This issue – as to whether sex work constitutes a legitimate 
form of labour – will be discussed in full in Chapter 3.662 
        At a similar time to the 1949 Trafficking Convention, the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (UDHR)663 was drafted. The relevant provision is Article 4, which states 
that: ‘No one shall be held in slavery or servitude; slavery and the slave trade shall be 
prohibited in all their forms’. The provision does not explicitly include forced labour as 
a form of, or practice related to, slavery. Forced labour was addressed at this time 
through the two abovementioned ILO Conventions.  
        During drafting of the UDHR, it was debated whether to even include a 
freestanding Article 4, because of the obvious overlaps between slavery, inhuman 
treatment, and the deprivation of liberty. Inclusion of the Article, however, indicates 
that this right was deemed to be of notable importance and significance, and that there 
may be differences of nature and/or degree between the practices mentioned. Accounts 
of the experiences of victims of trafficking will frequently touch upon elements of some 
or all of the above.664 
                                                                                                                                                        
person, whether for pay or not, in involuntary servitude, forced or bonded labour, or in slavery-like 
conditions, in a community other than the one in which the person lived at the time of the original 
deception, coercion or debt bondage.’  
660 B E Hernandez-Truyol, and J E Larson ‘Sexual Labour and Human Rights’, (2006) 37 Columbia 
Human Rights Law Review, 391 – 445, 391 
661 Ibid. 
662 See Chapter 3, Part IV, section B. 
663 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (adopted 10 December 1948 UNGA Res 217 A(III) (hereafter 
‘UDHR’). 
664 See, L Brown, n 120, passim. 
 184
        Such practices were also addressed in a multilateral treaty drafted between 1947 
and 1966 – the ICCPR.665 Article 8 prohibits slavery, servitude, and forced labour. As 
with the UDHR, inclusion of the word ‘involuntary’ to directly precede ‘servitude’ was 
rejected, for reasons mirroring those given during UDHR drafting debates; that one 
should not be able to contract oneself into bondage.666 Forced/compulsory labour is 
explicitly prohibited by Article 8(3) of the ICCPR, which gives examples of practices 
which are deemed not to constitute this, such as work or services required of a person 
under detention in consequence of a lawful order of a court.667 Forced/compulsory 
labour is not defined within the instrument, although during drafting reference was 
made to Article 2 of the ILO Forced Labour Convention (above). The common element 
of slavery, the slave trade, and servitude in the ICCPR, is that they are prohibited 
regardless of whether the person concerned has offered their consent. Suggestions of 
addressing forced labour as a wholly separate issue were rejected. 
        The ICCPR essentially replicates the corresponding UDHR provision, but it takes 
it further with the separate inclusion of servitude,668 and the explicit inclusion of forced 
or compulsory labour,669 thus paving the way for broader scope of inclusion of slavery-
related practices. Sex work and sexual exploitation are not explicitly included under the 
umbrella of forced labour according to these provisions, yet this may be overcome by 
developmental interpretation. The development of provisions and definitions relating to 
slavery and – in particular - its related practices, have appeared to tend toward a more 
inclusive nature, so further development and expansion of scope is not an impossible or 
even improbable aspiration.  
                                                 
665 ICCPR, n 279. 
666 Although this is questioned by some – see B E Hernandez-Truyol, and J E Larson, n 551, 418 – 419. 
667 Article 8(3)(c)(1). 
668 Article 8(1) addresses slavery, Article 8(2) addresses servitude. 
669 Article 8(3). 
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        Slavery and servitude were dealt with separately in the ICCPR, as it has been 
observed that slavery, in the legal sense, is a technical term which requires strict limited 
construction, as it ‘implied the destruction of the juridical personality …whereas 
servitude was a more general idea covering all possible forms of man’s domination of 
man.’670 This once again makes a notable effort to separate slavery, the central 
characteristic of which is ownership, from related practices which are also considered 
to undermine human dignity. Thus, servitude covers other forms of ‘bondage’ or human 
domination which do not constitute slavery.671 
        One interesting point to be drawn from the ICCPR drafting debates is that ‘slave 
trade’ is also to be construed in a limited manner. A proposal to substitute the phrase 
for ‘trade in human beings’, which may have encompassed the trafficking of women for 
sexual exploitation, was rejected, as it was thought that the clause should only deal with 
the slave trade as such.672 From this, one might infer that trafficking of women for 
sexual exploitation was still predominantly seen as a separate issue which it was 
necessary to address in its own right. The main international instrument to address sex 
traffick remained the explicit prohibition contained in the 1949 Trafficking Convention, 
and the implicit prohibition contained in the UDHR. 
        Respective provisions of the ECHR673 and the American Convention on Human 
Rights, 1969674 prohibit slavery, servitude, and forced or compulsory labour. 
Interpretation of the ECHR makes it clear that there are positive obligations on States 
with respect to dealing with such practices. These positive obligations have some reach 
                                                 
670 M J Bossuyt ‘Guide to the ‘Travaux Preparatoires’ of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights’ (Dordrecht; Lancaster : Nijhoff, 1987) 167 
671 Ibid. 
672 Y Dinstein ‘Liberty: Freedom from slavery and forced labour’, in L Henkin (Editor) The International 
Bill of Rights: The Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, (New York,Columbia University Press, 1981) 
127. 
673 Article 4. 
674 American Convention, Article 6, which also prohibits trafficking in women. 
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in terms of, for example, Articles 2675 and 3676 ECHR, and can reasonably include 
criminalisation of such practices, which would be reflected in the national laws of 
Parties to the Convention. 
 
ii. Begging 
 
The 2011 Directive contains a broader definition of the forms of ‘exploitation’ which 
may form the ‘purpose’ element of human trafficking, in that it specifically includes 
‘begging’, and ‘the exploitation of criminal activities’. The preamble to the Directive 
justifies inclusion of this element.677  
        Although this appears to be a response to the prevalence of trafficking for 
organised begging, it does not seem wholly necessary to include begging specifically as 
a ‘purpose’ element of trafficking. Developmental interpretation may have included this 
practice under the guise of ‘forced labour’, provided that all of the elements of forced 
labour or services were present. There is however evidence of, for example, Roma 
people being trafficked for the purpose of forced begging,678 so specific inclusion of 
this manifestation of the ‘purpose’ element of human trafficking is not an unwelcome 
development.679 This expands somewhat on the definition offered in the Trafficking 
                                                 
675 Article 2 ECHR addresses the right to life. 
676 Article 3 ECHR addresses the right to be free from torture and inhuman or degrading treatment. 
677 EU 2011 Directive, (n 10) Preamble, para 11, states that ‘in order to tackle recent developments in the 
phenomenon of trafficking in human beings, this Directive adopts a broader concept of what should be 
considered trafficking in human beings than under Framework Decision 2002/629/JHA and therefore 
includes additional forms of exploitation. Within the context of this Directive, forced begging should be 
understood as a form of forced labour or services as defined in the 1930 ILO Convention No. 29 
concerning Forced or Compulsory Labour. Therefore, the exploitation of begging, including the use of a 
trafficked dependent person for begging, falls within the scope of the definition of trafficking in human 
beings only when all the elements of forced labour or services occur.’ 
678 See CARE, n 219, and BBC News, ‘Children removed in Ilford People-trafficking raids’ (14 October 
2010) <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-london-11524732> accessed 15 Oct 2010. 
679 The preamble goes on to state, as regards the latter issue of ‘the exploitation of criminal activities’ that 
‘The expression … should be understood as the exploitation of a person to commit, inter alia, pick-
pocketing, shop-lifting, drug trafficking and other similar activities which are subject to penalties and 
imply financial gain.’ See EU 2011 Directive, (n 10) Preamble, para 11. 
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Protocol and CoE Trafficking Convention, and may have specific ramifications for 
trafficked victims who have committed criminal offences purely as a result of having 
been trafficked and therefore subjected to, for example, force or coercion.680 
 
iii. The Relationship between Slavery and Trafficking 
 
In the context of the trafficking definition, the definition of slavery remains that 
provided by the 1926 Slavery Convention: ‘The status or condition of a person over 
whom any or all of the powers attaching to the right of ownership are exercised’.681 The 
definition of ‘slave trade’ provided within the Convention can be broken down into the 
elements of ‘action’ ‘means’ and ‘purpose’, although the ‘means’ is much less clearly 
defined than it is in the trafficking definitions offered by the UN Trafficking Protocol 
and reproduced in subsequent instruments. The 1926 Slavery Convention defines the 
‘slave trade’ as: 
 
All acts involved in the capture, acquisition or disposal of a person with 
intent to reduce him to slavery; all acts involved in the acquisition of a slave 
with a view to selling or exchanging him; all acts of disposal by sale or 
exchange of a slave acquired with a view to being sold or exchanged, and, 
in general, every act of trade and transport in slaves.682  
 
What appears to be common to slavery and its related practices is the element of 
control, of ownership, which is a central characteristic of slavery. It is the status of 
commodification – the subject is essentially reduced to a possession which can be 
                                                 
680 See Chapter 4, Part VII. 
681 Article 1(1). 
682 Article 1(2). 
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bought and sold or ultimately disposed of – which is the defining factor. Related or 
comparable practices can be distinguished from slavery on this basis. For example, in 
Siliadin v France683 the subject was effectively used as a domestic servant. It was held 
by the ECtHR that, since the evidence did not suggest that a genuine right of ownership 
having the effect of reducing her to an object, had been held over her, Ms Siliadin had 
not been held in slavery. It was held that she had, however, been subject to forced 
labour and held in servitude within the meaning of Article 4 ECHR.684 
        Subsequent instruments which address the slave trade, such as the ICCPR, solely 
contained prohibition, thereby accepting the 1926 Convention Slavery definition as 
adequate. The only real elaboration upon the definition came from the 1956 
Supplementary Slavery Convention,685 which called for the abolition of certain 
practices, ‘whether or not they are covered by the definition of slavery contained in 
article 1 of the Slavery Convention.’686 The practices referred to include debt 
bondage687 and serfdom,688 as well as:  
 
(c) Any institution or practice whereby:  
(i) A woman, without the right to refuse, is promised or given in marriage 
on payment of a consideration in money or in kind to her parents, guardian, 
family or any other person or group; or  
                                                 
683 Siliadin v France (app no. 73316/01) [2005] ECHR 545.  
684 This can be contrasted with the Kunarac judgment, where forced labour was deemed to fall within the 
remit of ‘enslavement’ – see Prosecutor v Dragoljub Kunarac, Radomir Kovac, and Zoran Vukovic 
(Appeal Judgment) Case Nos. IT-96-23 & IT-96-23/1-A 12 June 2002, 542. 
685 Supplementary Slavery Convention, n 504. 
686 Supplementary Slavery Convention, Article 1. 
687 Defined in Article 1(a) of the Supplementary Slavery Convention (n 504) as ‘the status or condition 
arising from a pledge by a debtor of his personal services or of those of a person under his control as 
security for a debt, if the value of those services as reasonably assessed is not applied towards the 
liquidation of the debt or the length and nature of those services are not respectively limited and defined’. 
688 Defined in Article 1(b) of the Supplementary Slavery Convention as ‘the condition or status of a 
tenant who is by law, custom or agreement bound to live and labour on land belonging to another person 
and to render some determinate service to such other person, whether for reward or not, and is not free to 
change his status’. 
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(ii) The husband of a woman, his family, or his clan, has the right to 
transfer her to another person for value received or otherwise; or  
(iii) A woman on the death of her husband is liable to be inherited by 
another person;  
(d) Any institution or practice whereby a child or young person under the 
age of 18 years, is delivered by either or both of his natural parents or by his 
guardian to another person, whether for reward or not, with a view to the 
exploitation of the child or young person or of his labour.689 
 
        The words ‘trafficking’ or ‘traffick’ in the context of early legal definitions such as 
that provided within the 1910 Trafficking Convention arguably carried different 
connotations than they do today. During the Temporary Slavery Commission’s 
deliberations, the actual word ‘traffic’ only crops up briefly, and is explained as ‘the 
transformation of free men in to slaves’.690 This loosely covers the entire process of 
action, means, and purpose, to the exclusion of those already enslaved. ‘Trafficking’, 
however, was not explicitly defined by the Temporary Slavery Commission, nor was it 
explicitly included in the 1926 Slavery Convention.  
        Although the Temporary Slavery Commission appeared to push for a broader 
definition of slavery than that adopted,691 as did certain of the Governments of 
respondent countries during the drafting of the 1926 Slavery Convention,692 the 
consensus among certain members was that to address the disguised forms of slavery 
                                                 
689 Article 1. 
690 League of Nations 6.B.4 Temporary Slavery Commission: Minutes of the first (and Second) 
Session(s), Geneva, 1924-5, 7. 
691 Ibid.  
692 Germany, for example, proposed that conditions resembling slavery, such as trafficking, be included: 
see League of Nations, Draft Convention on Slavery, Replies of Governments, Reply from the 
Government of Germany, League of Nations Doc. A.10(a).1926.VI (July 22, 1926), reprinted in 
Publications of the League of Nations, VI.B. Slavery, 1926. VI.B. 3,4 (1926). 
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would take the Commission beyond the ambit of its competence.693 Consequently, 
trafficking for the purpose of exploitative sex work or labour was explicitly excluded 
from the ambit of the 1926 Slavery Convention, and so the resultant chosen definition 
became the narrow, specific definition of slavery as we know and understand it to be 
today, exclusive of related ‘lesser’ forms of exploitation. It is, however, clear that the 
two related yet distinct practices of slave trading and trafficking have not consistently 
been viewed distinctly. As well as this confusion being evident in some academic 
commentary,694 comments on Article 4 UDHR made it clear that ‘slavery’ was 
intended to encompass the trafficking of women and children,695 evidently without 
explicit mention. The slave trade and the resulting ‘purpose’ element of slavery amount 
to a form of exploitation. Trafficking according to current legal definition goes beyond 
this, in that it covers a broader spectrum of ‘purpose’ elements which are all forms of 
‘exploitation’, of which slavery is one. 
        Allain696 considers the relative meanings of ‘slavery’ and ‘enslavement’ against an 
international criminal law backdrop, and makes a variety of salient points, noting in 
particular that the definitions provided in the 1998 Rome Statute697 of the International 
Criminal Court and the 2002 Elements of Crimes698 are somewhat contradictory on the 
points of slavery and sexual exploitation, and sex trafficking. Article 7 of the former 
                                                 
693 See M Van Rees, League of Nations 6.B.4 Temporary Slavery Commission: Minutes of the first (and 
Second) Session(s), Geneva, 1924-5, 10. 
694 See S Scarpa, n 135, and F Gold, n 420. 
695 Report of the Working Group on the Declaration of the second session of the Commission on Human 
Rights, E/CN.4/57, 1947; and summary records of the Third Committee of the third session of the 
General Assembly, UN docs. A/C.3/SR. 109 and 110, 1948. 
696 See, J Allain ‘The Parameters of ‘Enslavement’ in International Criminal Law’ n 425, and J Allain, 
‘The Definition of Slavery in International Law’ n 425, 239. 
697 Rome Statue of the International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9 
698 Elements of Crimes under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, available at 
<http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/9CAEE830-38CF-41D6-AB0B-
68E5F9082543/0/Element_of_Crimes_English.pdf> accessed 28 Jan 2010. 
 191
includes ‘enslavement’ as a crime against humanity,699 as well as sexual slavery and 
enforced prostitution.700 The Article expands upon the meaning of enslavement as 
‘(T)he exercise of any or all of the powers attaching to the right of ownership over a 
person and includes the exercise of such power in the course of trafficking in persons, 
in particular women and children’,701 thereby recognising that enslavement can occur 
during the process of trafficking in human beings. Aside from that extra consideration, 
the definition mirrors closely that provided within the 1926 Slavery Convention. The 
Elements of Crimes provides a somewhat broader definition, and refers to the elements 
of ‘enslavement’ as:  
 
… (the exercise of) any or all of the powers attaching to the right of 
ownership over one or more persons, such as by purchasing, selling, 
lending or bartering such a person or persons, or by imposing on them a 
similar deprivation of liberty.702 
 
Further to this, Allain703 notes, the abovementioned provision of the Elements of 
Crimes has a footnote annexed to it, which provides that: 
 
It is understood that such a deprivation of liberty may, in some 
circumstances, include exacting forced labour or otherwise reducing a 
person to servile status as defined in the Supplementary Convention on the 
Abolition of Slavery, The Slave Trade, and Institution and Practices Similar 
                                                 
699 Article 7 of the Rome Statute provides a list of acts which will constitute crimes against humanity 
‘when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, 
with knowledge of the attack’. 
700 Article 7 of the Rome Statute, subsections (c) and (g) respectively. 
701 Rome Statue of the International Criminal Court, Article 7(2)(c). 
702 Elements of Crimes, Article 7(1)(c). 
703 See J Allain ‘The Parameters of ‘Enslavement’ in International Criminal Law’ n 425, 239. 
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to Slavery of 1956. It is also understood that the conduct described in this 
element includes trafficking in persons, in particular women and 
children.704 
 
This expansion of ‘enslavement’ reads as though intended to include both slavery and 
institutions and practices which are similar, such as servitude, but which do not in 
themselves necessarily constitute actual slavery. Thus, a broader notion of 
‘enslavement’ is apparently postulated, which goes beyond just ‘slavery’ as recognised 
by the 1926 Slavery Convention. Accordingly, the abovementioned provisions imply 
that one who is trafficked can be deemed to be ‘enslaved’; one who is trafficked could 
be deemed to be a ‘slave’, even if one who is trafficked and enslaved is not necessarily 
a slave in the 1926 Slavery Convention sense. Similarly, the Kunarac judgment 
concluded that: 
 
… indications of enslavement include exploitation: the exaction of forced 
or compulsory labour or service, often without remuneration and often, 
though not necessarily, involving physical hardship; sex; prostitution; and 
human trafficking.705 
 
        Literally, to enslave is to ‘make (someone) a slave.’706  Further, to enslave is to 
‘cause (someone) to lose their freedom of choice or action.’707 The apparent lack of 
clarity as to the meanings of ‘slavery’ and ‘enslavement’, against a backdrop of 
trafficking and slavery, does serve to cloud the meaning of ‘slavery’ as traditionally 
                                                 
704 Footnote to Elements of Crimes, Article 7(1)(c). 
705 Prosecutor v. Dragoljub Kunarac, Radomir Kovac, and Zoran Vukovic (Appeal Judgment) Case Nos. 
IT-96-23 & IT-96-23/1-A 12 June 2002, 542. 
706 Oxford English Dictionary (Oxford University Press, Second Edition 2003). 
707 Ibid. 
 193
understood (according to current international legal definition). Although slavery can 
(according to current international legal definition) occur as a ‘purpose’ element of 
trafficking, it is clearly not the sole ‘purpose’ element of trafficking. 
        Allain observes that: 
 
From the preparation of the 1926 definition onwards, attempts have been 
made to obfuscate the term “slavery” and to distance its legal definition 
from a definition that might instead be consonant with any type of 
exploitation.708 
 
Between the variants of ‘exploitation’ provided within the trafficking definition such as 
servitude,709 and slavery,710 there may be differences of degree711 but there are also 
differences of nature. Consequently, trying to assimilate these different forms of 
exploitation into the definitive terms of ‘slavery’ is not necessarily possible, if the full 
reach of illegal trafficking is to be caught. As defined, slavery can only occur where 
‘any or all of the powers attaching to the right of ownership are exercised’712 and forms 
of human exploitation which fall short of this standard cannot be deemed actual 
slavery.713 They may, however, still feasibly be within the scope of the definition of 
trafficking.  
        The UN Secretary General in his 1953 report noted the following, which was 
contained within a governmental communication: 
                                                 
708 J Allain, ‘The Definition of Slavery in International Law’ n 425, 242. 
709 Siliadin v France - 73316/01 [2005] ECHR 545 (26 July 2005) 
710 Hadijatou Mani Koraou v The Republic of Niger [2008] ECW/CCJ/JUD/06/08. 
711 Prosecutor v. Dragoljub Kunarac, Radomir Kovac, and Zoran Vukovic (Appeal Judgment) Case Nos. 
IT-96-23 & IT-96-23/1-A 12 June 2002. 
712 Article 1(1), 1926 Slavery Convention, n 404. 
713 For further discussion of this issue, see J Allain, ‘The Definition of Slavery in International Law’ n 
425, 239. 
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 (A) person is a slave if any other person can, by law or enforceable custom, 
claim such property in him as would be claimed if he were an inanimate 
object; and thus the natural freedom of will possessed by a person to offer 
or render his labour or to control the fruits thereof or the consideration 
therefrom is taken from him. The term also seems to imply a permanent 
status or condition of a person whose natural freedom is so taken away, for 
from the proprietary interest of the other person in the person to whom that 
status attaches is implied a right of disposal by sale, gift or exchange.714 
 
Thus, in the case of Siliadin v France715 this standard was – in the opinion of the 
ECtHR - not met, as the treatment of the individual had not had the effect of reducing 
her to an object. This begs the question as to what ‘ownership’ actually is. Arguably, its 
characteristics include possession, the right to use, and the right to make income from 
the object.716 To own is to be able to buy, sell, and perhaps go so far as to destroy, 
although as Allain observes, the killing of slaves was criminalised under Roman law.717     
        Clearly, ownership relates to established proprietary rights, that is, as rights over 
property, although in the context of slavery falling short of legal right of possession - 
the abolition of de jure slavery by the 1926 Slavery Convention negates legal right of 
possession of a human being in States which are party to the Convention. The meaning 
of ‘the powers attaching to the right of ownership’ (emphasis added)718 in the 
Convention definition can be taken to mean what would otherwise be powers of actual 
                                                 
714 United Nations Economic and Social Council, Slavery, the Slave Trade, and other forms of. Servitude 
(Report of the Secretary-General), UN Doc. E/2357 (Jan 27, 1953). 
715 Siliadin v France - 73316/01 [2005] ECHR 545 (26 July 2005). 
716 See A M Honore, ‘Ownership’, in AG Guest (ed.) Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence, (Oxford 1961), 
112 – 24. 
717 J Allain, ‘The Definition of Slavery in International Law’ n 425, 258.  
718 Article 1(1). 
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ownership, if such ownership were legal.719 Thus, if one treats a human being in a 
fashion that would be acceptable if that human being was a legally owned object, one is 
exercising ‘the powers attaching to the right of ownership.’  
        The characteristics of the powers referred to include the abovementioned 
characteristics of ownership: the ability to buy, sell or transfer the individual; property 
rights to the fruits of any labour of the individual; and permanence in that the status or 
condition cannot be terminated by the individual who is subject to it.720 As recognised 
by Weissbrodt:  
 
In the modern context, the circumstances of the enslaved person are crucial 
to identifying what practices constitute slavery, including: (i) the degree of 
restriction of the individual’s inherent right to freedom of movement; (ii) 
the degree of control of the individual’s personal belongings; and (iii) the 
existence of informed consent and a full understanding of the nature of the 
relationship between the parties.721 
 
        As stated previously ‘exploitation’ is a key element of human trafficking. It would 
seem clear that ‘exploitation’ per se does not hit the specific standard of slavery, yet it 
seems clear that trafficking can, in certain circumstances, amount to de facto slavery in 
the sense of the definition 1926 Slavery Convention, i.e. where ‘any or all of the 
powers attaching to the right of ownership are exercised’, that is to say, where the 
                                                 
719 J Allain, ‘The Definition of Slavery in International Law’ n 425, 261. 
720 United Nations Economic and Social Council, Slavery, the Slave Trade, and other forms of. 
Servitude, n 714. 
721 UNHCHR, D Weissbrodt and Anti-Slavery International, n 436, para 21. 
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powers of ownership are exercised with respect to a trafficked person as if said person 
were legally owned.722  
        Consideration of R v Tang723 may aid this discussion. This recent case, heard by 
the High Court of Australia, has provided an insight into the application of the 
abovementioned definition and characteristics of slavery to a situation of human 
trafficking. Allain observes that this decision has ‘brought much depth of understanding 
to the parameters of what constitutes “slavery” both in the Australian context, but also 
in international law.’724 This case concerned application of the relevant sections of the 
Australian Criminal Code Act which address slavery.725 The Act uses a definition of 
slavery726 which is very similar to that provided within the 1926 Slavery Convention. 
Interestingly, Division 270 of the Criminal Code Act has provisions relating not only to 
slavery, but also to ‘trafficking in persons’,727 and to ‘sexual servitude’. Section 
270.4(1) provides the following definition: 
 
(1) For the purposes of this Division, sexual servitude728 is the condition of 
a person who provides sexual services and who, because of the use of force 
or threats: 
(a) is not free to cease providing sexual services; or  
(b) is not free to leave the place or area where the person provides sexual 
services.  
 
                                                 
722 This much is voiced by Hayne J in R v Tang [2008] HCA 39 (28 August 2008) 142. 
723 Tang [2008] HCA 39 (28 August 2008). 
724 J Allain, ‘R v Tang: Clarifying the Definition of ‘Slavery in International Law’ (2009) Melbourne 
Journal of International Law 246, 1. 
725 Australian Criminal Code Act, Sections 270.1 – 270.3. 
726 Section 270.1 states that ‘For the purposes of this Division, slavery is the condition of a person over 
whom any or all of the powers attaching to the right of ownership are exercised, including where such a 
condition results from a debt or contract made by the person.’ 
727 Section 271.2. 
728 Emphasis in the original text. 
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The Act also has related provisions which address the use of threats729 and deception730 
in the course of sexual servitude. 
        The facts of Tang concerned five women of Thai nationality who had voluntarily 
come to Australia to work in the sex industry. On arrival, they discovered that they had 
been ‘bought’ and consequently were required to work off the debt which consisted of 
more than double their ‘purchase’ price. Their passports were withheld, and their 
movement was restricted until their debt was paid off, at which point the restrictions 
were lifted, travel documents were returned, and they were given freedom of choice 
with respect to their hours of work.731 The High Court, rather than defaulting to 
application of trafficking or sexual servitude provisions, applied Section 270 and 
considered the characteristics of slavery i.e. where ‘any or all of the powers attaching to 
the right of ownership’732 were exercised.  
        A distinction was made between exploitative labour conditions and conditions of 
slavery,733 and although it was recognised that borderline cases would be 
problematic,734 the outcome of the present case indicates that the degree of control 
exercised over the victims went beyond any level of exploitation which is to be 
tentatively deemed acceptable, and in fact, went to far as to constitute slavery. Gleeson 
CJ indicated that the difference lay in the nature and extent of the powers attaching to 
the right of ownership that were exercised over the victim,735 and referred to treatment 
of the individual in terms that echo those explored above with reference to The UN 
                                                 
729 Australian Criminal Code Act, section 270.4 (2). 
730 Australian Criminal Code Act, section 270.7. 
731 Tang [2008] HCA 39 (28 August 2008), para 17. 
732 Section 270.1 of the Australian Criminal Code Act, drawing upon the definition of slavery provided 
within Article 1(1) of the 1926 Slavery Convention. 
733 Tang [2008] HCA 39 (28 August 2008), para 32. 
734 Tang [2008] HCA 39 (28 August 2008), para 44. 
735 Tang [2008] HCA 39 (28 August 2008), para 44. 
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Secretary General in his 1953 report;736 treating the individual as an object who might 
be sold – in other words, commodification.  
        Gleeson CJ also stated that in the present case it was unhelpful to draw boundaries 
between slavery and related practices such as servitude, as the boundaries are not 
necessarily clear-cut,737 and that traffickers ‘are unlikely to be so obliging as to arrange 
their practices to conform to some convenient taxonomy’.738 This, however, seems 
inconsistent with the principle of ‘representative labelling’, so termed by Ashworth,739 
but more commonly referred to as ‘fair labelling’.740 Slavery, servitude, debt bondage 
and other related practices have, for the most part, consistently been addressed 
separately741 and therefore cannot easily be assimilated without further justification. 
For example, Allain is critical of the ECtHR judgment in Rantsev for not adequately 
engaging with the distinction between different types of human exploitation such as 
slavery and servitude,742 as the Court in that case determined that trafficking is based 
upon slavery and therefore invokes the obligations which emanate from Article 4 
ECHR.743 There is an inherent need for precision on these matters in a criminal context, 
particularly in terms of, for example, assessing the rights and needs of victims. 
          What can be taken from the Tang judgment, however, is that the reasoning is 
sound for the most part, and the law relating to slavery and the elements of the 
definition therein was consistently applied. This judgment therefore exemplifies that the 
trafficking process can, in certain circumstances where the high threshold is met i.e. 
                                                 
736 United Nations Economic and Social Council, Slavery, the Slave Trade, and other forms of. 
Servitude, n 714. 
737 Tang[2008] HCA 39 (28 August 2008), para 29. 
738 Tang [2008] HCA 39 (28 August 2008), para 29. 
739 See Ashworth, A., ‘The Elasticity of Mens Rea’ in C F H Tapper (ed), Crime, Proof and Punishment: 
Essays in Memory of Sir Rupert Cross (London: Butterworth, 1981) 45, 53. 
740 G Williams, ‘Convictions and Fair Labelling’ (1983) 42 Cambridge Law Journal 85. 
741 Although the Rantsev judgment muddied the waters somewhat here – see J Allain, ‘Rantsev v Cyprus 
and Russia: The European Court of Human Rights and Trafficking as Slavery’ (2010) Human Rights 
Law Review 10:3, 546 – 557. 
742 Ibid, 546. 
743 Ibid. 
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where ‘any or all of the powers attaching to the right of ownership’ are exercised, result 
in the condition of slavery, as does the slave trade. However, due to the myriad types of 
‘exploitation’ envisaged as ‘purpose’ elements of trafficking, the slave trade and the 
process of human trafficking may be compared, but cannot and should not be wholly 
equated. Human trafficking is for ‘exploitation’ and supersedes definitions of the slave 
trade and the condition of slavery.744  
 
E. The ‘Purpose’ – Some Conclusions 
 
The terminology used within the criminal anti-trafficking regime is clearly borrowed 
from human rights law and requires interpretation. Due to the increasing importance of 
the principles of interpretation enshrined in the Vienna Convention, elucidation of these 
elements using internationally recognised human rights standards allows us to gain a 
sounder understanding of the scope of the types of exploitation outlined in the 
‘purpose’ element of the trafficking definition. 
        Evidently, the trafficking definition casts its net widely and envisages a spectrum 
of exploitative activities, so that a variety of ‘purposes’ fall within the ambit of the 
international legal definition of human trafficking. The status or condition of slavery, 
where ‘any or all of the powers attaching to the right of ownership are exercised’, sits 
clearly at one end of this spectrum, and represents the most severe form of exploitation 
                                                 
744 As a final point on the scope of the UN Protocol, the definition also extends to illegal adoption, where 
it ‘amounts to a practise similar to slavery as defined in Article 1, paragraph (d), of the Supplementary 
Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Institution and Practises similar to 
Slavery.’ See United Nations General Assembly ‘Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Elaboration of 
a Convention against Transnational Organized Crime on the work of its first to eleventh sessions, 
Addendum, Interpretative notes for the official records (travaux preparatoires) of the negotiation of the 
United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and the Protocols thereto’ (2000) UN 
Doc A/55/383/Add.1, 66. In terms of illegal adoption, the ‘action’ is satisfied, and the issue of consent is 
irrelevant as the subject of the illegal adoption will be a child, so the ‘purpose’ element becomes the 
central focus. Thus, the illegal adoption of a child in order to use them as a domestic servant, for 
example, can be caught by the trafficking definition. 
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which may come about as a ‘purpose’ element of human trafficking. Along this 
spectrum sit the multitude of other forms of exploitation which form part of the 
trafficking process. This confirms that serious exploitation is the central characteristic 
of the ‘purpose’; the non-exhaustive definition of ‘exploitation’ provided by the current 
definition ensures that myriad activities are caught, so that States can make an effective 
attempt at tackling this global phenomenon and the serious forms of human exploitation 
that it involves. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The current internationally recognised definition of human trafficking has taken major 
steps in defining exactly what ‘trafficking in persons’ is in a legal sense. The definition 
is comparable to the legal definition addressing the slave trade, which can similarly be 
broken down into the three elements of ‘action’ ‘means’ and ‘purpose’. Both the slave 
trade and human trafficking are exploitative forms of trade in human beings. The fact 
that the purpose element of trafficking - as provided within the current internationally 
accepted definition of ‘trafficking in humans’ - now includes the status of slavery as a 
relevant form of exploitation, demonstrates that the trafficking definition intends to 
address severe forms of non-consensual exploitative migration in a broader sense than 
previously achieved by individual traffick and slavery-specific instruments. While sex 
work is not globally accepted to be a form of labour, the definition incorporated within 
the relevant instruments745 must remain on the fence by not defining sexual exploitation 
- a result of a need to secure signatures and ratifications etc to these landmark 
instruments.  
                                                 
745 I.e. The Trafficking Protocol, The CoE Trafficking Convention, and the EU 2011 Directive. 
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        The ‘action’ element of human trafficking is phrased in necessarily broad terms, to 
encompass all situations where traffickers come into contact with putative victims. It 
has been established for the most part that international borders do not necessarily have 
to be crossed,746 nonetheless, that cases of ‘intra-state’ or ‘internal’ trafficking may 
well be dealt with according to national law. Furthermore, it has been established that 
entry into the destination State does not have to be illicit. This extends the scope, 
applicability, and therefore efficiency of the anti-trafficking regime.  
        The inclusion of the ‘means’ element into recent trafficking definitions has proven 
to be a controversial step, as it has the effect that otherwise ‘trafficked’ persons who 
have not been subject to force or coercion (or at least where there is no objective proof 
of such) arguably fall without of the scope of the trafficking definition. This raises 
further issues that warrant exploration, and so the role of consent (or lack thereof) in the 
context of human trafficking will be considered further in Chapter 3. The particulars of 
the ‘means’ element are not always clearly separable, yet nonetheless go toward 
establishing the definition of human trafficking as a non-consensual process, or at least 
a process where any consent given may be rendered ineffective by use of any of the 
‘means’. This in turn relies upon objective proof of ‘coercion’, etc, being available in 
order for the ‘victim’ to be formally identified as trafficked – such is the centrality of 
the consent/coercion spectrum created by the trafficking definition.747 
        The analysis of ‘economic coercion of circumstances’748 recognises that it is 
indeed  difficult to sustain an argument that these migrants who are subject to severe 
economic coercion of circumstances should be treated as trafficked victims. Such a 
paternalist stance is somewhat extreme and not particularly fashionable; neither is it 
                                                 
746 With the caveat under the Trafficking Protocol that the activity be ‘transnational’ in nature 
747 The word ‘dichotomy’ is rejected here for reasons discussed in Chapter 3, Part III, section A, and 
instead a ‘spectrum’ is envisaged, as discussed in section B of the same Part. 
748 Discussed in Chapter 2, Part III, section B, subsection iv. 
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likely to have a positive reception from States upon whom the anti-trafficking regime 
places obligations. Yet, due to the contextual nature of migration and trafficking and 
the role that economic hardship clearly has to play in the continuance of the 
phenomenon, it may be possible to retain a stance which recognises the autonomy of 
the ‘consensually trafficked’ (who have been subjected to exploitation of some form), 
yet simultaneously to recognise the potentially highly vulnerable position of the same, 
and to sketch out a prima facie case for such persons to have access to more favourable 
treatment than if they were simply viewed as economic migrants, in appropriate cases – 
this will be discussed in Chapter 4.749 
        Early traffick-specific instruments defined trafficking as a process which entailed 
a ‘purpose’ element solely comprised of exploitation of a sexual nature. It is now clear 
that non-consensual ‘exploitation’ per se is the defining element of this activity. The 
detailed trafficking definition works toward clarifying exactly which exploitative 
situations do and do not constitute human trafficking, and attempts to provide a clearer 
view of what the ‘purpose’ element of human trafficking is.  
        The evolution of the scope of this element of trafficking legislation can only 
enhance its effectiveness in combating the most severe forms of non-consensual 
exploitative migration, as it takes what has already been done in human rights and 
labour law instruments to address slavery and its related forms, sexual exploitation, and 
exploitation of labour, and creates instruments to address all of these aspects by 
criminalising them as acts committed by private individuals. The ‘purpose’ element of 
the anti-trafficking regime is supplemented by the pre-existing instruments which 
address slavery, forced labour etc, and recourse to these instruments as aids to 
                                                 
749 See Chapter 4, Part IX, section B. 
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interpretation of the ‘purpose’ elements of human trafficking can be justified by 
reference to Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention. 
        The analysis conducted throughout this Chapter indicates that all activity which 
can be deemed human trafficking falls along a spectrum of exploitation, which at an 
extreme point can cross into the realms of de facto slavery. With ‘exploitation’ being 
the central ‘purpose’ element of human trafficking, the definition provided within the 
relevant instruments takes a ‘broad brush’ approach, thereby encompassing a multitude 
of exploitative activities, provided that the other elements of the trafficking definition 
are present. We now know what human trafficking is in a legal sense. It is a tripartite 
process comprised of an ‘action’, ‘means’ and ‘purpose’, inclusive of a range of serious 
exploitative activities. The UN Trafficking Protocol has drawn upon previous 
instruments and years of debate, and the resulting definition - although not 
unproblematic - is comprehensive and appropriate, in that it sets the standard high 
enough to encompass the worst forms of exploitation, yet low enough to encompass 
those which may push the boundaries of the traditionally recognised conditions of 
slavery and its related practices. 
        This Chapter has established what human trafficking is, including the importance 
of the fairly new and inherently controversial ‘means’ element. This provides a sound 
basis to go on to analyse the specific and problematic role of consent in human 
trafficking, which will now be done in Chapter 3. 
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 Chapter 3 
The Role of Consent in Human Trafficking 
 
Introduction 
 
The discussion throughout previous chapters has established that lack of 
consent/presence of coercion etc is a necessary condition to establish the existence of 
trafficking according to legal definition, whether as an offence, as a condition for 
criminal cooperation, or to identify victims of trafficking. The issue of consent is a 
much-debated consequence of the requirement imposed by the ‘means’ element of 
trafficking – human trafficking is now defined explicitly with reference to lack of (full 
and genuine) consent, and the presence of factors invalidating consent. Correct 
determinations as to the presence or lack of consent are made all the more important 
where ‘social relationships are framed by a respect for human rights.’,750 as is the case 
in a smuggling/trafficking/exploitation nexus.  
        While it is evident through lack of inclusion of a ‘consent’ element in slave trade 
provisions that one may not contract oneself into bondage in the context of slavery, the 
potential to contract oneself into a form of bondage in the context of human trafficking 
is a contentious issue. Consequently, consent has come to play a pivotal role in 
trafficking debate. Where the ‘means’ element of human trafficking is not deemed to be 
satisfied, the activity falls outside of the scope of the trafficking definition, and this 
issue is left to be addressed by individual governments.    
                                                 
750 D Beyleveld, and R Brownsword, n 321, 2. 
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        Apparent lack of coercion or other ‘means’ renders the activity prima facie 
consensual.  Here, ‘trafficking’ becomes consensual facilitated migration for sex work 
or labour in exploitative conditions, and we are left with a body of ‘consensually 
trafficked’ persons. Consent in such a situation does not necessarily render the activity 
harmless or justified; the exploitative conditions still exist.  
        The aim of anti-trafficking legislation is to combat trafficking through imposing 
criminal responsibility on the traffickers and obligations on the State to protect the 
rights (including the human rights) of trafficked persons. Establishing consent in the 
context of human trafficking can be a problematic area which may constitute a barrier 
to obtaining successful prosecutions against traffickers, and an obstacle to protecting 
the rights of the ‘victims’ as the consequence of an individual being accorded, or not 
being accorded, victim status under the instruments which form the anti-trafficking 
regime.751 Correct determinations of valid consent are paramount to securing adequate 
treatment and protection of victims. 
        Consequently, consent seems to serve to negate, or at least mitigate, the exact 
wrongfulness of transporting people and benefitting from their exploitation. If a person 
consents to border crossing in order to work under the control of another in exploitative 
conditions, then under the anti-trafficking instruments the act or process is not 
criminalised; therefore, this consent serves to operate as a defence for the putative 
trafficker. The (Unofficial) Guide to the explanatory notes to the Protocol attempts to 
expand upon the issue of consent within the context of human trafficking, stating that: 
 
… despite evidence that that the victim consented to migrate, to carry false 
documents and to work illegally abroad, defendants cannot argue that the 
                                                 
751 This issue is discussed at a later point in this Chapter, Part VI section C, and Part VII, passim, and the 
treatment of victims is specifically considered in Chapter 4, passim. 
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victim ‘consented’ to work in conditions of forced labour, slavery or 
servitude. By definition, these three crimes mean there is no consent.  For 
example, a woman can consent to migrate to work in prostitution in a 
particular city, at a particular brothel, for a certain sum of money. However, 
if the defendant intended actually to hold the woman in forced or coerced 
sex work, then there is no consent because everything the defendant 
trafficker told the woman is a lie. No one can consent to a lie. Even if a 
person agrees to work in very bad conditions, for very little money, with 
very little freedom, he would still be a victim of trafficking if the trafficker 
intended to hold him in debt bondage, involuntary or forced conditions.752 
 
This excerpt takes its cue from the trafficking definition, which recognises that consent 
to exploitation may be given.753 For trafficking to exist, it would appear that 
exploitative conditions alone are not sufficient. In order for the crime to constitute 
trafficking, there must be an element of force, or some form of broken agreement, 
which will suffice to satisfy the ‘means’ element of human trafficking and therefore 
vitiate any initial consent.  
        None of the central legal instruments754 using the recognised definition of human 
trafficking adequately provide for situations of ‘consensual’ human trafficking. 
Exploiting a person – and profiting from the exploitation - seems to be acceptable in 
terms of the trafficking definition, as long as no one was deceived and the exploitative 
situation was not enforced or altered from what was agreed. The definition seems to 
shift the focus from the end result of the offence to the nature of the offence; how the 
                                                 
752 A D Jordan, n 450, 11. 
753 This is evident through the explicit statement in the trafficking definition that ‘The consent of a victim 
… to the exploitation … shall be irrelevant where any of the means … has been used.’ 
754 I.e. the Trafficking Protocol, The CoE Trafficking Convention, and the EU 2011 Directive. 
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end result, i.e. exploitation, was brought about. It has been suggested that the focus 
should surely be not on the consent of the victim, but on the harm done.755 Through the 
inclusion of the consent element, what we are left with is a category of persons who, 
through the giving of consent, have been ‘less than trafficked, but more than 
smuggled’. These persons – the ‘consensually trafficked’ – may have recourse to 
ordinary human rights law and domestic criminal law for protections and standards of 
treatment, but are currently entitled to no specific provision under the anti-trafficking 
regime. 
        This Chapter aims to analyse the role of consent (or lack thereof) in human 
trafficking. Part I will revisit and draw upon the conditions for a valid consent which 
were discussed in Chapter 1,756 with the discussion here focussing specifically on valid 
consent in a trafficking context. Part II will consider how the inclusion of the ‘consent’ 
element in human trafficking came about, and Part III will discuss the reality of consent 
in human trafficking while challenging the dichotomous approach which some take to 
the consent/coercion debate in a trafficking context.757 Part IV analyses the Autonomy 
v Paternalism perspectives as regards sex work and exploitation. This will involve 
consideration of what one is, or should be, capable of consenting to in this context, and 
includes an analysis of sex work as a legitimate form of labour and what this means for 
trafficked/smuggled sex workers. The effects of recognising consent in a trafficking 
context will then be addressed in Part V – this will include consideration of the 
potential for consent to act as a defence for would-be traffickers, and a barrier to 
securing adequate support and protection for putative victims. Finally, alternatives to 
                                                 
755 B Balos ‘The Wrong Way to Equality: Privileging Consent in the Trafficking of Women for Sexual 
Exploitation’, 27 Harvard Women’s Law Journal 137, 149. 
756 See Chapter 1, Part III. 
757 See, for example, J Doezma, ‘Forced to Choose: Beyond the Voluntary v. Forced Prostitution 
Dichotomy’, in Doezma J. and Kempadoo K. (eds)  Global Sex Workers: Rights, Resistance and 
Redefinition (Routledge, New York, 1998), and J Bhabha, n 517.  
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the current situation offered by the anti-trafficking regime will be suggested in Part VI, 
so that the specific ramifications of this debate from the perspective of putative victims 
can be built upon and discussed further in the Chapter 4. 
 
I. The Requirements of a Valid Consent in the Context of Human Trafficking       
 
The various aspects of a valid consent were analysed at an earlier point in this thesis.758 
These aspects will now be considered and applied in the specific context of human 
trafficking. As will be seen from the analysis which follows throughout this Chapter, it 
may not necessarily be appropriate in the context of trafficking for sexual exploitation 
to base determinations of valid consent upon a ‘consent threshold that centres on such 
theoretically contested, and malleable, concepts as ‘freedom,’ (and) ‘capacity.’’759  
 
A. Consent must be ‘Freely’ Given 
 
As established in Chapter 1,760 the Law Commission and Scottish Law Commission 
view ‘freely’ given consent as ‘…agreement to what is done’761 and that this agreement 
must be ‘free and genuine agreement to the act in question’.762 Furthermore, that 
‘agreement’ can be given in situations where it is not ‘real’, ‘full’, or ‘valid’.763 In the 
most basic sense in a trafficking context, ‘free’ consent is that which is free from any 
form of coercion or other ‘means’, or more specifically as stated in the trafficking 
definition, that which is free from: 
                                                 
758 See Chapter 1, Part III. 
759 V E Munro, n 510, 926. 
760 See Chapter 1, Part III, section A, subsection i. 
761 The Law Commission, n 323, para 2.9.  
762 Ibid, para 2.12. 
763 Scottish Law Commission, n 336, para 2.38.  
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 … threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, 
of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of 
the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a 
person having control over another person…764  
 
The meaning of each of these terms was explored in Chapter 2.765 The ‘consensually 
trafficked’ person must, therefore, give clearly un-coerced consent, and must exercise 
autonomous agency, free from the influences of external pressure such as force, etc, 
being applied by the trafficker. This, as will be argued, is not without its complications. 
        Abramson asserts that the existence of full, free consent in the context of human 
trafficking is problematic, as it ‘ignores the real difference in choices between rich and 
poor, male and female, and educated and uneducated.’766 This statement extends 
beyond consideration of lack of consent in the face of more obvious forms of coercion, 
such as force, and harks back to the discussion in Chapter 2 of, ‘economic coercion of 
circumstances’,767 in which case it was argued that the notion of ‘free’ consent is 
morally suspect where the consenting agent was motivated by severe poverty. Yet, it 
must be concluded in a metaphorical sense that no matter how hungry, one may not 
steal the loaf.  
        With respect the views of MacKinnon, which are heavily paternalistic as regards 
consent – particularly in a sexual context - Hernandez-Truyol and Larson note that 
‘[w]ith characteristic boldness, she (MacKinnon) suggests that “rape law takes 
women’s usual response to coercion – acquiescence, the despairing response to 
                                                 
764 Article 3 of the UN Trafficking Protocol, Article 4 of the CoE Trafficking Convention, and Article 2 
of the EU 2011 Directive. 
765 See Chapter 2, Part III. 
766 K Abramson, n 14, 475. 
767 See Chapter 2, Part III, section B, subsection iv. 
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hopelessness to unequal odds – and calls that consent”’.768 Those who suffer more 
greatly from poverty and lack of opportunity for economic gain, may well have fewer 
options and therefore less ability to truly exercise ‘free agency’, and instead ‘acquiesce’ 
or make a choice as a ‘despairing response to hopelessness to unequal odds’. It is 
difficult to view consent in such a situation as truly being ‘freely’ given. Yet, this is 
insufficient according to both present definition, and the analysis in Chapter 2,769 to 
invalidate consent and render the putative victim as formally trafficked. 
        Also following the analysis in Chapter 2770 regarding ‘abuse of a position of 
vulnerability’, it seems that there may indeed be scope for invalidation of consent 
where the exercise of authority of, say a community leader is abused. Furthermore, 
where the trafficker(s) take advantage of the economic or social vulnerability of the 
victim in order to recruit them, there may also be the potential for ineffective or 
invalidated consent, yet this may turn on the facts of each case. The use of abuse of a 
position of vulnerability based upon persuasive tactics (on the part of the trafficker) as 
regards the lure of good fortune in the sex trade abroad may be less persuasive to States 
than in the case where the ‘victim’ is already in a situation of exploitation – which may 
have been entered consensually at first – and is then subjected to abuse of a position of 
vulnerability or authority through economic-based threats or coercion, such as in the 
Moir case.771 The use of such tactics in that case clearly rendered the ‘consent’ of the 
sex workers invalidated as it was not ‘freely’ given. 
        Establishing the existence of ‘freely’ given consent in a trafficking context is 
clearly problematic. This is the case not least because of the intricacies of the ‘means’ 
element of the trafficking definition, but also in the face of external pressures – such as 
                                                 
768 B E Hernandez-Truyol, and J E Larson, n  551, citing C MacKinnon, Toward A Feminist Theory of 
the State (Harvard 1991)  168.    
769 Chapter 2, Part III, Section B, subsection iv. 
770 Chapter 2, Part III, Section B, subsection v. 
771 [2007] EWCA Crim 3317, discussed in Chapter 2, Part II, Section B, subsection v.  
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those of an economic form – which do not come from the trafficker. Nonetheless, it 
would appear from the preceding analysis that invalidation of ‘freely’ given consent is 
dependent upon some form of positive action from another agent, which would require 
some objective proof of activity interfering with the freedom of any consent given.  
        Furthermore, it seems that the standard of interference may be set too high in 
certain circumstances, such as in a trafficking or sex trade context, which comprises an 
inherently coercive environment,772 which may obscure the coercive reality and lead to 
the appearance of freely given consent. Ostensible forms of coercion such as force can 
clearly render ineffective any consent given, but where the force used is not sufficiently 
evident to the objective observer, this renders genuine ‘freely’ given consent difficult to 
determine here. 
 
B. Consent must be ‘Informed’ 
         
In the context of consent to exploitation, one might ask whether ‘where a choice 
touches on a person’s most basic interests … do we (or should we) set a higher 
threshold for free and informed consent than where lesser interests are at stake…’773 
Exploitative conditions of any type of work may encroach upon a person’s basic 
interests. Therefore, not only do the parameters of ‘Autonomy versus Paternalism’ in 
this context merit discussion,774 but it may be possible to ask for a higher standard of 
free and informed consent. 
                                                 
772 As regards discussion of ‘free’ consent in an inherently coercive environment, see Human Rights 
Watch, ‘No Escape: Male Rape in U.S. Prisons’, in particular see the section entitled ‘Consent and 
coercion in Prison’, <http://www.hrw.org/legacy/reports/2001/prison/index.htm> accessed 12 June 2011. 
773 D Beyleveld, and R Brownsword, Consent in the Law, (Hart Publishing, 2007) 11 
774 See Part IV, section A et seq, below, for discussion of the Autonomy v Paternalism perspectives. 
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        In a trafficking context, the definition provides that the existence of any of the 
stipulated ‘means’ will render invalid a consent ‘to the intended exploitation’.775 
Therefore, the parameters of the ‘exploitation’ are relevant to the idea of the putative 
victim being considered to be ‘informed’. Here, the notion of informed consent raises 
the question of exactly what the putatively trafficked person will be consenting to, and 
how informed she has to be – particularly when bearing in mind that she may have little 
to no knowledge of the ‘typical’ conditions to be faced in the sex sector of the 
destination State. The law – and those executing it – must take care to distinguish 
between genuine consent, and situations where there is merely the appearance of 
consent.776 Human trafficking against a backdrop of illicit economic migration and 
people smuggling renders it more difficult to distinguish between real and apparent 
consent.  
        Addressing this question (as to how well-informed the putative victim must be) a 
person ‘will not have had the capacity to agree by choice where their understanding and 
knowledge were so limited that they were not in a position to decide whether or not to 
agree.’777 In the context of human trafficking, given the tripartite nature of trafficking, 
then for the consent to be considered informed and genuine, the nature, quality, and 
purpose of the act or process must be agreed upon and the facts on which it was based 
must be maintained.  
        Some subsequent change in conditions from those which were agreed will 
potentially satisfy the ‘means’ element, and render the activity capable of being caught 
                                                 
775 Article 3 UN Trafficking Protocol, Article 4 CoE Convention, Article 2 EU 2011 Directive. 
776 The Anti Trafficking Monitoring Group note that ‘In many cases, victims may appear “free”. 
Sometimes, they might get paid some money. However, often these appearances merely mask the 
coercion: debt bondage, control over people’s identity or immigration status, threats and other 
psychological pressures are very real factors that control behaviour as much as any physical 
imprisonment. These forms of coercion leave serious psychological consequences.’ See The Anti 
Trafficking Monitoring Group, ‘Wrong Kind of Victim’ (June 2010) 17. 
777 P Rook Q.C and R Ward, n 386, para 1.94. 
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by the trafficking definition. This will be easier to establish where for the ‘purpose’ 
element of human trafficking, the objective standards of ‘slavery’ or ‘servitude’,778 for 
example, are met. By definition, apparent initial consent would surely be rendered 
ineffective by a change from what was agreed which led to circumstances where the 
characteristics of these practices were endured. There will however exist cases of a 
more borderline nature which will not be unproblematic.  
        Jordan states that:  
 
A woman can consent to migrate to work in prostitution in a particular city, 
at a particular brothel, for a certain sum of money. However, if the 
defendant intended actually to hold the woman in forced or coerced sex 
work, then there is no consent…779  
 
This quote lays down a potential standard of informed consent in a trafficking context. 
In a this context, then, consent to be transported from point A to point B in order to 
work in the sex industry as a prostitute is prima facie capable of constituting a valid 
consent. Nonetheless, this is a too simple formula which does not take full account of 
the intricacies of smuggling and trafficking of humans. Accordingly, a consent to be 
transported to work as a prostitute can be valid but if the conditions of ‘work’, such as 
pay, are different to those agreed, then this no longer qualifies as informed consent, and 
the consent is invalidated – there is deception. The initial giving of consent no longer 
subsists; it is damaged, changed from the initial state in which it was offered – it can no 
longer be considered to be informed, due to the change from what was agreed. 
                                                 
778 See Chapter 2, Part IV, section D, for a full discussion of these ‘purpose’ elements of the trafficking 
definition. 
779 A D Jordan, n 450, 11. 
 214
        In order for consent to be real and informed, sufficient of the conditions of ‘work’ 
must have been agreed upon, free from the constraints of any form of coercion. 
Research conducted into victims of trafficking into Israel estimates that in ‘… 70% of 
the cases the women are aware of the fact that they will be selling their bodies in 
prostitution but they are not aware of the harsh conditions that await them when they 
arrive in Israel.’780 If we ask for a higher standard of informed consent here, it is 
rendered more palatable to respect the autonomous choices of the migrant sex 
worker/would-be trafficked person.781  
        There may be some responsibility on the consenting individual to gather 
information prior to giving consent. One might query how much responsibility is to be 
placed upon the migrant to determine the details of the arrangement to which they are 
consenting. It cannot be assumed that all putative victims, particularly those living in 
rural areas,782 will have an adequate understanding of the risks associated with 
migration and trafficking. It may also not be suitable to expect the putative victim to 
have sound knowledge of the conditions of sex work in the destination State.  
        While retaining a stance which recognises the autonomy of the individual to agree 
to sex work (or even exploitative sex work), a sufficiently paternalistic stance – which 
requires a higher, more stringent standard of informed consent - is not an unreasonable 
proposition where exploitation, which interferes with the basic interests of human 
beings, is the intended outcome of the activity in question. The ‘Autonomy’ and 
                                                 
780 L G Gold and N B Ami ‘National NGOs Report to the Annual UN Commission on Human Rights: 
Evaluation of National Authorities activities and actual facts on the Trafficking in Persons for the 
purpose of prostitution in Israel, (On behalf of Awareness Centre, Machon Toda’a, Representative of the 
IAF in Israel 2004) 8. 
781 Furthermore, many women who are exploited in the sex trade, whether or not trafficked, are 
dependent upon drugs – the economic need to fund their habits and the possibility that any decisions are 
less than genuine and informed ought to be taken into account if consent is so crucial a matter. 
782 It has been reported that those from rural areas are more likely to underestimate the risk of being 
trafficked, see GfK Ukraine, n 46, 5. 
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‘Paternalist’ stances associated with sex work will be addressed at a later point in this 
Chapter.783 
        Autonomy is a difficult matter in terms of the choice to engage in exploitative sex 
work; that is, sex work in conditions which meet a standard of ‘exploitation’,784 as 
opposed to sex work per se. In the context of exploitation, the exploiter cannot be said 
to have the best interests of the exploited at heart, therefore it may be justifiable to 
require a high standard of informed consent. 
        Various areas of the law which employ notions of informed consent were explored 
in Chapter 1.785 The notion of ‘informed consent’ in certain contexts concerns different 
issues. For example, informed consent in a medical, family or contractual context may 
raise issues of bodily integrity, personal relationships, and harm to an individual. These 
are clearly of a less ‘arm’s length’ nature than informed consent in a commercial 
contractual sense, and therefore more fitting as basis of comparison in a sex trafficking 
context, particularly when considering the nature of the ‘work’ to be undertaken and the 
risks involved. The trafficking/smuggling type of ‘transaction’ or agreement needs to 
be treated more tentatively because of the issues outlined at the start of this paragraph. 
Furthermore, it needs to be treated so because of the potentially risky nature of such a 
‘transaction’, and also potentially because women (or perhaps sex workers in general) 
are more vulnerable (note the ‘gender perspective’, or similar, alluded to in some of the 
main anti-trafficking instruments discussed in this thesis),786 and, ultimately, because of 
the inherently personal nature of the ‘work’ or ‘services’ to be provided. 
                                                 
783 See, Part IV, below. 
784 See, Part VI, section B, below, where a definition of ‘exploitation’, as offset against accepted labour 
standards in the destination State, is proposed. 
785 See, Chapter 1, Part III, section A, subsection ii. 
786 Notably the UN Trafficking Protocol refers in its title to ‘especially women and children’, and the EU 
2011 Directive refers in the preamble, para 3, to the ‘gender-specific phenomenon of trafficking’. 
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        Notably, ‘informed consent is a normative variable, not an empirical constant.’787 
If it is treated as an empirical constant, then the law serves as somewhat of a blunt tool 
in terms of protecting the vulnerable. In summary, it is argued here that a high standard 
of informed consent is called for in the case of trafficked persons. To reiterate what was 
stated in Chapter 1,788 ‘the level or kind of consent that might be sufficient to ground 
enforcement in one type of situation may not be sufficient in another.’789 Borderline 
cases of trafficking may, in absence of a requirement of a high standard of informed 
consent, otherwise simply be deemed as cases of human smuggling. Because the 
consequences for the victim are so serious, the putative victim should have been 
informed as to many aspects of the process before it can be said that she has consented. 
Only then can she be said to have demonstrated the ‘informed exercise of a choice, and 
(had) an opportunity to evaluate knowledgeably the options available and the risks 
attendant upon each.’790 
        On the basis of the analysis in this section, and as noted by Jordan, it is not entirely 
unprincipled to ask that the requisite standard of informed consent may at the least be 
that ‘… a woman can consent to migrate to work in prostitution in a particular city, at a 
particular brothel, for a certain sum of money.’791 The purpose and nature of the act(s) 
consented to must be maintained as agreed, so that the consent elicited can be 
considered to be informed. The fact that establishing such matters is resource intensive, 
and demanding evidentially, is not necessarily sufficient to lower the standard required 
here, particularly if effective protection of victims of trafficking and sexual exploitation 
is to be achieved. 
 
                                                 
787 P H Schuck, n 385, 956. 
788 See Chapter 1, Part III, Section A, subsection ii, page 97. 
789 B Bix, n 368, 5. 
790 Canterbury v Spence 464 F 2d 772 (DC Cir 1972). 
791 A D Jordan, n 450, 11. 
 217
 C. Capacity and Understanding 
 
This clearly relates to mental capacity – the consenting agent must have the capacity to 
understand that which she is consenting to. A consistent theme is how trafficking 
definitions deal with minors – namely that those under 18 are not to be deemed capable 
of consenting in this context. Although the competence of minors to make their own 
decisions may at times be recognised in certain areas of the law, there is to be no grey 
area resembling ‘Gillick Competence’792 here. Where mental capacity to consent is 
lacking in an adult, a consent cannot be considered to be valid. As stated in Chapter 
1,793 adults may be assumed to have the mental capacity to consent, but this assumption 
can be rebutted.794 
 
D. The Timing of Consent 
 
Migration situations will frequently be difficult to categorise. The ‘means’ element of 
trafficking fundamentally distinguishes this activity from smuggling, as the latter 
requires no form of coercion. This element of trafficking demonstrates the involuntary 
nature of this activity, whereas the fact that there is no need to demonstrate ‘means’ 
where smuggling is concerned implies activity of a more voluntary nature.795  
                                                 
792 The elasticity of consent in terms of legal acceptance of capacity to consent is demonstrated by the 
1985 Gillick case in the United Kingdom where a Lords majority ruled upon the potential capacity of 
under 16s to make their own decisions about medical treatment - See Gillick v. West Norfolk and 
Wisbech Area Health Authority [1985] 3 All ER 402. 
793 See, Chapter 1, Part III, section A, subsection iii. 
794 This point was made by Butler-Sloss LJ in the context of medical treatment in Re MB (Medical 
Treatment) [1997] 2 FLR 426. 
795 T Obokata, ‘Smuggling of Human Beings from a Human Rights Perspective: Obligations of Non-
State and State Actors Under International Human Rights Law’ (2005) International Journal of Refugee 
Law, 17(2) 394 – 415, 394. 
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        Whether one has been trafficked or smuggled, whether one has consented or been 
coerced, is a question of both interpretation and timing, and any consent given must 
subsist at the time of the act consented to.796 Initial consent may indeed be given in 
many circumstances. However, what one has ‘consented’ to will frequently be far from 
the realities facing the migrant on arrival. Is her position at the point of departure or the 
point of arrival a better indicator of the migrant’s intentions? From a human rights 
perspective, for victims of human trafficking, it is surely the point of arrival.797 In order 
to adequately cater for victims, it is submitted here (and developed in Chapter 4)798 
that, provided there is at least some evidence that a woman is putatively a victim, we 
should start from a presumption of trafficking (and therefore of coercion or lack of 
consent for adults). 
                                                
        It has been established that in a trafficking context there may frequently be an 
initial consent, but if this consent is obtained through, or followed by, subsequent 
deception, then it can no longer be accepted as a valid consent. If the deceptive 
intention was always present, the consent was never valid. If consent must be 
subsisting, then it follows that it can be withdrawn at any point,799 although this may 
not always be straightforward in principle and in practice. 
        Research conducted in Birmingham, UK, indicates that local police believe that 
many ‘victims’ of trafficking are complicit in the process, and knew what they were 
getting into.800 This may indicate how belief by law enforcement authorities in the 
 
796 The Law Commission, n 323, para 2.11. 
797 J Bhabha, n  517. 
798 See, Chapter 4, Part IX, section B. 
799 The Law Commission in 1998 stated that ‘…an agreement to an act should not be regarded as a 
consent to that act unless it is subsisting at the relevant time. If what is relied on is past agreement, this 
will mean both (a) that, when previously given, the agreement must have extended to the doing of the act 
at that later time, and (b) that it must not have been withdrawn in the meantime.’ See, The Law 
Commission, n 323, para 2.11. 
800 Statement by Sarah Garrat (Personal Communication on 14 February 2008, following research 
conducted by the Asylum and Immigration Research Team, Birmingham, into the treatment of victims of 
human trafficking once discovered in the destination state). 
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giving of consent by the ‘victim’, can rest on the giving of initial consent, and fail to 
take into account the scope for subsequent vitiation of consent by deceptive or coercive 
conditions.  
        The difficulty inherent in determining this matter is exemplified in an account 
provided in Chapter 2,801 which refers to a victim who agreed (and therefore consented) 
to be recruited (the ‘action’) in order to work in the Israeli sex industry (the ‘purpose’), 
and yet subsequently received no money from her pimp. There was no deception about 
the nature of the ‘work’.802 Yet, it may be argued that the deception as regards the 
nature of the payment, occurred at a later point in the process, or was perhaps the 
intention of the exploiter all along. Whether this is sufficient to vitiate consent and 
therefore render a situation of otherwise consensual facilitated migration - possibly into 
an exploitative situation – one of human trafficking, is a central factor and further 
highlights the problematic nature of the consent requirement in this branch of the sex 
trade.  
        A female co-trafficker cited in the UK Action Plan on Tackling Human 
Trafficking makes the following observation: 
 
The girls I’ve met … some of them don’t even have a clue what they’re 
doing, why they came … some of them know why they’re coming … right, 
some of them knew that they were going to work as prostitutes but they 
didn’t know they were going to be controlled by Albanians to start with, or 
                                                 
801 Chapter 2, Part III, section B, subsection ii, page 134, which refers to an excerpt provided by 
International Organization for Migration, n 474, 67 – 68. 
802 International Organization for Migration, n 474, 68. 
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some of them thought they were going to work for themselves as 
prostitutes.803 
 
        The Explanatory Report to the CoE Trafficking Convention provides some 
illumination on this point of the timing of consent: 
 
The question of consent is not simple and it is not easy to determine where 
free will ends and constraint begins. In trafficking, some people do not 
know what is in store for them while others are perfectly aware that, for 
example, they will be engaging in prostitution. However, while someone 
may wish employment, and possibly be willing to engage in prostitution, 
that does not mean that they consent to be subjected to abuse of all kinds. 
For that reason Article 4(b) provides that there is trafficking in human 
beings whether or not the victim consents to be exploited.804 
 
The above qualifications make for a broad view as to when, and for what, consent must 
be given. This encompassing view recognises that initial consent to migrate in order to 
work in prostitution can potentially be rendered ineffective by deception with respect to 
factors other than solely the strict nature of the ‘work’ to be undertaken. This indicates 
that the scope of the consent must be determined, i.e. the specific extent of what has 
been consented to. The excerpts illustrate the point that consent to sex work does not 
equal to consent to exploitation. The justificatory scope of consent in such situations 
should have limits placed upon it.805 
                                                 
803 Female co-trafficker, cited in Home Office and Scottish Executive, ‘UK Action Plan on Tackling 
Human Trafficking’ (March 2007) 27. 
804 Explanatory Report to the CoE Trafficking Convention, n 248, 97. 
805 See Part IV, section E, below, where consent to harm and/or exploitation is discussed. 
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 II. The Move toward Inclusion of a ‘Consent’ Element in Human Trafficking 
Definitions 
 
The relevant instrument preceding the Trafficking Protocol, namely the 1949 
Trafficking Convention,806 deemed consent irrelevant through inclusion of the words 
‘even with the consent of that person’. The Convention simply focused upon the 
‘action’ and the ‘purpose’ elements of trafficking as they are understood today; 
although at the time the ‘purpose’ element was limited to prostitution or the 
exploitation of the prostitution of others. Since there was no ‘means’ element, it was 
not necessary to establish lack of consent.  
        The 1949 Convention had followed the pattern set by the 1933 Trafficking 
Convention,807 which states that trafficking of a woman or girl occurs ‘even with her 
consent’, by including no list of specific ‘means’ and thereby providing that traffickers 
could not rely upon consent as a defence to the crime contained in the treaties. 
Prostitution itself was not considered illegal under the 1949 Convention, thus the 
emphasis was taken away from the perceived immorality of prostitution and prostitutes, 
and placed upon punishment of those responsible for the trafficking. This approach 
accepts that, even if there is consent, there is also the simultaneous existence of 
inherently exploitative activity, which needs to be punished accordingly.  
                                                 
806 n 411, above. 
807 n 409, above. 
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        Some more recent definitions of trafficking in persons solely concentrate on 
commercial sex work.808 Others envisage trafficking for a wider ‘purpose’ such as the 
definition offered by the UN General Assembly in 1994, which described trafficking as: 
 
… the illicit and clandestine movement of persons across national and 
international borders, largely from developing countries and some countries 
with economies in transition, with the end goal of forcing women and girl 
children into sexually or economically oppressive and exploitative 
situations, for the profit of recruiters, traffickers and crime syndicates, as 
well as other illegal activities related to trafficking, such as forced domestic 
labour, false marriages, clandestine employment and false adoption.809 
 
The above definition makes no mention of consent. It does explicitly mention force, the 
presence of which would serve to vitiate consent in any case, but the fact that consent is 
not even mentioned means that the problems inherent in requiring lack of consent to be 
shown810 may be less likely to arise. During drafting debates surrounding the 
trafficking Protocol, NGOs offered their own definitions. Many combined an element 
of ‘action’ such as movement or transport, with an element of ‘purpose’ such as 
exploitative labour of some sort. Trafficking has – as we know - now evolved to 
become a strict combination of all three constituents of ‘action’, ‘means’, and 
‘purpose’. 
                                                 
808 See, for example, Article 1(3) of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation  Convention 
on Preventing and Combating Trafficking in Women and Children for Prostitution, which envisages 
trafficking ‘with or without … consent’, n 633, above. 
809 ‘Traffic in women and girls’, UNGA Resolution 49/166 (24 February 1995) U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/49/166. 
810 The problems that come with requiring lack of consent to be proven are discussed in Part VI of this 
Chapter, below. 
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        Whether consent to exploitation of any form should be recognised is an interesting 
point for debate.811 Hernandez-Truyol and Larson state that ‘[t]he presence of consent 
or voluntariness alone is not enough to fend off the dispossession, exploitation, and 
alienation of human bondage: “mere exemption from servitude is a miserable idea of 
freedom”’.812 To allow consent of the transported woman to exclude from trafficking 
the movement of women to conditions of exploitation (in the context of exploitative 
facilitated migration), would create a body of persons who risk serious exploitation, or, 
who have been seriously exploited, yet who fall outside of the scope of the international 
legislation enacted to combat trafficking.  
        Nonetheless, trafficking according to current legal definition consisting of all three 
elements of the process, and ‘trafficking’ (if it can be so called), consisting only of the 
‘action’ and ‘purpose’ elements, are not the same. Although both situations result in 
exploitation and must be legally addressed, it is questionable whether they should be 
deemed identical and therefore capable of being addressed in the same way by the same 
instrument(s), with the same definition. This is particularly so when framed in terms of 
the principle of ‘fair labelling’.813 The concern of this normative principle is, as 
Ashworth states:  
 
… to see that widely felt distinctions between kinds of offences and degrees 
of wrongdoing are respected and signalled by the law, and that offences are 
                                                 
811 See Part IV, section E, below, for discussion of this issue. 
812 Rep. Holman of Indiana, Cong. Globe, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. (2962 1864), speaking in the debate over 
the enactment of the Thirteenth Amendment, Cited in B E Hernandez-Truyol, and J E Larson, n 551, 
424. 
813 Initially identified as ‘representative labelling’ by Ashworth, and re-named ‘fair labelling’ by G 
Williams, n 740. 
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subdivided and labelled so as to represent fairly the nature and magnitude 
of the law-breaking.814 
 
Accordingly, application of this principle would determine that those who facilitate 
migration into an exploitative situation where consent has been given, and those who 
traffick humans, should indeed not be treated in the same way in terms of criminal 
sanction. These two activities signal different degrees of wrongdoing; therefore this 
should be reflected in the legislative response. However, this does not avoid the 
problems inherent in determining the existence of a valid consent in either context, if 
anything, it would make the enquiry more important. 
 
III. The Consent/Coercion ‘Dichotomy’: The Reality of Consent in the Context of 
Human Trafficking 
 
A. The Consent/Coercion ‘Dichotomy’  
         
In a trafficking context, the consent debate is frequently flawed due to the supposition 
that there are only two situations: consent OR coercion/force. It is argued here that the 
reality is a spectrum with one of the two states at either end. Munro states that the 
excessive and inherent ambiguity of consent ‘means that it is simply not useful in the 
delineation of the law itself.’815 Coercion, force, or other ‘means’ elements of the 
trafficking definition are capable of vitiating consent, that is, they can impair the quality 
of consent. In some circumstances they may go so far as to negate consent, that is, to 
                                                 
814 A Ashworth, Principles of Criminal Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 5th ed, 2006) 88 - 90. 
815 V E Munro, n 510, 940. 
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fully invalidate it. These respective terms – vitiate, negate – also sit on a spectrum as to 
what degree they damage the quality of consent.  
        The perceived coercion/consent ‘dichotomy’ assumes a rather clean line between 
cases, which does not necessarily reflect reality. In the 2000 Report, the UN Special 
Rapporteur on Violence against Women states that it is ‘the non-consensual nature of 
trafficking that distinguishes it from other forms of migration’;816 thus, trafficking is 
largely characterised by the lack of consent, whereas smuggling, also addressed by a 
Protocol817 annexed to the UN Organised Crime Convention, is seen as being 
characterised by a more voluntary nature – smuggled persons are considered to have 
‘willingly engaged in a criminal enterprise.’818.  
        Bhabha819 also points out the flawed distinction made by the trafficking definition 
through its presupposition of solely the two states of either consent or coercion. It is 
this distinction and the grey area in between which tempers the trafficking debate. The 
internationally recognised definition of human trafficking already provides us with a 
sliding scale of severity of activity, all of which constitutes trafficking. Initially, we 
have the example of the victim abducted fully against their will. Further along the 
spectrum, we have the situation where consent is given, but some event occurs to 
render the consent irrelevant or invalidated. This could come about where one of the 
‘means’ elements of the current definition of ‘trafficking in persons’ is employed; say, 
                                                 
816 United Nations Economic and Social Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on violence against 
women, its causes and consequences, Ms. Radhika Coomaraswamy, on trafficking in women, women's 
migration and violence against women, submitted in accordance with Commission on Human Rights 
resolution 1997/44,  ‘Integration of the Human Rights of Women and the Gender Perspective: Violence 
against Women’, Commission on Human Rights, Fifty-sixth session, Agenda item 12 (a) of the 
provisional agenda, (2000) E/CN.4/2000/68 
<http://www.unhchr.ch/Huridocda/Huridoca.nsf/0/e29d45a105cd8143802568be0051fcfb?Opendocumen
t> accessed 01 July 2011. 
817 Smuggling Protocol, n 5. 
818 J Bhabha, n 517. 
819 Ibid. 
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the nature of ‘work’820 or conditions agreed to are changed and therefore deception has 
occurred, rendering the victim trafficked (by definition) even though initial consent was 
given. These cases illustrate differences of degree, rather than nature.  
        Finally, at the far end of the spectrum, we have the person who has consented to 
every part of the process (or where objective proof of any coercion is lacking), even 
though they are to be performing exploitative work in perhaps dangerous conditions, 
which may threaten an individual’s human rights or basic rights. The presence of 
ostensible consent illustrates differences of both degree and the nature of the activity. 
This person has not been trafficked. Neither have they been smuggled, at least in a 
moral sense, as the activity goes beyond the ambit of the Smuggling Protocol. What we 
are left with is a body of persons who come within a larger spectrum of ‘facilitated 
exploitative migration’, or ‘facilitated migration for the purpose of exploitation’, which 
although exploitative and potentially illegal in nature, cannot currently be said to be 
human trafficking in a legal sense.  
        In the context of the definitional gap between trafficking and smuggling, these 
persons exist in a legal vacuum. They may have experienced the comparable levels of 
exploitation and abuse of rights as many persons who are deemed to have been 
trafficked. However, the State is unable to obtain prosecution against the migration 
facilitator as a ‘trafficker’, and the exploited migrants are not afforded the ‘victim’ 
status and, therefore, the protection offered to trafficked persons by the State. One 
might ask whether there are likely to be any persons at all who can really be said to 
have truly given their consent, and therefore consideration of this category of persons is 
unnecessary. Yet, in response, one would say that the drafters of the Trafficking 
                                                 
820 For the immediate purposes we will assume that ‘work’ includes that of a sexual nature. Sex work as a 
form of legitimate labour is discussed in Part IV, section B, below. 
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Protocol clearly envisaged the potential to consent in this context, and considered it to 
be relevant as to the determination of the existence of trafficking.  
        As outlined above, older traffick-specific instruments did not deem consent to be 
relevant or probative of human trafficking. Slavery related instruments make it clear 
that one cannot contract oneself into bondage in a slavery context. The Trafficking 
Protocol presents somewhat of an anomaly – the ability to contract oneself into an 
exploitative and potentially harmful situation. The nature and degree of the exploitation 
in question, and relevant factors such as coercion and deception, are clearly relevant to 
determining on which side of a blurred line – or at which point on a spectrum of 
coercion and consent - the activity in question will fall.  
 
B. The ‘Spectrum’ of Consent/Coercion: The Reality of Consent in the Context of 
Human Trafficking 
 
As the above discussion indicates, the ‘dichotomy’ or consent/coercion is rejected here. 
It is submitted instead that these inherently malleable concepts sit at opposite ends of a 
spectrum. Along this spectrum and between these concepts there are varying shades of 
grey as to what constitutes valid consent, or coercion sufficient to render consent 
ineffective or invalidated in any given situation. 
        Drew asserts that in the case of smuggling, the human being is the consumer, 
whereas in the case of trafficking, the human being is the commodity.821 Yet, the 
division between trafficking and smuggling is not clear cut. One can give polarised 
such as the kidnapped victim juxtaposed against the willing migrant sex worker. These 
                                                 
821 S Drew ‘Human Trafficking: A Modern Form of Slavery?’ (2002) European Human Rights Law 
Review, 4, 481 – 492, 484. 
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examples may represent how one perceives ‘pure’822 cases of smuggling or trafficking, 
but in reality cases are rarely this simple.  
        The concepts of consent and coercion are particularly problematic when 
considered within a coercive environment, as indicated by research conducted into 
prison rape.823 Where there is the potential that individuals enjoy limited autonomy, 
such as in a potentially exploitative sex work environment, the appearance of valid 
consent can obscure the reality of coerced consent. The power imbalance which can 
occur in such relationships i.e. prison sex/rape and trafficking/smuggling for sexual 
exploitation further problematises determinations of valid consent. This hierarchical 
relationship of exploiter and exploited further means that a valid consent can become a 
coerced consent, yet to an objective observer, there has been little or no change to the 
relationship.  
        Consequently the potential for, and effects of, exploitation and abuse may be 
exacerbated. In such a coercive environment there may be little need for overtly and 
obviously coercive acts, and there is the further issue that the exploited individual may 
not view herself as coerced or trafficked. Human Rights Watch state that:  
 
… in instances where the victim makes little apparent effort to escape the 
abuse, both prisoners and prison authorities often fall into the trap of 
viewing non-consensual [sic] sexual activity as consensual, ignoring the 
larger context in which the activity takes place.824  
 
Similarly, the apparently willing smuggled prostitute may in fact be labouring under 
coercion – thereby rendering her formally ‘trafficked’ - but this may not be apparent. 
                                                 
822 J Bhabha, n 527. 
823 See Human Rights Watch, n 327. 
824 Ibid, particularly the section entitled ‘Consent and coercion in prison’.  
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Valid consent requires the power to refuse – it may not be clear where this is lacking. 
Unwanted can still equate to unforced, but this does not amount to a valid consent. 
        In realistic terms, we might ask what degree of coercion or deception (and about 
what issues) is necessary in order to establish that a woman has been trafficked.825 Let 
us assume that one can consent to sex work, even in exploitative conditions where 
pimps or traffickers take their inflated cut of the earnings. In this situation, if the 
usually willing sex worker is persuaded to service one more client that she wants to on 
a particular day, does that mean she has been coerced significantly for her to have been 
trafficked? Even if it were concluded that she had been coerced, whether or not the 
coercion is sufficient to invalidate consent is a further issue. If, for example, on arrival 
in the agreed destination State the rate of remuneration is lower than that which was 
agreed but the victim cannot logistically withdraw consent and get herself back home, 
engaging in sex work may give the appearance of consent to the nature and degree of 
exploitation. The appearance of consent can obscure the coercive reality.  
        The consent/‘means’ aspect of the trafficking definition leaves the question 
unanswered as to how severe the interference with consent has to be – we have no 
specific pinpoint on the spectrum. This allows for States to interpret and implement the 
anti-trafficking regime differently. This will potentially allow for significant difference 
in terms of the identification and treatment of putative victims in destination States. If 
the terms are to be interpreted inclusively, the putative victim benefits, and the pool of 
recognised victims is wider. If the terms are to be interpreted exclusively and 
stringently, then the reach of the anti-trafficking regime is more limited. 
        Where an individual agrees to be smuggled for exploitation, there is prima facie a 
valid consent. Where the conditions of exploitation agreed to are changed, i.e. where 
                                                 
825 See the discussion in this Chapter of ‘informed consent’ in a trafficking context, Part I, section B, 
above. 
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there was deception as to some conditions of the ‘work’ such as hours or rate of pay, 
then this vitiates the initial consent. Yet, it is questionable as to whether destination 
States would view this individual as trafficked, since she had consented to the transport 
and to the exploitation, but in different terms to those which she eventually 
experienced. Prima facie, this is trafficking, yet the willingness of States to recognise 
trafficking in such a situation where the initial giving of consent has played such an 
important part in the process, is uncertain, if anything, it is doubtful that they would.826 
The consent is damaged, but is the damage sufficient to fully negate the consent, 
therefore rendering the individual a trafficked victim who has the entitlement to rights 
and protections provided by the anti-trafficking regime?827  
        The difference here is less one of nature and more of quality or degree. The 
agreement as regards the latter, deceived, individual was always to undertake sex work, 
therefore the nature remains the same. The quality and degree of the exploitation, 
however, is changed – deception as to the rate of pay, for example, would alter the 
quality of the acts consented to. This should be sufficient to vitiate consent.828 The 
theory and application may vary depending upon the context, as States’ legitimate 
interests in border protection may colour the perception of consent with respect to some 
putative trafficking victims. 
        Clearly, then, the quality of the act consented to is relevant, as UK domestic cases 
such as Tabassum829 have indicated. Similarly, the nature and degree of the harm 
                                                 
826 On this point, see specifically See The Anti Trafficking Monitoring Group, n 306, 12, where the point 
is made that those who agreed to come to the UK to engage in work yet were subjected to abuse and/or 
deception  have all too often been identified as ‘not trafficked’, even though the trafficking definition 
would intend for such persons to be formally identified as ‘trafficked’. 
827 The bespoke rights and protections available to formally trafficked victims are discussed in Chapter 4, 
Part IV et seq. 
828 See, for example, R v Tabassum (Naveed) [2000] 2 Cr App R 238. 
829 R v Tabassum (Naveed) [2000] 2 Cr App R 238. 
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caused is relevant to consent – as domestic cases such as Brown830 have shown us. 
Brown is a clear illustration of the importance of public policy in the making of 
decisions regarding the potential for consent to operate as a defence. The transnational 
criminal regime831 applicable to human trafficking does not allow exploitation where 
consent to it has been obtained by significant deception, coercion etc. It does, however, 
allow exploitation where there is no apparent or significant deception or coercion, and, 
therefore there is deemed to be a valid consent.  
        The nature and degree of harm caused in situations of consensual and non-
consensual trafficking varies sufficiently for the situations to receive different 
treatment. It is unfortunate, however, that the treatment of consensually exploited 
persons is left to be addressed wholly by domestic law. In, for example, a medical law 
context, the consent of a patient renders lawful the touching etc. that takes place in 
medical procedures. Consent in a trafficking context does not negate the wrong, 
morally or legally – exploitation cannot be justified. In a legal sense, the migration 
facilitator is still in breach of legislation relating to the facilitation of the illicit border-
crossing of humans,832 and accepted domestic labour standards,833 although the 
position as regards the latter depends, in terms of sex work, upon how prostitution is 
dealt with by the legislative framework of the destination State.834 
                                                
        As a matter of public policy, the transnational criminal regime applicable to 
trafficking and smuggling should go further and provide for criminalisation of would-
be traffickers who fall into the grey area between trafficking and smuggling, as the 
extent of the harm caused should be the concern of the criminal law. What this means 
 
830 R v Brown [1993] 2 WLR 556, [1993] 2 ALL ER 75, Laskey, Jaggard, and Brown v. The United 
Kingdom [1997] Case No. 109/1995/615/703-705. 
831 As identified in Chapter 1, Part II, section A. 
832 I.e. smuggling offences, see, n 235. 
833 As regards, say, the provision of a minimum wage, or other conditions of the ‘work’ undertaken. 
834 See Part IV, section B, of this Chapter for discussion of sex work as a legitimate form of labour. 
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for the ‘victim’ who has been ‘less than trafficked but more than smuggled’ (at least in 
a moral sense) is another matter, and will be discussed later.835 As a protective measure 
or a matter of public policy, then, the law may be framed so as not to recognise the 
giving of consent in certain situations, at least to the extent that the justificatory scope 
of consent is limited. The capability of humans to give consent in the context of human 
trafficking will now be considered, in terms of opposing views which support either a 
‘Paternalist’ or ‘Autonomy’ approach. 
 
IV. Consent to Trafficking, Exploitation and Sexual Labour: Autonomy v 
Paternalism 
 
Discourse regarding the trafficking of adults can lead to the making of a distinction 
between sex work and other forms of ‘exploitation’ under the trafficking definition. The 
discussion hinges largely on whether a person should be deemed capable of consenting 
to prostitution, or sexually exploitative work – i.e. should such a consent be legally 
recognised. It follows from this that – as will be discussed below - some see sex work 
as inherently exploitative, yet this is resisted here as a comprehensive proposition.836 
Politically and socially, it is easier to accept that there has been consent to other forms 
of exploitative work which might otherwise be undertaken in acceptable conditions 
than it is to sex work, which has always carried with it implications of exploitation and 
immorality (and often illegality). Balos contends that one form markets strength, the 
other markets intimacy.837 Sixteen hour days spent working in a field or factory, and 
                                                 
835 See Part V, sections C and D, and Part VI, sections B and C of this Chapter, for discussion of what the 
consequences of consent are for the ‘consensually trafficked’ person, and also see Chapter 4, Part IX, 
section B for suggestions as to how this category of persons should be dealt with in the destination State. 
836 See, Part IV, section D, below, for further discussion of this issue. 
837 B Balos, n 14, 151 – 2. 
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sixteen hour days spent servicing man after man in a brothel, each for exploitatively 
low wages, may be perceived and reacted to in very different ways.  
        This is largely why the trafficking and smuggling related debate is frequently of a 
gendered nature – men are smuggled, women are trafficked. The common perception is 
that men consent to facilitated migration, or smuggling, in order to look for work on 
arrival in the host state. Trafficking, on the other hand, is perceived as largely affecting 
females and as being for the purposes of commercial sex work. It is, for some, difficult 
to accept that any woman would consent to being trafficked for these purposes. This 
gendered slant does not represent the full picture.   
 
A. Autonomy v Paternalism 
 
In terms of sex work, discourse has historically made a distinction between those who 
are pure and innocent, and those who are immoral i.e. prostitutes.  Two polarised 
camps, the arguments of which are outlined in detail by various commentators,838 fuel 
the debate as to whether anyone should be considered capable of consenting to sex 
work, or whether consent to sex work should be recognised (legally). One position is 
the ‘Autonomy/Empowerment’ view, and the other is the ‘Paternalist/Protectionist’ 
view.839 These views are generally put forward by women, and should be seen in the 
context of the wider debate about the relationship between women and the law.840  
                                                 
838 See for example, K Abramson, n 14, and J Chaung ‘Redirecting the Debate over Trafficking in 
Women; Definitions, Paradigms and Contexts’ (1998) 11 Harvard Human Rights Journal 65. 
839 See K Abramson, n 14, 473. 
840 See, for example, C MacKinnon, Feminism Unmodified: Discourses on Life and Law (Harvard 1987), 
C MacKinnon, Toward a Feminist Theory of the State (Harvard 1991), C MacKinnon, Sex Equality: 
Family Law (Foundation Press 2001), C A MacKinnon, ‘Prostitution and Civil Rights’, (1993) 1 
Michigan Journal of Gender and the Law, 13, K Mahoney, ‘Theoretical Perspectives on Women’s Rights 
and Strategies for their Implementation’, (1996) Brooklyn Journal of International Law 21(3): 799-856 
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        The former is based in liberal theory, and maintains that individuals have the 
capacity and right to consent to prostitution-related activity. It allows for free will and 
expression of sexual self-determination,841 and is an example of people, women in 
particular, seeing a market with the potential for economic gain, and making the most 
of that opportunity. Essentially, this view says that the choice to partake in commercial 
sex work is a rational economic choice made by a woman who is simply cashing in on 
her sexuality by taking advantage of a pre-existing market. After all, prostitution is 
referred to as the oldest profession, and this market will never be short of consumers. 
The world has its share of ‘happy hookers’, and the extreme view of a minority would 
go so far as to hold that ‘[o]utside of sex trafficking, it seems to me that it’s the women 
exploiting the men.’842 Although the reality of such a view may be restricted to a small 
number of sex workers, anecdotal examples - such as Belle de Jour843 - do exist. 
        The Paternalist/Protectionist view on the other hand focuses largely on anti-
prostitution debate, and argues that, since the sex trade is based on male dominance and 
the commodification of women, prostitution is inherently exploitative and any consent 
by women is irrelevant to its condemnation, including in trafficking law. If prostitution 
were such a rewarding job and the product of free choice, why, it is asked, is it most 
often the women with the fewest meaningful or desirable choices who are most often 
the ones found doing it,844 and why do traffickers have to ‘deceive, coerce and enslave 
women to get them into and keep them in the sex industry.’845  
                                                 
841 J Chaung, n 838, 86. 
842 Godfrey Bloom, UKIP MEP, BBC News, ‘UK ‘should outlaw paying for sex’ (20 December 2007) 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/7153358.stm> accessed 20 Dec 2007. 
843 A pseudonym used by a high profile call girl who has published several books about her experiences, 
including Belle de Jour, The Intimate Adventures of a London Call Girl (Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2005). 
844 C A MacKinnon, ‘Prostitution and Civil Rights’, (1993) 1 Michigan Journal of Gender and the Law, 
13, 28. 
845 D M Hughes, n 164, 632. 
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        Opposing groups of feminist lobbying targeted the preparation of the UN 
Trafficking Protocol, each advocating either an Autonomy or Paternalist stance. This 
input came predominantly from the Human Rights Caucus (the Caucus),846 and the 
Coalition Against Trafficking in Women (CATW).847 The former were of the view that 
prostitution is a legitimate form of labour, in which women are capable of consenting to 
participate. CATW were strongly opposed to this view, advocating that prostitution is 
inherently exploitative and a violation of women’s rights in all circumstances. CATW’s 
position was effectively that consent be deemed irrelevant, and that trafficking should 
solely be comprised of ‘action’ and ‘purpose’ elements and cover all forms of 
‘recruitment, transportation…’ etc. for prostitution. This echoes the all-encompassing 
sentiments of the 1926 Slavery Convention, which envisaged the subject being brought 
into the slave trade ‘by any means’,848 and goes hand-in-hand with the idea that one 
cannot contract oneself into bondage. The Caucus, in keeping with their view of 
prostitution as a form of labour, felt that prostitution should be placed in the same 
category as all forms of labour, and that it was therefore necessary to include an explicit 
‘means’ element. The aim of the Trafficking Protocol was to be an anti-human 
trafficking document, not an anti-prostitution document aimed solely at women.   
        The Autonomy view represents a more modern take, and piggy-backs on 
arguments promoting equality, in turn implying and accepting that those involved are 
exercising choice. It is necessary to make a distinction between ‘free’ choice and 
‘necessary’ choice. The former may be enjoyed by those individuals who are less 
                                                 
846 Human Rights Caucus 1999: Members of the Human Rights Caucus: International Human Rights 
Law Group, Foundation Against Trafficking in Women, Global Alliance Against Traffic in Women, 
Asian Women’s Human Rights Council, La Strada, Ban-Ying, Fundacion Esperanza, Foundation for 
Women, KOK-NGO Network Against Trafficking in Women, Women’s Consortium of Nigeria, 
Women, Law & Development in Africa (Nigeria). 
847 Coalition Against Trafficking in Women 1999 (CATW) 
<http://www.catwinternational.org/index.php?srccd=g206&gclid=CPLDivvD16ACFSU8lAodM0r9Fg> 
accessed 01 July 2011. 
848 Article1(2), 1926 Slavery Convention, n 404. 
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constrained by social and economic factors. Those with more constraints upon their 
ability to freely choose are more likely to make their decisions out of necessity, for 
example, those suffering severe economic impoverishment, or opting for sex work in 
order to fund drug addiction. Criticism of this view raises the frequently asked 
question; can there be such a thing as a ‘willing prostitute’? The fact is that there exist 
bodies of sex workers who argue that partaking in sex work is their free and un-coerced 
choice,849 and the views of such persons should not be disregarded. 
        It is argued by some that legalised prostitution blurs the line between what is 
coerced and what is voluntary, so that traffickers can claim that the woman had full 
prior knowledge of the nature and conditions of her ‘work’.850 In the most extreme 
sense, the Autonomy view focuses on consenting to sex work and, therefore, to 
potentially exploitative activity as a career move from economic motives. Further, the 
Autonomy view accepts it as given that the consumers - chiefly male – will always 
have the need for prostitutes. Acceptance of this stems from and perpetuates the gender 
imbalance that underpins the sex trade. This idea of capitalising on sexuality may 
represent part of a skewed ethos that women can gain control of this market. The liberal 
model of autonomy presumes the giving of consent in a ‘free and unfettered’ way.851 
Munro states that critics consider that the rhetoric of liberalism has played a role ‘in 
both disguising the complex realities of consent and obscuring the extent to which 
human agency is curtailed to comply with this artificial framework.’852 What is 
required is ‘a more realistic account of the constructed operation of choice in specific 
human situations.’853 
                                                 
849 Such as the English Collective of Prostitutes - see <http://www.prostitutescollective.net/> accessed 01 
July 2011. 
850 D M Hughes, n 164, 633. 
851 V E Munro, n 510, 925. 
852 Ibid, 929. 
853 Ibid. 
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        On the other hand, the Paternalist/Protectionist view also invites criticism, as it 
victimises women and deems them to be weaker, sexually passive, and in need of 
paternalistic protection. Indeed, it can be argued that ‘paternalistic ethics impinge on 
individual self-determination (limiting the significance of consent)’.854 Commentators 
such as Mackinnon855 ‘draw… attention to the constraints and cultural pressures that 
operate on women’s ability to make sexual choices.’856 MacKinnon has produced some 
heavily paternalistic commentary.857 She insists that the notion of consent is 
inadequate, because it ignores the reality that all men and women are not on an equal 
footing when engaging in sexual encounters or negotiations.858 Furthermore, that 
‘women exist as oppressed victims of male power, tokens of heterosexual interest, 
acquiescence, or even initiative, may be as much a mechanism for survival as an 
expression of legitimate choice.’859  
                                                
        Conversely, Munro observes that: 
 
 ... while Mackinnon’s claims are perhaps to be commended … her failure 
to discriminate between the different kinds of pressure and her refusal to 
engage with the role that (some) women play in perpetuating – or, indeed, 
resisting – these pressures is theoretically limiting and strategically 
damaging.860  
 
 
854 D Beyleveld, and R Brownsword, n 321, 27. 
855 See for example C MacKinnon, Sex Equality: Family Law (Foundation Press 2001), C MacKinnon, 
Feminism Unmodified: Discourses on Life and Law (Harvard 1987), C MacKinnon, Toward A Feminist 
Theory of the State (Harvard 1991); C A MacKinnon, ‘Prostitution and Civil Rights’, (1993) 1 Michigan 
Journal of Gender and the Law. 
856 V E Munro, n 510, 939. 
857 n 855, above. 
858 C MacKinnon, Feminism Unmodified: Discourses on Life and Law (Harvard 1987) 100. 
859 V E Munro, n 510, 938. 
860 Ibid, 939. 
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        The Paternalist stance removes the element of choice advocated by the Autonomy 
view; that women are simply taking advantage of an opportunity for economic gain. 
Yet, a quasi-paternalist stance in the context of consensual migration for the purpose of 
exploitation, particularly where the latter takes place in a coercive environment, may be 
preferable in that it can pave the way for a better standard of protection for those who 
may be coerced. Full autonomy is the luxury of the free and un-coerced agent who 
exercises choice in an ideal setting. 
        Consent to exploitation – particularly as a result of severe economic need – may 
be less a reflection of the exercise of genuine autonomy, and more of a necessary 
submission. This is based upon an abstract conception of free agency which does not fit 
comfortably in all situations. Conceding to sex work as a mechanism for survival does 
not necessarily equate to an acceptable standard of autonomous agency, at least 
morally. Yet, the desire here is not to belittle the choices of the autonomous migrant sex 
worker. Consent to sex work – even exploitative sex work861 - is recognised as valid in 
an un-coerced setting, and should not be attributed to ‘false consciousness’ – as 
Stephen Schulhofer recognises, ‘[w]e cannot simply dismiss as ‘false consciousness’ 
the perceptions of women themselves.’862  
        Hernandez-Truyol and Larson state that ‘[l]abor measures the legitimacy of work 
not by the presence of contract or worker consent, but rather by substantive ethical and 
moral standards of what conditions of work accord with the dignity, health, and liberty 
of the worker.’863 Who are we to tell the voluntary sex worker that her choice of work 
means that she lacks dignity? The right to work includes the right to work in hard 
                                                 
861 A definition of ‘exploitation’ in this context is offered at a later point in this Chapter – See Part VI, 
section B, below. 
862 S Schulhofer, Unwanted Sex: The Culture of Intimidation and the Failure of Law, (Harvard 1998) 56. 
863 B E Hernandez-Truyol, and J E Larson, n 551, 395. 
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conditions. Nonetheless, it may be that a case can be made for the consideration ‘in 
context’ of the validity of certain choices and consents. 
        A central problem with both views (i.e. Autonomy v Paternalism) is that they do 
not see the sex trade as a whole; they appear to have been conceived solely with adult 
women in mind. A fully paternalistic approach is taken with regard to children, who are 
deemed incapable of making such a choice. Early trafficking instruments solely dealt 
with women being trafficked for the sex trade, and early slavery-specific instruments 
appear to have mainly envisaged a male subject.864 Now that trafficking definitions 
have extended to include other forms of exploitation, the subjects are both male and 
female. It is questionable as to whether either the Paternalist view or the Autonomy 
view would extend to male sex workers. Indeed, advocates of each view have thus far 
limited their application to women. 
        These views are polarised at opposite ends of a spectrum, which envisages 
informed consent in an ideal setting, or purely coerced sex work in an exploitative 
setting. Prostitution does not always occur in coercive conditions, neither is it always 
the product of choice.865 Either way, criminalising prostitution is not so much about 
protecting women or removing their ability to make choices; in reality, it has the effect 
of criminalising women who are sex workers, a proportion of whom will have become 
so due to a lack of other meaningful choices. Lim recognises that some sex workers:  
 
… freely choose sex work as an expression of sexual liberation, or as an 
economically rational decision based on income potentials, costs involved 
and available alternatives. Others are pressured by poverty and dire 
                                                 
864 See, for example, League of Nations 6.B.4 Temporary Slavery Commission: Minutes of the first (and 
Second) Session(s), Geneva, 1924-5. 
865 See L L Lim, ‘Whither the sex sector? Some policy considerations’ in L L Lim, The Sex Sector: The 
Economic and Social Bases of Prostitution in Southeast Asia, (International Labour Office 1998), 212. 
The ILO concludes that although prostitution may frequently be coercive, it can also be freely chosen.  
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economic circumstances. Still others are subject to overt coercion from 
third parties, in the form of deception and/or physical violence or threats.866  
 
Although one may accept that, in many cases, prostitution may either be a product of 
force, coercion, severe economic need or of the absence of other preferable choices, it 
must also be accepted that it is still a potentially viable economic choice. This is the 
case as long as there are sex workers who are proponents of this view. In the 2006 
Report, the Special Rapporteur stated that ‘One of the many benefits of the 
(Trafficking) Protocol definition is that it provides a foundation upon which anti-
trafficking discussion, research, and policy development may transcend the general 
debate about the rights and wrongs of prostitution to a significant extent.’867 Clearly, 
exploitation is wrong – this is something about which all may agree. Prostitution per se 
presents a more difficult exercise in terms of searching for a uniform approach. 
 
B. Sex Work as a Legitimate Form of ‘Labour’ 
 
Reconciliation of the two polarised views (Autonomy v Paternalism) is nigh on 
impossible. Hernandez-Truyol and Larson868 propose that prostitution should be 
studied under a labour paradigm i.e. as an exercise of the right to work, even though it 
might contain elements of servitude. Abramson reaches a similar conclusion, stating 
that ‘emphasis on the right to consent to a generic livelihood divorced from a sexual 
context may carry the day in winning support for the autonomy camp.’869 Similarly, the 
                                                 
866 Ibid. 
867 Report on the Special Rapporteur on trafficking in persons, especially women and children, Sigma 
Huda, Addendum, Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina, ‘Integration of the Rights of Women and the 
Gender Perspective’ (30 November 2005) UN Doc E/CN.4/2006/62/Add.2. 
868 B E Hernandez-Truyol, and J E Larson, n 551, 391. 
869 K Abramson, n 14, 491. 
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UN Special Rapporteur on violence against women, in the 2000 Report870 offered a 
definition of trafficking which omitted inclusion of a separate reference to sex work – 
the terminology ‘forced labour or slavery like practices’ was intended to be inclusive of 
sex work.  
        Viewing prostitution through a labour lens allows us to overcome the stalemate 
reached by the ‘Autonomy v Paternalism’ debate, and to address trafficking for the 
purpose of exploitation as a whole. Issues of autonomy, morality, sinners and saints 
have long stood in the way of progress on this particular point. The same factors, such 
as economic hardship, can lead people to ‘choose’ any form of exploitative labour, 
sexual or otherwise. Treating sex work in this way (i.e. as a form of labour) may have 
the additional advantage of ridding consideration of it and the women who engage in it 
from a moralistic perspective, which can only obscure the genuineness of the consent to 
participate of some of them and the very real exploitation of others. 
        Prostitution and trafficking-related discourse can frequently – and mistakenly - 
equate prostitution with trafficking, which is an inherently misguided approach. 
Outshoorn asks ‘[i]s all “trafficking” forced or is it prostitution-related migration?’871 
thereby highlighting the consent/coercion spectrum of migration-related sex work. 
Early anti-trafficking Conventions872 made the prohibited conduct trafficking for 
prostitution, and a link between the two has endured and has led to the two practices 
being all too often seen as indistinguishable. There can be a blurred line as to when 
prostitution-related migration becomes trafficking. Conflating those who are controlled 
                                                 
870 Report of the Special Rapporteur on violence against women, its causes and consequences, Ms. 
Radhika Coomaraswamy, on trafficking in women, women's migration and violence against women, 
submitted in accordance with Commission on Human Rights resolution 1997/44, ‘Integration of the 
Human Rights of Women and the Gender Perspective: Violence against Women’ (28 February 2000) UN 
Doc E/CN.4/2000/68. 
871 J Outshoorn, n 43, 142. 
872 See Chapter 2, Part I in particular, although early trafficking-specific Conventions are discussed at 
various points throughout that Chapter. 
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and seriously exploited with those who have arguably exercised their right to work 
creates a barrier to making progress in terms of the fight against sexual exploitation. In 
keeping with this line of argument, Phoenix states the following: 
 
Take, for instance, the recent identification of the links between global 
migration and prostitution. Recognition of the mass movement of people 
(usually women) from around the globe into the sex industry in more 
affluent Western societies has conditioned the almost complete collapse of 
any discursive boundary between human trafficking and prostitution. In 
responding to the international call to do something about human 
trafficking and the misery, exploitation and human tragedies which 
trafficking often involves, and in an endeavour to stop illegal migration, 
governments around the world have focused their attention on 
prostitution.873 (Emphasis added) 
 
Although it cannot be disputed that the two are sometimes linked, ‘Prostitution’ should 
not be used as a euphemism for ‘human trafficking.’ Prostitution per se and trafficking 
for the purpose of prostitution are fundamentally different things - prostitution can be a 
‘purpose’ element of human trafficking, it can also be a result of prostitution-related 
migration,874 or a wholly separate issue in its own right i.e. concerning domestic sex 
workers – coerced or fully consensual. 
        This leads us more specifically on to consideration of whether sex work is to be 
viewed as a legitimate form of labour. It is undisputed that ‘[t]he legal status of 
prostitution is an unsettled issue in nations throughout the world, particularly those of 
                                                 
873 Jo Phoenix, ‘Frameworks of understanding’, in Jo Phoenix (Ed) Regulating Sex for Sale: Prostitution 
policy reform in the UK, (The Policy Press 2009) 7. 
874 J Outshoorn, n 43, 142. 
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the west.’875 For example, prostitution in Sweden is viewed as a form of violence 
against women in all situations, and this is reflected in the legislative framework, which 
criminalises the purchaser of sexual services in all situations.876 Clearly, there is a lack 
of uniformity as to how sex work is viewed in different countries. Sex work is not 
‘legitimate’ in the UK in the sense that it is not legalised and regulated, in contrast to 
the system adopted in the Netherlands, which has a fully regulated and legitimised sex 
sector and has clearly identified sex work as ‘labour’, like any other form of work. In 
the UK context then - and those of other countries where a system operates other than 
one of a regulated sex trade, there remains the philosophical and political question of 
whether sex work is ‘legitimate’ labour.  
        What, then, is ‘labour’, and can sex work be viewed through this paradigm? In the 
most basic sense, labour – specifically wage labour – is the exchange of services for 
remuneration. One’s ordinary understanding of the meaning of the word ‘prostitution’ 
might be ‘the exchange of sex or sexual services for money or other material 
benefits’.877 According to Section 51(2) of the Sexual Offences Act 2003, a ‘prostitute’ 
is: 
 
… a person (A) who, on at least one occasion and whether or not compelled 
to do so, offers or provides sexual services to another person in return for 
payment or a promise of payment to A or a third person; and “prostitution” 
is to be interpreted accordingly.878 
 
                                                 
875 B E Hernandez-Truyol, and J E Larson, n 551, 396. 
876 Law (1998:408) Prohibition of the Purchase of Sexual Services; Lag ou förbund mot köp av sexuella 
tjänster (1998): Dem som mot ersattning skaffar sig en tillfällig sexuell förbindelse, doms – om inte 
gärningen är belagd med straff enligt Brottsbalken – för köp av sexuella tjänster till böter eller fängelse i 
högst sex månader. För försök döms till ansvar enligt 23 kap. Brottsbalken. 
877 J Outshoorn, n 43, 141.   
878 SOA 2003, s 51(2). 
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This definition indicates that it is possible to prostitute one’s self and also to be 
prostituted by another, illustrating the potentially coercive and exploitative nature of 
prostitution in some circumstances. However, prostitution is neither always the result of 
either free will, or coercion or force. These are two opposite points on a spectrum, 
along which all prostitution-related activities may be placed, including prostitution as a 
‘purpose’ element of human trafficking. ‘Sexual labour’ may also extend beyond 
prostitution – for example, ‘[s]ome sex trafficking victims are forced into the following 
situations: forced prostitution, pornography, stripping/exotic dancing, mail order brides, 
and massage parlors.’879 These forms of ‘labour’ may also – and indeed in some 
situations are – undertaken or engaged in, in a fully voluntary and unforced manner. 
        In contrast to forced or coerced prostitution, prostitution itself is, as stated by 
Bakrici ‘when a woman sells her body as a commodity and pockets the income. 
Prostitutes are not slaves and are not controlled by the traffickers.’880 Clearly this 
represents the ideal scenario of fully consensual and un-coerced prostitution. The 
presence of exploitation – actual or intended – does little to render prostitution less of 
an activity capable of being viewed as a legitimate form of labour. The quintessential 
smuggled or trafficked potato picker, for example, may work consensually and in 
acceptable labour conditions; consensually in exploitative conditions; or involuntarily 
as a result of coercion etc – as, indeed, may the sex worker. It is, however, potentially 
necessary (and not entirely unprincipled) to consider that the sex worker may be a more 
vulnerable person than the potato picker. Sex workers are predominantly female, and 
anti-trafficking instruments are increasingly making reference to gender as a 
consideration to be taken in account when considering any/all aspects of the fight 
                                                 
879 K Bakirci, ‘Human trafficking and forced labour: a criticism of the International Labour Organisation’ 
(2009) Journal of Financial Crime 160 – 165, 164. 
880 Ibid. 
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against trafficking.881 This added vulnerability of the sex worker is not solely based 
upon gender, however – the nature of the ‘work’ may raise other issues.882 
        Eckberg states that ‘prostitution has been normalized by neoliberals as a form of 
sexual entertainment, with equal players exchanging services for money. “Working” as 
a “sex worker” is seen as a legitimate career path for women’.883 Although such a 
realisation may not sit well with all who comment on sex work, the reality is that 
alluded to in the previous section of this thesis, i.e. that ultimately for some individuals, 
prostitution is a viable choice in terms of ‘economic survivalism’:884 a job, a 
profession, a way of making money – preferable to some other forms of ‘legitimate’ 
employment.885 Outshoorn recognises that: 
 
It should be noted that not all those adhering to the sex work position set 
prostitution within the same feminist framework. Some are radical liberals 
who celebrate sexual variety and free choice … whereas others, while 
analyzing prostitution as (sexual) service work, maintain a feminist critique 
by contextualizing prostitution within unequal relations of sexual economic 
exchange…886 
 
                                                 
881 Notably the Trafficking Protocol refers in its title to ‘especially women and children’ and the EU 2011 
Directive refers in the preamble to the ‘gender-specific phenomenon of trafficking’ at para 3. This is not 
to disregard the potential vulnerability of male sex workers or sex traffick victims – it is accepted here 
that these men may be similarly vulnerable when compared to their female counterparts. Yet, the 
references to gender in the 2011 Directive indicate that female victims may be seen as particularly 
vulnerable. 
882 See Part IV, section C, below, where it is recognised that different typed of ‘work’ may be subject to 
different types of regulation and safety standards, for example. 
883 G Ekberg, ‘The Swedish Law that Prohibits the Purchase of Sexual Services: Best Practices for 
Prevention of Prostitution and Trafficking in Human Beings’, Violence against Women (October 2004) 
Vol. 10 No. 10, 1187 – 1218, 1187 – 8. 
884 Jo Phoenix, n 873, 3. 
885 This is certainly not to suggest that the majority of prostitutes feel this way, but that a proportion does. 
Anecdotal examples of willing prostitutes, such as Belle de Jour and Xaviera Hollander, do exist and 
should not be disregarded. 
886 J Outshoorn, n 43, 146. 
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        Hernandez-Truyol and Larson refer to the ‘current human rights debate that 
dichotomises prostitution as either a modern form of slavery or as the exercise of the 
right to work.’887 This encapsulates perfectly the problem with prostitution related 
discourse – it is not simply a case of one or the other. The authors engage in a labour 
analysis of prostitution, in order to deconstruct the practice and its component parts.888 
It is nonsensical to see prostitution as EITHER bondage OR work. The authors refer to 
prostitution as ‘sexual labour’ and recognise that like all forms of labour, it can be 
exploited.889 This is key to the argument made in this thesis, as it demonstrates 
recognition of the delineation between prostitution, exploitative prostitution (which 
may be un-coerced), and coerced/forced prostitution (which will always be 
exploitative). 
        Over the past decade, the ILO's Committee of Experts on the Application of 
Conventions and Recommendations has made various comments regarding human 
trafficking (of persons of all ages and genders) for the purposes of labour exploitation, 
such as that performed in factories, construction, or the sex and entertainment 
industry.890 ‘Forced labour as a result of organised criminal trafficking can be found in 
the sex industry all over the world.’891 (Emphasis added). It follows from this that work 
or services provided within in the sex industry, or ‘sexual labour’ services, are therefore 
capable of being viewed as a form of forced labour.  
        Bakirci states that:  
 
According to the ILO (2005) supervisory bodies: A woman forced into 
prostitution is in a forced labour situation because of the involuntary nature 
                                                 
887 B E Hernandez-Truyol, and J E Larson, n 551, 391. 
888 Ibid. 
889 B E Hernandez-Truyol, and J E Larson, n 551, 393. 
890 B Andrees, n 563, 17. 
891 Ibid, 16. 
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of the work and the menace under which she is working, irrespective of the 
legality or illegality of that particular activity.892  
 
It follows from this that sexual labour can be forced, it can also be unforced, in the 
same way that any form of labour can. That sex work might be seen as legitimate 
‘work’ or ‘labour’ is clearly not a novel idea, albeit a contentious one that not all may 
agree with. 
        The ECJ ruled in a fairly recent case that ‘sex work’ such as prostitution is a 
protected economic activity.893 The finding of the Court was that ‘[t]he activity of 
prostitution pursued in a self employed capacity can be regarded as a service provided 
for remuneration.’894 The Court went on to state that the economic activity must be 
‘outside any relationship of subordination … under (the sex worker’s) own 
responsibility; and in return for remuneration paid to that person directly and in full.’895 
It was concluded that in each case it is for the national court to determine whether those 
conditions were satisfied, in the light of the evidence before it.896 Granted, this case 
concerned the Netherlands sex sector which is State legitimised and regulated, yet it is 
significant in terms of the potential for the ‘sex work as labour’ debate. 
        Hernandez-Truyol and Larson propose that: 
 
... even where prostitution is chosen by an adult woman as a form of work, 
it may be an intolerably exploitative form of labour analogous to 
                                                 
892 K Bakirci, n 879, 163. 
893 Aldona Malgorzata Jany v Staatssecretaris van Justite (Case C-268/99) [2001] ECR I-8615 
(regarding the refusal of the Netherlands Secretary of State for Justice to grant residence permits for 
Polish and Czech nationals to engage in self-employed sex work) 
894Ibid, para 4. 
895 Ibid, para 5. 
896Ibid. 
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sweatshop, child, or bonded labour, and subject to the same legal and 
political pressures for extinction or transformation.897 
 
Elimination - of prostitution per se - is unlikely; it has always been around and always 
will be. Extinction of exploitative prostitution, i.e. where the conditions or rate of pay 
are exploitative, even in the face of consent, is without doubt desirable. The creation of 
the harms should be tackled,898 as opposed to the simple sale and purchase of sexual 
services.  
 
C. Consequences of Sex Work as Labour – Access to Labour Rights and Standards 
 
If prostitution is fully legitimised in the UK in the formal sense, sex workers may have 
access to the economic and social rights which affect all legitimate workers, as well as 
the civil and political rights from which they already benefit as human beings (where 
countries are party to the relevant instruments). The fact that they currently do not may 
have some implications for part of the discussion in Chapter 4 as regards concessions 
for the ‘consensually’ trafficked.899 
        However, there is the potential for ‘the presence of the wage labour contract, 
which manifest’s the workers consent, (to) obscure any reality of exploitation or 
bondage.’900 The presence of some form of contract may obscure the coercive or 
bonded reality. At present, since the sex sector is not regulated in UK, there is nothing 
to ensure that treatment of sex workers is maintained within a fair labour framework. 
Consent does not necessarily equate to legitimacy: 
                                                 
897 See B E Hernandez-Truyol, and J E Larson, n 551, 393. 
898 See, for example, J Elliott, n 275, where the argument is made that the creation of the harms 
surrounding sex work need to be tackled, as opposed to the sale and purchase of sexual services per se. 
899 See Chapter 4, Part IX, section B 
900 B E Hernandez-Truyol, and J E Larson, n 551, 394. 
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 A sex worker’s consent does not legitimate conditions of work that are 
otherwise incompatible with her human dignity. We may accept that a 
labourer is making the best choice she can and still acknowledge that she 
lacks the bargaining power to insist upon standards of decent work.901 
 
To take this one step further, we may accept that ‘sexual labourers’ may make the best 
choice they can yet still insist upon and experience decent conditions of work for them. 
This may realistically only be a true reflection of a very small proportion of the sex 
sector, but vehement responses from groups such as the International Prostitutes 
Collective902 indicate that a body of sex workers themselves argue for and recognise 
free consent and that not all sex work takes place in forced or exploitative settings.  
        If sex work is not viewed as a legitimate and regulated form of labour within a 
State, then it will fall without of the scope of labour inspection systems.903 Indeed:  
 
NGOs and other civil society organisations are essential in economic 
sectors that are not covered by trade unions and that are difficult to reach 
for labour inspectors or the police. Examples are domestic service, sex and 
entertainment or other types of work that are out of scope for labour 
inspectors.904 
 
It is the lack of legal legitimacy of sex work as ‘labour’ in the UK renders this activity 
beyond the reach of any enforceable labour standards, and instead places significant 
                                                 
901 Ibid, 395. 
902 See International Prostitutes Collective website <http://www.prostitutescollective.net/> accessed 05 
June 2011. 
903 B Andrees, n 563, 21.  
904 Ibid 36.  
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aspects of it within the remit of the criminal law, leaving sex workers particularly 
vulnerable when compared with other forms of labourers. Sex work as labour should be 
subject to international and national labour standard regulations,905 thereby creating a 
clearer legal and political separation between the exploited and unexploited sex 
workers.906 Further empirical research into the conditions of domestic prostitution is 
perhaps needed, in order to establish the standards, varied as they may be. 
        Labour rights and human rights are clearly intertwined, particularly so where 
consensual economic migration, consensual exploitative facilitated migration, and 
human trafficking (non-consensual by definition) are concerned. In a labour context, 
civil and political rights are not wholly separate or independent from economic and 
social rights, as the worker, the exploited worker, and the forced labourer draw their 
rights from these instruments.907 Together, these rights comprise ‘the fundamental 
guarantees of essential rights inherent in human existence.’908 The preamble to the 
ICCPR909 and the International Covenant on Economic and Social Rights (ICESCR)910 
both state that ‘freedom from fear and want can only be achieved if conditions are 
created whereby everyone may enjoy his civil and political rights, as well as his 
economic, social and cultural rights’, thereby underpinning this point. The UDHR 
recognises the right to work, and the right to ‘just and favourable conditions of 
                                                 
905 See L L Lim, n 865. 
906 Hernandez-Truyol and Larson state that ‘we believe that the case can be made now for partial 
decriminalisation as a mandate of international law in order to protect the fundamental labor and human 
rights of sex workers to organize and freely associate.’ The authors are under no illusion, however, that 
full legalisation would solve all problems associated with sex work, as there is no ‘magic bullet’; see B E 
Hernandez-Truyol, and J E Larson, n 551, 440. 
907 Ibid, passim. 
908 Ibid, 407. 
909 ICCPR, n 279. 
910 International Covenant on Economic and Social Rights (adopted and opened for signature, ratification 
and accession by General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 1966, entry into force 3 
January 1976, in accordance with article 27) (hereafter ‘ICESCR). 
of 16 December 1966 
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work.’911 ICESCR enshrines the same basic substantive rights, and refers to ‘just and 
favourable conditions’912 and ‘safe and healthy working conditions’.913  
        Analogies with other forms of wage labour may aid the discussion here. Spector 
states that:  
 
What is really needed … is a sustained comparison between prostitution 
and other forms of wage labor, to try to identify what might be troubling 
about prostitution, or rather, about the way that it is practiced. 
Schwarzenback likens the prostitute as physical labourer to a dancer, while 
Nussbaum compares prostitution to a number of jobs … including domestic 
servant and masseuse ... Accordingly, since we treat other such jobs as 
legitimate choices, we should similarly treat prostitution. For feminist 
liberalism, it is the worst form of paternalism to preclude the choices of 
women whose options are already limited.914 
 
The intention in this thesis is not to embrace this ‘worst form of paternalism’, but 
instead to recognise the right of sex workers to choose sex work as a legitimate labour 
choice. Furthermore, to emphasise that there is a spectrum of situations, ranging from 
voluntary sexual labour, through exploitative (yet still potentially voluntary and 
consensual) sexual labour, to coerced/forced sexual labour. 
        Spector also recognises that:  
 
 
                                                 
911 Articles 30 and 23(1), UDHR, n 663. 
912 Article 7, ICESCR, n 910. 
913 Article 7(b), ICESCR, n 910. 
914 J Spector, n 530, 426. 
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 … the radical feminist critique of prostitution is both an argument about the 
harms caused by prostitution and an argument about the fact (or sometimes, 
about the possibility) of consent to such harms, while the feminist liberal 
defense of the legitimacy of prostitution is an argument that the harms are 
not of a different kind than the harms caused by other jobs and, as such, can 
be subject to meaningful consent.915  
 
The author of this thesis holds more closely with the latter view, but recognises that 
other forms of wage labour may involve different levels of potential harm – prostitution 
and sexual labour per se can be high risk, and therefore ‘safety measures’ would need 
to be taken if it is legitimised – the ‘hardhat’916 of the sex industry, so to speak.  
        Askola917 suggests that trafficking for the purpose of sexual exploitation raises 
complex issues connected to freedom, sexuality, choice and gender equality, in contrast 
to trafficking for the purpose of other forms of more traditionally recognised labour.918 
It seems that although sex work may indeed be viewed as a legitimate form of labour in 
that it comprises an exchange of services for remuneration, it is a complex issue which 
cannot easily be assimilated with a generic idea of labour – different types of labour 
raise different issues, and accordingly may require different responses. 
 
 
                                                 
915 Ibid, 427. 
916 To draw an analogy with the construction industry and the potential for ‘harm’ to occur through work 
in that industry – there is clearly no need for a hardhat when working in the office, therefore different 
levels of harm, risk etc may be identified within currently recognised and regulated form of ‘legitimate’ 
labour. 
917 See H Askola, Legal Responses to Trafficking in Women for Sexual Exploitation in the European 
Union, (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2007). 
918 See, A Gilbert and C Moore, ‘Human Trafficking in the United Kingdom: the journey so far and the 
road ahead’, (2010) Criminal Lawyer, 2 – 4, 2. 
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  D. What Constitutes ‘Exploitative’ Labour, and is Sex Work Inherently 
Exploitative? 
 
It is said that: 
 
Mostly female prostitutes sell access to their intimate body, sexual service, 
time, and intellectual and emotional labour for mostly male profit and 
consumption. This commodification of female characteristics in accord with 
sexualised gender roles stigmatises women as objects and reaffirms 
women’s subordinate status.919  
 
Yet, must this necessarily lead us to conclude that the sale of sex is inherently 
exploitative? There is sex work in the ideal setting – safe, consensual, un-coerced, un-
exploitative (in terms of accepted labour standards). Then, there is exploitative sex 
work – say, where the would-be economic migrant agrees to work in the UK sex sector 
for less than UK minimum wage, or for arduously long hours. Finally, there is fully 
coerced, forced sex work. These are all different things – sexual labour, exploitative 
sexual labour, and forced/coerced sexual labour – and there is not necessarily the same 
graduation of awfulness of the conditions of the work, though there sometimes will be.  
        It appears from the discussion in the previous section920 that sex work (i.e. the first 
category) can therefore – in a philosophical and/or political if not necessarily legal 
sense - be deemed a legitimate form of labour. There is compromised legitimacy in the 
face of exploitation, and furthermore there is nothing legitimate about force or 
                                                 
919 B E Hernandez-Truyol, and J E Larson, n 551, 441. 
920 Section C, above. 
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coercion. These latter categories are not sexual labour or prostitution – they are 
exploitation of, or force as to, sexual labour or prostitution. 
        What exactly constitutes ‘exploitative’ labour remains largely undefined in 
international law, although the Convention Concerning the Prohibition and Immediate 
Action for the Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labour 921 provides some 
specific insight as regards exploitative child labour.922 Hernandez-Truyol and Larson 
conveniently summarise from that Convention four factors which characterise 
exploitative child labour. These are: 
 
(1) work that meets existing standards of slavery or forced labour, (2) 
culturally stigmatized or degrading work, (3) the illegality of the work 
itself, and (4) harmful or dangerous conditions that interfere with human 
development and capacity.923 
 
        For the purposes of the argument made in the thesis, a definition of ‘exploitation’ 
in a labour context is proposed which explicitly refers to lack of conformity with 
accepted labour standards in the country where the work is taking place.924 There exists 
no international legal instrument which formally defines what is ‘exploitative’ in an 
adult labour context. 
        That sex work is inherently exploitative does not have to be accepted as given. The 
Trafficking Protocol does not state that prostitution itself is exploitative; instead, it 
refers to ‘the exploitation of … prostitution’.925 It is essential at this point to emphasise 
                                                 
921 Convention Concerning the Prohibition and Immediate Action for the Elimination of the Worst Forms 
of Child Labour, June 17, 1999, ILO No. 182. 
922 Ibid, Articles 3(a) – (d). 
923 B E Hernandez-Truyol, and J E Larson, n 551, 434. 
924 See Part VI, section B, below. 
925 Article 3, UN Trafficking Protocol, n 8.  
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the separation between consent to the ‘purpose’, e.g. commercial sex work, outside of a 
trafficking context, and consent to trafficking for that ‘purpose’. In terms of domestic 
prostitution, there are many convincing arguments for recognising a capacity to consent 
in that context,926 including the recognition of prostitution as a legitimate form of 
labour, and participation in it as an expression of autonomy, as previously discussed.  
        Autonomy advocates may rely upon an abstract conception of consent to reinforce 
a freedom which may really be illusory. It is argued that ‘the autonomous individual 
agent is itself a product of social construction’.927 The disparate power relations 
inherent in an exploitative relationship have to be taken into account when considering 
the validity of any consent. In a trafficking context, it should also be acknowledged that 
there are conditions present which do not affect the domestic prostitute.928 These 
include the fact that the trafficked prostitutes are away from their family and friends 
and therefore their community support network, as well as perhaps being hundreds or 
thousands of miles from home. They may be illegally present on the soil of the 
destination state, and therefore unable to approach law enforcement agencies for 
protection, fearing ill-treatment or deportation. On top of this, their native language 
may well be different from that of the destination State.  
        All of these conditions render the putative victim potentially more vulnerable than 
the domestic sex worker, and therefore arguably more in need of protection; ‘sexual 
exploitation becomes trafficking when the abuse involves forcefully moving women 
from one location to another.’929 Similarly, the victim trafficked for forms of labour 
other than sex work is more vulnerable than domestic labourers for the same reasons. 
Even those who have consented to the trafficking process may be more vulnerable than 
                                                 
926 See, for example, J Doezema, n 14. 
927 E Frazer and N Lacey, The Politics of Community: A Feminist Critique of the Liberal-Communitarian 
Debate, (Harvester Wheatsheaf, Hemel Hampstead, 1983) 57. 
928 Home Office and Scottish Executive, n 254, 47. 
929 F Gold, n 420, 101. 
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the domestic worker for the reasons outlined above.  In terms of the realities of 
determining a valid consent in an exploitative facilitated migration/human trafficking 
context, an argument can be made for a context-sensitive understanding of, and 
corresponding standard of, consent.930 
        Nonetheless, although empirical evidence clearly demonstrates that sex work can 
be exploitative,931 it also demonstrates that other forms of work or labour can, too. This 
does not lead here to a conclusion that all work, or indeed all sex work, is exploitative. 
In fact, it is submitted here that provided that satisfactory labour conditions are present 
(i.e. those in conformity with the accepted labour standards in the destination State) sex 
work or sexual labour can be undertaken in a wholly un-exploitative way. 
 
E. Consent to Harm and/or Exploitation 
 
As regards all forms of exploitation, including sex work (where it is exploitative), it 
must be considered whether consent to exploitative, abusive and dangerous situations 
should be recognised as valid or as having legal effect. After all, ‘[people] may agree to 
exploitative working conditions, but … agreement is not tantamount to consent.’932 
What is considered to be consent may in reality more closely resemble ‘giving in’.  
                                                 
930 On this point in a sexual autonomy context, see V E Munro, n 510. 
931 See, J Raymond, ‘10 Reasons for Not Legalising Prostitution’, (2003) Journal of Trauma Practice 2, 
315; C H Hauge, n 407; Home Office, ‘Tackling the Demand for Prostitution: A Review’ (November 
2008); Home Office ‘Paying the Price: a consultation paper on prostitution’ (July 2004) 
<http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/documents/paying_the_price.pdf?view=Binary> accessed 01 July 2011;  
Eaves, ‘Men who buy sex: who they buy and what they know’ (2009) 
<http://www.eaves4women.co.uk/Documents/Recent_Reports/Men%20Who%20Buy%20Sex.pdf> 
accessed 01 July 2011; L Brussa, n 108; M Coy, M Horvath and L Kelly, Child and Women Abuse 
Studies Unit ‘It’s just like going to the supermarket’: Men buying sex in East London, (2007) 
<http://www.cwasu.org/filedown.asp?file=17242_LMU_Demand_Report_Text_screen-1.pdf> accessed 
01 July 2011. 
932 See, K Abramson, n 14, regarding the view taken by Ateneo Human Rights Centre, The Philippine-
Belgian Pilot Project Against Trafficking in Women. 
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        In the context of offences against the person, Ormerod asks ‘[i]n what 
circumstances should the acts of the accused which cause injury to the victim be 
punished when that victim has expressly consented to, or at least knowingly taken the 
risk of, the injury occurring?’933 English law does not take a single position on whether 
or not the ‘victim’s’ consent to otherwise unlawful conduct will be a bar to the criminal 
liability of the perpetrator. In some circumstances, the law does recognise that this is 
the effect of consent. In Wilson,934 a husband branded his wife with a hot iron – with 
her full consent - as an apparent token of his love for her. He was acquitted. Jehovah’s 
Witnesses can refuse to consent to blood transfusions, a decision which may result in 
their death,935 thereby attributing a high level of autonomy to the consenting agent in a 
situation which can result in harm or death. 
        In various Reports and Consultation Papers, the Law Commission have considered 
the effect of consent on criminal liability in the context of offence against the person.936 
In Consultation Paper No 134,937 the Commission consider the general rule that ‘no 
offence is committed if harm of a minor and limited kind is inflicted with the consent of 
the victim’,938 which meant that, beyond special categories,939 ‘a person cannot 
effectively consent to the intended or actual infliction on him of ‘actual bodily 
harm’.940 This rule was developed through the common law in UK domestic cases such 
                                                 
933 D Ormerod, ‘Reports: Consent and Offences Against the Person: Law Commission Consultation 
Paper no. 134’, (1994) Modern Law Review 928, 928. 
934 R v Wilson (Alan Thomas) [1997] QB 47. 
935 See, for example, R v Blaue [1975] 3 All ER 446, and more recently Emma Gough, a Jehovah’s 
Witness, died following severe blood loss after giving birth to twins, Times Online, November 5, 2007, 
<http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/article2809423.ece> accessed 07 Nov 2007. 
936 See, Law Commission, Legislating the Criminal Code: Offences Against the Person and General 
Principles (Law Com No 218, November 1993), and Law Commission, Consent and Offences Against 
the Person (Law Com Consultation Paper No 134, 1994). 
937 Law Commission ‘Consent and Offences Against the Person’ (Law Commission Consultation Paper 
No 134, 1994). 
938 Ibid, at 4.1. 
939 Such as sports, and medical procedures.  
940 Law Commission, n 937, at 4.2. 
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as Coney,941 Donovan,942 Attorney General’s Reference (No 6 of 1980)943 and most 
recently, Brown.944  
        What these cases illustrate is a quasi-paternal approach; the State puts a limit on 
the acceptable level of harm to which consent can operate as a defence. A distinction 
remains, however, between situations such as that which occurred in Brown and those 
of the consenting trafficked victim. Those in Brown concerned individuals who were on 
a more comparably equal footing with each other. In the case of ‘consensual’ 
trafficking, one party has a clear advantage over the other. Such is the nature of 
exploitation, which is why ‘consensual’ trafficking may appropriately be labelled 
‘consensual facilitated exploitative migration’. It is important to recognise that the 
autonomy of those engaging in sex work is valid and real. That is to say, consent to sex 
work is accepted here as prima facie valid. Consent to exploitative sex work is also 
recognised here as prima facie valid. But, due to the nature of the latter – particularly in 
the context of migration and trafficking - perhaps a quasi-paternalist stance is 
acceptable in the face of serious exploitation. 
        These different effects of consent raise the question of whether or not it is possible 
to recognise the validity of consent to trafficking/exploitative facilitated migration but 
still retain the criminality of the ‘trafficker’, and more pertinently for this thesis, 
whether any concession may be made for the victim who has ostensibly consented/is 
ostensibly un-coerced. The latter will be considered later.945 
        The negative ramifications of recognising consent in a trafficking context will now 
be considered in Part V. Part VI will then consider potential alternatives to the current 
                                                 
941 [1882] 8 QBD 534. 
942 [1934] 2 KB 498. 
943 [1981] QB 715. 
944 R v Brown [1993] 2 WLR 556, [1993] 2 ALL ER 75, Laskey, Jaggard, and Brown v. The United 
Kingdom. [1997] Case No. 109/1995/615/703-705. 
945 See, Chapter 4, Part IX, section B, for discussion of concessions for the ‘consensually trafficked’. 
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situation created by the deficit arguably created between the definitions of trafficking 
and smuggling, which will in turn be developed through Chapter 4. 
 
V. The Effects of Recognising Consent 
 
In order for the trafficker to be convicted, the prosecution must show that women have 
been transported for exploitation as a result of coercion or otherwise have not consented 
to being brought to the destination State. This test poses several difficulties.  
        The first is the evidential burden produced by the need to show lack of 
consent/presence of coercion. It cannot be assumed that the criteria, indicators and 
training provided to the authorities charged with identifying victims of trafficking will 
always be adequate in this respect.946 The second problem is the potential for the 
existence of consent to act as a defence for the would-be trafficker. The third is the 
most pertinent for the discussion in this thesis and concerns the denial of victim status 
as regards the trafficked person who is deemed to have consented. This feeds into the 
fourth problem: that of the potential criminality of the victim as a result of their 
consensual role in the breaching of borders and domestic labour laws. 
 
A. The Evidential Problem 
 
Primarily, there is the evidential problem. One might ask whether, ‘where consent is 
equivocal or uncertain, (should) we take a precautionary approach or do we treat the 
consent as given?’947 Coercion of some form must be shown in order to vitiate consent, 
but what of those cases where this simply is not clear? The problems associated with 
                                                 
946 See, Chapter 4, Part VI, section C, for discussion of training of officials and ‘indicators’ used in the 
victim identification process. 
947 D Beyleveld, and R Brownsword, n 321, 22. 
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determining the presence of, or lack of, consent in rape cases provides an example of 
the difficulties presented here.948 Bhaba makes the following observation as regards 
consent or coercion in situations of human trafficking: 
 
The distinction between coercion and consent remains useful in some 
circumstances. There are clear-cut cases that fall at one or the other end of 
the spectrum, and they should be treated accordingly. Where the distinction 
is not clear, however, significant investment of administrative resources 
will be necessary to ensure that basic human-rights protections are not 
violated by thoughtless categorizations designed to serve exclusionary 
agendas and improve deportation statistics.  
 
Wherever the lines are drawn, they must involve the discretion of 
experienced and skilled professionals. Determining who is coerced and who 
has consented – whether at the border or in the workplace – requires 
detailed case histories and considerable background knowledge about states 
                                                 
948 At present, 6% of reported rapes result in prosecution in the UK. See R v A [2001] UKHL 25, where 
tensions between section 41 of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 (YJCEA) (which 
prohibits the giving of evidence and cross examination about any sexual behaviour of the complainant 
except with leave of the court, in certain circumstances outlined throughout the subsections of the 
provision) and Article 6 ECHR were apparent. The relevant provision was s. 41(3)(c) which states that 
‘This subsection applies if the evidence or question relates to a relevant issue in the case and either …  it 
is an issue of consent and the sexual behaviour of the complainant to which the evidence or question 
relates is alleged to have been, in any respect, so similar (i) to any sexual behaviour of the complainant 
which (according to evidence adduced or to be adduced by or on behalf of the accused) took place as part 
of the event which is the subject matter of the charge against the accused, or (ii) to any other sexual 
behaviour of the complainant which (according to such evidence) took place at or about the same time as 
that event, that the similarity cannot reasonably be explained as a coincidence.’ It was held in that case 
that the YJCEA 1999 s.41(3)(c) should, where necessary, be construed according to the interpretative 
obligation under the Human Rights Act 1998 s.3, and furthermore by considering the need to aim to 
protect complainants from humiliating questions, or indignity. It was found that evidence of a 
complainant's previous sexual history was admissible where that evidence, and any questioning which 
concerned it, was so relevant to the issue of consent that to not include it would raise Article 6 concerns. 
Also, see Home Office ‘The Stern Review’, Government Equalities Office (2010) 
<http://www.equalities.gov.uk/pdf/Stern_Review_of_Rape_Reporting_1FINAL.pdf> accessed 01 May 
2011. 
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of origin, states of transit, and employment arrangements within particular 
industries. Once this process has been undertaken – and grass-roots border-
patrol agents, immigration officials, NGOs, community associations, 
newspaper reporters, trade unions, and other labour-rights groups should be 
involved as consultants – then sensible determinations can be made.949 
 
As the above statement illustrates, proving coercion is likely in many cases to be an 
arduous and difficult task. As a result, the coercion/consent debate provides an 
opportunity for legal representatives which could provide a real barrier to the successful 
prosecution of those facilitating migration and subsequently exploiting the putative 
‘victim’.  
 
B. Consent as a Defence for the Trafficker 
 
As regards the second problem identified above, whether or not consent should act as a 
defence in a trafficking context, the matter is debatable. It is necessary to make the 
point that ‘consent’ here is not, as it usually is in the criminal context to do with the 
mens rea of the defendant or giving him a defence but with establishing an element of 
the actus reus, such as coercion or deception. In the most basic sense, one would 
generally accept that the presence of consent indicates a lack of any crime. The reality 
is not quite this simple.  
        Harmful activities were consented to in the cases of Wilson,950 mentioned above, 
and also in the case of Brown951, which concerned consensual sado-masochistic 
                                                 
949 J Bhabha, n 527. 
950 R v Wilson (Alan Thomas) [1997] QB 47. 
951 R v Brown [1993] 2 WLR 556, [1993] 2 ALL ER 75, Laskey, Jaggard, and Brown v. The United 
Kingdom. [1997] Case Laskey, Jaggard, and Brown, n No. 109/1995/615/703-705. 
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activities between adults. In the former, consent was accepted as a defence to the harm 
caused. In the latter, the domestic courts found that consent was not a defence to the 
crime. The ECtHR allowed that the identification of criminal harm which could not be 
lawfully consented to was largely for each State to decide.952  
        It can be contended that:  
 
When individuals consent to undergo medical operations, to engage in 
sexual intercourse, to open their homes to police searches, or to testify 
against themselves in court, they convert what would otherwise be an 
invasion of their person or their rights into a harmless or justified 
activity.953  
 
This view is overly simplistic. Some activities require justification in order for them to 
be rendered harmless, and as to what these activities are there is some disagreement in 
academic discussion.954 It is questionable as to whether exploitation can ever be 
justified. Consent can be transformative; it can, as suggested by Hurd, work its ‘moral 
magic’ and transform rape into lovemaking, and trespass into a dinner party.955 Yet, not 
every situation is capable of being disposed of with such a simplistic formula.  
        If consent is simply seen as justification for the doing of ‘something’, then this 
does not go far enough. This justification does not take into account whether the doing 
of this ‘something’ is right or wrong, at least in a moral if not legal sense. Exploitation 
of human beings unquestionably has a moral dimension. Does consent in a trafficking 
                                                 
952 Laskey, Jaggard, and Brown v. The United Kingdom. [1997] Case No. 109/1995/615/703-705. 
953 G P Fletcher, n 320, 109. 
954 See, for example, M M Dempsey, and J Herring, ‘Why Sexual Penetration Requires Justification’ 
(2007) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 27, No. 3, 467 – 491. 
955 H Hurd, ‘Was the Frog Prince Sexually Molested?: A review of Peter Westen’s The Logic of 
Consent’(2005)  Michigan Law Review Vol. 103, 1329, at 1329. 
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context render the exploitative activity harmless or justified? Few would answer ‘yes’; 
‘consent functions as a ‘procedural’ rather than as a ‘substantive’ (or, ‘on the merits’) 
form of justification.’956 Should consent in a trafficking context provide a legal ‘flak-
jacket’957 to protect the would-be trafficker? If the answer were ‘yes’, then this surely 
would not be a wholly satisfactory situation. An attitude of ‘it’s my body and I’ll do 
what I want with it’958 should be deemed insufficient to excuse certain acts; paternalism 
in this context does have its place. It is for this reason that, even in the face of an 
ostensible consent, the thesis asks for consideration of concessions for the 
‘consensually trafficked’.959  
        There is argument to be drawn upon from a public interest perspective; the ‘wider 
social harm’ must be considered - consent should be no defence if it is ‘injurious to the 
public, as well as the person injured.’960 Consent should not preclude an otherwise 
trafficked person from asserting that they have been wronged – a line must be drawn, 
beyond which consent is no defence. Where the trafficker stands trial, the burden of 
proof is on the prosecution to show coercion in order to prove lack of consent. 
Uncertainty as to the limits of what constitutes ‘coercion’ in this context, coupled with 
the fact that initial consent is often given, renders the issue more difficult to prove. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
956 D Beyleveld, and R Brownsword, n 321, 61. 
957 Lord Donaldson in Re W (A Minor) (Medical Treatment) [1992] 4 ALL ER 627, at 635. 
958 D Ormerod, n 933, 938 – 9. 
959 See, Chapter 4, Part IX, section B. 
960 Stephen J in Coney [1882] 8 QBD 534, at 549. 
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 C. Denial of Victim Status 
 
As regards denial of victim status under the trafficking instruments, the three main 
instruments considered in this thesis all make provision for some form or another of 
consideration of support (or requirement of support and protection) for victims, 
whereas the Smuggling Protocol extends no such status to the smuggled person. 
Chapter 1 outlines the basic provisions contained within the main instruments 
considered in this thesis,961 and Chapter 4 will go on to consider these victim-specific 
provisions in depth. 
        The consenting trafficked person who falls in the grey area between the trafficking 
and smuggling definitions is left in limbo. This allows for the potential for destination 
States, in the situation where coercion cannot be shown, to deny the consenting 
trafficked person protection and support. In terms of maintaining border integrity, 
controlling immigration, and meeting quotas, this may well be in the State’s interests.  
        Under the continuing existence of a definition which recognises consent, it is 
possible to argue that the consenting trafficked person both does, and does not, deserve 
to be accorded victim status. Arguments ‘for’ include the fact that consent does not 
necessarily cancel out the existence of serious abuse through exploitation. The 
consenting trafficked person is still potentially a victim of unacceptable circumstances 
flowing from the exploitative conditions of their ‘labour’. Arguments ‘against’ include 
the perspective that the consenting trafficked person has not been coerced in the manner 
of the non-consenting trafficked person. In fact, they have willingly and knowingly 
agreed to breach borders and domestic immigration laws. This brings us to the third 
                                                 
961 See Chapter 1, Part II, section B. 
 265
issue; that of the potential criminality of the trafficked person, who, through the giving 
of consent, could be seen as an accomplice.  
 
D. Criminality of the ‘Consensually Trafficked’ Due to Breach of Immigration Laws 
 
The focus of anti-trafficking legislation must be borne in mind – it should offer a 
combination of the criminalisation of the activities of the trafficker, coupled with 
protective human rights-based measures as regards the trafficked person. None of the 
Smuggling or Trafficking Protocols, CoE Trafficking Convention or EU 2011 Directive 
envisage criminality for the migrant in terms of their illicit entry into the destination 
State, even though smuggling seems to be of a largely consensual nature on the part of 
the migrant. The question of criminality is left for States to determine where smuggled 
migrants are concerned.  
        It can be argued that, on the face of it, it is difficult to justify criminalisation of the 
consenting trafficked person, as this undermines the purpose of anti-trafficking 
legislation, one of the aims of which is to combat exploitation. However, tensions will 
arise in this respect concerning breaches of immigration law, and border integrity. 
Conversely, if there is existence of true consent, then the ‘consensually’ trafficked 
person will often have committed an immigration offence. It is difficult here to 
maintain an argument for non-criminalisation, it might be suggested that as a matter of 
prosecutorial discretion - whether prosecution is in the public interest – should be used, 
where women have been exploited and remain vulnerable.962 
        Essentially, the issue seems to be not whether consent in a trafficking context 
should be deemed meaningless, more whether or not it should be deemed irrelevant. 
                                                 
962 This argument will be built upon in Chapter 4, Part VII, section B, where existing Crown Prosecution 
Service Protocols, which provide for prosecutorial discretion as regards formally trafficked victims who 
committed an offence as a result of having been trafficked, will be drawn upon. 
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Alternatives to the current situation created by the trafficking and smuggling 
definitions, which encompass the abovementioned problems, will now be considered. 
 
VI. Where Next? Alternatives to the Current Situation 
 
The consent debate could potentially leave trafficked persons in a state of limbo, on the 
wrong side of the law, and denied any victim status. They may be subject to legal 
sanctions and/or peremptory removal, with the destination State struggling to obtain 
prosecution against their trafficker. This aspect of human trafficking legislation is a 
contentious issue, but ultimately the inclusion of this issue in legal definition takes 
major steps in clarifying what trafficking actually is in a legal sense.  
        Inclusion of the consent element in the trafficking definition creates a hierarchy of 
severity of exploitative migration. This means that those who have ostensibly consented 
to migrate and be subjected to exploitative conditions are indeed exploited in a way that 
undermines human dignity, but they have not, in a current legal sense, been trafficked. 
The trafficking and smuggling definition, therefore, have created a loophole. The 
definition of smuggling includes solely an ‘action’ element.963 The definition of 
trafficking includes ‘action, ‘means’ and ‘purpose’. Where there is consent, we are left 
with ‘action’ and ‘purpose’.  
        The abovementioned situation is not simply smuggling, as it goes beyond the 
ambit of the Smuggling Protocol. It also may not be trafficking, as it falls short of the 
requirement for ostensible coercion or some other ‘means’. It is, therefore, unclear what 
exactly this type of exploitative migration is. That which may tentatively (yet perhaps 
realistically) be deemed a ‘lesser’ form of exploitative migration than trafficking, i.e. 
                                                 
963 See, Article 3, Smuggling Protocol, n 5. 
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that where consent has been given, can and must be addressed by international 
legislation. Consent lends legitimacy to traffick-related activity. Even in the face of 
consent, such activity still merits suppression and punishment, beyond simply 
addressing the breach of immigration laws which it may involve.  
        Hernandez-Truyol and Larson consider ‘relations within which an individual 
consents to conditions of labour that cannot be reconciled with human dignity.’964 In a 
smuggling context, the focus is on the smuggler, his illegal activity and the damage that 
it does. Consent in the context of the trafficking definition shifts the focus from the 
damage done, and keeps the focus on the victim and the existence or otherwise of 
ostensible consent/lack thereof. 
        Consent exists largely to protect the stereotypical trafficked victim, the woman 
who is abducted and forced into sex work against her will. This victim does not 
comprise the entire victim pool. The following proposals suggest alternatives to the 
current situation created by the definition provided within the UN Trafficking Protocol 
and reproduced within the other main instruments considered in this thesis.965 These 
alternatives will potentially mean that the those who -  on application of the criteria 
used to identify victims of human trafficking966 - do not display ostensible ‘indicators’ 
or signs of coercion and so are deemed to have consented, are not left in a legal 
vacuum.  
        Progress can realistically follow one of two routes. Either consent must be deemed 
irrelevant in a trafficking context, or specific measures must be taken or legislation 
enacted to address situations of ‘consensual facilitated migration for the purposes of 
labour exploitation’, as a category separate to both smuggling and trafficking. 
 
                                                 
964 B E Hernandez-Truyol, and J E Larson, n 551, 394. 
965 I.e. the CoE Trafficking Convention and the EU 2011 Directive 
966 See, Chapter 4, Part VI, section C. 
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 A. Rendering Consent Irrelevant in the Context of Human Trafficking 
 
Abramson states that the Protocol ‘offers the opportunity to urge state party compliance 
in a way that protects trafficked people without making a formal pronouncement on 
their ability or inability to consent.’967 Yet, deeming consent to be irrelevant in a 
trafficking context is not about denial of the capacity to make choices about one’s life. 
Rather, it is about effectively combating a phenomenon which constitutes criminal 
activity coupled with serious exploitation. Feinberg considers reconciliation of the 
prohibition against contracting one’s self into slavery with maintaining respect for 
freedom of contract. He suggests that when faced with fallible tests of voluntariness, 
then a presumption of non-voluntariness is more preferable than the alternative.968 
        If this route were to be taken, and consent were deemed to be irrelevant in the 
context of trafficking, it would be necessary to draft an instrument providing a 
definition of ‘trafficking in humans’ which recognised trafficking as an activity 
involving an element of transport, and an element of exploitation of labour, including 
sex work, ‘regardless of consent’, or ‘by any means’. An instrument which supersedes 
both the trafficking and smuggling definitions is a possible option, but smuggling is not 
characterised by exploitation in the same way that trafficking is and so this may not be 
the most comprehensive way to proceed. However, a definition which covers a wider 
group of people retains what should be the essential focus of anti-trafficking legislation; 
the criminalisation of perpetrators and the protection of trafficked and exploited 
persons. Even if valid consent only exists in a very limited number of situations, the 
current existence of this element excludes some – perhaps many - from the protection 
                                                 
967 K Abramson, n 14, 497. 
968 J Feinberg, ‘Legal Paternalism’ in Rights, Justice, and the Bounds of Liberty (Princeton, Princeton 
University Press, 1980). 
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offered by the legal instruments forming the anti-trafficking regime, and makes it 
harder for others who did not consent to get the protection that they need and deserve 
under said instruments.   
        A definition tailored to fit this proposal might read along the following lines: 
 
“Trafficking in persons” shall mean the recruitment, transportation, transfer, 
harbouring or receipt of persons, by any means, for the purpose of 
exploitation. 
Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution 
of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour or services, 
slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs… 
 
B. The Creation/Recognition of a New Category: Concessions for the ‘Consensually 
Trafficked’ 
 
Consent operates as a ‘transformative channel between the harmful and the harmless, 
and also thereby between the permissible, the condemnable, and the criminal.’969 
Consequently, addressing formal trafficking and ‘consensual’ trafficking for the 
purpose of sexual exploitation both in the same way, with the same instruments, may 
not provide a satisfactory answer. Although the two do not sit at opposite ends of a 
spectrum of what is harmful and what is harmless, they do indicate different degrees of 
harm and therefore in a ‘fair labelling’ sense need to be addressed separately, as 
unsatisfactory as this may be in some cases. 
                                                 
969 V E Munro, n 510, 924. 
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        As opposed to rendering consent irrelevant in the context of human trafficking, the 
other potential route to be taken involves recognition of a third category as wholly 
separate from trafficking and smuggling: that of ‘consensual facilitated migration for 
the purpose of exploitation’, or ‘smuggling for the purpose of exploitation’, or similar. 
This approach is less paternalistic than the one outlined above, as it accepts that there 
may be valid consent, even to exploitative work in the sex trade but it does not allow it 
to fully negate the wrongness of exploitation. If it must be maintained that legally, 
human trafficking cannot involve any consensual transportation for the purpose of 
exploitation, then this new category allows for criminalisation of serious exploitative 
activity which undermines human dignity, even in the face of consent. Furthermore, 
this new category allows the potential for concessions970 to be made for victims in 
borderline cases of trafficking, or where, for example, ostensible evidence of coercion 
etc cannot be shown. Smugglers, in the most basic sense, commit a wrong against the 
country whose borders have been breached. Those who ‘traffick’ even consenting 
persons commit a wrong which far exceeds the breach of borders and involves harm to 
human beings and undermines the dignity of the human. 
        To determine a precise point on a spectrum of consent and submission, or free 
consent and coerced consent, is a ‘philosophical conundrum’.971 In the context of the 
creation of a new category of consenting trafficked persons in the broad spectrum of 
facilitated migration, it is perhaps possible to achieve some concession as to allow 
support and assistance (for ‘victims’) without fully going into the realms of paternalism 
(i.e. not opting for ignoring the autonomous choice of a consenting agent to consent to 
migrate to work in the sex trade). It is undoubtedly possible to achieve criminalisation.  
                                                 
970 This will be discussed in Chapter 4, Part IX, section B 
971 R Stone, Offences Against the Person, (Cavendish Publishing, 1999) 147. 
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        In terms of policy, more people may benefit if it is not accepted that consent may 
be given by a trafficked person to transport into exploitative conditions.972 However, 
some may find it difficult to fully concede that consent should be rendered irrelevant. If 
we take the following completely polarised examples: at one end of the spectrum, we 
have the person who is abducted and forced into some form of exploitative labour. At 
the opposite end of the spectrum is the person who is earning low wages at home – 
although enough to survive – who consents to be ‘trafficked’ to, say, Cornwall to pick 
turnips for sixteen hours a day for low/exploitative pay but at a higher rate of pay than 
they were receiving while working at home. The second person has given full consent, 
but is still being exploited by working long hours for very low pay. Since these 
polarised scenarios differ in both degree and nature, it is difficult to concede that they 
can be deemed identical and, therefore, properly addressed in the same way, by the 
same instrument. Coerced trafficking can include elements of violence and control 
which go beyond the scope of ‘trafficking’ against a backdrop of consent. Someone 
who trafficks an inanimate object, such as firearms,973 should not be seen in the same 
light as one who trafficks human beings who are capable of choice. 
        A potential definition tailored to fit this proposal might read as follows: 
 
“Facilitated migration for the purpose of labour exploitation” shall mean the 
recruitment, transportation, transfer, harboring, or receipt of persons, with 
the consent of that person, for the purpose of exploitation. 
 
                                                 
972 K Abramson, n 14, 493. 
973 See, for example, Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Their 
Parts and Components and Ammunition, supplementing the United Nations Convention against 
Transnational Organized Crime (adopted June 2001 by United Nations General Assembly Resolution 
A/RES/55/255), which defines illicit trafficking as: ‘the import, export, acquisition, sale delivery, 
movement or transfer of firearms….’ thus demonstrating only an ‘action’ element. 
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        In order for this proposal to be implemented, the meaning of ‘exploitation’ or 
‘labour exploitation’ - both to include commercial sex work – would have to be 
considered in some depth. This issue would either have to be determined as ‘a question 
of degree depending on circumstances’974, or alternatively a minimum level would have 
to be established. Although the meaning of ‘exploitative labour’ has been alluded to at 
an earlier point in this Chapter,975 further exploration of this issue goes beyond the 
ambit of this Chapter, yet it is suggested here that a suitable definition of ‘exploitation’ 
could be offset against a standard compliant with domestic labour legislation. This 
definition would also cover the exploitation of prostitution, on the basis that sex work is 
‘sexual labour’ and should be viewed as a form of labour. Abramson offered a 
definition of traffick in persons which, although intended to address trafficking 
regardless of consent, proposed the following as regards ‘exploitation of labour’:  
 
… for the purpose of the exploitation of their labor, as defined through 
illegal work or legally recognized work that is carried out in a pattern of 
serious non-conformity with existing labor laws.976 
 
Similarly, labour exploitation as a ‘purpose’ element of human trafficking was 
considered in a European Union Commission proposal for a Framework Decision on 
combating human trafficking.977 Article 1 defined it as: 
 
                                                 
974 Stephen J in Coney [1882] 8 QBD 534. 
975 See, Part IV, section D, above. 
976 K Abramson, n 14, 499. 
977 European Union (2001b) Communication from the Commission to the European Council and the 
European Parliament: Combating Trafficking in Human Beings and Combating Sexual Exploitation of 
Children and Child Pornography, Proposals for a Council Framework Decision on Combating 
Trafficking in Human Beings and on Combating Sexual Exploitation of Children and Child Pornography 
COM (2001) 854.  
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… the purpose of exploiting him or her in the production of goods or 
provision of services in infringement of labour standards governing 
working conditions, salaries and health and safety. 
 
Exploitation, then, depends not on the nature of the work, but on the degree i.e. 
voluntary prostitution juxtaposed against exploitative prostitution, with the latter falling 
below the accepted labour standards of the State in question. Both of the 
abovementioned examples provide a sound basis from which to proceed in developing 
a definition of ‘exploitation’ in the context of sex work as an accepted form of labour. 
 
C. The Effect of the Implementation of these Proposals 
 
Either of the above proposals recognises the potential for validity of consent in a 
trafficking context, but they differ in how the presence of consent is to be legally 
addressed. The implementation of either of these proposals allows for some resolution 
of the four problem areas identified above.978 If the first proposal is followed (i.e. that 
consent be deemed irrelevant), then the evidential problem is eradicated as it is not 
necessary to prove lack of consent. Yet in terms of the second proposal, the evidential 
problem still exists, as it is still necessary to determine lack of consent in order to 
determine which category the individual case falls into i.e. that of ‘trafficking’ (non-
consensual) or ‘consensual facilitated migration for the purpose of exploitative labour’, 
i.e. where one has been ‘consensually trafficked’. 
        Either proposal cancels out the potential for consent to serve as a full defence for 
the perpetrator, as there is criminality of his activity in either instance – and not simply 
                                                 
978 See, Part V, above. 
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that resulting from breaches of immigration law. Some may struggle to accept 
criminalisation in the face of consent, on the basis that if one voluntarily accepts 
exploitative labour conditions, there is no wrong to be remedied. Yet, on the basis of 
cases such as Brown,979 it can be contended that as a defence should only go so far – 
without being overly paternalistic, there can realistically be limits on what is considered 
‘harmless’ in the face of consent. In Donovan,980 it was argued that: 
 
If an act is unlawful in the sense of being in itself a criminal act, it is plain 
that it cannot be rendered lawful because the person to whose detriment it is 
done consents to it. No person can license another to commit a crime. So far 
as the criminal law is concerned, therefore, where the act charged is in itself 
unlawful, it can never be necessary to prove absence of consent... As a 
general rule, although it is a rule to which there are well established 
exceptions, it is an unlawful act to beat another person with such a degree 
of violence that the infliction of bodily harm is a probable consequence, and 
when such an act is proved, consent is immaterial.981 
 
If we transpose the above into a trafficking/exploitative migration context, the 
movement of persons and the exploitation of these persons, regardless of consent, 
potentially infringes domestic immigration and labour laws. Facilitating an illicit border 
crossing and exploiting the labour of another, are unacceptable irrespective of the 
giving of consent. Arguably, ‘Where human dignity is independently compromised, 
                                                 
979 R v Brown [1993] 2 ALL ER 75, Laskey, Jaggard, and Brown v. The United Kingdom. [1997] Case 
No. 109/1995/615/703-705. 
980 [1934] 2 KB 498. 
981 [1934] 2 KB 498, at 507. 
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irrespective of whether the act in question is freely performed, consent is not 
material.’982  
        Due to the difficulties of determining a valid consent or the presence of coercion, 
and the obvious gap between those who are trafficked and those are smuggled, 
international law should provide for criminalisation of the would-be trafficker despite 
the presence of ostensible consent, and perhaps treat the lack of evidence of coercion as 
a ‘mitigating factor’ or similar. The effect of this would be that the would-be trafficker 
is not simply treated as a smuggler – they must pay for their part in the exploitation of 
the ‘victim’. Consent does not negate the wrong which undermines human dignity and 
the basic values of society and, therefore it should not absolve the trafficker of any 
responsibility for his actions.  
        As regards the denial of victim status, the former proposal eradicates this issue, as 
‘victims’ will be victims regardless of consent, although their treatment may vary 
according to which instruments are ratified by each State and what those instruments 
provide for. It would be difficult to maintain an argument for exactly the same access to 
the same rights for those who ostensibly consented, unless the instrument was drafted 
so that no line was drawn between ‘types’ of victim. If consent is deemed irrelevant, the 
‘victim’ is more likely to be portrayed as a victim, and therefore the state will be more 
likely to accord victim status.983  
        The latter proposal is more problematic in terms of the denial of victim status (and 
therefore the bespoke rights created for victims of trafficking) as not all would agree 
that the exploited migrant who falls into this category deserves comparable victim 
status. Those who have given an ostensible consent (which may possibly be merely 
                                                 
982 D Beyleveld, and R Brownsword, n 321, 17. 
983 J Chuang, n 838, 85. 
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‘assumed’ due to lack of adverse indicators) might be left less deserving of full victim 
status and the protection that it provides.  
        On the one hand, it can be argued that consent does not destroy the duty on the 
state to protect the otherwise-trafficked person. On the other hand, as Bhaba states, 
‘Having chosen to migrate illegally, smuggled illegals are considered less deserving of 
protection.’984 Thus, the voluntary nature of consensual trafficking forms a potential 
barrier to victim status. Yet, consensually trafficked people have been more than 
smuggled – they have also been exploited, thus placing them in a grey area, somewhere 
between victim and complicit actor. The exploitation taking place against a backdrop of 
consent arguably benefits both parties – the ‘consensually trafficked’ person earns more 
than they did back at home, and the migration facilitator/trafficker profits from the 
exploitation of that person, although both parties cannot be said to be on an equal 
footing.  
        Denial of victim status will, however, adversely affect those who did not consent 
but were unable to show lack of consent. Balos states that ‘The evolution of language in 
human rights documents has increasingly made the choice or consent of the trafficked 
woman the linchpin to determine if a human rights violation has occurred.’985 It may be 
desirable to allow consent to determine the presence of human trafficking, but not 
necessarily that which may arguably be deemed a lesser ‘wrong’ – exploitative 
consensual migration. The fact remains that the consenting ‘victim’ has been the object 
of serious ill treatment at the hands of their exploiter(s). There may be, at the least, a 
case to be made for a sympathetic ‘victim of exploitation’ based approach to be 
considered on a case-by-case basis. Depending on various factors such as the nature 
and degree of exploitation experienced, different ‘victims’ will have different needs. 
                                                 
984 J Bhabha, n 527. 
985 B Balos, n 14, 173. 
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Issues such as the potential for reprisals from the would-be-traffickers or similar would 
justify consideration of protection in the same way as it would where legally recognised 
non-consenting trafficked victims are concerned. The treatment and protection of 
victims of human trafficking, and those who might be deemed ‘consensually 
trafficked’, is discussed in Chapter 4.986 
        As regards the potential criminality of the trafficked person, once again the former 
proposal fully eradicates this issue. Consideration of this issue under the latter proposal 
necessitates return to the justification laid down previously; that the focus of anti-
trafficking legislation and anti-smuggling legislation is to criminalise the agent, not the 
‘object’ of the trafficking or smuggling. This is particularly true as regards the 
Organised Crime Convention and the Smuggling and Trafficking Protocols thereto, as 
these instruments are intended to combat organised crime and the activities flowing 
from it. Therefore, the organised crime groups are the intended targets for 
criminalisation. Further, the existence of exploitative labour undermines human dignity 
and constitutes intolerable treatment of individuals, and so these are the central issues 
which need to be tackled – not the potential criminality of the migrant. Of course, that 
is not the end of the story – States have a legitimate concern in maintaining border 
integrity and therefore require the potential to criminalise and prosecute those who 
willingly flout immigration laws. This issue will be specifically examined in terms of 
trafficked and ‘consensually’ trafficked persons in Chapter 4.987 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
986 See, Chapter 4, Part IX, section B. 
987 See, Chapter 4, Part VII. 
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 Conclusion 
 
Consent provides a ‘procedural justification’ for an action or omission.988 Whereas 
consent may lend legitimacy to trafficking-related activity, the use of coercion, force or 
other relevant factors will damage that consent and render it ineffective. The 
introduction of a lack of consent element as determinative as to the existence of human 
trafficking, places emphasis firmly on the coerced or un-coerced nature of the activity. 
In a given ‘trafficking’ situation, where none of the coercive ‘means’ are proved to 
have been used, and therefore lack of consent cannot be shown, the individual is 
deemed to have consented. The transformative nature of consent therefore means that 
that which would otherwise be termed ‘trafficking’ now becomes a form of consensual 
facilitated migration for sex work or labour in exploitative conditions. The resulting 
legal status of the ‘consenting’ individual is that they are viewed as merely another 
illicit migrant or smuggled sex worker.  
        The consent/coercion ‘dichotomy’ created by the trafficking definition has been 
the subject of much debate in recent years. The most basic approach would simply say 
‘[t]hat which in the absence of consent would be wrong is rendered permissible by the 
giving of consent.’989 This approach has been shown to be too simplistic in the context 
of trafficking and facilitated migration for the purpose of sexual exploitation. The 
trafficking definition shifts the focus so that consent or the absence thereof is the 
central issue, as opposed to the subsequent exploitation of the trafficked person. It 
assumes ‘pure’ cases of coerced and un-coerced trafficking, whereas in reality, cases 
are rarely this clear cut.  
                                                 
988 See D Beyleveld, and R Brownsword, n 321, 125.  
989 See, D Archard, ‘Book Reviews’ (2007) Journal of Applied Philosophy, Vol. 24, No. 2, 209. 
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        The current situation with the legal anti-trafficking regime recognises the 
traffickers who are the criminals, the trafficked persons who are the victims, and the 
trafficked persons who consent, and therefore by definition have not been trafficked 
and therefore are not ‘victims’ in this context. The last comprises a category of persons 
who have uncertain status.990 As a result, anti-trafficking legislation has the potential to 
act as a barrier to obtaining prosecutions and protecting victims of exploitation and 
human rights abuse. An ability to give valid consent in this context should be 
recognised, but the real point at issue is whether consent should ever be deemed 
irrelevant. From a ‘fair labeling perspective’, consent must be deemed relevant. Yet, 
consent must be valid - care is needed, as full and informed consent may be rare and the 
appearance of consent may obscure the coercive reality. 
        This Chapter has argued that sex work can be viewed as a legitimate form of 
labour. Trúóng argues that the elements of the body that are purely sexual may be used 
not only for pleasure but also for survival and sustenance.991 This may not sit well with 
traditional social norms i.e. sex as intimacy, to be reserved for a proper relationship, but 
it is nonetheless a modern reflection of the potential for sex work to be viewed as a 
legitimate form of labour, albeit not in a legal sense in every State. 
        Any form of labour is capable of being exploited or exploitative. Hernandez-
Truyol and Larson state that ‘the premise of labor rights is that consent or voluntariness 
alone cannot guarantee freedom from bondage.’992 They go on to recognise that ‘[w]hat 
the wage labourer sells is control over the body, energy, will and time.’993 They 
consider ‘relations within which an individual consents to conditions of labour that 
                                                 
990 K Abramson, n 14, 500.  
991 See, T Trúóng, Sex, Money and Morality: The Political Economy of Prostitution and Tourism in South 
East Asia (1990) 67 – 92. 
992 B E Hernandez-Truyol, and J E Larson, n 551, 418. 
993 Ibid, 420. 
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cannot be reconciled with human dignity.’994 It is the conditions of the sale, the 
agreement, which make the different between slavery, consensual exploitation, and 
consensual labour resulting from an agreement/sale. Arguably, the law should provide 
additional protections to those who are potentially more vulnerable – clearly this 
category includes children, it may also include women, or sex workers in general. 
        During the drafting of the Trafficking Protocol, organisations such as the Global 
Alliance Against Trafficking in Women995 did not want the instrument to be 
overprotective or too paternalistic. But, even in the face of consent, exploitative activity 
should be criminalised and addressed. Consent may well be deemed probative as to the 
existence of human trafficking, but it should not be deemed probative as to the 
existence of serious exploitation. Consensual or forced, exploitative labour undermines 
human dignity.  
        The exercise of self-determination and free (or ‘free’) choice does not preclude the 
existence of exploitation which has been consented to. Simply because a woman 
agrees, in absence of a preferable choice, to service 16 men a day for an exploitatively 
low wage does not mean that she does not suffer ‘harm’, or at least that she does not 
have needs – for example - for assistance and support once discovered. This is 
particularly the case as it is evident that correct identification of victims of human 
trafficking is not always straightforward or correct. 
        If it is to be accepted that exploitation is the focus and that consent is irrelevant, 
then there is the potential to draft an instrument which supersedes the definition 
provided within the Trafficking Protocol and other relevant instruments,996 and which 
addresses trafficking regardless of consent. This approach, however, is rejected here - 
                                                 
994 Ibid, 394. 
995 See, Global Alliance Against Trafficking in Women <http://www.gaatw.net/> accessed 29 March 
2009. 
996 I.e the CoE Trafficking Convention and the EU 2011 Directive. 
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one who trafficks a human being who is deemed capable of choice cannot be treated in 
the same fashion as one who trafficks an inanimate object. On this basis, a distinction 
must be made between the agent who kidnaps their victim, and the agent who aids the 
‘victim’ in their migration into exploitative circumstances. This illustrates the fact that 
where human beings are concerned, responsibility must be apportioned accordingly: if 
it is accepted in a given situation that full, informed consent has been provided, then the 
‘agent’ who would otherwise be labelled a trafficker is perhaps little more than a 
facilitator in the exploitative migration process. Yet, they must be held to account for 
their part in the facilitated migration and subsequent exploitation of the person in 
question.  
        If it is to be accepted that one can give full, informed consent in a trafficking 
context, then ‘consensual facilitated migration for the purpose of exploitation’, or 
‘smuggling of humans for the purpose of exploitation’, is a new category existing as a 
result of the loophole created by the grey area between the Trafficking and Smuggling 
Protocols (and therefore the other main instruments discussed in this thesis which form 
the anti-trafficking regime). As the discussion in this Chapter has highlighted, the lines 
between these categories are often blurred anyway, without there being need for a black 
spot category created by the consent debate. Yet, this black spot category clearly exists 
– either because consent is clearly given, consent is ostensible, or the presence of any 
coercion etc is not clearly, objectively present according, for example, to the 
‘indicators’ used by those charged with identifying trafficked persons.997 This is 
inherently problematic, and exactly what this means for the consenting ‘victim’ will be 
discussed in Chapter 4.998 
                                                 
997 See, Chapter 4, Part VI, section C. 
998 See, Chapter 4, Part IX, section B. 
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        However we are to proceed on this issue, the focus on the harm done999 must be 
retained, and the aim of anti-trafficking legislation must be kept well in mind. 'There is 
… abundant authority for saying that no consent can render that innocent which is in 
fact dangerous.'1000 The public interest surely lies more in combating exploitative 
trafficking and migration-related activity than in becoming tangled in the issue of 
consent.  
        The following Chapter will consider – in more depth than previously done in the 
thesis - the International legal regime applicable to victims of trafficking. This will 
include discussion and analysis of the bespoke regime applicable to formally trafficked 
victims, the international legal protection regime which is applicable to all human 
beings in States who are party to these regimes, and finally discussion as to what 
concessions may be offered to the ‘consensually trafficked’. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
999 See, B Balos, n 14, 149. 
1000 Mathew J., in Coney [1882] 8 QBD 534, 547. 
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 Chapter 4 
The Treatment of Victims  
 
Introduction 
 
There are in the UK an undetermined but considerable number of irregular migrants. It 
must be borne in mind from the outset that States have a very broad right to set the 
policy and adopt the law to control the entry to and to regulate the residence in and 
removal from their territory of non-nationals.1001 Some of these people will, however, 
be entitled to some protection against removal, despite their irregular entry. These 
entitlements may be general - all persons in the UK are, for example, entitled not to be 
removed to a destination where there is a real risk of serious ill treatment. The 
entitlements may apply only to members of a specific class, such as refugees, who 
enjoy a more nuanced protection against removal. To this list of groups to which these 
considerations apply, we can now add victims of human trafficking. 
        Previous Chapters have established the tripartite nature of the trafficking process 
according to the internationally recognised definition of ‘trafficking in persons’. 
Accordingly, when all three criteria are satisfied, a person can be said to have been 
trafficked and is a victim of human trafficking, who is entitled to certain standards of 
treatment. Those who have consented to the process may fall outside of the definition 
of human trafficking, and are, on the face of it, not subject to any bespoke assistance, 
support or protection which would otherwise be offered as a result of their being 
                                                 
1001 Moustaquim v Belgium (12313/86) [1991] ECHR. 
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conferred ‘victim’ status. Such persons are not considered to be ‘victims’ in a 
trafficking context. 
        The instruments considered throughout this thesis which form the anti-trafficking 
regime include Articles outlining the purpose of the instrument, which include 
protecting and assisting victims - and respecting their human rights. The growing 
recognition of this criminal activity and the human rights abuses that it involves have 
resulted in legislation and action on an international, European, and domestic level. 
Policy objectives, however, have until recently been predominantly geared towards the 
criminalisation and prosecution of traffickers. Efforts to provide for victim support, and 
show adequate consideration for the many trafficked victims, who may be unable or 
unwilling to cooperate with state authorities in criminal proceedings, and give evidence 
against their traffickers, have been insufficient. A human rights based, victim-centred 
approach should take account of the effect that trafficking and any subsequent sexual 
exploitation has on the victims, and provide for their support and rehabilitation. 
        The drafting and enactment of any legislation to deal with trafficking must cover 
the prohibition, prosecution, and punishment of traffickers, as well as the protection of 
victims. Legislation which deals with only some of these aspects must be complimented 
by legislation to address the other(s). Piotrowicz correctly observes that these two 
aspects of trafficking – namely the prosecution of traffickers and the protection of 
victims – are not separable, and therefore should not be dealt with separately.1002 All 
too often, trafficking victims are treated not as victims but as criminals, either because 
of their involvement in prostitution, or their status as an illegal immigrant.  
        In some cases, trafficked victims may be deported because of their immigration 
status, with insufficient regard for the gravity of their situation – this may be 
                                                 
1002 R Piotrowicz, ‘European Initiatives in The Protection Of Victims Of Trafficking Who Give Evidence 
Against Their Traffickers’(2002) International Journal of Refugee Law, vol 14, 263 – 278, 263. 
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particularly so where the ‘indicators’1003 used by those charged with identifying victims 
are lacking, or fail to bring to the surface the presence of ‘coercion’ etc, giving the 
trafficked victim the appearance of being yet another ‘smuggled’ (and willing) 
prostitute.  
        Further to this, there may be borderline cases of trafficking, or cases where the 
conditions experienced by the exploited individual have been so harsh that, although she 
may have/appear to have ostensibly consented and therefore not be formally trafficked, 
she is still in need of some support and assistance. We do not know the proportions of 
consenting women to smuggled women to trafficked women, but we do know that the 
number of trafficking convictions is small,1004 and yet there is evidence of the presence 
of large numbers of foreign sex workers in the UK.1005 It seems unlikely that all of these 
will be consensual prostitutes. There is, thus, a real problem - which a strict application 
of the trafficking law would appear to make worse – of what to do about ‘victims’ of 
exploitation, who, for one reason or another, are not able to bring themselves within the 
formal trafficked category. 
        This Chapter aims to analyse the international, European and UK stance taken with 
respect to providing for victims of trafficking for the purpose of sexual exploitation to 
date. Although this Chapter necessarily enquires into the range of benefits that the 
victim might be entitled to, it also raises and considers the centrally important matter of 
                                                 
1003 See, Part VI, section C of this Chapter. 
1004 In the period 2009 - 2010, 106 prosecutions were secured for human trafficking offences. See Mr 
Hanson, Written Answers to Questions, Hansard HC, Column 935W (30 March 2010). Also see, for 
example, UK Human Trafficking Centre, ‘United Kingdom Pentameter 2, Statistics of Victims recovered 
and Suspects arrested during the operational phase’, which cites 15 convictions for trafficking offences 
secured as a result of the operation, full document available at <http://www.soca.gov.uk/about-
soca/library/doc_download/122-uk-pentameter-2-statistics.pdf> accessed 01 July 2011, and See also 
Nick Davies, n 111. 
1005 Barbara Follet MP stated in November 2007 that ‘10 years ago 85 per cent. of women in brothels 
were UK citizens now 85 per cent. are from outside the UK.’ See Barbara Follet MP, Hansard HC vol 
467 Column 537W (19 November 2007). Also, see Project Acumen, n 92, and see, UK Human 
Trafficking Centre, ‘United Kingdom Pentameter 2, Statistics of Victims recovered and Suspects arrested 
during the operational phase.’  
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how we decide effectively who is a victim and how we deal with those who are. 
Ultimately, conclusions will be drawn to the effect that the danger is that the 
implementation of the State obligations as regards victim support measures in the UK 
still does not go far enough in achieving adequate victim protection. It will be shown 
that there are gains to be made from adopting measures which are yet more sympathetic 
to the victim than those in place at present. Further, a case will be sketched out for 
consideration of offering concessions in the form of support and assistance to the 
‘consensually trafficked’, for reasons which will be elucidated throughout the Chapter. 
        Primarily, Part I will consider the previous poor performance of the UK 
Government as regards implementation or consideration of victim support measures. 
Part II will detail the progressive approach to assisting trafficked victims which has 
been adopted in Italy. Part III will address why there is a need for a victim-centred 
approach, and is followed by consideration of the effects (upon State Parties and 
trafficked victims) of ratification of the Council of Europe Convention on Action 
against Trafficking in Human Beings, in Part IV. Part V addresses recent EU activity – 
specifically the 2011 Directive, and the victim assistance measures provided for within. 
Part VI deals with the all-important issue of victim identification and outlines the 
procedure currently in place, as well as its shortcomings. Part VII addresses the issue of 
non-criminalisation of trafficked persons who have committed offences as a result of 
having been trafficked, and Part VIII considers international protection for the trafficked 
person available beyond the bespoke regime implemented as a result of the main anti-
trafficking instruments. Finally, Part IX makes recommendations for dealing with 
trafficked persons and the ‘consensually trafficked’, thereby considering potential 
improvements to the current system and explicitly calling for a more inclusive regime 
which makes concessions for the ostensibly consenting trafficked person. 
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I. Victim Protection – the UK’s Previous Poor Performance 
 
It has been suggested that the UK is one of the main destination countries for victims of 
human trafficking.1006 The presence of any trafficked victims in a country signifies that 
an approach that accommodates the needs of victims is required. However, consistent 
poor performance in respect of these victims’ rights in the UK has meant that even an 
adequate minimum standard has not previously been achieved. Limited initiatives have 
been in existence, such as The Poppy Project,1007 yet even this project has had limited 
reach in terms of actually assisting and supporting victims of trafficking.1008 This 
consistent poor performance in respect of victims’ rights in UK will now be considered, 
with reference to the relevant legislation and policy. 
 
 
 
                                                 
1006 See, Europol, n 37, 5, where this claim is made, and see also Nick Davies, n 111, 2009, which 
suggests that the results of Operation Pentameter 2 potentially show that trafficking into the UK has been 
somewhat overestimated. 
1007 The Poppy Project is funded by the Office for Criminal Justice Reform and offers accommodation 
and support to female victims of trafficking. This project has played a valuable role in identifying and 
supporting victims of human trafficking.  See the Poppy Project, 
<http://www.eaves4women.co.uk/POPPY_Project/POPPY_Project.php> accessed 16 June 2007. 
1008 The criteria for receiving help and support from this organisation have previously been quite 
restrictive and therefore lacked applicability in respect of many trafficking victims (see, for example, UK 
Action Plan on Tackling Human Trafficking, n 224, 51). Criteria included having worked as a prostitute 
within the last 30 days, and having shown the will to co-operate with the authorities. A four-week period 
of support is provided while the victim makes this decision. Beyond the Poppy project, various 
independently funded organisations have set up victim support schemes (see UK Action Plan on 
Tackling Human Trafficking, n 224, 52). Victims have had the option, regardless of whether they choose 
to cooperate with the authorities, to apply for asylum or humanitarian protection (see UK Borders 
Agency ‘Humanitarian Protection’ 
<http://www.ukba.homeoffice.gov.uk/sitecontent/documents/policyandlaw/asylumpolicyinstructions/apis
/humanitarianprotection.pdf?view=Binary> accessed 21 Feb 2010. Also within recent years, 
parliamentary debate within the UK has at times focused upon victim incentive schemes and evidence for 
residence bargaining in a human trafficking context (see for example, Lord Filkin, Lords Hansard, 
Written Answers, Hansard HL vol 645 Column WA143 (10 March 2003)) although not all were in 
favour of this approach. Indeed, it was felt by some that support for victims should in no way be 
dependent upon their cooperation in the criminal process (see, for example, The Earl of Sandwich, 
Hansard HL vol 652 Column 555 (10 July 2003)). 
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A. European Union activity: Council Directive 2004/81/EC  
 
Activity within the EU resulted in a Council Directive in 2004 on the residence permit 
issued to third-country nationals who are victims of trafficking in human beings or who 
have been the subject of an action to facilitate illegal immigration, who cooperate with 
the competent authorities (2004 Council Directive).1009 Article 6(1) requires the 
establishment by Member States of a reflection period, during which the victim may 
consider whether or not that to cooperate with the relevant authorities. Yet, it states that 
‘[t]he duration and starting point of the period referred to in the first subparagraph shall 
be determined according to national law…’, thereby allowing for much variation in the 
actual recovery and reflection periods adopted by different Member States. This 
Directive has been subject to criticism from various corners for the lack of incentive for 
victims to cooperate,1010 and also because, as the title implies, it offers protection to 
victims only in exchange for cooperation with state authorities.1011 This illustrates the 
fact that trafficking is a matter of both criminal law and human rights law, and this 
Directive appears to exist predominantly to satisfy the former.  
        This type of ‘evidence for residence’ bargaining at best envisages a quasi-
sympathetic approach to the victim in return for their cooperation with state authorities 
in the criminal proceedings, and provides no scope at all for victim support measures 
outside of those necessary to effectively induce the victim into such cooperation.  
                                                 
1009 Council Directive 2004/81/EC of 29 April 2004 on the residence permit issued to third-country 
nationals who are victims of trafficking in human beings or who have been the subject of an action to 
facilitate illegal immigration, who cooperate with the competent authorities  [2004] OJ L 261/19. 
1010 R Piotrowicz, n 243, 263. 
1011 See, for example, Human Rights Watch Briefing Paper, ‘Commentary on the European Commission 
Proposal for a Council Directive “on the short-term residence permits issued to victims of action to 
facilitate illegal immigration or trafficking in human beings who cooperate with the competent 
authorities”’ (1 July 2002). 
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Further to this, the offer of victim support is qualified in that even a willingness to 
cooperate is inadequate for the granting of a residence permit if the victim is not 
considered to be sufficiently ‘useful’ to the criminal proceedings.1012 Furthermore, the 
duration of the residence permit, if granted, is ‘linked to the length of the relevant 
national proceedings’.1013 The 2004 Council Directive was an attempt to tackle growth 
in illegal immigration and the increasing development of human trafficking and 
smuggling networks, and the Commission Proposal for the Council Directive openly 
admitted that it is not concerned with victim protection.1014  
        This approach is less victim-centred and more functional in terms of securing 
border integrity. Although the issuance of residence permits, temporary or otherwise, is 
a contentious issue in that there is the potential for abuse by those claiming to be 
victims of human trafficking, the previous proposals and legislation have failed to 
sufficiently take account of the vulnerable position of the trafficked victim who may be 
put seriously at risk from deportation, resulting from her status as an illegal immigrant. 
Many international human rights instruments envisage enforcement measures against 
illegal migrants, but a human rights based, victim centred approach should take better 
account of victim vulnerability, rather than simply regarding them as a nuisance who is 
on the wrong side of the law.  
                                                 
1012 Article 10 of the Commission Proposal for a Council Directive on the residence permit issued to 
third-country nationals who are victims of trafficking in human beings or who have been the subject of 
an action to facilitate illegal immigration, who cooperate with the competent authorities. 
1013 Article 1, 2004 Council Directive, n 1009. 
1014 Commission Proposal for a Council Directive on the residence permit issued to third-country 
nationals who are victims of trafficking in human beings or who have been the subject of an action to 
facilitate illegal immigration, who cooperate with the competent authorities, Explanatory Memorandum, 
2.3, COM (2002) 71 Final states that ‘This proposal for a Directive is concerned with a residence permit 
and defines the conditions for its issue. In this sense, and to the extent that certain provisions on the 
conditions of residence constitute protective measures (starting with the residence permit itself, which 
offers de facto "protection" against deportation), the proposal may appear to serve to protect victims. 
This is not, however, the case: the proposed Directive introduces a residence permit and is not 
concerned with protection of either witnesses or victims. This is neither its aim nor its legal basis.’ 
(Emphasis added) 
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        The Directive offers a form of bargain which is inappropriate with respect to the 
gravity of harm potentially suffered by victims of trafficking activity. Not only is it 
unsatisfactory on this basis, but also on the basis that the incentives offered to those 
who choose to give evidence are limited and inadequate; this is ultimately a one-sided 
bargain. Lack of victim cooperation is a definite barrier to effectively combating 
trafficking, but lack of incentive does not invite cooperation. Trafficked victims are 
frequently suspicious or even frightened of the authorities, which similarly does not 
encourage cooperation. The fear or suspicion can occur either as a result of their 
anxiety about deportation, or from a darker fear that the authorities may at best be 
tolerant, and at worst be complicit in, the illegal activities.1015 
        Although many EU Member States are subject to this Directive, the UK 
unfortunately chose to ‘opt out’, and therefore is not subject to its content and is 
consequently not required to observe the ‘reflection period’ provided for by the 
Directive. Tough stance on immigration has at times meant that victims of serious 
abuse, such as trafficked persons, have been swept aside in favour of the interests of 
UK border integrity.1016 
 
B. The UN Trafficking Protocol 
 
The Trafficking Protocol is one of the more recent comprehensive international 
instruments to address the trafficking phenomenon. Guidelines on International 
Protection state that the Trafficking Protocol ‘represents a crucial step forward in 
efforts to combat trafficking and ensure full respect for the rights of the individuals 
                                                 
1015 See, Chapter 1, Part I, section C, subsection iii, on the corruption of State Officials. 
1016 See, for example, R (Limbuela, Tesema, Adam) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2005] 
UKHL 66 (2006) 1 A.C. 396. 
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affected by trafficking.’1017 The Trafficking Protocol evidently envisages some form of 
victim support, assistance and protection, as it states in Article 2 that one of the aims is 
‘[t]o protect and assist the victims of such trafficking, with full respect for their human 
rights’, yet the Trafficking Protocol did little to yield a more favourable approach as 
regards victims of trafficking. The main focus of the Protocol was crime control;1018 the 
same can be said of the Council Directive discussed in the preceding section. 
        The relevant provisions on the treatment of victims are Articles 6, 7, and 8, located 
in Part II of the Protocol. Article 6(3) states that: 
 
Each State Party shall consider implementing measures to provide for the 
physical, psychological and social recovery of victims of trafficking in 
persons, including, in appropriate cases, in cooperation with non-
governmental organizations, other relevant organizations and other 
elements of civil society, and, in particular, the provision of … (housing, 
counselling – see full text of the article for exhaustive list) (Emphasis 
added) 
 
The tentative language used does not provide a solid obligation for States to actually 
take any action, and this minimum standard envisaged by the Protocol may be 
interpreted as little more than an afterthought by some state parties: only a limited few 
willingly implemented noteworthy victim-friendly schemes of their own volition.1019  
        The issuance of temporary or permanent residence may once again be ‘considered’ 
by States, by virtue of Article 7(1), with Article 7(2) requesting that this be done with 
                                                 
1017 ‘Guidelines on International Protection: The Application of Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention 
and/or 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees to victims of trafficking and persons at risk of 
being trafficked’ (2007) International Journal of Refugee Law, vol 19 (372) para 2. 
1018 Ibid, para 7. 
1019 Examples include Germany and Italy – the latter is discussed in Part II, below. 
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‘appropriate consideration (given) to humanitarian and compassionate factors.’ Article 
8 addresses repatriation of victims.1020  
        The UK implemented no bespoke victim assistance measures to speak of.1021 In 
order to achieve signatures and ratifications, concessions must at times be made.1022 
Yet overall, in terms of support, assistance and protection for victims of trafficking, the 
Trafficking Protocol has a lack of bite and therefore may be termed somewhat of a 
toothless instrument in this particular respect. The tentative language of the Protocol 
requires and therefore achieves little in the way of victim protection and support. 
 
II. More Favourable Conditions from Abroad: The Example of Italy 
 
The Explanatory Memorandum to the Commission Proposal1023 for an EU Council 
Directive (discussed above)1024 observes that States have the freedom to enact more 
favourable conditions for trafficked victims. This, coupled with the tentative language 
of the Trafficking Protocol, effectively transfers responsibility on to Member States to 
deal with these victims in the way they deem to be most suitable, and leaves the door 
                                                 
1020 In summary, Article 8 of the UN Trafficking Protocol and its relevant subsections provides for origin 
States to ‘facilitate and accept … the return of that person without undue or unreasonable delay’; that 
repatriation ‘shall preferably be voluntary’; that origin States ‘verify whether a (trafficked victim) is its 
national or had the right of permanent residence’; that where proper documentation is lacking, the origin 
State of whom the victim was a national or resident will issue (on request) the necessary documents for 
travel etc; that ‘[t]his article shall be without prejudice to any right afforded to victims of trafficking in 
persons by any domestic law of the receiving State Party’; and also ‘without prejudice to any applicable 
bilateral or multilateral agreement or arrangement that governs, in whole or in part, the return of victims 
of trafficking in persons.’ This must all be done consistently with ‘due regard for the safety of that 
person’. 
1021 Beyond the Poppy Project, which was set up post signature but pre-ratification of the Trafficking 
Protocol. 
1022 Take, for example, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against 
Women, (adopted in 1979 by the United Nations General Assembly, entered into force 3 September 
1981) - one of the most highly ratified yet also most highly reserved Conventions in existence today. 
1023 Commission Proposal for a Council Directive on the residence permit issued to third-country 
nationals who are victims of trafficking in human beings or who have been the subject of an action to 
facilitate illegal immigration, who cooperate with the competent authorities, Explanatory Memorandum, 
2.3, COM (2002). 
1024 See, Part  I, section A, above. 
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open for a range of reactions. At one end of the spectrum the United Kingdom has 
demonstrated tough policies, with trafficked victims at times being subject to rapid (and 
at times wholly unprincipled) deportation.1025 This is in stark contrast to the approach 
taken in Italy, where significant provisions relating to the provision of residence 
permits for trafficked victims were adopted in 1998.1026  
        Article 18 of Legislative Decree 286/1998 provides for issuance of a special 
residence permit ‘enabling the foreign citizen to escape from a situation of abuse and 
conditioning perpetrated by a criminal organisation and to participate in a social 
assistance and integration programme.’1027 The legislation goes on to specify how such 
a situation could be established.1028 
        The permit can be issued whether or not the victim chooses to cooperate with law 
enforcement authorities.1029 It promotes opportunities for victims to reintegrate into 
‘normal’ society, and pursue education or employment. This period of reflection is not 
a ‘victim inducement scheme’1030 such as that provided for in the 2004 Council 
Directive, but ‘a means of extracting the individual from an intolerable situation 
without imposing legislative cooperation’.1031 Such an approach takes a victim-centred 
approach to dealing with victims of human trafficking, whereas offering support and 
protection, albeit limited, solely in return for cooperation with state authorities in the 
                                                 
1025 See, for example, Alan Travis, ‘Sex trafficking victim wins substantial damages from Home Office’, 
Guardian, (April 2011) <http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2011/apr/11/sex-trafficking-home-office-
damages?INTCMP=SRCH>  accessed May 01 2011. 
1026 See Article 18 of Legislative Decree 286/1998. 
1027 STOP Programme, ‘Article 18: Protection of Victims of Trafficking and Fight Against Crime (Italy 
and the European Scenarios) Research Report’, 41.  
1028 Such a situation could be established through, for example, ‘…the existence of situations of violence 
or serious exploitation and of concrete danger for the personal safety of the foreigner, because of his/her 
attempts to escape from the criminal organisation, or because of statements made in the course of 
criminal proceedings. These prerequisites must be ascertained in the course of police operations, 
investigation, proceedings undertaken concerning specific offences (Offences indicated in Art 380, Code 
of Criminal Procedure of Italy, enacted in 1930) or in the context of assistance provided by social 
services.’ 
1029 Article 18 of Legislative Decree 286/1998, sections 7.2 and 7.3. 
1030 R Piotrowicz, n 1002, 263.  
1031 Hansard, Baroness Elles, Hansard HL vol 651 Column 549 (10 July 2003). 
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criminal proceedings merely treats the victim as a pawn who is discarded once their 
‘usefulness’ has come to an end. The unspecified reflection period provided for by the 
2004 Council Directive essentially serves as a period in which the women may decide 
whether or not to assist in the prosecution, as opposed to a period of actual recovery. 
During this period, the victim’s residence in the destination State is merely ‘tolerated, 
until such time as the competent authority can rule on their future status’.1032 Such an 
attitude of temporary ‘tolerance’ appears to view the presence of a victim as a mere 
expedient, and once they have been deemed useful or otherwise, their presence may be 
terminated forthwith.  
        Although the victim may have access to assistance and care during this period, its 
limited time span – determined by the Member State - means that the benefit will also 
be limited, especially given the imminent threat of deportation which hangs over the 
victims who decide not to cooperate. The Italian system really allows for the victim to 
begin the recovery process and reintegration in to society. Although the 2004 Council 
Directive allows for access into the labour market, education, and vocational training 
whilst victims hold a valid temporary residence permit,1033 this offer rings rather 
hollow when it is realised that once the ‘usefulness’ of the victim has expired, so too 
will the residence permit and the employment and education opportunities along with it.  
                                                
        This is a saving grace of the Italian system, as permits can be renewed for a further 
period of a year after an initial grant of six months on the basis that either the victim is 
assisting in the prosecution proceedings or that she is employed or enrolled in an 
education programme at the time of expiration of the initial six month permit.1034 The 
 
1032 Article 8 of the Proposal for a Council Framework Decision on combating the sexual exploitation of 
children and child pornography, COM (2000) 854 final/2.  
1033 Article 11, 2004 Council Directive, n 1009. 
1034 Anti-Slavery International, ‘Human Traffic, human rights: redefining victim protection’ 
<http://www.antislavery.org/homepage/resources/humantraffichumanrights.htm> accessed 7 August 
2009 
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Joint Committee on Human Rights (JCHR) has praised the Italian legislation by stating 
that ‘…we were highly impressed by the way in which the proactive victim-centred 
approach adopted in the country has allowed such high numbers of trafficking victims 
to be supported and ultimately integrated into Italian society.’1035 
        The unspecified period of reflection offered by the 2004 Council Directive, and 
similarly the 30 day period provided through the UK Poppy Project can be compared 
with the slightly more accommodating 45 days provided for in Belgium under the 1994 
Circular,1036 and contrasted with the three month reflection period provided for under 
the B9 regulation1037 in the Netherlands. Both Belgium and the Netherlands recently 
ratified the Council of Europe Convention.1038 The reflection period is essential not 
only to the wellbeing of the victim but also in enabling the victim to make a properly 
thought out decision regarding whether or not to cooperate with state authorities in the 
criminal proceedings. However, the requirements of adequate victim protection go well 
beyond the provision of a minimum period of recovery and decision making. 
        Of course, the Italian system requires correct identification of trafficked persons so 
that Article 18 might be invoked. Therefore, it is essential that those who come into 
contact with trafficked persons are effectively trained in order that they recognise 
potential victims. Further, the victim, once identified, must be informed of her right to 
invoke the Article. It has been documented that in certain parts of Italy – notably 
                                                 
1035 Joint Committee on Human Rights Twenty-Sixth Report, n 31. 
1036 Circular regarding the issuance of residence documents and work permits to migrant victims of 
trafficking in human beings (7 July 1994, Belgium).  
1037 Circular for immigrants: regulation B9 (2000) (formerly B17 (1988), The Netherlands). 
1038 List of signatures and ratifications available at 
<http://conventions.coe.int/treaty/Commun/ChercheSig.asp?NT=197&CM=0&DF=&CL=ENG> 
accessed 01 June 2011.  
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Rimini – proactive police have promoted the use of this Article to the benefit of victims 
on many occasions.1039  
 
III. The Need for a Victim-Centred Approach 
 
The JCHR observes that with respect to anti-trafficking legislation, ‘[t]he focus should 
be shifted from immigration control to the prevention of exploitation of migrants and 
workers, and care of victims.’1040 The legislative framework within the UK has lacked 
this focus, and immigration legislation and policy has presented an obstacle to the 
protection of victims’ rights. Notably, the reference by the JCHR to the exploitation of 
migrants and workers makes no mention of consent. Since the UK was not subject to 
the Council Directive or (until recently) subject to any obligations arising from the CoE 
Trafficking Convention, and the requirements of the UN Trafficking Protocol in respect 
of victim protection were minimal, no comprehensive victim protection framework 
existed and victims drew their rights from the Refugee Convention and the ECHR. 
This, coupled with restricted access to public funds and healthcare, highlights the needs 
for an approach which caters for victims.  
        The UK Action Plan on Tackling Human Trafficking recognises that:  
 
… the impact of the crime itself is often exasperated [sic] by other factors 
that can affect non-UK national victims such as: isolation; language 
                                                 
1039 See M Ventrella, ‘Protecting Victims of Trafficking in Human Beings in the UK. The Italian ‘Rimini 
Method’ that could influence the British Approach’ Journal of Migration and Refugee Issues, Vol 3 No2, 
64 – 86 
1040 Joint Committee on Human Rights Twenty-Sixth Report, n 31, para 118. 
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barriers; cultural differences; unfamiliar surroundings; and possible 
irregular immigration status.1041  
 
        The UK Borders Agency (UKBA) has issued general guidance on handling 
victims of human trafficking to staff in asylum screen units and regional asylum 
teams,1042 in which it highlights various issues such as the potential distressed or 
traumatised state of the victim, and resulting trauma-induced mental or physical illness. 
For these reasons, amongst others, trafficked victims constitute a particularly 
vulnerable body of persons and therefore need to be treated accordingly. 
        In 2002, the Commissioner for Justice and Home Affairs observed that the 
Commission Proposal for the 2004 Council Directive (considered above) was:  
 
… only one element of a comprehensive strategy which must strike a clear 
balance between the repressive aspect of fighting crime and respect for 
human rights and aid for victims.1043  
 
There has been a distinct lack of comprehensive strategy to aid the victim who cannot 
or will not cooperate with State authorities in the criminal proceedings against their 
traffickers, and where the potential for such aid does exist, it appears to have been 
largely ignored by the UK. The development of (and adherence to) a minimum 
international standard as to assistance, protection and support for victims is necessary to 
                                                 
1041 Home Office and Scottish Executive, n 254, 47. 
1042 UK Borders Agency, ‘Victims of Trafficking’ 
<http://www.ukba.homeoffice.gov.uk/sitecontent/documents/policyandlaw/asylumprocessguidance/speci
alcases/guidance/victimsoftrafficking.pdf?view=Binary> accessed 15 April 2010. 
1043 Europa Press Releases, Combating illegal immigration and trafficking in human beings: 
Commission’s proposal for a residence permit for victims who cooperate with the authorities reminds the 
Member States that the phenomenon cannot be tackled at national level alone, (Brussels, 12 February 
2002). 
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ensure that these victims do not continue to suffer once they have become emancipated 
from their traffickers or current ‘owners’.  
        Ventrella calls for the provision of permanent residence permits to victims of 
trafficking as opposed to consideration of the needs of each victim on a case-by-case 
basis.1044 It cannot ultimately be said that destination States have an absolute duty to 
provide for rehabilitation or residence as regards victims of trafficking but they have 
some duties towards these people which cannot be satisfied if they are peremptorily 
removed under ordinary immigration law. What is needed is a human-rights based, 
victim-centred approach which has procedures adequate enough to determine who is a 
victim and to identify what their rights are, so that they might be effectively accessed. 
Such a regime undoubtedly requires positive action by destination State authorities to 
seek out potential victims and to assist them in gaining access to the facilities which the 
State provides. 
        Recently, international recognition of the rights of victims of crime and human 
rights abuses is increasingly evident,1045 and a UK response is evident through various 
Government measures such as the introduction of a Statutory Code of Practice for 
Victims of Crime1046 and signature and ratification of the CoE Trafficking Convention. 
At first blush, the CoE Trafficking Convention contains much stronger provisions with 
respect to victim protection than the UN Trafficking Protocol. The obligations placed 
upon state parties by the provisions of the CoE Convention appear to be much more 
onerous, and of considerable benefit to the victim. The success or otherwise of 
                                                 
1044 M Ventrella, n 1039, 64. 
1045 See M Cherif Bassiouni, ‘International Recognition of Victim’s Rights’ (2006) Human Rights Law 
Review 6, 203 – 279. 
1046 Home Office ‘Statutory Code of Practice for Victims of Crime’ 
<http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/documents/victims-code-of-practice> accessed 12 May 2011. 
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implementation in the UK of this Convention with respect to improved victim support 
will be evaluated later.1047 
        Human trafficking carries with it opportunities for human rights abuse. Although 
comprehensive victim-centred, human-rights led anti-trafficking legislation has not 
previously existed in any specific form in the UK, an applicable human rights 
framework has existed - albeit divorced from a specific trafficking nexus.1048 The UK 
has, at present, obligations under the ECHR, and the Refugee Convention, which are 
analysed in further depth below.1049  
        At present, those who do not qualify for refugee status can be considered for 
Humanitarian Protection1050 or Discretionary Leave1051 if they need to remain in the 
UK because of the reasons outlined above. A trail of cases1052 indicates the application 
of ECHR rights to the plight of asylum seekers, which can similarly be invoked in 
situations of human trafficking. These issues will be discussed at a later point in this 
Chapter.1053 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1047 Discussed from Part IV et seq., below. 
1048 See, S Egan ‘Protecting the victims of trafficking: problems and prospects’ (2008) European Human 
Rights Law Review, 106 – 119. 
1049 See, Part VIII, sections A – C for analysis of the Refugee Convention and Article 3 ECHR in terms 
of their applicability to trafficked victims.  
1050UK Borders Agency ‘Humanitarian Protection’ 
<http://www.ukba.homeoffice.gov.uk/sitecontent/documents/policyandlaw/asylumpolicyinstructions/apis
/humanitarianprotection.pdf?view=Binary> accessed 21 Feb 2010. 
1051 UK Borders Agency ‘Discretionary Leave’ 
<http://www.bia.homeoffice.gov.uk/sitecontent/documents/policyandlaw/asylumpolicyinstructions/apis/d
iscretionaryleave.pdf?view=Binary> accessed 21 Feb 2010. 
1052 See, for example, Soering v United Kingdom [1989] 11 EHRR 439, See R Lillich ‘The Soering Case’ 
(1991) 85 American Journal of International Law, 128, and Harris, O’Boyle and Warbrick, Law of the 
European Convention on Human Rights, DJ Harris, M O’Boyle, E P Bates, C M Buckley (eds) (Oxford 
2009) 79 – 90 for discussion on this point. 
1053 See, Part VIII, below. 
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 IV. Ratification of the Council of Europe Convention on Action against 
Trafficking in Human Beings 
 
The UK signed the Council of Europe Convention on Action against Trafficking in 
Human Beings1054 on 23 March 2007, thereby meeting the first point of action 
proposed in the UK Action Plan on Tackling Human Trafficking.1055 Ratification took 
place on December 18, 2008, and the Convention entered into force on 1st April 2009. 
Implementation is monitored by a Group of experts on action against trafficking in 
human beings (GRETA),1056 and the Committee of the Parties,1057 Effective 
implementation is essential in order for the requirements of the Trafficking Convention 
to have any force in national courts.1058  
        UK Government spokespersons responded positively as regards this milestone 
event.1059 Ratification of the Convention constitutes part of a UK agenda geared toward 
victim protection and punishment of their exploiters,1060 and the decision to sign and 
ratify came after measuring the risks against the wider benefits to be gained. The main 
concern was in respect of border integrity and immigration control as trafficking policy 
and ratification of the Convention inevitably impacts upon government targets, such as 
                                                 
1054 CoE Trafficking Convention, n 9. 
1055 Home Office and Scottish Executive, n 254, 76. 
1056 Established by Article 36 of the CoE Trafficking Convention. 
1057 Established by Article 37 of the CoE Trafficking Convention. 
1058 A Harvey ‘Human Trafficking – the road to ratification of the Council of Europe Convention Against 
Trafficking in Human Beings in the UK’ (2008) Journal of Immigration Asylum and Nationality Law, 
218 – 235, 219. 
1059 Jacqui Smith, then Home Secretary, stated with respect to this important event: ‘We have reached a 
major milestone today in the fight against trafficking by implementing measures that help us build on our 
existing efforts to turn the tables on traffickers and provide victims with protection, support and a voice 
in the criminal justice system. It is vital that European member states work together to stop this awful 
crime and I am determined that the UK will continue to play its part by supporting victims and bringing 
the perpetrators to justice.’ See UK Borders Agency, ‘New measures to boost United Kingdom fight 
against human trafficking’ (1 April 2009) 
<http://www.ukba.homeoffice.gov.uk/sitecontent/newsarticles/boosttoukfightaginsthumantraffic> 
accessed 3 July 2009, link no longer live. 
1060 Home Office and Scottish Executive, n 254, 76. 
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the aim to ‘ensure fair, controlled migration that protects the public and contributes to 
economic growth.’1061  
        The UK government showed initial reluctance to sign and ratify the Trafficking 
Convention, notably because although the aims of the Convention were broadly 
supported, there were concerns that ‘some of the provisions, such as the automatic 
granting of reflection periods and residence permits for trafficking victims, might act as 
‘pull’ factors to the UK.’1062 The JCHR rejected this argument in its Twenty-Sixth 
Report, stating that such concerns may be largely or entirely ‘unfounded’.1063 
 
A. The CoE Trafficking Convention: a Victim-Centred Approach 
 
It is stated in the UK Action Plan on Tackling Human Trafficking that support for 
victims ‘should go beyond providing safe and secure accommodation to include help in 
their recovery, and prevent re-trafficking or re-victimisation’.1064 The Council of 
Europe Convention requires the implementation of minimum standards in respect of 
victim protection and support, involvement of victims in the criminal justice system, 
increased prosecution of traffickers, and increased prevention of trafficking activity.1065 
This indicates a move toward a holistic approach to combating human trafficking, as 
                                                 
1061 Home Office ‘Impact Assessment of Ratification of the Council of Europe Convention on Action 
against Trafficking in Human Beings’ (6 October 2008) 3 
<http://www.ialibrary.berr.gov.uk/ImpactAssessment/?IAID=da0f3cecd6214381bef9e9514cb46afd> 
accessed 23 Jan 2009, link no longer live. 
1062 Home Office/Scottish Executive ‘Tackling Human Trafficking – Consultation on Proposals for a UK 
Action Plan’ (2006) 6 <http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/documents/cons-2006-tack-human-
trafficking/cons-2006-tackling-trafficking?view=Binary> accessed 12 Sept 2007. 
1063 The JCHR Stated that ‘The bulk of the evidence submitted by NGOs in this inquiry suggests … that 
such concerns are largely, if not entirely, unfounded. Nor did we find any evidence of a pull factor 
resulting in fraudulent claims to have been trafficked arising from Italy's Article 18 procedure. 
Safeguards exist within the Convention itself, so that reflection periods do not have to be provided if 
fraudulent claims are made. We therefore do not accept that there is any realistic likelihood that the 
Convention's provisions relating to reflection periods and residence permits would act as a pull factor for 
migration into the UK.’ See Joint Committee on Human Rights Twenty-Sixth Report, n 31, para 200. 
1064 Home Office and Scottish Executive, n 254, 47. 
1065 Home Office, n 1061, 1. 
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protecting and providing for victims as well as creating a hostile environment for 
traffickers complements the aim for reducing the harm caused by illegal immigration.  
        There is a difference, however, between an obligation to provide a systematic 
response and the obligation to protect individual rights. Systems, however efficient, 
may not prevent some exploitation. Where an individual complains that the system has 
not protected her, ideally, there would be an accessible and effective remedy to test 
whether she were right nor not. The Human Rights Act 1998 and the ECHR might do 
this, so long as potential deportees were given access to informed lawyers and there 
were a process by which adverse decisions could be challenged. 
        As regards assistance to and protection of victims of trafficking, implementation 
of the Convention required policy changes in various areas, which will now be 
considered. 
 
i. Recovery and Reflection Period 
 
Where there are ‘reasonable grounds’ to believe that an individual is a victim of 
trafficking, the CoE Trafficking Convention calls for the provision of a recovery and 
reflection period of at least 30 days.1066 Initial response in the UK was to provide a 
recovery and reflection period of 45 days, which could be extended in certain 
circumstances.1067 Amnesty International, amongst others, call for a more substantial 
period of 90 days,1068 particularly due to the alarming figures which relate to the 
various types of trauma suffered by trafficked persons.1069 
                                                 
1066 CoE Trafficking Convention, Article 13 
1067 Home Office, n 1061, 5. It is not specified what these ‘certain circumstances’ may be. 
1068 Amnesty International, ‘UK: Startling new report on trafficked women's health published, urgent call 
for protection of trafficked women’ (June 2006) 
<http://www.amnesty.org.uk/news_details.asp?NewsID=17013> accessed 12 Aug 2007 
1069 Ibid. 
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        It is envisaged that the decision as to whether ‘reasonable grounds’ exist in respect 
of each individual will be made in an average of 5 days following initial contact 
between a potential victim and a ‘first responder’.1070 The latter is envisaged as being 
the police, the UK Borders Agency, or another party entirely.1071 Therefore, a process 
is established for correct identification of an individual as a potential victim of 
trafficking, an essential pre-requisite to being granted a recovery and reflection period. 
While this decision is being made, temporary accommodation will be provided to those 
possible victims who are destitute. Evidently, correct identification has implications for 
the possible victim. This will be discussed further below.1072 
                                                
 
ii. Temporary Residence Permits and Other Victim Assistance and Support Measures 
 
On the face of it, the policy changes in the UK following implementation of the 
requirements of the Convention demonstrate a notable improvement when compared to 
the pre-Convention position, particularly in respect of the accommodating terms 
relating to the provision of residence periods. When the abovementioned reflection 
period has passed and it has been concluded that an individual is a victim of human 
trafficking, a residence permit should be granted where a victim is cooperating in 
criminal proceedings or an investigation, and/or, notably, where provision of a 
residence permit is deemed necessary owing to the victim’s ‘personal situation’.1073  
        The meanings of these terms are expanded upon in the Explanatory Report to the 
Convention, where it is stated that ‘[t]he personal situation requirement takes in a range 
 
1070 Home Office, n 1061, 5. 
1071 Home Office ‘Council of Europe Convention on Human Trafficking’ 
<http://www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk/humantrafficking005overview.pdf> accessed 12 Feb 
2010. 
1072 See, Part VI and sections therein, below, which discusses the requisite system for victim 
identification and its implementation in the UK, as well as its shortcomings. 
1073 Article 14. 
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of situations, depending on whether it is the victim’s safety, state of health, family 
situation or some other factor which has to be taken into account.’1074 The Home 
Office/Border and Immigration Agency judge that, in respect of the second category 
relating to the ‘personal situation’ of the victim, ‘a combination of our existing 
obligations on asylum and human rights and our Discretionary Leave policy already 
cover situations where an individual’s personal circumstances … make it necessary for 
them to remain in the UK.’1075 They further state that ‘we intend to extend 
discretionary leave to explicitly cover the first category as well.’1076  
                                                
        Following full implementation of Convention in the UK, where an individual 
qualifies for a residence permit, it will be granted for a minimum of one year.1077 This 
exceeds the provisions of the UN Trafficking Protocol. Although victim involvement in 
investigation and criminal proceedings is an integral part of the fight against human 
trafficking,1078 securing prosecution against the trafficker must not be the only focus of 
anti-trafficking legislation and policy. Participation in criminal proceedings or 
investigation may also be dependent upon the mental or physical well being of the 
victim, which provides yet another reason for securing adequate treatment and support 
of victims. 
        For some, however, the scope of the Council of Europe Convention is not 
sufficient. The Convention for the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against 
Women (CEDAW) Committee Report ‘invites the State party to give consideration to 
granting victims of trafficking indefinite leave to remain.’1079 Ventrella calls for the 
 
1074 Explanatory Report to the CoE Trafficking Convention, n 248, 184. 
1075 Home Office, n 1061, 6. 
1076 Ibid. 
1077 Ibid. 
1078 By late 2008, only one recorded prosecution had been secured in the UK without the involvement of 
the victim, see Home Office, n 1061, 8. 
1079 OHCHR ‘Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against 
Women: United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland’, (Committee on the Elimination of 
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imposition of permanent residence permits for trafficking victims.1080 The practical 
implications of this mean that it is really not a viable option; the Council of Europe 
Convention attempts to offer a more practical and realistic approach i.e. residence 
permits where needed, and repatriation where a more lengthy or permanent measure is 
not needed. The UN Trafficking Protocol refers to the repatriation of victims 
‘…without undue or unreasonable delay’,1081 but that return should preferably be 
voluntary.1082 CoE Trafficking Convention also states that repatriation shall preferably 
be voluntary, and be done ‘with due regard for the rights, safety and dignity of that 
person and for the status of any legal proceedings related to the fact that the person is a 
victim’.1083 Not all trafficking victims necessarily wish to remain in the destination 
country.1084 The CoE Trafficking Convention position is that involuntary removal or 
repatriation is a last resort, and will only take place where it is safe to do so.1085 
        Under the CoE Trafficking Convention, States are required to protect the identity 
and private life of victims.1086 Furthermore, States are required to ‘such legislative or 
other measures as may be necessary to assist victims in their physical, psychological 
and social recovery’1087 which include giving assistance in terms of providing 
accommodation and medical treatment, and access to counselling and interpreters etc. 
Obligations are also imposed as regards providing access to legal assistance and free 
legal aid, as well as to compensation from the perpetrators.1088 
  
                                                                                                                                                        
Discrimination Against Women, Forty-first session, 30 June – 18 July 2008) at 36, 
<http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cedaw/docs/CEDAW.C.GBR.CO.6.pdf> accessed 01 July 2009. 
1080 M Ventrella, n 1039, 69 -70. 
1081 Article 8(1). 
1082 Article 8(2). 
1083 Article 16(2). 
1084 Home Office and Scottish Executive, n 254, 59. 
1085 Ibid. 
1086 Article 11. 
1087 Article 12. 
1088 Article 15. 
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 V. Recent European Union activity – The Directive of the European Parliament 
and of the Council on preventing and combating trafficking in human beings, and 
protecting victims        
 
Very recent EU action has culminated in the Directive of the European Parliament and 
of the Council on preventing and combating trafficking in human beings, and protecting 
victims (EU 2011 Directive).1089 The UK Government initially proposed not to opt in to 
this directive.1090 The possibility that the Government might review its position was, 
however, not ruled out.1091 As well as the claim that the UK was already compliant, it 
was stated that opting in would have the effect of making provisions mandatory which 
are currently discretionary.1092 The Government were therefore keen to avoid being 
bound by provisions which would apparently be ‘against our interests.’1093 This 
continues the pattern of the Government showing a certain reluctance to concede to 
provisions which are increasingly accommodating the interests of victims of human 
trafficking.1094  
        The response from CARE1095 was highly critical of this position, on the basis that 
the UK ‘was not complaint in a number of key areas and that without the Directive (or 
some other identical provision) British provisions for the victims of trafficking would 
                                                 
1089 EU 2011 Directive, n 10. 
1090 The Prime Minister on 15 September 2010 justified the choice not to opt in on the basis that that the 
Directive would add nothing of value to British anti-trafficking law, stating that ‘[w]e have put 
everything that is in the Directive in place.’ See Hansard HC, column 873 (15 September 2010). 
1091 Home Office, ‘Home Office Defends Position on Human Trafficking’ 31 August 2010 
<http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/media-centre/news/trafficking-directive> accessed 01 Dec 2011. 
1092 It was stated that ‘[o]pting in now would also require us to make mandatory the provisions which are 
currently discretionary in UK law. These steps would reduce the scope for professional discretion and 
flexibility and might divert already limited resources.’ See Home Office, Ibid. 
1093 Home Office, n 1091. 
1094 See, Chapter 4, Part I for discussion of the UK’s past poor performance as regards catering for the 
needs of trafficked victims. 
1095 A registered UK Charity – see, CARE, n 219. 
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become weaker than those of other Member States.’1096 Various areas other were also 
singled out for criticism.1097  
        In March 2011, the Government announced that it had reviewed its position and 
that it had the broad intention to apply to opt in to the Directive now that there was a 
finalised text, stating that ‘The new text still does not contain any measures that would 
significantly change the way the UK fights trafficking.’1098  
 
A. ‘Vulnerability’ and Aggravating Factors 
 
The Preamble to the Directive States that ‘When the offence is committed in certain 
circumstances, for example against a particularly vulnerable victim, the penalty should 
be more severe.’1099 The Directive goes on to state that certain factors relating to 
vulnerability in this context include, for example, gender,1100 thereby building or 
expanding upon previous instruments,1101 and the Preamble refers directly to situations 
where the offence is ‘particularly grave’ being ‘reflected in a more severe penalty.’1102 
                                                 
1096 Ibid. 
1097 Such as the point that through not opting in, the extended scope of the trafficking definition provided 
within the Directive would not apply in the UK. Furthermore, as regards the establishment under Article 
19 of a ‘National Rapporteur or equivalent mechanism’, CARE were critical of the ‘equivalent 
mechanism’ in the UK, which is the Inter-Departmental Ministerial Group on Trafficking, on the basis 
that ‘This group … is, by definition, part of the Government and so cannot constitute the conventional 
meaning of a rapporteur which is supposed to be independent.’ Criticism was also levelled at the lack of 
UK power to prosecute where the activity takes place beyond UK borders, and at the potential for victim 
protection and assistance measures to be weaker than in other Member States as a result of opting out. 
See CARE, n 219. 
1098 Home Office, (Minister of State of Immigration, Damian Green) ‘EU Directive on Human 
Trafficking – Written Ministerial Statement’ (22 March 2011) 
<http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/publications/about-us/parliamentary-business/written-ministerial-
statement/eu-direct-human-trafficking-wms/> accessed 12 April 2011. 
1099 EU 2011 Directive, n 10, preamble, para 12. 
1100 EU 2011 Directive, n 10, preamble, para 12. 
1101 The UN Trafficking Protocol notably refers to ‘Women and Children’ in its title. 
1102 The preamble states that ‘[w]hen the offence is particularly grave, for example when the life of the 
victim has been endangered or the offence has involved serious violence such as torture, forced 
drug/medication usage, rape or other serious forms of psychological, physical or sexual violence, or has 
otherwise caused particularly serious harm to the victim, this should also be reflected in a more severe 
penalty.’ EU 2011 Directive, n 10, preamble, para 12. 
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The CoE Trafficking Convention has a similar provision,1103 yet does not use the 
terminology of ‘vulnerability’. 
        Thus is appears that a form of ‘aggravated’ trafficking is envisaged, therefore 
drawing delineations between the severity of experiences of different trafficking 
victims. As will be argued later, such an approach, taken by the 2011 Directive, which 
focuses upon vulnerability and spectrum of severity of treatment and exploitation of 
victims, may leave open the possibility that situations of exploitation which fall much 
further down the spectrum – perhaps falling short of even the formal trafficking 
threshold - may still need to be scrutinised, and at least some of the ‘victims’ thereof 
need some form of ‘favourable’ treatment beyond that of the purely, non-exploited, 
smuggled prostitute. 
 
B. The ‘Gender’ Perspective 
 
The Directive has some interesting additions to the current anti-trafficking framework. 
Article 1 refers directly to ‘taking into account the gender perspective.’ The preamble 
expands upon this in stating that:  
 
This Directive recognises the gender-specific phenomenon of trafficking 
and that women and men are often trafficked for different purposes. For this 
reason, assistance and support measures should also be gender specific 
where appropriate. The ‘push’ and ‘pull’ factors may be different depending 
                                                 
1103 Article 18 states that ‘Each Party shall ensure that the following circumstances are regarded as 
aggravating circumstances in the determination of the penalty for offences established in accordance with 
Article 18 of this Convention: a) the offence deliberately or by gross negligence endangered the life of 
the victim; b) the offence was committed against a child; c) the offence was committed by a public 
official in the performance of her/his duties; d) the offence was committed within the framework of a 
criminal organisation.’ 
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on the sectors concerned, such as trafficking in human beings into the sex 
industry or for labour exploitation in, for example, construction work, the 
agricultural sector or domestic servitude.1104 
 
Specific reference in this Directive to gender and the potential for gender-specific 
assistance and support measures, coupled with the fact that ‘women and children’ are 
explicitly mentioned in the very title of the Trafficking Protocol further raises the issue 
of the potential for recognition of the particular vulnerability of certain parties.1105 Not 
only does such an approach bring the particular vulnerabilities of women to the 
forefront of sex trafficking debate, but it may also have ramifications for the 
‘consensually trafficked’ woman too, who may have specific needs.1106 
 
C. Victim Assistance, Support and Protection 
 
As regards victim assistance and protection, mechanisms for early identification1107 of 
and assistance to victims are required by Article 11 which envisages safe 
accommodation and medical treatment, and access to counselling, information and 
interpretation services where needed. Provisions relating to non-prosecution of victims 
‘for their involvement in criminal activities which they have been compelled to commit 
as a direct consequence of being subjected to (trafficking)’1108 are also included, and 
are a welcome development, as cases such as R v O1109 have shown us. 
                                                 
1104 EU 2011 Directive, n10, preamble, para 3. 
1105 This thesis does not aim to specifically address child trafficking, therefore an in depth consideration 
of this issue would go beyond the ambit of the thesis. 
1106 See, Part IX, section B, below. 
1107 See, Part VI, below, regarding the identification of victims. 
1108 2011 Directive, Article 8. 
1109 [2008] EWCA Crim 2835. The case is discussed below in Part VI, and  the specific issue of 
prosecutorial discretion as regards criminal offences committed by trafficked victims, as a result of 
having been trafficked, is discussed with reference to this case in Part VII, below. 
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 i. Recovery and Reflection Period 
 
There is no new, bespoke recovery and reflection period for trafficked persons 
contained within the 2011 Directive – the period remains that set down in Council 
Directive in 2004 on the residence permit issued to third-country nationals who are 
victims of trafficking in human beings or who have been the subject of an action to 
facilitate illegal immigration, who cooperate with the competent authorities,1110 the 
exact length of which was to be left to individual Governments to determine.       
 
ii. Temporary Residence Permits 
 
As to residence permits, the 2011 Directive does not impose similarly onerous 
obligations on States as the CoE Trafficking Convention, and asks for little beyond the 
beyond the recovery and reflection period.1111 Article 11(2) states that: 
 
Member States shall take the necessary measures to ensure that a person is 
provided with assistance and support as soon as the competent authorities 
have a reasonable-grounds indication for believing that the person might 
have been subjected to (trafficking offences).1112  
                                                 
1110 Council Directive 2004/81/EC of 29 April 2004 on the residence permit issued to third-country 
nationals who are victims of trafficking in human beings or who have been the subject of an action to 
facilitate illegal immigration, who cooperate with the competent authorities  [2004] OJ L 261/19. 
1111 In para 18 of the Preamble to the EU 2011 Directive, it is stated that ‘In cases where the victim does 
not reside lawfully in the Member State concerned, assistance and support should be provided 
unconditionally at least during the reflection period. If, after completion of the identification process or 
expiry of the reflection period, the victim is not considered eligible for a residence permit or does not 
otherwise have lawful residence in that Member State, or if the victim has left the territory of that 
Member State, the Member State concerned is not obliged to continue providing assistance and support 
to that person on the basis of this Directive.’ 
1112 Article 11(2), EU 2011 Directive, n 10. 
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 The Directive does also state that ‘[w]here necessary, assistance and support should 
continue for an appropriate period after the criminal proceedings have ended’.1113 It is 
surprising that the measures relating to temporary residence permits appear to be less 
accommodating than those provided for within the CoE Trafficking Convention, given 
the statement that victim assistance and support is one of the primary objectives of the 
Directive, coupled with the specific mention of the ‘gender perspective’.  
        The current residence permit obligations go no further than those provided within 
the 2004 Council Directive discussed above.1114 Nonetheless, Article 11(3) of the 2011 
Directive does state that: 
 
Member States shall take the necessary measures to ensure that assistance 
and support for a victim are not made conditional on the victim's 
willingness to cooperate in the criminal investigation, prosecution or trial, 
without prejudice to Directive 2004/81/EC or similar national rules.  
 
Thereby paving the way for measures which are somewhat more accommodating, and 
which will have in any case been adopted by those who ratified the CoE Trafficking 
Convention and are therefore bound by its more sympathetic victim assistance and 
support provisions. 
        As previously mentioned, effective protection is dependent upon correct and 
timely identification of victims. This issue will now be considered.  
 
                                                 
1113 Para 18 of the Preamble to the EU 2011 Directive goes on to provide examples: ‘for example if 
medical treatment is ongoing due to the severe physical or psychological consequences of the crime, or if 
the victim's safety is at risk due to the victim's statements in those criminal proceedings.’  
1114 See, Part I, section A, above. 
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 VI. Victim Identification  
 
All people who enter the UK illegally are entitled to a fair trial before conviction for 
any immigration offence. Those entitled to this protection will be identified by the 
decision to prosecute them. Trafficked victims might have special characteristics which 
require special treatment in the fair trial context, and prosecutors and defence lawyers 
should be aware of these possibilities. It is, therefore, imperative that those putatively 
entitled to these protections be accurately and rapidly identified and provided with 
competent legal advice where necessary. It cannot be assumed that those officials 
charged with policing the immigration regime have the interests of these kinds of 
people at the head of their priorities. Matters of border security and economic 
protection are also significant concerns.  
        In these circumstances, the provision of effective processes to bring to the 
attention of people their rights and to decide on contested claims of eligibility are of 
crucial importance. Correct identification of trafficking victims is paramount to 
securing their effective protection, and effective protection of their rights. Ill-effects 
flowing from misidentification include lack of protection and opportunity to recover, as 
well as detention, expulsion,1115 or criminalisation as a result of being in breach of 
immigration law, as demonstrated by cases such as R v O, decided pre-ratification of 
the CoE Trafficking Convention,1116 considered below. 
 
 
 
                                                 
1115 See A Pacurar ‘Smuggling, Detention and Expulsion of Irregular Migrants: A Study on International 
Legal Norms, Standards and Practices’ (2003) European Journal of Migration and Law 5, 259 – 283. 
1116 R v O [2008] EWCA Crim 2835. 
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 A. (Mis)Identification of Victims of Human Trafficking: the Case of R v O 
 
That national law might not have been as effective as subsequently required by the 
UK’s international obligations, has been demonstrated by the recent decision in R v 
O,1117 which was decided prior to ratification of the CoE Trafficking Convention by the 
UK.    
The appellant was apprehended on her way out of the UK and was found to be 
carrying false identity documents. Between speaking to passport control officers and 
subsequently her legal representatives, it soon became clear that there were questions to 
be ascertained as to her age.1118 She stated that she had come to England with her 
boyfriend in order to escape her father, who would have killed her if she had not 
proceeded with an arranged marriage in Nigeria. She also stated that once in England, 
she was ‘given to be a prostitute’ and consequently ran away.  
Several days prior to her trial date, the appellant’s legal representatives received 
information from the Poppy Project to the effect that O was potentially a victim of 
human trafficking for the purpose of prostitution, yet failed to act upon this 
information. O was initially convicted at the Crown Court on 17 March 2008, resulting 
                                                 
1117 R v O [2008] EWCA Crim 2835. Also see, J Elliott ‘(Mis)Identification of Victims of Human 
Trafficking: The Case of R v O’, Int J Refugee Law (2009) 21 (4): 727-741 for full consideration of this 
case. 
1118 At interview the day following her apprehension at French passport control in the UK, she admitted 
that the identity card in which she was in possession of was not her own, and she proceeded to give her 
actual name and asserted that her nationality was Nigerian. She had initially stated that she was 31, but 
later had given her year of birth as 1985. Notably, she was described by two officers as ‘very young’, and 
in one instance, ‘possibly juvenile’. Several days prior to her trial date of 17 March 2008 at the Crown 
Court, she informed her legal representatives that she was 17.  From various meetings between the 
appellant and her legal representatives which took place prior to the trial, the latter obtained information 
to the effect that her actual date of birth was 10 December 1991, which would have made her only 16 
rather than 17 as she had claimed. The Crown Court was not informed of this.  
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in imposition1119 of a sentence of eight months imprisonment, less 16 days spent on 
remand. Leave to appeal was granted by Cox J on 26 June 2008. 
The grounds of appeal related to O’s age;1120 the potential for her to rely on the 
defence of duress;1121 and the lack of appreciation by the appellant’s lawyers of her 
position as a victim of trafficking.1122 Consideration of this issue by her legal 
representatives was largely non-existent,1123 as was any awareness by legal 
representatives on both sides, of two CPS Protocols which provided guidelines on 
‘Prosecution of Defendants Charged With Offences Who Might Be Trafficked Victims’ 
and ‘Prosecution of Young Defendants Charged With Offences Who Might Be 
Trafficked Victims’.1124 The appeal was allowed.1125 
Since the UK had not at that time ratified the CoE Trafficking Convention, it 
was not bound by its provisions and could not have been held legally accountable for 
                                                 
1119 By Judge Adele Williams. 
1120 Article 10(3) provides that the victim will be presumed to be a child if his/her age is uncertain and 
there are reasons to believe that he or she is a child. Further to this, since the age of the defendant was in 
doubt, then if she were indeed 16 she should have been tried in the Youth Court rather than the Crown 
Court. It is also clear that her legal representatives had ample opportunities and reasons to question the 
age of the defendant. The UK also has obligations under the Convention on the rights of the Child 1989 
(Adopted and opened for signature, ratification and accession by General Assembly resolution 44/25 of 
20 November 1989, entered into force 2 September 1990, in accordance with article 49), State Parties are 
committed to protecting children from sexual exploitation, etc – see Article 34 
1121 As regards any criminal charge for her potential complicity in breaching immigration laws. 
1122 Several days prior to her trial date, the appellant’s legal representatives received information from the 
Poppy Project to the effect that O was potentially a victim of human trafficking for the purpose of 
prostitution. The appellant’s legal representatives did not act upon this information. 
1123 The seventh and final ground of appeal was actually an application to admit fresh evidence in the 
following categories: a report by the Poppy project prepared after the trial date of 17 March; the file of 
the trial solicitors; correspondence between the appellant's present solicitors and her trial lawyer. The 
second category was admitted under section 23 of the Criminal Appeal Act 1968. As regards the first 
category, The Poppy Project report is dated 23rd June 2008. It provides that after the trial date of 17 
March, the appellant was assessed by a senior outreach worker and was deemed to be a victim of 
trafficking. A detailed history included showed that she was held in debt bondage, raped, and forced to 
work as a prostitute until she escaped a month later. This report was admitted as fresh evidence to the 
appeal. 
1124 Crown Prosecution Service, ‘Prosecution of Defendants Charged With Offences Who Might Be 
Trafficked Victims’ and ‘Prosecution of Young Defendants Charged With Offences Who Might Be 
Trafficked Victims’ <http://www.cps.gov.uk/legal/h_to_k/human_trafficking_and_smuggling/> accessed 
25 February 2009. 
1125 The complete lack of consideration given to the possibilities of the appellant being a victim of 
trafficking or being a child/young person, coupled with the lack of awareness on the part of the 
Prosecutors of the above-mentioned protocols meant that the appeal had to be allowed. 
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any failure to act according to the standards of the CoE Convention,1126 yet the facts of 
the case do show that the then existing provision of protection for such people as the 
applicant in O was deficient. It was recognised in O that the UK has taken measures 
expressly in support of the purpose of the Trafficking Convention,1127 yet these were 
clearly insufficient to protect O at first instance. Instead, Laws LJ found a way to get 
the most desirable outcome through drawing upon the sources which were available to 
be used at that point in time: the two CPS Protocols, the common law,1128 and Article 6 
of the ECHR.1129 He recognised that both the common law and Article 6 of the ECHR 
required standards of procedural protection that were much higher than those that had 
been accorded to the defendant in the present case. O had not had a fair trial.  
The issue of adequate legal assistance, something clearly lacking in this case, 
has been raised by the JCHR in their Twenty-Sixth Report.1130 Article 6(3)(c) of the 
ECHR includes the right to legal assistance, and legal assistance and legal aid is 
provided for in Article 15 of the CoE Trafficking Convention.1131 
                                                 
1126 Beyond Article 18 of the Vienna Convention which States that signatory States must ‘refrain from 
acts which would defeat the object and purpose of [the] treaty.’ Such an obligation – pre-ratification – 
cannot possibly exist, because, as Aust observes, ‘the act of ratification would then have little or no 
purpose, the obligation to perform the treaty being then not dependent on ratification and entry into 
force.’ See Aust, n 584. 117. 
1127 Notably through the criminalisation of trafficking by sections 57 and 58 of the Sexual Offences Act 
2003, and by introducing the two abovementioned CPS Protocols, yet as the facts indicate, these were of 
little help to O at first instance. It may be noted at this point that some of these measures taken ‘expressly 
in support’ of the Trafficking Convention were taken 4 years prior to signing of the Convention by the 
UK. 
1128 R v O [2008] EWCA Crim 2835, para 26. 
1129 R v O [2008] EWCA Crim 2835, para 26. 
1130 It is stated in the Report that ‘There was … some concern expressed regarding the quality of the 
initial legal assistance that was being provided to victims of trafficking, the following being a situation 
described as typical by one witness: ‘They were given access to legal representation but the information 
that we got from the POPPY Project who interviewed those women was that the duty solicitor was not 
really in a position to give them much advice or guidance. There was not any assessment of whether an 
appropriate adult might be needed for women who were clearly quite vulnerable and intimidated…’ Joint 
Committee on Human Rights Twenty-Sixth Report, n 31, para. 159. 
1131 As Drew recognises, ‘Article 15 of the (CoE Trafficking) convention requires the state to provide 
access to compensation and legal redress, including the right to legal assistance and to free legal aid for 
victims. This means competent legal assistance. The judiciary is starting to increase its awareness of the 
issue through training and familiarity with the indicators, as shown by judgements such as R v O.’ See S 
Drew, S Drew, ‘Comment: You’re missing the points’ (2008) Law Society Gazette, Issue 46, December 
Articles, 4 December 2008. 
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Clearly, a formalised procedure which is tailored to the identification or and 
catering for the needs of trafficking victims, such as the CoE Trafficking Convention 
requires, is much more suitable than relying on a patchwork of existing measures which 
were not created with victims of trafficking in mind. Although the UK could not be 
held to account for deficiencies as regards the CoE Convention which it had yet to 
ratify, O still provides a shocking insight into the lack of training, acknowledgement, 
and formal procedure for victim identification pre-ratification. 
 
B. Identification of Victims of Trafficking – Barriers to Identification, and the Need 
for Effective Procedures 
    
It is stated in the UK Action Plan on Tackling Human Trafficking that support for 
victims ‘should go beyond providing safe and secure accommodation to include help in 
their recovery, and prevent re-trafficking or re-victimisation’.1132 The CoE Trafficking 
Convention requires the implementation of minimum standards in respect of victim 
protection and support, involvement of victims in the criminal justice system, increased 
prosecution of traffickers, and increased prevention of trafficking activity.1133 Although 
the UK was apparently largely compliant with the Convention at the point of 
signature,1134 implementation required some legislative changes,1135 and policy changes 
in various areas, notably the development of a formal process for referring and 
                                                 
1132 Home Office and Scottish Executive, n 254, 47. 
1133 Home Office, n 1061, 1.  
1134 Ibid, 3.  
1135 Implementation required legislative amendments to the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008 
to ensure that automatic deportation of victims of trafficking under the UK Borders Act 2007 cannot take 
place where this would breach obligations under the Trafficking Convention; and to the Asylum & 
Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc.) Act 2004 to correct a cross-reference to human tissue 
legislation has been made through the Human Tissue (Scotland) Act 2006 (Consequential Amendment) 
Order 2008 (S.S.I. 2008/259). Also, Secondary legislation by way of the National Health Service 
(Charges to Overseas Visitors) Regulations 2008 which amend regulation 4(1) of the National Health 
Service (Charges to Overseas Visitors) Regulations 1989 (S.I. 1989/306) and ensure the UK meets 
obligations in relation to medical treatment under the Convention.  
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identifying victims of trafficking.1136 There is, however, a lack of clear implementing 
legislation following ratification of the CoE Trafficking Convention. This could be 
taken as an indication of the UKs continuing reluctance to concede too much for even 
those formally identified as trafficked, let alone those borderline cases where there is 
lack of ostensible coercion, etc, according to UK Border Agency (UKBA) 
‘indicators’.1137 
Evidently, trafficking is the kind of crime which places some responsibility on 
third parties with respect to victim identification. These parties range from police, 
border authorities and organisations such as the Poppy Project to sexual health services, 
prostitute users and beyond. Clearly, various barriers exist with respect to victim 
identification. Some of these arise from the predicament of the victim;1138 others arise 
from the responsibilities of the relevant persons charged with identification of victims. 
Drew observes that ‘[w]aiting for a client to self-identify will not suffice. Many clients 
will be unwilling or unable to raise the issue first, because of fear, ignorance or 
linguistic barriers.’1139 
Primarily, the circumstances in which human trafficking occurs mean that, 
despite an increasingly victim-centred approach, there is a low level of self-reporting on 
the part of victims.1140 Victims may be less likely to identify themselves to male 
                                                 
1136 Home Office, n 1061, 1.  
1137 See Part VI, section C, below, for an outline of these ‘indicators’. 
1138 The Anti Trafficking Monitoring Group state that ‘Myths about trafficking still exist and often 
impede identification. For example, to understand the real nature of forced labour, we need to understand 
the link between coercive exploitation and the abusive treatment that workers might be subjected to as a 
result of “rational” choice (Speech by the Roger Plant, the head of the Special Action Programme on 
Forced labour of the ILO, at a conference "Work - Migration - Rights; Strategies against Trafficking in 
Women", Vienna, October 2008.) Traffickers have become more sophisticated and the coercion they 
apply more complex and “invisible”. Instead of kidnapping, physical violence, and keeping victims under 
lock, traffickers tend to use methods that create a complex web of control, through debt bondage, 
psychological violence and threats, use of modern information technologies and intimidation to put their 
victims into a situation of total dependence, where victims are scared or too intimidated to escape or 
reveal what happened to them.’ See The Anti Trafficking Monitoring Group, n 306, 17. 
1139 S Drew, n 1131. 
1140 Home Office/Scottish Government ‘Update to the UK Action Plan on Human Trafficking’ (October 
2009) 25. 
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personnel. Therefore, increased representation of women involved in, for example, 
border management could be a factor in successfully identifying more female sex 
trafficking victims.1141 The clandestine nature of human trafficking means that outreach 
to victims is not easily achieved. The UK Action Plan on Tackling Human Trafficking 
goes so far as to recognise that some trafficked persons may not perceive themselves as 
such, which is a clear barrier to identification.1142 Secondly, the relevant persons 
coming into contact with victims of trafficking may not correctly identify them, as was 
the case in O.  
  
C. The Current Identification System – the ‘National Referral Mechanism’       
 
Article 10 of the CoE Trafficking Convention has some particular stipulations which go 
toward providing a victim identification mechanism, to be executed by competent 
authorities and trained staff to identify putative victims with whom they come into 
contact.1143 The EU 2011 Directive has a similar stipulation in Article 11(4),1144 yet the 
                                                 
1141 OSCE ‘Border Management and Gender’, Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed 
Forces (2008) <http://www.osce.org/publications/odihr/2008/02/29669_1035_en.pdf> accessed 21 Jan 
2009, link no longer live. 
1142 The UK Action Plan on Tackling Human Trafficking, Home Office, n 254, states that ‘[s]ome 
victims do not self-identify because they may not recognise that the situation in which they are in 
actually constitutes a recognised crime against their person, or they may have been in an exploitative 
situation for such a long period of time that they have built up a psychological dependency on their 
exploiters. Some victims may be unwilling to identify themselves to the authorities due to a fear of 
reprisal from their traffickers, whilst others may fear that they will be penalised for their immigration 
status. There are also a number of victims who have a distrust of the authorities due to past negative 
experiences or possible levels of corruption in their home countries.’ 
1143 Article 10 states that: ‘1) Each Party shall provide its competent authorities with persons who are 
trained and qualified in preventing and combating trafficking in human beings, in identifying and helping 
victims, including children, and shall ensure that the different authorities collaborate with each other as 
well as with relevant support organisations, so that victims can be identified in a procedure duly taking 
into account the special situation of women and child victims and, in appropriate cases, issued with 
residence permits under the conditions provided for in Article 14 of the present Convention; 2) Each 
Party shall adopt such legislative or other measures as may be necessary to identify victims as 
appropriate in collaboration with other Parties and relevant support organisations. Each Party shall ensure 
that, if the competent authorities have reasonable grounds to believe that a person has been victim of 
trafficking in human beings, that person shall not be removed from its territory until the identification 
process as victim of an offence provided for in Article 18 of this Convention has been completed by the 
competent authorities and shall likewise ensure that that person receives the assistance provided for in 
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Trafficking Protocol has no such corresponding provision. Such systems can only be 
effective if properly implemented and adhered to.1145  
        Implementing measures as regards Article 10 of the CoE Trafficking Convention 
required the creation of a process which is often referred to internationally as a 
‘National Referral Mechanism’1146 (NRM), whereby: 
 
Front-line professionals will use indicators to consider whether an 
individual could be a victim of trafficking before referring their details to a 
designated Competent Authority to make a decision on whether there are 
reasonable grounds to believe that the individual has been trafficked.1147  
 
Examples of ‘competent authorities’ are given in the Explanatory Report to the 
Convention as ‘public authorities which may have contact with trafficking victims, 
                                                                                                                                                        
Article 12, paragraphs 1 and 2; 3) When the age of the victim is uncertain and there are reasons to believe 
that the victim is a child, he or she shall be presumed to be a child and shall be accorded special 
protection measures pending verification of his/her age; 4) As soon as an unaccompanied child is 
identified as a victim, each Party shall: a)  provide for representation of the child by a legal guardian, 
organisation or authority which shall act in the best interests of that child; b) take the necessary steps to 
establish his/her identity and nationality; c) make every effort to locate his/her family when this is in the 
best interests of the child. 
1144 Article 11(4) states that ‘Member States shall take the necessary measures to establish appropriate 
mechanisms aimed at the early identification of, assistance to and support for victims, in cooperation 
with relevant support organisations.’ Paragraph 4 of the Preamble to the Directive also refers to ‘the 
development of general common indicators of the Union for the identification of victims of trafficking, 
through the exchange of best practices between all the relevant actors, particularly public and private 
social services.’ 
1145 Article 10 also provides for protection against peremptory removal until the identification process is 
complete, and makes some specific provision for the treatment of children. 
1146 Defined as ‘a procedure in which trained/qualified staff within ‘competent authorities’ can identify 
victims of all forms of trafficking and ensure their access to appropriate levels of support’ - see 
‘Explanatory Memorandum on the Council of Europe Convention on Action against Trafficking in 
Human Beings’, Report CM 7465 at <http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/about-the-fco/publications/treaty-
command-papers-ems/explanatory-memoranda/explanatory-memoranda-2008/humantrafficking>  
accessed 7 April 2009, link no longer live. Information on the NRM is now available through 
<http://www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk/humantrafficking005overview.pdf>  accessed 7 April 
2009. 
1147 Home Office, n 1061, 5.  
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such as the police, the labour inspectorate, customs, the immigration authorities and 
embassies or consulates.’1148  
        The NRM has been in place in the UK since 1 April 2009, and the relevant 
designated competent authorities are the UK Borders Agency and the UK Human 
Trafficking Centre.1149 Once a possible victim is identified, specialist staff will be 
assigned to assess the individual case.1150 Training and guidance are imperative as 
regards victim identification - the O case (above) demonstrates that the ramifications of 
misidentification can be severe for the victim. CPS guidelines state that ‘Guidance has 
been issued to police and immigration officers on identification of victims and what 
might constitute a credible trafficked victim.’1151 The NRM, however, lacks a formal 
route of appeal, which may give rise to Article 6 challenges and Judicial Review claims 
concerning those who are not found to be a credible trafficked victim. 
        The UK Borders Agency has also produced information as regards ‘indicators’ 
which those who come into contact with potential traffick victims should look out 
for.1152 These include: signs of physical or psychological harm or debt bondage; signs 
of fear or anxiety; and whether the testimony of the potential victim includes elements 
of coercion, deception or threat. The list provided is far from exhaustive. Further 
guidance is provided by the UK Human Trafficking Centre, and by Anti-Slavery 
International,1153 who include extensive lists of identification criteria under headings 
                                                 
1148 Explanatory Report, n 248, para. 129. 
1149 See UK Human Trafficking Centre website, < http://www.ukhtc.org/council_of_europe.htm> 
accessed 7 April 2009. 
1150 See Home Office ‘Overview of the implementation of the National Referral Mechanism’ 
<http://www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk/humantrafficking005overview.pdf> accessed 01 July 
2011. 
1151 The Crown Prosecution Service, n 318. 
1152 See Home Office/UK Borders Agency, ‘Enforcement Instructions and Guidance, Chapter 9 – 
Identifying Victims of Trafficking’. 
<http://www.ukba.homeoffice.gov.uk/sitecontent/documents/policyandlaw/enforcement/oemsectiona/cha
pter9?view=Binary> accessed 01 July 2011. 
1153 This includes extensive lists of identification criteria under headings such as ‘Personal documents 
and belongings’, ‘Violence or threat of violence’, and ‘Working conditions’. See Anti-Slavery 
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such as ‘Personal documents and belongings’, ‘Violence or threat of violence’, and 
‘Working conditions’. 
        As outlined previously,1154 where there are ‘reasonable grounds’ to believe that an 
individual is a victim of trafficking, a recovery and reflection period of at least 30 days 
is called for by the CoE Trafficking Convention.1155 The abovementioned criteria go 
toward the establishment of ‘reasonable grounds’ as regards any putative victim. 
Secondly, there is a notable improvement as regards the rather accommodating terms 
relating to the provision of residence periods.1156 
However, the granting of a residence permit is wholly dependent upon correct 
determination of the first stage; i.e. there being ‘reasonable grounds’ to believe that an 
individual is a victim of trafficking. Because the identification of an individual as a 
possible victim of trafficking is a pre-requisite even to being granted a recovery and 
reflection period, an essential period of time and space for the potentially severely 
traumatised victim of trafficking, it is necessary that those who are likely to come in to 
contact with victims of trafficking are alert to the indications which are signs of this 
possibility. The circumstances in the abovementioned O case were such that – even 
after ratification and after full implementation of the Convention – O may not have 
been in a position to enjoy the benefits conferred by the Convention because there was 
no recognition of her trafficked-victim status at a sufficiently early stage.  
        The UK is currently in the early stages of considering the Human Trafficking 
(Border Control) Bill 2010 – 11, which will, in summary, be ‘[a] Bill to require border 
control officers to stop and interview potential victims of trafficking notwithstanding 
                                                                                                                                                        
International, ‘Protocol for Identification and Assistance to Trafficked Persons’, (2005) 
<http://www.antislavery.org/homepage/resources/PDF/Protocoltraffickedpersonskit2005.pdf> accessed 
15 March 2009, link no longer live. 
1154 See Part IV, section A, subsection i, above. 
1155 Article 13. 
1156 See Part IV, section A, subsection ii, above. 
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entitlements under European Union law to free movement of persons; and for 
connected purposes.’1157 Such a legislative measure could clearly enhance the 
possibility of early detection and identification of trafficked victims, and therefore the 
fight against trafficking. 
 
i. Problems with the Current System 
 
Clearly the UK cannot be criticised for failing to meet international obligations to 
which they were not at the time subject, yet now they are required to meet these 
international obligations imposed by the CoE Trafficking Convention, the current 
system is not without its own flaws. That awareness and training among officials as 
regards identification of trafficked victims may still be somewhat deficient is 
exemplified by the recent case of OOO et al v Commissioner of Metropolitan 
Police,1158 in which there were a number of occasions where police officers were asked 
to investigate the situation of the women involved, yet failed to do so. Had they done 
so, it would potentially have been discovered that the women had been subjected to 
slavery-like practices. In summary, it was held that police duties to investigate alleged 
breaches of an individual's Article 3 and 4 ECHR rights was not solely limited to where 
an alleged victim had made a complaint. The duty was triggered as soon as a credible 
allegation was received that such an infringement had occurred, however that 
information was brought to their attention. Furthermore, the investigation would have 
to be undertaken promptly. For the effective protection of victims, it is clearly 
imperative that the relevant authorities charged with identifying the victims have 
                                                 
1157 At present the Bill has not proceeded beyond First Reading in the Commons - see ‘Human 
Trafficking (Border Control) Bill 2010 – 11 <http://services.parliament.uk/bills/2010-
11/humantraffickingbordercontrol.html> accessed 01 June 2011. 
1158 [2011] EWHC 1246 QB. 
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heightened awareness of and sensitivity to the clandestine nature of trafficking, forced 
labour etc. Intense scrutiny as regards any potential instance of trafficking is essential. 
        Although already theoretically compliant with the victim protection and assistance 
provisions of the anti-trafficking regime, the Anti-Trafficking Monitoring Group1159 
has in a Report noted various problems occurring under the current system,1160 
particularly with the identification system used in the UK – the NRM. The Report states 
at:  
 
persons, rather than the alleged crime committed against 
them.1161 
n measures for those not correctly identified 
         
th
The system appears to be relying excessively on the discretion of officials 
who receive minimal training to staff a mechanism supported by flawed 
legal guidance relating to who should be identified as victims of trafficking, 
and without a formal appeals process. This fails to consistently identify and 
assist people who have been trafficked. Furthermore, the system appears to 
be putting more emphasis on the immigration status of the presumed 
trafficked 
 
         If this is indeed the case, then the current system can indeed be said to be 
deficient – lack of consistent identification and a lack of formal route of appeal leaves 
the NRM and the assistance and protectio
as trafficked persons, with a lack of bite.  
                                        
1159 The Anti Trafficking Monitoring Group, ‘Call for Evidence’, 
<http://www.antislavery.org/english/what_we_do/programme_and_advocacy_work/anti_trafficking_mo
nitoring_group.aspx> accessed 01 June 2011. 
1160 See The Anti Trafficking Monitoring Group, n 306. 
1161 Ibid, 9. 
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        As considered in Chapter 2,1162 the specifics of the ‘means’ element of trafficking 
are not always clearly separable, yet nonetheless go toward establishing the definition 
of human trafficking as a non-consensual process, or at least a process where any 
consent given may be rendered irrelevant by use of any of the ‘means’. This in turn 
relies upon objective proof of ‘coercion’ etc being shown by the State’ in order to 
prosecute a trafficker. The victim stands in her own metaphorical trial in terms of 
establishing the same, as she is assessed by ‘indicators’ (outlined above) which are 
given to those charged with identifying her. These ‘indicators’ are used to decide 
whether she coerced, for example, and is therefore a victim, or if there are a lack of 
‘indicators’ of such treatment she may simply be rendered merely another ‘smuggled 
prostitute.’ In the words of Raymond, ‘[n]o woman should be punished for her own 
ation of trafficked 
ictims has the effect of doing. 
        T
 
nals from other EU states identified as 
trafficked was 29.2 per cent, while that of nationals from countries outside 
                                                
sexual exploitation’1163 but this is what incorrect or misidentific
v
he Anti Trafficking Monitoring Group Report also finds that: 
The UK citizens referred were speedily identified as having been trafficked 
with a rate of 76 per cent of cases positively identified as trafficking, in 
contrast with the rate of cases positively identified as trafficked as a whole 
of 19 per cent. The rate of natio
the EU was only 11.9 per cent.1164 
 
 
ution’, (2003) Journal of Trauma Practice. 2, 315. 
nti Trafficking Monitoring Group, n 306, 9. 
1162 See Chapter 2, Part III. 
1163 J Raymond, ‘10 Reasons for Not Legalising Prostit
1164 The A
 325
Although this cannot be interpreted conclusively as evidence of discrimination against 
third country nationals, the difference is startling.1165 The Report goes on to state that 
‘these figures merit further investigation by the Home Office, to check that individuals 
from outside the EU are not being subject to discrimination in the decision-making 
rocess.’1166 On the evidence, however, it would appear that the UK may not be doing 
 regards these putative 
ictims, particularly in terms of their identification which would lead to access to 
he prosecution of trafficked victims who have committed offences as a direct 
conse ked 
victim  The 
JCHR
 
ection 2 of the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc.) 
victims of trafficking, by explicitly stating that ‘Each Party shall, in accordance with 
the basic principles of its legal system, provide for the possibility of not imposing 
                                                
p
enough to meet its obligations under the CoE Convention as
v
bespoke rights and assistance. 
 
VII. Non-Criminalisation of Victims of Human Trafficking 
 
T
quence of having been trafficked is a controversial issue. All too often, traffic
s are treated not as victims but as criminals, as demonstrated by O, above.
 have voiced concerns, notably that: 
S
Act 2004 makes it an offence to enter into the UK without valid passports 
and visas. This, it was claimed, is detrimental to trafficked victims as many 
of them use false documentation to enter.1167 
 
        The CoE Trafficking Convention addresses the issue of non-criminalisation of 
 
ittee on Human Rights Twenty-Sixth Report, n 31, para 116. 
1165 Ibid. 
1166 Ibid. 
1167 Joint Comm
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penalties on victims for their involvement in unlawful activities, to the extent that they 
have been compelled to do so.’(Emphasis added)1168 Notably, the language employed 
here is weak:1169 non-prosecution is not a concrete requirement of the Convention. 
offender teams, so that the public interest in continuing a prosecution can be considered 
         
Nonetheless, this remains a very important provision. The 2011 EU Directive has a 
similar provision.1170 
        As noted by Laws LJ in O,1171 there are the CPS Protocols1172 which cover the 
commission of immigration offences, such as possession of a false passport or forged 
identity document, by trafficking victims who have been coerced by someone else. 
According to these Protocols, if the suspect is a ‘credible trafficked victim’ i.e. ‘the 
investigation officers have reason to believe that the person has been trafficked’,1173 
then the prosecutor must consider whether pursuing a prosecution for the immigration 
offence best serves public interest.1174 As regards the latter Protocol which deals with 
‘Prosecution of Young Defendants Charged With Offences Who Might Be Trafficked 
Victims’,1175 evidence of duress will lead to the case being discontinued, and where the 
evidence is less clear, ‘further details should be sought from the police and youth 
                                        
1168 Article 26. 
1169 A Gallagher, ‘Recent Legal Developments in the Field of Human Trafficking: A Critical Review of 
ments’ (2006) European Journal of Migration and Law, 
e 8 of the EU 2011 Directive states that ‘Member States shall, in accordance with the basic 
14. 
; 
the 2005 European Convention and Related Instru
Vol. 8, 163-189, 178. 
1170 Articl
principles of their legal systems, take the necessary measures to ensure that competent national 
authorities are entitled not to prosecute or impose penalties on victims of trafficking in human beings for 
their involvement in criminal activities which they have been compelled to commit as a direct 
consequence of being subjected to any of the acts referred to in Article 2.’ 
1171 R v O [2008] EWCA Crim 2835, para 
1172 Crown Prosecution Service, n 318. 
1173 Ibid. 
1174 In doing so, the following factors should be taken into consideration: the role that the suspect has in 
the immigration offence; was the immigration offence a direct consequence of their trafficked situation; 
were violence, threats or coercion used on the trafficked victim to procure the commission of the offence
was the victim vulnerable or put in considerable fear. See Crown Prosecution Service, n 318.  
1175 Crown Prosecution Service, n 318.  
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carefully.’1176 The Court of Appeal noted in O that these protocols – although 
incorporated into the Code for Crown Prosecutors – do not appear in standard criminal 
law pra
terest to prosecute genuine victims of human trafficking for 
immigr
 the 
         
ctice books.  
Once again, rather tentative language is employed in the Protocols, and the 
possibility of continuing with the prosecution remains. As the UK action Plan on 
Tackling Human Trafficking observes: ‘It is difficult to envisage circumstances where 
it would be in the public in
ation offences.’1177 
The pre-Convention ratification O case is a clear exemplar of the consequences 
of misidentification. More recent case law, decided post-ratification of the Convention, 
provides illumination as to whether or not O would necessarily be decided differently 
today. R v LM,1178 a combined appeal with five appellants, concerned individuals who 
had previously been trafficked, and were convicted for then playing a part in
‘controlling of prostitution for gain’1179 of other sex workers or trafficked persons. 
        References were made to Articles 261180 and 101181 of the CoE Trafficking 
Convention, as there were to the CPS protocols1182 and the O case. The appellants 
contended a breach of Article 10 of the CoE Trafficking Convention, on the basis that 
they had never been advised about the relevant referral agency who could have aided 
their identification as formally trafficked persons, and that this failure had rendered the 
                                        
1176
adult in interview could be the trafficker or a person allied to the trafficker. Any youth who might be a 
trafficked victim should be afforded the protection of our childcare legislation if there are concerns that 
they have been working under duress or if their well-being has been threatened. In these circumstances, 
the youth may well then become a victim or witness for a prosecution against those who have exploited 
 The Protocol goes on to state that ‘Prosecutors should also be alert to the fact that an appropriate 
them. The younger a child is, the more careful investigators and prosecutors have to be in deciding 
whether it is right to ask them to become involved in a criminal trial.’ 
1177 Home Office and Scottish Executive, n 254, 57. 
1178 [2010] EWCA Crim 2327; [2011] 1 Cr. App. R. 12; [2011] Crim. L.R. 425. 
1179 Contrary to SOA 2003, s 3. 
1180 Article 26 of the CoE Trafficking Convention provides for the possibility of non-prosecution of 
trafficked victims for offences committed as a result of having been trafficked. 
1181 Article 10 of the CoE Trafficking Convention provides for the identification of victims of trafficking. 
1182 Crown Prosecution Service, n 318.  
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prosecution unlawful. The appeal in LM was allowed, but not on this basis. It was 
instead allowed because the Article 26 duty (to consider non-prosecution) was ignored 
d in the victim 
coupled with lack of knowledge and understanding of 
ost - to a limited 
xtent - tell us how future similar cases should be conducted, and at the very least, we 
an continue to learn from them. 
      The following Part will discuss the international protection regime available to the 
ictim, beyond the bespoke provisions of the anti-trafficking regime. 
at the crucial point where the Crown had, at a late stage, accepted a basis of plea that 
the appellants had been trafficked and violently coerced into prostitution themselves, 
and that their part in anything comprising or resembling ‘controlling prostitution’ had 
been done under pressure, i.e. as a result of being trafficked, yet falling short of duress. 
        It seems that the lessons to be learned from O are still being learned now that a 
formal system is in place, and it is clear that the same mistakes as to referral to relevant 
agencies etc by counsel is still an issue, consequently raising the need for constant and 
improved awareness raising and training of all of those involve
identification process. Perhaps, the offence in O arguably being of a lesser nature (i.e. 
immigration offences as opposed to controlling prostitution) mean that had O occurred 
post-ratification of the CoE Convention then the case may possibly have been decided 
differently at first instance, yet one can only speculate on this matter.  
        These cases provide evidence that the system has flaws and required ‘kid gloves’ 
treatment – LM in particular illustrates the effects of appearance of consent in an 
inherently coercive environment, 
the legal representatives involved in the case. These cases are illustrative of the 
deficiencies of the identification system. These cases can at the m
e
c
  
v
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VIII. International Protection for the Trafficked Person 
 
International protection may apply to anyone who is in need of it. Specifically in the 
context of human trafficking, the CoE Trafficking Convention clearly envisages 
situations where it may be necessary for trafficking victims to remain in the destination 
State beyond simply taking part in the criminal proceedings against their traffickers. 
The potential vagueness of the ‘personal situation’1183 referred to in the CoE 
Trafficking Convention as regards temporary residence permits, for example, may 
mean that the current standards (of the anti-trafficking regime) are deficient, 
particularly in the UK context where it was perceived that there was barely a need for 
implementing legislation. This is not to suggest that the UK Government is legally at 
fault (although perhaps falling ‘below par’, so to speak,) as regards implementation of 
                                                
the CoE Trafficking Convention, but that the provisions of the Convention itself could 
have been drafted more conclusively and stringently, so that assistance and protection 
required owing to a ‘personal situation’ may have more clarity of scope1184 and 
therefore be more inclusively applied. 
 
1183 See Part IV, section A, subsection ii, above. 
1184 The terms used in the Explanatory Report to the Trafficking Convention as regards the victim’s 
‘personal situation’ refer directly to the ‘victim’s safety, state of health, family situation or some other 
factor’ which can be interpreted broadly, although they do appear to be drafted in a way which relates to 
human rights standards under, say Articles 3 and 8 ECHR, which were indeed already part of the UKs 
human rights obligations under the ECHR. 
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        Such issues i.e. the potential deficiency of the current system, become relevant 
when considering complementary protective measures, such as those available through 
international protection regimes. This is particularly so when considering the potential 
for re-trafficking and re-victimisation on return to the country of origin, as well as the 
threat of reprisals from the traffickers or persecution from their community as a result 
of having been a sex worker. The destination State must take various factors into 
ccount and make the decision as to whether the best action to take is to expel the 
e same regime would apply to the ‘consensually 
afficked’, as it would to any human being in a country where the relevant instruments 
h as discretionary leave, 
noted by the JCHR in its Tenth 
Report, there are ‘human rights issues raised by the treatment of asylum seekers, from 
         
a
victim, or allow them to remain. Th
tr
have been ratified. Such matters undoubtedly invoke human rights concerns, as will be 
discussed below. 
 
A. Trafficked Victims as Refugees? 
 
The purpose of asylum law and policy, and related matters suc
is twofold. Primarily, there is the focus of giving aid to those who are in need of it. On 
the other hand, the reduction and control of numbers entering and staying in the UK is 
also at the heart of this. Any system which is intended to benefit a body of persons will 
inevitably be subject to abuse; therefore procedures must be in place which aid the 
determination as to who is, and who is not, genuinely in need.  
        The first point of call for many persons with a potential need to remain in the 
destination state would be to claim asylum, relying upon the Convention Relating to the 
Status of Refugees (Refugee Convention).1185 As 
                                        
1185 Refugee Convention, n 20. 
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the time when they first claim asylum in the UK, through to either the granting of 
e refused, their departure from the 
K.’1186 Clearly, efficient application of the Refugee Convention criteria is paramount 
rsecution, in which case 
for the entitlement of a proportion of 
         
asylum, or, for asylum seekers whose claims ar
U
to securing protection of certain vulnerable persons. 
 
i. The Refugee Convention – Qualifying Criteria 
 
In order to come within the scope of the Refugee Convention, an individual must 
demonstrate a ‘well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, 
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion’.1187 Some 
such persons may well have sought out the services of traffickers or smugglers in order 
to leave the origin state where they are being subjected to pe
they may have grounds to make an asylum claim in the same way that non-trafficked 
asylum seekers would. It is, however, worth exploring if, how and when the Refugee 
Convention may apply to trafficked victims, i.e. the circumstances in which such 
persons may claim asylum because they have been trafficked.  
        Both the UN Trafficking Protocol1188 and the Council of Europe Trafficking 
Convention1189 implicitly recognise the potential 
trafficked victims to international refugee protection. The conditions contained within 
the Refugee Convention are somewhat limited, and there is likely to be a body of 
trafficked persons who may have a need to not be returned to the origin State but fall 
outside of the scope of the Refugee Convention.  
                                        
1186 Joint Committee on Human Rights Tenth Report (Session 2006 -7) ‘The Treatment of Asylum 
Seekers’ 5 <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/jt200607/jtselect/jtrights/81/81i.pdf> accessed 30 
January 2011. 
1187 Article 1(a) 2. 
1188 Article 14 (1). 
1189 Article 40 (4). 
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        A trafficked victim or putative victim may make claims for international 
protection in several circumstances, for example: she may have escaped her traffickers 
and seek protection in the destination state; she may have been trafficked within 
e1194 if they need to remain in the 
K. Nonetheless, there exist some established trafficking cases where refugee status 
as been attributed to the victim due to, for example, the inability of the origin State to 
rotect the victim from re-trafficking,1195 or where trafficked women have been 
onsidered to constitute a ‘social group’ for the purposes of the Refugee 
onvention.1196 This is therefore not a novel concept. 
                                                
national territory, and have fled abroad; or the individual may fear becoming trafficked 
and therefore flee abroad.1190 The victim may also fear persecution on return to the 
origin state as a result of having worked in the sex trade, albeit unwillingly. If a victim 
is to make a claim for international protection under the Refugee Convention, then they 
must fulfil the two-step criteria in order to qualify for refugee protection.  
        Primarily, they must demonstrate a well-founded fear of persecution. Secondly, 
there must be a causal link1191 between this persecution and one of the Convention 
grounds of ‘race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or 
political opinion’,1192 hence the words ‘for reasons of’ membership of a particular 
social group, for example. It is not difficult to envisage trafficked persons who do not 
fall into those categories but nonetheless require some form of help instead of 
deportation. At present, those who do not qualify for refugee status can be considered 
for Humanitarian Protection1193 or Discretionary Leav
U
h
p
c
C
 
ternational Protection’ n 1017, para 13. 
ection’, n 1050. 
ficking for sexual 
1190 ‘Guidelines on In
1191 Ibid, part f. 
1192 Article 1(A)(2). 
1193UK Borders Agency ‘Humanitarian Prot
1194 UK Borders Agency ‘Discretionary Leave’, n 1051. 
1195 See, for example, Alan Travis, n 1025. 
1196 See, for example, SB (PSG – Protection Regulations – Reg 6) Moldova CG [2008] UKAIT 00002, 
where it was stated that ‘“Former victims of trafficking” and “former victims of traf
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ii. The Scope of ‘Persecution’: Trafficking, Re-trafficking, Reprisals and Social 
Ostracism 
 
Guidelines on International Protection state that ‘persecution’ in the context of the 
Refugee Convention can involve ‘serious human rights violations, including a threat to 
origin State may also arguably amount to persecution. A recent and somewhat 
                                                                                                                                                       
life or freedom, as well as other kinds of serious harm or intolerable predicament, as 
assessed in the light of the opinions, feelings, and psychological make-up of the asylum 
applicant.’1197 With respect to trafficked victims or possible future trafficked persons, 
harm feared as a result of trafficking or its anticipation may amount to persecution in 
the context of the Refugee Convention.1198  
        Along the same vein, various characteristics inherent in the trafficking process, 
such as sexual enslavement, forced prostitution, and rape, may amount to persecution. 
The ongoing effects of past trafficking, such as psychological trauma, may in extreme 
cases qualify as persecution and render it sufficient to recognise an individual as a 
refugee, provided that a causal link with a Convention ground may be established.1199  
        The threat of reprisals, re-trafficking or ostracism from the community in the 
 
exploitation” are capable of being members of a particular social group within regulation 6(1)(d) because 
ving been trafficked.’ 
 International Protection, n 1017, para 14 
of their shared common background or past experience of ha
1197 ‘Guidelines on
1198 Ibid, para 15 
1199 Ibid, para 16. 
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groundbreaking decision taken in the UK High Court recently awarded substantial 
damages to a Moldovan victim of repeated trafficking, who now has refugee status in 
ly provided by the putative trafficked victim seems to be putting the threshold 
. 
      The basis for the requisite ‘well founded fear’ of persecution relates to the 
circum igh 
Comm tate 
that:  
 
                                                
the UK, ‘for failing to take steps to protect her and for sending her back to Moldova 
despite substantial grounds to believe she was at risk from her traffickers.’1200 Bearing 
all of the above in mind, it seems clear that persecution as such occur before, during, 
and post-trafficking.  
        Of course, evidence will be required to establish persecution or the possibility 
thereof in terms of asylum applications. In PO (Nigeria) it was stated that the ‘AIT 
erred in law by requiring her to prove by personal evidence that her trafficker had 
operated as part of a gang in Nigeria as a necessary element in establishing that she 
would be at risk on return.’1201 Maintaining border integrity is indeed a legitimate 
concern for States, yet requiring such a level of evidence in asylum claims to be 
personal
too high, to say the least. Yet, the requirement of providing evidence of fear of risk on 
return is a necessary part of the asylum process; this case is simply illustrative of the 
bar being set too high,1202 particularly with the onus placed directly on the putative 
victim
  
stances at the time in the country of origin. The United Nations H
issioner for Refugees (UNHCR) Guidelines on International Protection1203 s
 
1200 See Alan Travis, n 1025.  
1201 PO (Nigeria) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2011] EWCA Civ 132, para 10. 
1202 The evidence required was referred to as imposing an ‘unrealistic burden’ on the appellant, PO 
(Nigeria) para 33. 
1203 ‘Guidelines on International Protection’ n 1017. 
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… where a state fails to take such reasonable steps as are within its 
competence to prevent trafficking and provide effective protection and 
assistance to victims, the fear of persecution of the individual is likely to be 
 effects of, sex trafficking sufficient for a well founded fear of 
ersecution. Applicability of the Refugee Convention of course depends on satisfying 
                                                
well founded. The mere existence of a law prohibiting trafficking in persons 
will not of itself be sufficient to exclude the possibility of persecution.1204  
 
Trafficking victims overwhelmingly originate from countries either suffering political 
upheaval, economic impoverishment or at least with economies in transition;1205 
therefore it is not unreasonable to consider that those originating from such States may 
be at an increased risk of being trafficked than otherwise. Such States are ideal source 
countries for trafficked persons as a result of poverty, displacement, and vulnerability 
to organised crime gangs. Sex trafficking victims are overwhelmingly female. 
Therefore, this particular body of persons – females from impoverished States with 
poor employment opportunities – may have significant cause to apprehend, fall subject 
to, or suffer the after
p
the second stage; that of the causal link between persecution and one of the Refugee 
Convention grounds. 
 
iii. Applicability of Refugee Convention Grounds to Victims of Trafficking: 
Establishing a Causal Link 
 
 
pter 1, Part I, section A, for discussion of the underlying ‘push’ factors affecting the decision 
1204 Ibid, para 23. 
1205 See, Cha
to migrate. 
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The relevant Convention grounds are ‘race, religion, nationality, membership of a 
particular social group or political opinion’.1206 Such grounds may be difficult to 
 it be the sole, or even dominant, cause.’1207 
e Refugee Convention 
as designed to be inclusive, rather than exclusive. Of particular interest is the matter 
f whether women per se are capable of constituting a ‘social group’ for the purposes 
f the Refugee Convention, in the context of human trafficking. 
                                                
establish with respect to asylum claims made by trafficked persons, particularly if 
trafficking is predominantly motivated by economic motives on the part of the 
trafficker.  
        Although it is necessary for one of the above grounds to be satisfied, ‘it is 
sufficient that the Convention ground be a relevant factor contributing to the 
persecution; it is not necessary that
Therefore, the existence of economic motives as a central or dominant factor is not 
necessarily a damning factor, provided a relevant criterion can be satisfied for the 
purposes of the Refugee Convention. 
        Various, even numerous, Refugee Convention grounds may apply to victims of 
sex trafficking. Race and nationality are particularly relevant from the perspective of 
demand for sexual services from different and ‘exotic’ women. All of the grounds 
potentially become relevant in the context of internal or cross border conflict in and 
between countries leading to sex trafficking as a form of ‘weapon’, so to speak, such as 
took place in the former Yugoslavia, in which context sex trafficking (in a war context) 
was specifically referred to as a crime against humanity.1208 Th
w
o
o
 
 
 
 
1206 Article 1A(2), Refugee Convention. 
1207 ‘Guidelines on International Protection’, n 1017, para 29. 
1208 See, for example, T Obokata, n 48. 
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iv. The Scope of ‘Social Group’ 
 
Early discussion during the drafting of Article 1A(2) of the Refugee Convention 
it was noted in Applicant A v Minister for 
women, may have the option to claim asylum on those grounds. Certain social subsets 
         
envisaged narrower scope1209 than that which was ultimately adopted. ‘Social Group’ 
as a Convention ground was included on the basis that an exhaustive list proved 
impossible to achieve.  
        In order for this element to be satisfied and for the causal link to be established, 
the actual persecution must not be a defining factor of the social group,1210 i.e. the 
group must not be defined by reference to persecutory conduct. They are not members 
of a social group because they are persecuted; they must be persecuted because they are 
members of a social group. However, 
Immigration and Ethnic Affairs that ‘while persecutory conduct cannot define the social 
group, the actions of the persecutors may serve to identify or even cause the creation of 
a particular social group in society.’1211  
        It is not unreasonable to consider that gender could be an influential factor with 
respect to the type of persecution suffered.1212 If this analysis succeeds, then those who 
fear trafficking, and those who fear being re-trafficked, simply because they are 
                                        
1209 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, ‘1951 Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Status of 
Refugees and Stateless Persons (Travaux Preparatoires)’ <http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49da0e466.html> 
ation and Ethnic Affairs [1997] 2 B.H.R.C. 143, High Court of Australia. 
DIMA 1996). 
accessed 23 May 2011. 
1210 A v Minister for Immigr
1211 Ibid, Justice McHugh. 
1212 Guidelines on Gender Issues for Decision-Makers in 1996 (
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of women in particular may qualify as a social group such as single women, illiterate 
women, divorced women,1213 or women who have worked in the sex trade, or as ‘sex 
slaves’1214 – the latter subset in particular is of note, as this potentially encompasses 
those who fear social ostracism if returned to their community in the origin state. 
According to the dicta from A, above, ‘trafficked women’ as such may also constitute a 
‘social group’, by virtue of having been trafficked,1215 and indeed have been so classed 
 decided cases – in SB (PSG – Protection Regulations – Reg 6) Moldova CG [2008] it 
was s
 
able of being members of a particular social group … 
because of their shared common background or past experience of having 
-trafficking may be ‘persecuted’ for Refugee 
‘social group’ as a result of having been trafficked and being at risk of being re-
                                                
in
tated that:  
Former victims of trafficking” and “former victims of trafficking for sexual 
exploitation” are cap
been trafficked.1216  
 
It follows from this that those at risk of re
Convention purposes, therefore establishing both the persecution and the causal link to 
the Convention ground of ‘social group’.  
        In order to satisfy this Convention ground in terms of ‘women’ as a social group, 
women would have to show that they feared persecution, i.e. trafficking, simply by 
virtue of their gender. The abovementioned ‘former victims of trafficking’ become a 
 
1213 ‘Guidelines on International Protection’, n 1017, para 38. 
1214 See, The Queen on the Application of P v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2008] EWHC 
2447 (Admin). 
1215 See, R Piotrowicz ‘Victims of People Trafficking and Entitlement to International Protection’ (2005) 
24 Australian Yearbook of International Law, 159, 167 – 170. 
1216 SB (PSG – Protection Regulations – Reg 6) Moldova CG [2008] UKAIT 00002, ‘Determination and 
Reasons’, para 2. See, 
<http://www.nrcentre.org.uk/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=130:victims-of-
trafficking-can-get-refugee-status&catid=13:Policies%20&%20Rulings&Itemid=9> accessed 04 May 
2011. 
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trafficked. This demonstrates ‘after the event’ (i.e. post trafficking) recognition of a 
‘social group.’ Yet, can we establish ‘women’ as a freestanding ‘social group’ before 
re be feasible to argue that they constitute a particular social group 
disparities of 
         
the event (i.e. prior to trafficking, because they are at risk of being trafficked?). 
         In order to constitute a social group, it is necessary that the members of the 
particular group ‘either share a common characteristic other than their risk of being 
persecuted or are perceived as a group by society.’1217 Women share unchangeable 
characteristics i.e. that of being female, and frequently experience different treatment to 
men; it may therefo
in this context.1218  
        ‘Women’ as a ‘social group’ may on the face of it be deemed too broad. However, 
if women of a particular race (thereby satisfying the Convention ground) may be 
trafficked (and therefore persecuted) because of demand for the sexual services of 
exotic women, by the same token women as a social group, who share the immutable 
characteristic of being female, may equally be persecuted i.e. trafficked for sexual 
exploitation, simply by virtue of being women. Although demand for trafficked women 
for the purpose of sexual exploitation is ‘often further grounded in social 
race, nationality, caste and colour’,1219 the demand is, overall, for women. 
         The potential for women to be recognised as a ‘social group’ is becoming 
increasingly evident through examples such as Canada v Ward,1220 where it was 
recognised that a ‘social group’ could be constituted in various ways, including 
                                        
1217 ‘Guidelines on International Protection’, n 1017, para 37. 
1218 UNHCR Guidelines on International Protection, ‘“Membership of a particular social group” with
the context of Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention and/or its 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of 
Refugees’ para 14 <
in 
http://www.unhcr.org/3d58de2da.html> accessed 15 Feb 2011. 
1219 See Report on the Special Rapporteur on trafficking in persons, especially women and children, 
Sigma Huda, Addendum, Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina, ‘Integration of the Rights of Women and 
the Gender Perspective’ (30 November 2005) UN Doc E/CN.4/2006/62/Add.2 paras 48 and 66. 
1220 Canada (Attorney General) v. Ward [1993] 2 S.C.R. 689. 
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primarily ‘[g]roups defined by an innate or unchangeable characteristic’.1221 The case 
goes on to state that ‘The first category would embrace individuals fearing persecution on 
or Refugee Convention 
mentioned examples indicate that there is the 
potential for claims to be made here. 
                                              
such bases as gender, linguistic background and sexual orientation...’ (Emphasis added) 
        Nonetheless, if women as a social group were to be deemed too broad, an 
argument can still potentially be made in terms of economically impoverished women 
or unemployed women – particularly in certain geographical regions where the 
feminisation of poverty is evident - as social subsets; reflecting the fact that many 
trafficked women come from economically impoverished areas where female 
unemployment rates are high. Further weight is added to this argument by the 
judgement in Islam v Secretary of State for the Home Department and R v Immigration 
Appeal Tribunal, ex parte Shah1222 where a Lords majority found that ‘women in 
Pakistan’ and/or ‘Pakistani women’ constituted a social group f
purposes; clearly this is defined largely by reference to gender.  
        Difficulties in making such a claim can be envisaged, as it requires a departure 
from the norm, although the above
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
1221 Other ways included groups whose members voluntarily associate for reasons so fundamental to their 
human dignity that they should not be forced to forsake the association; and groups associated by a 
former voluntary status, unalterable due to its historical permanence. 
1222 [1999] 2 A.C. 629. 
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. Article 3 ECHR - Expulsion / Deportation, and the European Convention on 
here is undoubtedly a link between non-refoulement and Article 3 ECHR, as indicated 
by ca t:  
 
to amount to 
persecution, although we doubt that this refinement would be likely to be 
 may face on return to their country of origin may fall 
                                                
B
Human Rights 
 
T
ses such as Jabari.1223 In Kacaj1224 the Immigration Appeal Tribunal noted tha
We recognise the possibility that Article 3 could be violated by actions 
which did not have a sufficiently systematic character 
determinative in any but a very small minority of cases.1225   
 
Victims of human trafficking have the potential to expand this ‘very small minority of 
cases’ – the treatment that they
short of the requisite standard of persecution of a systematic character, yet they may 
still face serious ill treatment.  
 
1223 See, Jabari v Turkey (app no 40035/98)  9 B.H.R.C. 1; [2001] I.N.L.R. 136, where the individual 
concerned used a false passport to gain entry to Turkey following accusations of adultery in Iran, from 
where she originated. Initially, she was detained for deportation and refused asylum. Jabari was 
subsequently granted refugee status under the 1951 Refugee Convention, and she went on to lodge an 
application against her deportation in a Turkish court. This application was refused. She applied to the 
ECtHR, on the basis that there had been violations by Turkey of Art. 3 and Art.13 ECHR since if 
deported to Iran she faced the possibility of death by stoning or flogging, and furthermore that by the 
Turkish authorities had denied her an effective remedy. Her application was allowed, and violations of 
both Articles were found. 
1224 Kacaj (Article 3 - Standard of Proof - Non-State Actors) Albania v. Secretary of State for the Home 
Department, [2001] UKIAT 00018, United Kingdom: Asylum and Immigration Tribunal / Immigration 
Appellate Authority, 19 July 2001.  
1225 Kacaj, para 19. 
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        As mentioned previously, the Home Office/UKBA judge that, in respect of the 
issuance of a residence permit owing to the ‘personal situation’ of the victim, ‘a 
combination of our existing obligations on asylum and human rights and our 
Discretionary Leave policy already cover situations where an individuals personal 
circumstances … make it necessary for them to remain in the UK.’1226 Obligations 
under the ECHR are obviously a relevant factor, where matters such as support or 
eatment of Punishment,1231 the latter of which explicitly states 
that ‘No State Party shall expel, return ("refouler") or extradite a person to another State 
         
expulsion of victims trafficked for the purpose of sexual exploitation are concerned – 
most notably Articles 3 and 8.1227 Article 4 undoubtedly has significance for trafficking 
victims, as demonstrated in Siliadin v France.1228  
        Article 3 of the ECHR becomes particularly relevant when considering the 
potential for re-trafficking and re-victimisation on return to the country of origin, as 
well as the threat of reprisals from the traffickers, or perhaps the more general threat of 
organised crime, which has known links with human trafficking activity. The Article 
states that ‘No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment.’ This right forms part of the fundamental basis of any democratic society, 
and this value is enshrined in the ICCPR,1229 the American Convention on Human 
Rights,1230 and the United Nations Convention against Torture and other Cruel, 
Inhuman or Degrading Tr
                                        
1226 Home Office, n 1061, 6. 
1227 Expulsion could result in breaches of Article 3 where there was risk of ill-treatment on return to 
origin state, and of Article 8 where, for example, ‘there was a serious risk of the persons concerned 
suffering an adverse effect on their health or their physical or moral integrity.’ J McBride ‘Irre
the 
gular 
din v France (2006) 43 E.H.R.R. 423, and Rantsev v Cyprus and Russia (app no. 25965/04) 
ly of the United Nations on 10 December 1984 (resolution 
o force on 26 June 1987). 
Migrants and the European Convention on Human Rights’ (AS/Mig/Inf (2005) 21) para. 127. 
1228 Silia
[2010]. 
1229 Article 7. 
1230 Article 5(2). 
1231 United Nations Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment of 
Punishment (adopted by the General Assemb
39/46) entered int
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where there are substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being 
subjected to torture.’1232  
         Invoking Article 3 in the context of victims of trafficking involves consideration 
either they could not be unlucky enough for it to happen a 
                                                
of the existence of potential1233 as well as actual violations. The country of proposed 
return would have to be unable to provide sufficient protection itself to the victim.1234 
        Liability under the ECHR concerns the deporting State, as it is the direct 
consequence of the action of deportation which will lead to exposure of the individual 
concerned to treatment contrary to Article 3, albeit in the receiving State. The JCHR 
observes that repatriation into a situation of poverty does not bode well for victims of 
trafficking, who may fall subject to the same conditions or organised criminals who 
facilitated their trafficking in the first place.1235 Such measures are therefore counter-
productive. Those who have been trafficked may even by their own actions fall back 
into the hands of traffickers, through seeking out a ‘migration broker’ to help them 
migrate, in the belief that 
second time, or that they have learned enough from their experience to avoid making 
the same mistakes again.  
        When considering this issue transplanted into a trafficking context, it is useful to 
look to the standard set down in the Soering1236 case, in which it was stated that Article 
3 comes into play ‘where substantial grounds have been shown for believing that the 
person concerned, if extradited, faces a real risk of being subjected to torture or to 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment in the requesting country.’1237 Although 
 
 to 
ment on the basis that she was a trafficked victim and had therefore 
ixth Report, n 31, para 49. 
 (1989) 11 E.H.R.R. 439. 
1232 Article 3(1). 
1233 See, Soering v UK (1989) 11 E.H.R.R. 439. 
1234 See, for example, The Queen on the Application of P v Secretary of State for the Home Department 
[2008] EWHC 2447 (Admin), where it was alleged on behalf of the applicant that if she were returned
Cyprus, she would suffer ill treat
worked as a ‘sex slave’, para 9. 
1235 Joint Committee on Human Rights Twenty-S
1236 See, Soering v UK
1237 Soering, para 91. 
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originally applied to extradition, it has been established in subsequent case law that the 
Soering principle extends to expulsion.1238 A ‘mere possibility’ of ill treatment is 
insufficient to satisfy this standard.1239 Analogies can be brought where trafficking is 
concerned. After all, ‘the Convention is a living instrument which … must be 
interpreted in the light of present day conditions.’1240 Therefore, a modern day 
the absolute character of this provision and the fact that it 
the burden 
                                                
application of Article 3 may indeed be stretched to accommodate victims of trafficking, 
who are at risk of ill-treatment on return to the origin state, where necessary. 
        However, the high standard of proof required by the ECtHR means that Article 3 
may have limited applicability in practice.1241 In its Cruz-Varas1242 judgment, the Court 
noted several principles with regard to the assessment of the risk of ill treatment. 
Primarily, in determining whether the Soering principle is satisfied, the Court will 
assess the issue in light of all of the material placed before it. Secondly, the existence of 
the risk of ill treatment must primarily be assessed with reference to the facts which 
were known, or ought to have been known, by the Contracting state at the time of the 
expulsion. Finally, the assessment of the risk of treatment in breach of Article 3 must be 
a rigorous one, given ‘
enshrines one of the fundamental values of the democratic societies making up the 
Council of Europe.’1243 
        The Commission in Soering noted that ‘[i]t is only in exceptional circumstances 
that the removal of a person will give rise to an issue under Article 3 and 
 
ntified) proportion of whom are 
al risk’. 
m, (1979-80) 2 E.H.R.R. 1, para. 31. 
 76, and 83. 
08. 
1238 See, for example, Cruz-Varas v Sweden (1992) 14 E.H.R.R. 1. 
1239 See, for example Vilvarajah and Others v United Kingdom, para.111. On the point of ‘mere 
possibility’ being insufficient, this includes situations where there is some risk to some people but no 
evidence to single out the applicant from a group, only a small (and unide
at risk – here, they may be considered to be no or insufficient ‘re
1240 Tyrer v United Kingdo
1241 See, S Egan, n 1048. 
1242 Cruz-Varas v Sweden (1992) 14 E.H.R.R. 1, paras 75 –
1243 Vilvarajah and Others v. United Kingdom, para.1
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lies o  or 
punis
 
he case, 
such as the nature and context of the treatment or punishment, the manner 
ith part of the actual basis of Soering’s claim i.e. 
         
n the applicant to substantiate his fear that he will be exposed to treatment
hment falling under that Article.’1244 The Court stated in that case that: 
As is established in the Court’s case-law, ill-treatment, including 
punishment, must attain a minimum level of severity if it is to fall within 
the scope of Article 3 (art. 3). The assessment of this minimum is, in the 
nature of things, relative; it depends on all the circumstances of t
and method of its execution, its duration, its physical or mental effects and, 
in some instances, the sex, age and state of health of the victim.1245 
 
Dicta from subsequent case law has added to this.1246 The language used in the 
abovementioned paragraph, coupled w
the ‘increasing tension and psychological trauma’1247 that would be suffered as a result 
of the ‘death row phenomenon’,1248 opens the door to consider the relevance of the 
mental state of the trafficked victim. 
        As mentioned previously, the Trafficking Convention envisages the granting of 
residence permits as a result of the victims ‘personal situation’, which may include their 
                                        
1244 Opinion of the Commission in Soering, para 94. 
1245 See Ireland v. United Kingdom 2 E.H.R.R. 25, para. 162; and Tyrer v. United Kingdom 2 E.H.R.R. 1, 
paras. 29 and 80. At para 167, the Court goes on to state that ‘Treatment has been held by the Court to be
both "inhuman" because it was premeditated, was applied for hours at a stretch and "caused, if not actual
bodily injury, at least intense physical and mental suffering", and
 
 
 also "degrading" because it was "such 
t to be "inhuman" or "degrading", the suffering or humiliation 
vent go beyond that inevitable element of suffering or humiliation connected with 
le and Warbrick, Law of the European Convention on Human Rights, DJ Harris, 
n of Soering and 
as to arouse in [its] victims feelings of fear, anguish and inferiority capable of humiliating and debasing 
them and possibly breaking their physical or moral resistance"’. 
1246 See, Tyrer v. United Kingdom 2 E.H.R.R.1 paras 29 and 30, where it was stated that ‘[i]n order for a 
punishment or treatment associated with i
involved must in any e
a given form of legitimate punishment.’ 
1247 Soering, para 105 
1248 See, Harris, O’Boy
M O’Boyle, E P Bates, C M Buckley (eds) (Oxford 2009) 79 – 90 for discussio
subsequent case law. 
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‘state of health … or some other factor which has to be taken into account.’1249 Further, 
according to the two CPS Protocols addressing prosecutorial discretion where offences 
were committed by trafficked persons as a result of having been trafficked,1250 where 
there is evidence such as medical reports, relating to one who is suspected of 
committing immigration offences, which indicate post-traumatic stress as a result of 
their being trafficked, the prosecutor should consider whether prosecution is in the 
public interest or whether it should be discontinued.1251 Evidently, the mental state of 
the trafficked victim is a very real concern. This, coupled with the potential for reprisals 
or re-trafficking,1252 arguably constitutes ‘substantial grounds’ and ‘real risk’ for the 
purposes of the Soering principle. It would appear that the mental state of the victim on 
ce indicates that a wealth of evidence is 
         
return would be insufficient alone to qualify for the standard set down in Soering.1253 
The danger of re-trafficking and reprisals is assessed by the host state, and is a matter of 
degree and judgement. 
        The cases cited have required the applicant to bring evidence of the potential for 
treatment contrary to Article 3 to occur in the receiving state, and so would any victim 
of trafficking or ‘consensually trafficked’ person who was seeking to rely on this 
Article. Previous Article 3 jurispruden
necessary.1254 An IOM study indicates that many trafficking organisations operate in 
                                        
1249 Explanatory Report to the CoE Trafficking Convention, n 248, para 184.   
e risk of ill-treatment may come from individuals or private 
uz-Varas v Sweden (1992) 14 E.H.R.R. 1. 
1250 Crown Prosecution Service, n 318. 
1251 Ibid.  
1252 A string of cases clarifies here that th
groups as well as public authorities – see HLR v France [1997] 26 EHRR 29, Ahmed v Austria [1996] 24 
EHRR 278. 
1253 See, for example, Cr
1254 See, for example, Chahal v United Kingdom (1997) 23 E.H.R.R. 413, Vilvarajah and Others v The 
United Kingdom. 45/1990/236/302-306. 
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the same countries of origin,1255 which could go toward providing evidence for the 
potential for reprisals and re-trafficking.  
       There is even the potential for Article 2 ECHR to be invoked,1256 as ill-treatment 
on return might be that a victim risked being killed by the traffickers, organised 
criminals operating in the area, or even by their own community. Evidence of threats to 
turn, 
ould need to be brought forward, coupled with evidence that the receiving state was 
not ab ence 
of hig tate, 
and/o
        T
 
ction strategy for trafficked persons. A failure to [provide] for 
safe (and to the extent possible) voluntary return would amount to little 
                                                
the trafficking victim or their family, or with respect to re-victimisation on re
w
le to adequately protect the victim from said threats or re-victimisation. Evid
h rates of organised crime, high trafficking rates from the victim’s origin s
r proof that the origin state is a known source country, could be cited.  
he UN High Commissioner for Human Rights has expressed the view that:  
… safe and, as far as possible, voluntary return must be at the core of any 
credible prote
more than an endorsement of the forced deportation and repatriation of 
trafficked persons. When trafficking occurs in the context of organised 
crime, such an endorsement presents an unacceptable safety risk to 
victims.1257  
 
The links between trafficking and organised crime are undeniable, therefore this is a 
very real concern. It must be borne in mind as well that as well as the substantive tests 
 
1255 International Organization for Migration, ‘Changing Patterns and Trends of Trafficking in Persons in 
the Balkan Region’ (2004) 105 http://publications.iom.int/bookstore/free/Changing_Patterns.pdf 
accessed 21 June 2011. 
1256 Links between Articles 2, 3 and 14 ECHR in terms of gender-based violence were made in the recent
judgment in Opuz v Turkey [2009] (Application no. 33401/02). 
1257 United Nations General Assembly, ‘Informal note by the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Human Rig
 
hts’ UN Doc. A/AC.254/16, para 20. 
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for refugee status and human rights protection being different, there are also important 
procedural differences. No procedure is specified in the Refugee Convention, and so it 
fficked or subject to threats and 
                                                
is up to States as to what to provide.1258 The ECHR at least provides the right to an 
Article 13 remedy, and the Article 6 right to a fair trial may be relied upon where 
relevant. Furthermore, unlike all the other instruments considered, the ECHR provides 
an international mechanism of accountability, the ECtHR, to which individuals have 
access. 
        There is real difficulty in obtaining reliable statistics about this clandestine 
activity, as regards, for example, incidences of re-trafficking from certain regions, or 
evidence of reprisals from traffickers against other victims and/or their families. A 
victim may also be known to traffickers or trafficking networks who operate in that 
area, which could increase their chances of being re-tra
reprisals. Increased protection for victims will be necessary if they do qualify for a right 
to remain in the destination state in order to cooperate in criminal proceedings, as a 
result of the threat of reprisals from traffickers. An empirical study conducted in 
Rimini, Italy, whereby the head of the investigative office of Polizia di Stato in Rimini 
was interviewed, drew conclusions that verify this.1259  
        The threat of reprisals against victims or their families is very real and constitutes 
one of the many issues which stem from and perpetuate the human trafficking 
phenomenon. Victims may agree to and begin to take part in the criminal process, and 
disengage at a later point due to fear of reprisals. Article 28 of the CoE Trafficking 
Convention calls for States to ‘adopt such legislative or other measures as may be 
necessary to provide effective and appropriate protection from potential retaliation or 
 
1258 Information on the UK Asylum Appeals Process can be found at: Information Centre about Asylum 
and Refugees (ICAR) ‘Asylum Appeals Process: Thematic Briefing prepared for the Independent 
Asylum Commission’ (September 2007) <http://www.icar.org.uk/download/Appeals.pdf>  accessed 08 
Dec 2009. 
1259 M Ventrella, n 1039, 82. 
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intimidation in particular during and after investigation and prosecution of perpetrators’ 
as regards victim, witnesses, and other relevant persons. The Metropolitan Human 
st lie 
of return (this refers to a country or territory listed in paragraph 8(1)(c) of Schedule 2 to 
                                                
Trafficking Team has recently been running an initiative along with the Poppy project 
in order to communicate sensitively with women who choose to disengage in order to 
gain a better understanding of their reasons for doing so,1260 assumedly with a view to 
better meet the needs of victims who take part in criminal proceedings provide better 
support in order to encourage continued engagement. 
        With respect to the delicate balance between maintaining border integrity, 
immigration control, and adequate protection of victims, the public interest mu
primarily in providing for victims of trafficking and exploitation. When weighing up a 
balance of interests, one might consider the potential harm to the UK resulting from 
abuse of the system by those falsely claiming to be victims of trafficking, yet how 
problematic this will actually be remains to be seen,1261 particularly given that the 
residence permit is not automatically granted; there are many steps to the process. 
        If a trafficked victim has not been granted the one-year residence permit and is not 
in a position to apply for asylum, the next point of call is to consider whether they 
qualify for Humanitarian Protection. The qualifying criteria under paragraphs 339C and 
D of the Immigration Rules1262 states that Humanitarian Protection may be granted to 
an individual in the UK who is not a refugee if ‘there are substantial grounds for 
believing that the person would face a real risk of suffering serious harm in the country 
 
 
 
1260 Home Office/Scottish Government, n 1140, 25. 
1261 See, Alan Travis, n 1025. Damian Green reacted to this case by stating that the rights of victims have 
been strengthened, and that 'This very disturbing case shows why our approach to human trafficking has
changed significantly since 2003’ – see Home Office, ‘Damian Green reacts to ‘disturbing’ trafficking
case’ 12 April 2011 <http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/media-centre/news/trafficking-case?version=1> 
l 2011. Also see SB (PSG – Protection Regulations – Reg 6) Moldova CG [2008] 
.ukba.homeoffice.gov.uk/policyandlaw/immigrationlaw/immigrationrules/
accessed 29 Apri
UKAIT 00002. 
1262 Home Office/UK Border Agency, ‘Immigration Rules’, available at 
<http://www > accessed 10 
April 2011. 
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the Immigration Act 1971); and the person cannot obtain effective protection from the 
authorities of that country (or will not because of the risk of suffering serious harm).1263 
‘Serious harm’ in this context includes, most poignantly for victims of human 
trafficking, ‘torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment in the country of 
return’,1264 thereby mirroring the language of Article 3 ECHR. Humanitarian Protection 
eed, and severe mental stress as a result of having been 
afficked and forced to work in the sex industry would be unlikely to suffice. 
iscretionary Leave to be granted; therefore this category is only of use to a 
ery small group of persons. 
         
once granted does not imply permanence - it will be revoked or not renewed once the 
Secretary of State is satisfied that the conditions which led to the granting of 
Humanitarian Protection in the first place have ceased to exist or improved to an 
acceptable degree so that protection is no longer needed.1265 
        A final category under which a trafficked victim may be able to qualify for the 
right to remain is Discretionary Leave. This category comes into play where 
Humanitarian Protection is not available to an individual, simply because they are not 
in need of ‘protection’ per se. Discretionary leave may be granted in limited situations, 
such as where severe humanitarian conditions in the country of origin or an individual’s 
serious medical condition1266 would render return contrary to Article 3. The threshold 
is, predictably, very high ind
tr
Similarly, poor humanitarian conditions on return would have to be exceptionally 
severe for D
v
 
C. Consequences of not granting Asylum, Humanitarian Protection, or Discretionary 
Leave 
                                        
1263 UK Borders Agency, ‘Humanitarian Protection’, n 1050. 
1264 Ibid. 
1265 Home Office/UK Border Agency, ‘Immigration Rules’, n 1262. 
1266 See, D v United Kingdom [1997] 24 E.H.R.R. 423. 
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 Delays in processing asylum claims are not uncommon, and such delays can result in 
the asylum seeker becoming destitute in the interim period. One would hope that this 
 45 day recovery and reflection period during which decisions about the 
ture of the victim and any right to remain on their part will be made. 
         ight 
to rem king 
Artic gan 
obser
 
onvention apply to all persons within the 
jurisdiction of the contracting states, it could well be argued that a failure 
e would be a failure to respect that person’s 
                                                
situation would not occur with respect to trafficked victims, given the strict deadlines in 
the identification procedure, i.e. 5 days from initial contact to decide whether 
‘reasonable grounds’ to believe that an individual is a victim of trafficking exist, 
followed by the
fu
As well as Article 3 concerns, those who are awaiting a decision as regards a r
ain for any period of time may also have concerns which are capable of invo
le 8, which includes the right to respect for physical or moral integrity.1267 E
ves that:  
Given that the rights in the C
by any contracting state to provide adequate shelter to a trafficked person, 
to fail to meet his or her psychological or physical needs or to supply 
emergency medical assistanc
physical or moral integrity.1268  
 
It would appear that, under the conditions of the CoE Trafficking Convention, support 
and medical assistance will at first be available to trafficked victims, although delays in 
procedures could raise issues here. 
 
1267 See, X & Y v Netherlands [1986] 8 E.H.R.R. 235. 
1268 S Egan, n 1048, 117. 
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        Those trafficked victims who are not granted any right to remain beyond the 45 
day recovery period due to the fact that they are neither useful to the criminal process 
or do not meet the criteria with respect to their ‘personal situation’ do not appear to be 
entitled to any support by the State. Trafficked persons often may not comply with the 
asylum system, and may ‘disappear’ soon after making asylum applications.1269 Refusal 
of asylum, humanitarian protection or discretionary leave does not necessarily result in 
expulsion, although the individual may be expected to leave the UK. This opens up the 
potential for a proportion of trafficked victims to ‘fall through the cracks’ and become 
homeless or destitute – a problem which is not unknown as regards asylum seekers,1270 
and, according to the JCHR, the Government’s treatment of individuals may in some 
cases amount to inhuman and degrading treatment within the scope of Article 3 
ECHR.1271 It is those trafficked victims who are not ‘useful’ to any criminal 
proceedings, and who do not qualify for any right to remain yet who do not choose to 
leave, who will suffer. Failed asylum seekers – some of whom will be genuine, but 
have only sought help from NGOs and charities long after their asylum claim has 
failed, and are afraid to give basic information about themselves which would help 
         
could not bring forward sufficient proof of their situation - slip through the net and 
become destitute. This is well known. Some of them will be trafficked victims, who 
them to obtain such support.1272 
                                        
1269 Statement by Kate Smart, Director of Policy, Communications and Advoca
Council, (personal communication, 3 March 2009). 
1270 See, R (Limbuela, Tesema, Adam) v Secretary of 
cy, Welsh Refugee 
State for the Home Department (2005) UKHL 66 
(2006) 1 A.C. 396, also see Asylum seekers ‘living off hand-outs’, BBC NEWS UK, 14 May 2009, 
available at <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/8049300.stm> accessed 14 May 2009. 
1271 Joint Committee on Human Rights 
1272 Kate Smart, Director of Policy, Communications and Advocacy, Welsh Refugee Council, (personal 
communication, 3 March 2009). 
Tenth Report, n 1186, 5.  
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        The Asylum Support Programme Inter-Agency Partnership (ASP)1273 conducted a 
Destitution Tally in January 20081274 and a Second Destitution Tally in May 2009,1275 
and recognised a substantial1276 number of asylum seekers – either refused or at some 
point in the asylum process. It is estimated that more than 40% of people using refugee 
support agencies are destitute.1277 It is inevitable that there is the potential for the same 
to happen to trafficked persons or ‘consensually trafficked’ persons who are unable to 
bring the requisite proof of a need to remain and therefore do not qualify for any right 
to remain. A previous ASP representative states that, primarily, ‘ASP experience … is 
not with those who have admitted that they have been trafficked and then not been 
granted leave, but with those that we suspect have been trafficked but who don't admit 
to it’.1278 The ASP recognises an individual as destitute who is ‘currently with no 
access to benefits/BIA support/ income and are either street homeless or staying with 
         
friends only temporarily’.1279 A less stringent definition is provided within s. 95(3) of 
the Immigration and Asylum Act, 1999.1280 
                                        
1273 The Asylum Support Programme Inter-Agency Partnership (IAP) consists of five agencies: Refugee 
Council, Refugee Action, Migrant Helpline, Scottish Refugee Council and Welsh Refugee Council. 
1274 K Smart and S Fullegar ‘Refugee Agencies Policy Response, ‘The Destitution Tally: an indication of 
the extent of destitution among asylum seekers and refugees’, January 2008, 2 
<http://www.refugeecouncil.org.uk/Resources/Refugee%20Council/downloads/policy_responses/IAP_D
estitution_Tally_Jan08.pdf> accessed 01 July 2011. 
1275 See, Kate Smart, Asylum Support Partnership Policy Report: The Second Destitution Tally, ‘An 
indication of the extent of destitution among asylum seeker, refused asylum seekers and refugees’, Policy 
council.org.uk/Resources/Refugee%20Council/downloads/policy_responses/Second
and Development Advisor, May 2009 
<http://www.refugee
_Destitution_Tally.pdf> accessed 01 July 2011. 
l 
um Act 1999, s 95(3) states that ‘… a person is destitute if – (a) he does not 
 
he has adequate accommodation or the means of obtaining it, but cannot meet his other 
1276 The first Destitution Tally recognised 1,524 destitute cases recorded in 4 weeks – see K Smart and S 
Fullegar, n 1274, 5. 
1277 Ibid, 2. 
1278 Kate Smart, Director of Policy, Communications and Advocacy, Welsh Refugee Council, (persona
communication, 3 March 2009). 
1279 K Smart and S Fullegar, n 1274, 1. 
1280 Immigration and Asyl
have adequate accommodation or any means of obtaining it (whether or not his essential living needs are
met); or (b) 
essential living needs…’ 
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        Although ‘A general duty to house the homeless or provide for the destitute cannot 
be spelled out of Article 3’,1281 inaction in the face of conditions which are deemed 
nacceptable can suffice with respect to the Article 3 standard.1282 In order for any 
claim  the 
indiv HS 
treatm ing 
respo
 
icies ensure that no person who has sought protection 
need be destitute whilst they have a valid reason to be here – everyone is 
nd so, with respect to those trafficked persons who cannot satisfy the relevant criteria 
, we 
reach a s rced from a trafficking 
                                                
u
 to be made, destitution must be the result of State action as opposed to
idual’s own volition. Failed asylum seekers may also be denied access to N
ent.1283 Phil Woolas, Border and Immigration Minister, gave the follow
nse to the ASP report on destitute asylum seekers: 
If someone has no right to be here they must return home. I do not believe 
the taxpayer should be funding those with no grounds to stay in the United 
Kingdom. Our pol
entitled to apply for support at every stage of the process. Our asylum 
process is fair and humane, with oversight by the independent courts, 
decisions made quicker than ever, and those in genuine need of protection 
offered refuge.1284 
 
A
or bring forward the relevant proof that they are at risk on return of ill-treatment
talemate, as is the case with failed asylum seekers divo
 
1281 Limbuela, para. 7, also see O’Rourke v United Kingdom (Application No 39022/97 (unreported) 26 
te asylum seekers – UK Border 
June 2001. 
1282 See, Napier v Scottish Ministers (2004) Scot CS 100. 
1283 See, R (on the application of A) v Secretary of State for Health (2009) EWCA Civ 225. 
1284 UK Borders Agency ‘Asylum Support Partnership report on destitu
Agency Response’, (14 May 2009) <http://www.ukba.homeoffice.gov.uk/sitecontent/newsarticles/asp-
report-ukba-response> accessed 01 June 2009, link no longer live. 
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context. Failed asylum seekers may be eligible for section 4 or ‘hard case’ support
nly as long as one of the following conditions apply:1285 
, but 
o
1) S/he is taking all reasonable steps to leave the UK or place her/himself 
failed asylum seekers.1286 Some destitute, failed asylum seekers remain 
nd this real 
                                                
 
in a position in which s/he is able to leave the UK, or   
2) S/he is unable to leave the UK because of a physical impediment to 
travel or for some other medical reason, or 
3) S/he has applied for judicial review of the decision on his/her asylum 
claim and s/he has been granted permission to proceed, or 
4) There is no viable route of return. 
 
Once again, the conditions are – perhaps necessarily with respect to immigration 
control – very stringent. Evidence suggests that section 4 is not providing an adequate 
safety net for 
because they genuinely feel that they will be subject to serious ill-treatment or that their 
lives will be threatened on return to their country of origin, but have not been able to 
meet the standard of proof required for a successful claim.1287 This situation will 
undoubtedly occur with respect to a proportion of trafficked victims if they do not 
consider returning home to be ‘safe’. There seems no simple way arou
problem, short of adopting an all encompassing Rimini-style outright granting of a right 
to remain.1288 
 
5. 
75, 
o Their Unsafe Homelands’ 
cil.org/documents/pressreleases/May_09/Press%20Release%20Destitutio
1285 See, Immigration and Asylum (Provision of Accommodation to Failed Asylum Seekers) Regulations 
200
1286 See, Kate Smart, Asylum Support Partnership Policy Report: The Second Destitution Tally, n 12
9. 
1287 See, for example, Welsh Refugee Council Press Release, ‘Down But Not Out: Refused Asylum 
Seekers in Wales Choose Years of Destitution Over Return t
<http://www.welshrefugeecoun
n%20Tally.doc> accessed 24 Jan 2010, link no longer live. 
1288 See, M Ventrella, n 1039. 
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        Some destitute trafficked victims who do not qualify for any right to remain yet 
who have chosen to remain in the destination state may simply end up being re-
afficked within or out of the destination state, or simply fall back into sex work 
indep urn. 
Some
        W ship 
reque
sugge  with respect to the potential for 
afficked persons to become destitute, particularly the requested actions that States: 
                                                
tr
endently, or perhaps become ‘pimped’, because they have nowhere else to t
 form of resolution for this unsatisfactory situation must be achieved. 
ith respect to destitute failed asylum seekers, the Asylum Support Partner
sts specific action or conditions to be taken or imposed by the UKBA.1289 The 
stions made raise some interesting issues
tr
 
… explore solutions to destitution for those currently not entitled to 
support. Options made available should include provision of support, the 
right to work and regularisation of status, depending on circumstances; and 
 
 
ns 
e 
l 
 
oint 
t tight 
ns; Ensure seamless transition 
n 
tus or leave to remain. 
1289 These are: 1) To accept the evidence that destitution does not lead refused asylum seekers to return to
their country of origin; 2) To adopt the principle that destitution should not be a feature of the UK 
asylum system; 3) To explore solutions to destitution for those currently not entitled to support. Optio
made available should include provision of support, the right to work and regularisation of status, 
depending on circumstances; 4) To regularise the status of destitute refused asylum seekers from the 
most frequently occurring countries of origin; 5) To provide cash support without delay for all destitute 
refused asylum seekers with dependent children regardless of whether the children were born after th
asylum application was refused (See Refugee Council ‘More Token Gestures’ London: Refugee Counci
(2008)); 6) To significantly improve processes to end destitution among those with entitlements to 
support, by implementing various measures. See K Smart, Asylum Support Partnership Policy Report: 
The Second Destitution Tally, ‘An indication of the extent of destitution among asylum seeker, refused
asylum seekers and refugees’, Policy and Development Advisor, May 2009. With respect to the 6th p
made above, ‘various measures’ include: Enable asylum claims to be lodged locally in order to avoid 
destitution among those who wish to claim asylum but cannot travel to the Asylum Screening Unit; 
Simplify procedures for applying for asylum support and Section 4 support, in particular, ensure that 
eligibility for support does not require evidence, which is impossible for applicants to provide; Se
timescales for processing asylum support applications and Section 4 support applications and introduce 
management systems to ensure that these are met; Ensure that there are effective procedures for 
providing temporary emergency support and accommodation to counteract delays in processing support 
applications; Ensure that there are effective channels of communication for applicants and voluntary 
agencies to resolve queries about the handling of asylum support applicatio
between support for asylum seekers and support for refused asylum seekers; Ensure seamless transitio
to mainstream benefits for those granted refugee sta
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… regularise the status of destitute refused asylum seekers from the most 
frequently occurring countries of origin.1290  
 a very real problem, and this body of destitute persons has the potential to be 
dded to by trafficked persons who do not qualify for any right to remain, but who are 
f ill-treatment. As regards the second point, there are 
nown source countries for many trafficked victims,1291 therefore it must be recognised 
onvention concern the flawed 
                                                
 
As regards the first point above, destitution among asylum seekers and failed asylum 
seekers is
a
afraid to return because of risk o
k
that victims from these countries are going to continue to appear in destination 
countries. 
 
IX. Recommendations for Dealing with Trafficked, Smuggled and Exploited 
Persons 
 
A. Formally Trafficked Persons 
 
As regards formally trafficked persons, the main downfalls of the UK approach to 
implementation of the Council of Europe Trafficking C
NRM, and the right of the victim to remain in the host state owing to their ‘personal 
situation.’ The statement by the UK Government that it was already largely compliant 
with Convention provisions1292 indicates that largely, everything that was needed was 
already in place, which explains a lack of clear implementing legislation. Therefore, the 
phrase ‘personal situation’ in this context has the potential to be (or perhaps already has 
been) interpreted stringently, even to the point that implementation of the Trafficking 
 
1290 See, K Smart, Asylum Support Partnership Policy Report: The Second Destitution Tally, n 1275. 
1291 See, Chapter 1, Part I, section B, subsection ii. 
1292 Home Office, n 294, 6. 
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Convention in this respect will lead to little or no change or improvement at all with 
respect to the treatment of trafficked victims in the UK.  
        Progress in terms of rest and recovery periods and temporary residence permits 
can logically follow one of three paths. Primarily, at a minimum, the recovery and 
reflection period should be longer for all victims of trafficking, once discovered. 30 
days as a minimum standard (or even 45, as offered by the UK) is not an unfair starting 
dings against traffickers. 
 country where it was pioneered.  
(exceeding the minimum of 30 days stipulated by the Convention) and have had the 
point in terms of obtaining signatures and ratifications, but realistically it still does not 
offer a particularly sympathetic approach. Three months would potentially be a more 
appropriate standard, and the added time could prove invaluable in terms of securing 
co-operation by the victim in criminal procee
        Secondly, a middle-of-the-road approach could see ratifying States, such as the 
UK, providing all victims of human trafficking with temporary residence permits, if so 
desired by victims. Such a model would allow for increased opportunity for recovery, 
and encourage participation in criminal proceedings. 
        Finally, the most accommodating proposal, and therefore most likely to be rejected 
in favour of immigration control and border integrity, would be to grant permanent 
residence permits for all. This would involve taking a Rimini-style approach further 
than in the
        Of these suggestions, the first and second are more workable and therefore 
preferable. In terms of any of the recommendations, there are potentially other gains to 
be made from allowing temporary residence. It is not impossible to conceive of victims 
coming forward in order to help initiate or aid with criminal proceedings against 
traffickers once they have been allowed to remain in the host state for a period of time 
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benefit of a period of recovery without an imminent expiry date stamped on their 
forehead. 
        Perhaps more pertinently, there is the issue of victim identification, the mechanism 
 by the Anti Trafficking Monitoring Group1293 - 
ppears to be deficient. It does not seem unreasonable at this point to require a more 
ates that ‘consent 
ill be irrelevant where…. (the ‘means’ are used)’ still potentially leaves room for 
f coercion i.e., where consent may in fact be ‘relevant’. It 
as alluded to in the thesis1295 that it may be possible to sketch out a prima facie case 
         
in the UK for which – as identified
a
encompassing system which does not ostensibly discriminate on the basis of origin 
State (of the victim),1294 and also uses the widest feasible interpretation of the ‘means’ 
element of trafficking, which will be assessed through the current UKBA ‘indicators’ as 
to whether an individual has been trafficked or not. 
 
B. The ‘Consensually Trafficked’ 
 
Beyond the reach of ordinary human rights law, can we ask for more for the ostensibly 
‘consensually trafficked’? The fact that the trafficking definition st
w
consideration of cases where there is consent or at least the appearance of consent due 
to lack of objective proof o
w
for the ‘consensually trafficked’ to have access to more favourable treatment than if 
they were simply categorised as economic migrants. The bases for making this 
argument are various, and will be discussed in the following section. 
 
                                        
1293 The Anti Trafficking Monitoring Group, n 306. 
1294 See, The Anti Trafficking Monitoring Group, n 306, where it was suggested that the lower 
identification statistics relating to third country nationals was not probative of discrimination, yet, a 
sceptical approach might consider that discrimination here is indeed a possibility and that border integrity 
is being placed above the concerns of the trafficked victim. 
1295 See, Chapter 2, conclusion. 
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i. The Consideration of Concessions for the ‘Consensually Trafficked’ – Can Such 
an Approach be Justified? 
 
There are various rationales for considering the potential for concessions to be made by 
States as regards the ‘consensually trafficked’, who constitute body of persons whom 
can be viewed as being in a ‘special position’: that of ‘more than smuggled, but less 
than trafficked’. Primarily, it is necessary to recognise the role that economic hardship 
clearly plays in situations of migration and trafficking, and this therefore cannot be 
ignored – many smuggled or trafficked persons may have been ‘pushed’ to search out 
migration channels through severe economic need, or because the position of 
vulnerability resulting from said economic need has been abused by the trafficker.1296  
        Secondly, the issue that – as was demonstrated in Chapter 3 – the realities of the 
tify an individual as ‘not trafficked’ when in reality she 
as been – misidentification may occur due to various reasons - ineffective 
proce ntial 
discri ntry 
nation
                                                
coercion/consent spectrum in a trafficking context are that determinations of 
consent/lack thereof (and therefore status as ‘trafficked’ or not) as regards each putative 
victim can be difficult and may not always be correct – there will be genuine ‘hard 
cases’ and there will be instances where those charged with identifying victims simply 
get it wrong and incorrectly iden
h
dures,1297 preconceptions about the amount of ‘voluntary’ women,1298 pote
mination on the basis of nationality (particularly in terms of third cou
als),1299 and UKBA quotas which have to be met.  
 
1296 As discussed in Chapter 2, Part III, section B, subsection v. 
1297 As evidenced by the O and LM cases discussed above – see Part VI, section A and Part VII of this 
Chapter. 
1298 As appears to be the case following research conducted in Birmingham, which identified that police 
there have preconceptions as to the level of ‘complicity’ of the ‘victims’ - See Statement by Sarah Garrat 
(Personal Communication on 14 February 2008, following research conducted by the Asylum and 
Immigration Research Team, Birmingham, into the treatment of victims of human trafficking once 
discovered in the destination state). 
1299 See, The Anti Trafficking Monitoring Group, n 306.  
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        F d as 
‘cons f the 
‘mean  be 
comp Anti 
Traff
 
authorities fail to apply 
the (CoE Trafficking) Convention and do not define as victims all those 
thorities concluded that as the person 
         
inally, that the conditions of ‘exploitation’ experienced by those identifie
ensually trafficked’ individuals (i.e. those who fall short/appear to fall short o
s’ threshold provided within the trafficking definition) may in reality
arable to those experienced by formally trafficked persons. As noted by the 
icking Monitoring Group:  
… one of the key problems is the incorrect application of the trafficking 
definition when assessing a victim. Too often the 
who were subject to the crime of trafficking. Instead, the system creates a 
narrow, legally dubious, interpretation of a victim, and attaches conditions 
that have been proven to impede identification, and have also been found to 
undermine prosecution in some cases. For example, in numerous cases 
reviewed by the research, the au
concerned agreed to come to the UK for work, they could not have been 
trafficked despite the fact that the deception and abuse should, according to 
the Convention, render such consent irrelevant.1300 
 
This research indicates that application of the current UK system is indeed deficient, 
despite broadly incorporating the standards laid down and obligations imposed by the 
CoE Trafficking Convention. It also compounds the possibility that there are a 
proportion of misidentified victims who will have needs as regards support and 
assistance yet will not have access to it. 
                                        
1300 See, The Anti Trafficking Monitoring Group, n 306, 12.  
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        Furthermore, there is the issue of those who fall below the standards of coercion 
required by the trafficking definition – either through misidentification, or through 
genuinely (or ostensibly) not having been subject to a comparable level of coercion as a 
formally identified trafficked person. Jordan notes that ‘[e]ven if a person agrees to 
work in very bad conditions, for very little money, with very little freedom, he would 
still be a victim of trafficking if the trafficker intended to hold him in debt bondage, 
.’1302 
he situation of consensual exploitation resulting from facilitated migration may 
const  the 
explo deal 
with t
        T  and 
identi ates 
from s it 
transp ntage of UK nationals 
ere positively identified as trafficked (in the UK) when compared to, in particular, 
                                                
involuntary or forced conditions.’1301 But, what if they did not hold her in debt 
bondage, or similar? These ‘very bad conditions’ alluded to still exist. Should we 
really, on an international legal level, deem this acceptable? True autonomy in a sex 
work context is the ability ‘to say that she alone can define the nature of her 
relationships with others-except to the extent that the state is prepared to exercise its 
coercive regulatory authority by forcing her into, or redefining, such relationships
T
itute such a situation – there may be, in order to achieve full protection of
ited and vulnerable, a need for the State to ‘redefine’ such relationships and 
he exploited ‘victim’ accordingly. 
he figures relating to the identification of individuals discovered in the UK
fied as ‘trafficked’ vary significantly according to where the individual origin
– the Anti Trafficking Monitoring Group Report has proven this,1303 a
ired through the Report’s findings that a much higher perce
w
third-country nationals discovered in the UK.1304 The Report goes on to state that: 
 
 
he Anti Trafficking Monitoring Group, n 306, 9. 
1301 A D Jordan, n 450, 11. 
1302 P H Schuck, n 385, 901. 
1303 See, T
1304 Ibid. 
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This research suggests the UK is creating a ‘hierarchy’ of victims, and 
allows, intentionally or not, discrimination against certain categories of 
victims, such as those who were trafficked before the Convention came into 
force (but identified after), or those coming from particular countries or 
trafficked as victims of crime and places too much emphasis on 
judging them, rather than bringing traffickers to justice.1305 
 
States hose 
they their 
powe moval, have no incentive to be generous in identifying as 
utative victims those not formally victims of trafficking. These kinds of policies, 
might propose changes to the draft Directive 
which could affect UK interests, such as expanding ... the support to be 
 
                                                
regions. The research indicates that the system fails to treat those who have 
been 
 which have no wish to tolerate the continued presence on their territory of t
perceive to be economic migrants, nor to have any restrictions placed on 
r of peremptory re
p
which are common, do not bode well for the protection of some of those women who 
are certainly in need of it. 
        In assessing the reasons not to opt into the EU 2011 Directive, Damian Green 
stated that: 
  
... the European Parliament 
provided to individuals not yet identified as victims of trafficking.1306 
(Emphasis added) 
 
1305 Ibid, 13. 
1306 House of Commons European Scrutiny Committee, Twenty-fourth Report of Session 2010 – 11 
(Ordered by the House of Commons to be printed on 30 March 2011)  at 3.7 
<http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201011/cmselect/cmeuleg/428-xxii/428xxii.pdf> accessed 
01 June 2011. 
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Clear hat 
touchy subject with the UK Government. Nonetheless, the ostensibly ‘consensually 
afficked’ individuals clearly exist – the consensually smuggled and exploited sex 
ictims, and the 
onsensually trafficked’ and exploited individuals who come somewhere in between. 
f the conditions of work – albeit 
 which they may have ostensibly agreed – are still victims and witnesses. 
toward deficiencies in the identification system and possible discriminatory treatment 
ictims. Consequently, it seems justifiable to consider specifically 
         
ly, supporting those who ostensibly do not merit bespoke assistance is a somew
tr
worker, or the unfortunate who displays insufficient ‘indicators’ to be identified as 
trafficked, even though she may have been severely coerced. In fact, it has been 
reported by NGOs in Europe that: 
 
… traffickers use the work permits to bring foreign women into the Dutch 
prostitution industry, masking the fact that women have been trafficked, by 
coaching them to describe themselves as independent “migrant sex 
workers.’’1307  
 
        Bakirci notes that trafficked persons are, first and foremost, victims and 
witnesses1308 – victims of exploitation and witnesses of the criminal activity which 
comprises the trafficking process. There are ‘workers’, trafficked v
‘c
Those who are exploited through the sheer awfulness o
to
Unfortunately, but realistically, they may also be criminals, particularly in terms of the 
voluntary breach of immigration laws. 
        The evidence considered throughout this section and indeed this thesis point 
of putative trafficked v
what concessions may be considered for the ‘consensually trafficked.’ 
                                        
1307 J Raymond, n 1163, 315. 
1308 K Bakirci, n 879, 165. 
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 ii. What Concessions Can Justifiably be Considered? 
 
States have a clear right to criminalise and to deport those non-nationals who 
unlawfully enter their territories. However, as the CPS Protocols show,1309 the power to 
prosecute1310 may be exercised under discretion and some discretionary factors affect 
those who are the victims of trafficking. It is suggested here that those discretions ought 
to be extended from beyond ‘trafficked’ women - it is, after all, ‘sound utilitarian 
theory to confine the imposition of sanctions to circumstances where they will secure 
some benefit.’1311 This is not to argue for a policy of non-prosecution, but for a policy 
for prosecutorial discretion with respect to the ‘consensually trafficked’, to be 
re outside the trafficking definition, 
the circumstances as described were so close to trafficking as to constitute mitigation, 
                                                
considered on a case-by-case basis. Any reason for doing so is in answer to the 
humanitarian need of those engaged in the sex industry and takes into account the 
considerable difficulties of the definition of ‘trafficking’ and the evidential problems 
with respect to certain of its elements. It is conceded, though, that governments might 
not be easily persuaded to give the benefit of any doubt to a group of women, some of 
whom almost certainly will be ‘mere’ economic migrants. 
        Domestic case law underpins this point – in Kibunyi,1312 the appellant had initially 
been sentenced to 12 months imprisonment for possession of false identity documents. 
It was argued for the appellant that ‘even if she we
 
1309 See, Crown Prosecution Service, n 318. 
1310 For offences committed as a result of having been trafficked, such as immigration offences – for 
example - possession of a forged passport or documents under section 5 of the Forgery and 
Counterfeiting Act 1981. The CPS guidance states that ‘Where there is clear evidence that the suspect 
at 
fence and the action (of, say coercion) of the 
Criminal Law: 
 EWCA Crim 9; (2009) 173 C.L. & J. 94. 
has a credible defence of duress, the case should be discontinued on evidential grounds’ indicating th
there should be a causal link between the victim’s of
trafficker. See Crown Prosecution Service, n 318.  
1311 A P Simester, J R Spencer, G R Sullivan and G J Virgo, Simester and Sullivan’s 
Theory and Doctrine, (Hart Publishing, 2010), 725. 
1312 R v Kibunyi (Jacinta) [2009]
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so substantial that it causes her case to fall outside the conventional sentencing 
structure.’1313 This ground of appeal was dismissed,1314 as the appellant’s ‘indicators’ 
(as to trafficking for exploitation) fell short of the ‘exploitation’ threshold which forms 
part of the trafficking definition, and on that basis that she had therefore effectively 
agreed to commission of the immigration offence. 
        The recently released Project Acumen Report1315 includes an analytical section 
which focuses on 17,000 migrant women working in the UK off-street sex sector. Their 
findings clearly identify a 3-tier diaspora.1316 Of the 17,000 subjects, the report 
entifies 2,600 as trafficked. This body of persons is identified by the Report as 
‘high ence 
thems e to 
famil  are 
consi
nsidered to meet the ‘trafficked’ or 
‘vulnerable’ thresholds.1319 The Report notes that there is no ‘single story’ as regards 
                                                
id
ly vulnerable’, and states that ‘[a]lthough most are not subject to viol
elves, many are debt-bonded and strictly controlled through threats of violenc
y members.’1317 The second category – consisting of 9,600 women –
dered to be ‘vulnerable’. The Report notes that: 
 
Although they have elements of vulnerability to trafficking, most are likely 
to fall short of the trafficking threshold. They tend to have day to day 
control over their activities, and although they may have large debts, they 
generally do not consider themselves to be debt-bonded.1318 
 
The final category consists of 5,500 who are co
 
009] EWCA Crim 9; (2009) 173 C.L. & J. 94, para 14. 
 this decision the court applied R v Kolawole (David Oladotun) [2004] EWCA Crim 3047, 
r. App. R. (S.) 14. 
t Acumen, n 92. 
 were aware before leaving their home country that they would 
 involved in prostitution, live and work largely independently of third-party influence, keep 
1313 R v Kibunyi (Jacinta) [2
1314 In making
[2005] 2 C
1315 Projec
1316 Ibid, 5.   
1317 Ibid.   
1318 Ibid. 
1319 The Report states that ‘[t]hese women
likely become
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those involved in sex work – ‘[s]ome are subject to kidnap, rape and imprisonment, 
some enter the sector independently and are effectively self-employed within it, and 
others fit somewhere between these extremes.’1320 It is those who ‘fit somewhere 
between’ who are the chief concern of this thesis.  
        It has been discussed throughout this Chapter that not only are there bespoke 
provisions for formally identified trafficked victims resulting from obligations placed 
on States by the anti-trafficking regime, but there are also options for international 
protection which are available to any human being in need of protection. This is the 
basis of a humanitarian and human rights-orientated regime which respects the dignity 
of the human. As noted earlier,1321 those who fall short of, say, the strict requirements 
of the Refugee Convention criteria have recourse to various discretionary remedial 
         
concessions on humanitarian grounds, including exceptional rights to remain in the 
territory. These concessions acknowledge the potential for genuine ‘hard cases’, which 
discretionary measures mitigate, to a degree, without undermining the integrity and 
aims of the refugee regime.   
        A comparable humanitarian response to marginal or questionable cases of 
trafficked women, even of women who have not formally been trafficked but who have 
been identified as ‘exploited’ and/or ‘vulnerable’ to trafficking might be appropriate, in 
light of the circumstances in which these women are recruited into the trade in humans 
and the severity of the conditions in which they find themselves in the destination 
States. Consequently, it is submitted here that individual Governments may be able to 
adopt a more encompassing approach. This could include, for example, a policy parallel 
to a humanitarian right to remain which complements the international anti-trafficking 
                                                                                                                                               
a significant proportion of the money they earn and are not subject to debt-bondage or threats of 
violence.’ See Project Acumen, n 92, 5.   
1320 Ibid, 5.   
1321 See, Part VIII, section B, above. 
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legal regime, as this would indeed constitute a response to the trafficking phenomenon 
which must be seen within context and addressed from a perspective which not only 
pplication. The unclear (or basic lack of) 
 to 
                                                
aims to criminalise the traffickers, but also to protect their victims. This parallel policy 
should include access – assessed on a case by case basis – to the bespoke rights 
currently available to formally trafficked persons, including the granting of rest and 
recovery periods and residence permits owing to the ‘personal situation’ of the 
‘consensually trafficked’ woman. 
        In context, the thesis has established that the definition of human trafficking is 
technical and may be mechanical in its a
implementing legislation in the UK further muddies the waters, as does the use of 
‘indicators’ by those charged with identifying victims,1322 such as the requirements of 
ostensible signs of physical or psychological harm or debt bondage, fear or anxiety, and 
as regards the testimony of the potential victim in terms of whether elements of 
coercion, deception or threat are reported.  
        It has been discussed in Chapter 3 that an ostensible consent does not necessarily 
equate to a genuine valid consent, and also that a valid consent can be difficult
establish. This, coupled with the clandestine nature of trafficking and exploitative 
activity having the potential to mask the coercive realities of some cases, paves the way 
for genuine consideration of adoption of policy which deals with borderline cases or 
where the individual is identified as having been exploited, or as ‘vulnerable’ to 
trafficking, on a case by case basis and which assesses the needs of those involved.  
 
1322 Such as evidence of physical or psychological harm or debt bondage, signs of fear or anxiety, and 
whether the testimony of the potential victim includes elements of coercion, deception or threat. See 
Home Office/UK Borders Agency, ‘Enforcement Instructions and Guidance, Chapter 9 – Identifying 
Victims of Trafficking’ 
<http://www.ukba.homeoffice.gov.uk/sitecontent/documents/policyandlaw/enforcement/oemsectiona/cha
pter9?view=Binary> accessed 3 April 2009. 
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        At the ‘strong’ end, this may go so far as to, in some cases, protect against 
peremptory removal, particularly where there is, say, the potential for re-trafficking, or 
where the individual is clearly vulnerable and in need of assistance, such as 
psychological or basic health assistance. Where the individual case is borderline or 
unsure, a preferable position to adopt is that of a presumption of ‘trafficked’ as opposed 
ction and support 
s trafficked, yet who are 
still in need of some form of assistance or support, using tentative language such as that 
         
to ‘not trafficked’, and at least minimum concessions as regards health treatment or 
counselling be considered for the ‘victim’ prior to any consideration of peremptory 
removal. This should not be interpreted as an open-door policy to consensual economic 
migrant sex workers, but instead as something more than simply a nod to the notion 
that there is not a clean line to be drawn – evidentially or factually – between the 
formally trafficked and ‘consensually trafficked’ individual. 
        In its Tenth Report, the JCHR noted that ‘[m]any asylum seekers and refused 
asylum seekers are vulnerable individuals who are reliant on prote
from others.’1323 In the way that the system dealing with refused applicants is deficient, 
similarly this may be the case with ‘refused’ trafficked victims unless positive State 
action is taken to make some concessions where necessary and appropriate. Those who 
are not formally identified as ‘trafficked’ yet who have been subjected to awful 
conditions of work or who are unable to leave the UK for some reason (such as fear of 
reprisals from traffickers or smugglers) are the ones who will suffer. 
        At the ‘weak’ end, it may be desirable to amend or add to the anti-trafficking 
regime, at least to provide for States to consider offering more favourable treatment to 
those who are borderline cases or are not formally identified a
                                        
1323 Joint Committee on Human Rights Tenth Report, n 1186, 5.  
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used within the Trafficking Protocol as regards actual trafficked victims.1324 At the 
‘hard’ end, the relevant instruments could be amended to include an obligation to 
provide a system – potentially skeletal – which assesses the individual needs of any 
migrant sex worker who appears to be vulnerable and who may (ostensibly or 
genuinely) fall short of the scope of the trafficking definition. 
        Of course, there is an issue as regards measuring a standard of ‘exploitation’1325 
against accepted labour standards while the UK does not recognise sex work as a 
‘legitimate’ (i.e. formally legalised and regulated) form of labour, yet this does not have 
to be an absolute barrier to the application of these standards. Victim protection of the 
‘consenting’ trafficked victims currently has to be drawn from human rights, labour 
rights or a new, bespoke system. Since in the UK sex work is not legally regulated and 
‘legitimised’, a bespoke system for dealing with exploited yet ostensibly consenting sex 
trafficking victims seems the preferable way to proceed. According to such a system, 
e needs of the individual victim – who can legitimately be referred to as a ‘victim’ 
xploitation suffered – could be assessed on a case-by-case basis which 
alistically takes into account the fact that coercion and sexual exploitation are very 
authorities and legal representatives. The UK Borders Agency provides guidance on 
                                                
th
due to the e
re
real problems, nationally and globally, which may be masked by the appearance of 
consent or the incorrect application of victim identification and assistance procedures. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The flaws identified in the current victim identification system highlight the need for 
training of those who may come across victims of trafficking, such as immigration 
 
able provisions. See, Article 6(3), CoE 
 Chapter 3, Part VI, section B. 
1324 I.e. that State may ‘consider’ implementing more favour
Trafficking Convention, n 9. 
1325 Such as that suggested in
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identifying victims of trafficking for sexual exploitation, which states that ‘During 
operations, enquiries into whether a person is a victim of trafficking should take 
 
includes 
identification of victims of human trafficking at the earliest possible juncture. Neither 
                                                
precedence over enquiries into the individual’s immigration status.’1326 Adequate 
victim protection requires that putative victim status be accepted primarily at face 
value, with sanctions or prosecution being pursued later if victim status is not accorded. 
Immediate detention is likely to be inappropriate for potential trafficked victims. 
        Particular reference was made in the O judgment to paragraph 134 of the Twenty-
Sixth Report of the JCHR, which states that that ‘the main criticism levelled against the 
Government's approach by witnesses to our inquiry is that the first arm of the “twin-
track” approach, the protection of victims, has not been promoted and implemented 
effectively.’1327 In order for victims of human trafficking to have access to the rights to
which they are entitled under the CoE Trafficking Convention such as a period for 
recovery or temporary residence rights, then clear implementing legislation may be 
necessary which clarifies that victims of trafficking have these specific rights in English 
law which are in accordance with what is required by the CoE Trafficking Convention. 
        The importance of correct and timely identification of victims is clear, so that the 
process of recovery might begin as soon as is possible. The focus of British policy has 
been on criminalisation and prosecution of traffickers for far too long, with victim 
protection often falling well short of any acceptable minimum standard. The CoE 
Trafficking Convention represents a welcome – and long overdue - step in the right 
direction, and although it has not currently been ratified by a large number of countries, 
those who have ratified it must now provide the minimum standard of treatment to 
victims of trafficking who are discovered in their territory, which 
 
1326  Home Office/UK Borders Agency, ‘Enforcement Instructions and Guidance, Chapter 9 – Identifying 
Victims of Trafficking’ 9.1. 
1327 Joint Committee on Human Rights Twenty-Sixth Report, n 31, para 134. 
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implementation of the CoE Trafficking Convention nor reliance on the Human Rights 
Act can do all that is required to provide an effective regime for the protection of 
victims of human trafficking, nor can the matter be left entirely to the courts.  
        Procedures allowing for correct and timely identification of victims of human 
trafficking are key, but beyond that there is a host of issues to be dealt with. Trafficking 
victims and victims of serious exploitation (even in the face of what is, or may appear 
to be, consent) are a highly vulnerable body of persons, as are asylum seekers and 
others in need of assistance, support, and protection. They need to be given an 
appropriate level of treatment and care, as necessary, and repatriation while trafficking 
 determining the fate of 
der this. Victims should 
not have to be shoehorned into a pre-existing and therefore inappropriate legal 
activity and organised crime is still rife in the country or specific area of origin serves 
little purpose other than the immediate immigration control interests of the destination 
State.  
        Governments will have to tread very carefully indeed when trying to repatriate 
women. It is clear from the considerations made during the determinations of asylum 
cases that conditions in the country of origin can change, and that this is considered by 
the courts – wars end, political shifts occur, safe areas emerge and a level of ‘peace’ 
can sometimes be achieved, thereby facilitating the return of the individual who has 
claimed asylum. Similarly, considerations will be made in
identified trafficked victims – as long as trafficking and organised crime continues in 
the origin state, there will be risks on return of varying degree to the trafficked victim, 
including to those who may have ‘consented’ to the process.  
        Trafficking is arguably like slavery, servitude and about profit, and less the result 
of conflict and persecution. At the extreme, some of these trafficked victims face risks 
of slavery or ill treatment on return, and the State has to consi
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framework which was not designed to suit their needs. In stating that everything that is 
needed is already in place, this is what the UK may have done. 
        The Rimini method, has not, as Ventrella asserts, ‘defeated’ human trafficking.1328 
It has simply provided safe havens for victims who have been trafficked, yet such 
victims will continue to appear unless a multi-pronged, global attack on this abhorrent 
activity continues and succeeds. Victim protection is the closest thing to a ‘cure’, but 
with effective prevention, there is no need for cure. The demand for sold sex will not go 
away simply because victims are granted leave to remain, rights to work etc in the 
destination state. So long as the criminal law aspects of the regime do not eliminate 
trafficking, it will be necessary that the victim protection aspects are taken equally 
                                                
seriously as the criminalisation ones - so long as there is trafficking, there will be 
victims.   
        In order to adopt a more accommodating approach to treatment and protection of 
victims of human trafficking, it is necessary to weigh up the public interest concerns of 
immigration control versus giving immediate protection and sympathetic treatment to 
victims, and protecting victims from ill-treatment on return to the destination state, 
regardless of whether they can show sufficient evidence to be granted some form of 
leave to remain in the UK. Adopting a Rimini-style method is extreme in that it does 
not depend upon considering the merits of individual cases, yet it is evident that a more 
accommodating approach than that currently envisaged and in place may be needed - 
therefore, some sort of balance must be struck. 
        On the face of it, consent will render trafficked victims outside of the protective 
confines of the CoE Trafficking Convention. However, if determinations as to whether 
one is a possible victim of trafficking are indeed made rapidly (within 5 days, as 
 
1328 M Ventrella, n 1039, 64. 
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envisaged) there is the possibility that even those who may have consented or whose 
status is unsure may at least initially fall within the ‘possible trafficked victim’ 
category, although certain sources cited throughout this Chapter clearly indicate that the 
opposite may indeed be the case,1329 and it is a possibility which increases in ‘grey 
area’ cases. In any event, they should fall within this category, until there is sufficient 
as exploitation – which results from even a consensual 
sexual exploitation which takes place on a global scale on a daily basis, and the fact that 
                                                
proof to indicate that they are truly irregular migrants, rather than a ‘victim’, whether 
formally trafficked or a ‘consensually trafficked’ victim.  
        Case law examples indicate how serious the ramifications of misidentification or 
late identification can be of victims of human trafficking can be,1330 and the need for a 
legal and administrative framework which offers protection to victims or those who 
might become victims.1331 The Council of Europe Convention on Action against 
Trafficking in Human Beings defines a ‘victim’ in a trafficking context as ‘… any 
natural person who is subject to trafficking in human beings as defined in this 
article.’1332 The Oxford English Dictionary offers a range of definitions as to what 
constitutes a ‘victim’ including that of ‘One who perishes or suffers in health, etc., from 
some enterprise or pursuit voluntarily undertaken,’1333 thereby suggesting that in a 
general sense, harm – such 
situation, does not preclude an individual being attributed some form of victim status 
and catered for accordingly. 
        Beyond the formally trafficked, it has been argued that concessions may be made 
for the ‘consensually trafficked’ – this is not entirely unprincipled in the face of serious 
 
1329 See, for example The Anti Trafficking Monitoring Group, n 306.  
1330 See, R v O [2008] EWCA Crim 2835, and  R v LM [2010] EWCA Crim 2327; [2011] 1 Cr. App. R. 
12; [2011] Crim. L.R. 425, and J Elliott n 1117. 
1331 Rantsev v. Cyprus and Russia [2010] (application no. 25965/04). 
1332 Article 4. 
1333 Oxford English Dictionary <http://www.oed.com/> accessed 27 June 2011. 
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the question of consent/lack thereof will continue to negatively affect not only those 
who have been consensually transported and exploited, but also those who have in fact 
ht be interpreted strictly, and so on, and ultimately, the political 
de might turn.          
 
been formally trafficked.  
        It is necessary to make an explicit acknowledgement that arguing for further 
protection of women who fall outside the present trafficking frameworks (and may 
include some women who are simply economic migrants) is not likely to be a 
politically favourable cause at a time when many governments are trying to impose 
limits on entry and residence of non-nationals. The question is political because either 
we need new agreements (or unilateral national legislation) or the exercise of 
administrative discretions in favour of women in the ‘grey area’, neither of which may 
be forthcoming. However, the courts may not be wholly without the means to help – a 
more relaxed approach to the meaning of consent might be possible, perhaps; human 
rights obligations mig
ti
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Conclusion 
‘[Th]e problem of consent is hatever means are adopted 
to deal with it.’1334 
 a loophole in the protections offered to those who are transported 
n overarching conclusion 
art V) which draws together and consolidates ‘the thesis’.  
                                                
 
 unlikely to vanish w
 
This research set out to investigate the legal nature of human trafficking, and it rapidly 
recognised the centrality of consent in the trafficking of women for sexual exploitation. 
Coercion and lack of consent are the essential elements to distinguish the trafficking of 
people from people smuggling. Once trafficking is established, a lot follows - the 
criminality of the trafficker, the obligation of State to cooperate in anti-trafficking 
measures and the identification of victims of trafficking and specific measures for their 
protection, as a necessary condition for determining who are the victims of trafficking 
and how they should be treated. ‘Consent’, though, turns out to be a far from simple 
notion. The problematic nature of the inclusion of a ‘means’ or ‘lack of consent’ 
element of the definition of human trafficking is analysed and criticised in the thesis, 
firstly on the basis that consent is an inherently problematic and mutable concept, and 
secondly because inclusion of this element renders identification of trafficked victims 
difficult and creates
and exploited.         
        The following sections (I – IV) will consider and discuss the conclusions drawn 
throughout each Chapter of the thesis, to be followed by a
(P
 
1334 J Tempkin, Rape and the Legal Process, 2nd Ed. (Oxford 2002) 176. 
 377
  
I. The Contextual and Legal Background 
cilitated migration for the purpose of 
nder women particularly vulnerable to 
 
Chapter 1 provides the contextual and legal background to set the scene for the 
remaining three substantive Chapters of the thesis. As a necessary starting point, 
Chapter 1 opens with consideration of the factors underlying the continuance of the 
transnational trade in women for sexual exploitation. This involved recognition of the 
point that, since a proportion of trafficking at least begins on a voluntary footing, the 
‘push’ factors are the same as regards economic migrants, victims of human trafficking, 
and those who have entered a situation of ‘fa
exploitation’, i.e. the ‘consensually trafficked’.  
        The ‘push’ factors identified highlight the fact that voluntary and involuntary 
transportation into working in the sex sector takes place against a complex backdrop of 
socio-economic factors which underpin and perpetuate the global sex trade. The inquiry 
conducted in Chapter 1 provided a snapshot of these ‘push’ factors and other relevant 
issues such as the involvement of organised crime, in order to illustrate the contextual 
nature of smuggling and trafficking. Poverty, lack of opportunity, unemployment, and 
gender discrimination feature highly in discourse surrounding migration push factors, 
and therefore play a central role in the continuance of the migration and trafficking 
phenomenon. These factors work together to re
the exploitative transnational sex trade market.  
        The transnational aspect of human trafficking and the need to combat the spectrum 
of exploitative activities that it involves requires a comprehensive regime which targets 
traffickers and provides for victims. This was outlined in Chapter 1, which identified 
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the central transnational criminal law and human rights anti-trafficking regime at a UN, 
Council of Europe, and European Union level, and the corresponding obligations 
imposed upon the State as regards the criminalisation of trafficking offences, provision 
for prosecution and punishment, monitoring mechanisms and preventative measures 
r problematic the identification (and 
                                                
such as demand sanctions.1335 
        Furthermore, and central to the thesis, the provisions relating to providing support, 
assistance and protection to victims are outlined in Chapter 1. These include the 
ordinary human rights obligations addressed to States as regards any individual (as 
opposed to solely trafficked persons) and also a brief outline of the bespoke provisions 
of the anti-trafficking regime which are directly applicable and available to solely 
victims of human trafficking. As was further discussed in Chapter 4, there is some 
variation as regards State obligations between the three main instruments considered in 
this thesis, and as discussed throughout Chapters 3 and 4, the ‘lack of consent’ 
requirement of human trafficking can rende
therefore the subsequent treatment) of victims.  
        The final Part of Chapter 1 outlined the basic conditions for a valid consent; that 
consent must be freely given; that it must be informed; that the consenting agent must 
have the capacity to consent; and that the timing of consent is a relevant factor. This 
Part of the Chapter explored and drew upon the meaning, role and effect of consent in 
different areas of the law, and drew conclusions that there are differences as to the 
 
1335 As regards demand sanctions, the corresponding UK provision imposes an evidential burden 
comparable to that located in the trafficking definition thereby creating the same problem of identifying 
who is, and who is not, a ‘victim’ in this context. Neither criminalisation nor regulation are particularly 
likely to reduce the demand for sexual services, yet opting for regulation ought to reduce exploitative 
conditions and the coercion/lack of consent issue as regards trafficked women may also be reduced, 
although it seems realistic to conclude that coercion/lack of consent will continue to play a part in the 
trafficking of women for sexual exploitation, and in turn traffickers and migration facilitators will play a 
part in meeting this demand. See, for discussion of these issues: J Elliott, n 275; Home Office, ‘Tackling 
the Demand for Prostitution: A Review’ (November 2008): G Ekberg, n 270; V Clausen, ‘An 
Assessment of Gunilla Ekberg’s account of Swedish prostitution policy’, (January 2007) 
<http://www.sexworkeurope.org/site/images/PDFs/ekberg_kritik.pdf> accessed 03 July 2008, link no 
longer live. 
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effect of the giving of consent in different situations, and that a higher standard of free 
and informed consent may be required where the act consented to concerns physical 
integrity and close personal relationships as opposed to more ‘arms length’ commercial 
transactions. This analysis served to introduce and define the notion of consent, which 
is central to this thesis, at a sufficiently early stage in order to lay the foundations for 
specific analysis of the role of consent in human trafficking in Chapter 3, and to draw 
upon the different sources of the law relating to discussed in this Part of Chapter 1 in 
order to establish and justify why some are more persuasive to the argument maintained 
roughout the latter part of the thesis.    
I. Human Trafficking: The Evolution of an International Legal Definition 
 terms of it being a tripartite process 
         
th
 
I
 
As noted in the Introduction to the thesis,1336 as with all transnational criminal projects 
it is necessary to begin with a comprehensive definition of the activity to be targeted. 
Chapter 2 analyses the elements of the trafficking definition provided within the 
instruments considered throughout the thesis,1337 in
comprising of an ‘action’, ‘means’ and ‘purpose’. 
        The ‘action’, of recruitment, transportation etc is the least problematic aspect of 
the definition and is sufficient to cover all methods of – for want of a better word – 
obtaining the putative victim. It is established that although theoretically the 
international instruments considered could cover ‘internal’ trafficking,1338 this may 
                                        
1336 See, Introduction, Part III. 
1337 The UN Trafficking Protocol, the CoE Trafficking Convention, and the 2011 EU Directive. 
1338 Bearing in mind the requirement of the UN Trafficking Protocol that the offences must be 
‘transnational in nature’.  
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frequently be dealt with according to national laws. Furthermore, it is established that 
border-crossing need not be illicit.1339 
        The ‘means’ aspect is the more recent and most controversial element of the 
definition – a wide range is envisaged, from direct physical force to psychological 
coercion, and the scope of the ‘means’ elements – which are not always wholly 
separable - are analysed. This element, which was not present in the previous relevant 
anti-trafficking instrument,1340 is problematic on the basis that the many and varied 
‘means’ envisaged are open to varying interpretations, and it may at times be difficult 
                                                
to tell at which point on a spectrum of consent or coercion (or some other ‘means’) a 
particular case may fall.1341  
        The ‘means’ Part of Chapter 2 considers in some detail the role of economic 
‘push’ factors, as are outlined in Chapter 1, in terms of their influence on the decision 
to migrate, and the potential for recognition of ‘economic coercion of circumstances’ as 
a ‘means’ element is discussed. Women leave because of the pressure of economic 
circumstances – either because of the opportunity to economically better themselves or 
because their home situation is sufficiently dire to leave them no effective choice. This 
therefore places them at various points on a spectrum of economic coercion. The degree 
of severity of their economic situation renders it something from influential to severely 
coercive. Ultimately, it is conceded that States would not respond positively to such a 
departure from the norm, the orthodox criminal law position being that any form of 
coercion would necessarily have to come directly from the trafficker. Nonetheless, the 
role of economic factors in the decision to enter a smuggling/trafficking situation 
cannot be underestimated and clearly has a role to play in the consent/coercion debate, 
 
1339 To have such a requirement in place would be to render the legal instruments considered inapplicable 
to, for example, those trafficked within the EU. 
1340 I.e. the 1949 Trafficking Convention. 
1341 Where no such objective proof (of, say, coercion) is evident, this renders correct victim identification 
inherently problematic. The issue of victim identification was discussed in Chapter 4, Part VI. 
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and accordingly traffickers/migration facilitators taking advantage of the most 
economically marginalised section of society in the origin States – that of women – 
on on the interrelation of 
on, consists 
f transportation into an exploitative situation (or the intention to exploit) against a 
ackdrop of coercion or some other ‘means’, and therefore lack of consent. 
                                                
may be capable of constituting ‘abuse of a position of vulnerability’ as contained within 
the trafficking definition.   
        As regards the third element of the trafficking definition, the thesis clearly 
highlights that the central ‘purpose’ aspect of this phenomenon is ‘exploitation’, with 
the definition envisaging a non-exhaustive range of possible activities which are 
included, at a minimum, within the scope of ‘exploitation’, such as slavery, forced 
labour, and the exploitation of prostitution. A specific secti
treaty obligations justifies the use of International Human Rights law instruments to 
elucidate the meanings of the terms used where possible.1342 
        Sexual exploitation, prostitution in particular, is the central focus of this thesis, and 
the discussion in Chapter 2 recognises that these exploitative activities are frequently 
treated as - but are not necessarily – separable: sex work can be viewed through a 
labour paradigm1343 and therefore as a form of labour,1344 and, further, that this 
‘purpose’ element of human trafficking, i.e. sexual exploitation, can amount to slavery 
if the relevant conditions of the 1926 Slavery Convention are met. Clearly therefore, 
human trafficking according to current accepted international legal definiti
o
b
 
 
 
 
 
1342 See, Chapter 2, Part IV, section B. 
1343 B E Hernandez-Truyol, and J E Larson, n 551, 391. 
1344 That of ‘sexual labour’. 
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III. The Role of Consent in Human Trafficking 
 
The legal framework renders human trafficking an activity which is characterised by 
lack of consent (on the part of the putative victim), the role of which is considered in 
depth in Chapter 3. The controversial consent element goes against the grain of early 
international anti-trafficking instruments and leaves one with the impression that a 
central focus of the inclusion of this element was recognition of the rise in voluntary 
illicit migration, facilitated by globalisation i.e. improved ease of movement and 
communication. Indeed, the rise in such migration may have altered the face of 
trafficking as previously understood, and the legal response reflects this. To see 
uman trafficking. The distinction is 
                                                
trafficking just as an aspect of economic migration does not provide adequately for 
victims of trafficking and severe exploitation. 
        Consent is transformative yet it is a problematic notion, uniform application of 
which is difficult to achieve. Furthermore, uniform application of this concept which is 
not a normative or empirical constant would not necessarily be appropriate in all 
situations anyway. The conditions for a valid consent which were discussed in Chapter 
1 are revisited, and discussed in the context of h
reiterated as regards consent to ‘arms length’ agreements and those which involve 
bodily integrity and/or personal relationships.1345  
 
1345 This is initially discussed in Chapter 1, Part III, section A, subsection ii, and the point that a high 
standard of informed consent might be required where, for example, bodily integrity, personal 
relationships or harm or exploitation is concerned, is reiterated and discussed in the specific context of 
human trafficking and facilitated migration for the purpose of sexual exploitation in Chapter 3, Part I, 
section B. 
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        The ‘dichotomy’ approach taken by some commentators to consent/coercion is 
rejected, and instead a notion of a spectrum of consent/coercion is recognised. 
Furthermore, the ‘Autonomy v Paternalism’ approaches to consent in the context of sex 
oitative, or as 
the status of a trafficked ‘victim’, and that those who facilitated their migration into a 
situation of exploitation (for gain, therefore taking them beyond the scope of 
‘smuggling’, at least in a moral if not legal sense) may not be prosecuted for trafficking.  
                                                
work are discussed, and although the autonomy of the consenting sex worker is 
recognised, it is considered that in situations such as where exploitative sex work is 
undertaken, that there are limits to the justificatory scope of consent. 
        The legal response also leaves open the matter of consent to prostitution and 
sexual exploitation on the basis that different States view these matters differently and, 
therefore, attempts to adopt a single approach, whether hostile or sympathetic to the 
prostitution aspect would in some instances stand in the way of ratification of the anti-
trafficking instruments. Although some view sex work as inherently expl
an act of violence against women,1346 prostitution itself is decriminalised or legalised in 
various States.1347 The argument is made that prostitution can indeed constitute a 
legitimate form of labour, in a philosophical if not always legal sense.1348 
        The central argument is therefore that, in a trafficking and migration context, there 
may in some circumstances be consent (or at least the appearance thereof) on the part of 
the putative victim to transportation for exploitation, or that pressure to migrate as a 
result of severe economic circumstances in the origin State (i.e. ‘economic coercion’) 
means that those individuals who fall into either of these categories may fall without of 
the scope of trafficking definition. It follows from this that some women who are 
transported for sexually exploitative purposes or for prostitution may not be accorded 
 
1346 As is the position in Sweden. 
1347 Such as the Netherlands. 
1348 See, Chapter 3, Part IV, section B. 
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        There is, therefore, a loophole between smuggling and trafficking according to 
current international legal definition. Smuggling constitutes an ‘action’.1349 Trafficking 
constitutes an ‘action’, ‘means’ and ‘purpose’. The existence of ostensible consent (or 
lack of ‘indicators’ such as objective evidence of force) leaves the putative trafficked 
victim somewhere between the two; ‘more than smuggled, less than trafficked’. In 
response to this loophole created by the definitions of smuggling and trafficking, it is 
proposed that the ‘gaps’ identified in the anti-trafficking regime be supplemented by 
provisions which restrict the effect of ‘consent’ on the status of the putative ‘victim’ 
and the potential for a defence to criminality on the part of the trafficker who has 
nonetheless engaged in exploitative conduct.  
 
IV. The Treatment of Victims  
 
Chapter 4 primarily critiques the lack of a victim-centred focus in the UK anti-
trafficking legislative regime, and goes on to consider a more encompassing approach 
using the example of Italy. This followed by a critical analysis of the current victim-
specific provisions of the three main legal instruments considered throughout this 
thesis. 
        The ‘means’ or ‘lack of consent’ element of the trafficking definition has been 
clearly established to be problematic. Although the difference between trafficking and 
smuggling can be difficult to maintain, it is submitted that not only may the current 
international standards for assistance and protection for trafficked victims be deficient, 
but also that the requirements of the anti-trafficking regime have not necessarily been 
                                                 
1349 ‘[O]f transporting an individual from one location to another for ‘financial or other material benefit.’ 
Article 3, Smuggling Protocol, n 5. 
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implemented and used to the best possible effect (from the victim perspective) in the 
UK.1350  
        On the basis that valid consent can be so difficult to determine, it is argued in 
Chapter 4 that women who seek out the services of traffickers or migration facilitators 
because of lack of opportunity in the origin state, or in the case where there is no 
ostensible coercion/lack of consent, should, in some cases, be treated as ‘victims’ and 
therefore entitled to some favourable treatment and/or protections in the destination 
State. There can be little doubt that this proposal will not appeal to destination States, 
which see these women in the same light as ordinary illicit economic migrants, who are 
not entitled to any special rights or protections in the destination State and who can 
therefore be subject to deportation. This would place the women firmly back in the 
category of ‘smuggled’ rather than ‘trafficked’ persons. Yet, to return to the point made 
above, they may still have been subjected to severe exploitation which cannot be 
rendered justifiable by ostensible consent. 
        In response to the anticipated responses of States to taking such an encompassing 
approach, one can look to the treatment of those discovered in the destination State. 
Certain persons are entitled to certain rights and protections, in terms of, for example, 
protection against removal to a destination where there is a real risk of serious ill 
treatment,1351 or protection against removal to a State where they will be subjected to 
persecution as a result of falling within the certain categories of persons recognised by 
the Refugee Convention. Certain obligations are therefore placed upon the State as a 
result of the provisions of the relevant instruments, such as the ECHR and the Refugee 
Convention.  
                                                 
1350 As discussed in Chapter 4, Part VI. 
1351 Article 3, ECHR. 
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        There have been indications that refugee applicants and failed asylum seekers have 
been exposed to conditions which constitute violations of their human rights during the 
periods while they are awaiting decision or awaiting removal.1352 These conditions are 
clearly not restricted to putative victims of human trafficking; they may affect anyone. 
Certain categories of persons may have particular needs which require particular 
treatment and responses, such as trafficked and sexually exploited women, who it has 
been demonstrated constitute a particularly vulnerable1353 body of persons, and remain 
so throughout the trafficking/exploitative facilitated migration process, whether or not 
they can strictly be deemed to have been coerced, or to have given consent.  
        Furthermore, it is argued that not only should the widest possible interpretation of 
the ‘means’ element be adopted so that the highest possible number of exploited 
victims may have access to the bespoke rights attributed by the anti-trafficking regime, 
but also that there is room for consideration of concessions to be made by States, 
considered on a case by case basis, for those who have been subject to exploitation but 
who fall short of the requirements of the technical trafficking definition. The global sex 
trade is gendered, and takes place against a backdrop of exploitation, and on a spectrum 
of coercion and consent of those caught up in it. These themes are explored as part of 
an attempt to address the central enquiry of the thesis. Nonetheless, it is recognised that 
there may indeed be reluctance on the part of Governments to concede to much for the 
‘consensually trafficked.’  
 
                                                 
1352 See, Chapter 4, Part VIII, section C. 
1353 On the point of state responses to the vulnerable subject, Martha Fineman states that ‘Vulnerability is 
posited as the characteristic that positions us in relation to each other as human beings and also suggest a 
relationship of responsibility between state and individual. The nature of human vulnerability forms the 
basis for a claim that the state must be more responsive to that vulnerability.’ Women who have been 
trafficked, or smuggled and exploited constitute a body of vulnerable persons to which the State owes 
some responsibility, and this should be reflected in the transnational anti-trafficking, anti-exploitation 
regime. See M Fineman, ‘The Vulnerable Subject and the Responsive State’, Emory Law Journal, Vol. 
60, No. 2 (2010) Emory Public Law Research Paper No. 10-130, 9. 
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 V. Conclusions – The Way Forward 
 
The question of ‘means’ or ‘lack of valid consent’ highlights a category of persons who 
will have been determined – sometimes incorrectly – not to have been trafficked. 
Furthermore, the international anti-trafficking regime does not provide for those who 
have consented to be transported into a situation of exploitative sex work, yet who have 
been subjected to an unacceptable level of exploitation. The voluntary undertaking of 
conduct does not, of itself, render it harmless, and should not leave the putative ‘victim’ 
beyond the reach of specific aid. Interpreted too strictly, the consent question may mean 
that traffickers have a defence and that exploited persons do not have adequate remedy 
for their treatment. As regards those who are, by definition, trafficked, and also those 
who are so similar to individuals who have been trafficked or who have been 
misidentified as ‘not trafficked’, such differential treatment as is envisaged by the 
fallacious coercion/consent dichotomy, which is far from a clear-cut divide, cannot be 
easily justified.  
        As has been established, there is a distinction, well-understood by the law, 
between smuggling people and trafficking people.1354 A substantial group of such 
people are smuggled in order to work in the destination State. Some of these will know 
full-well the conditions in which they will be working but are content to do so, even if 
those conditions would not be lawful in the destination State, e.g. minimum wage 
legislation, health and safety conditions.  
        These people may be driven by press of economic circumstances in their home 
State, but this is not enough to affect their consent to the cross-border transfer (and nor 
                                                 
1354 See, Introduction (to the thesis), Part II. 
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will it affect their criminal liability for any immigration offences which they may 
commit). In some cases, the exact conditions in which they will be working are not 
explained to the persons involved – very poor wages, very harsh working conditions, 
high fees to gang-masters, de facto no right to leave the employment. Here, though it 
will be a case-by-case inquiry, we might sometimes conclude that the worker did not 
consent to be moved to these (exploitative) conditions, so that we should say that she 
had been trafficked, rather than smuggled. But to maintain the distinction between 
smuggling and trafficking, we should have to concede that the conditions must be very 
bad, approaching or even attaining those of de facto servitude. Not to do so, would not 
accord with the claims States make to be able to remove forthwith smuggled workers, 
including those smuggled to conditions not compliant with national law (quite apart 
from the formal unlawfulness of an illegal immigrant working at all).    
        This is a distinction which is accepted for women transferred to work in the sex 
trade. The thesis has argued that some women consent to doing so, the transaction for 
them being no different from the worker smuggled to pick vegetables or build roads. 
Such women could not, by reason of their trade alone, claim the benefits which would 
apply to the treatment of trafficked women (for whatever purpose but including the sex 
trade). The categories of ‘willing’ sex workers included those who made the economic 
calculation that this was a viable work choice (the ‘Belles de jour’) and those who were 
motivated to travel by reason of their desperate economic plight at home, who also exist 
on a spectrum of ‘choice’.  
        Just as for the vegetable picker, any failure by his employer to meet local labour 
standards was a matter for local law enforcement authorities and the worker’s removal 
was a simple application of immigration law, so it should be for the sex worker. A 
problem, of course, is that prostitution is not, in the UK, subject to a comparable regime 
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of work place regulation as most other trades – though some might say that the 
regulation and its enforcement against pimps and madams are sometimes harsher than 
they are against farmers and road builders. However, the immigration consequence is 
the same – the sex worker is liable to peremptory removal to her national State, and to 
face the consequences of willingly breaching immigration laws. 
        Empirical studies show that the conditions of workers in the sex trade are more 
likely to reach those of exploitation than simple, mere illegality for a large proportion 
of those involved.1355 These awful circumstances are relevant in two different contexts. 
The first goes to the responsibility of the destination State. It has positive obligations to 
respond to servitude under human rights treaties, whatever the nationality (including its 
own) of the women involved. But it also has obligations with respect to foreign women, 
the deportation of whom may cause a return to the unacceptable conditions or subject 
them to a real risk of other harsh treatment in their national State, factors which should 
influence any deportation decision (though not necessarily their prosecution for 
immigration offences, if they were smuggled into the country).  
        But, the exploitative nature of their work may be relevant to another matter – it is 
hardly likely that any ‘smuggler’ would reveal these conditions to any woman seeking 
to be transported to another State, so that there would be no consent to the transaction: 
the woman would have been trafficked, not smuggled, and would be entitled to the 
protection provided by trafficking law, in addition to the protection of her human rights 
(which might include the application of the criminal aspects of immigration law to her). 
The evidence1356 seems to be that a significant proportion of women transported and 
who work in the sex trade fall into this last category but there is no justification for 
                                                 
1355 n 931. 
1356 See, for example, L Brown, n 120, which is based upon an empirical study conducted by Brown and 
includes numerous accounts and excerpts of the experiences of trafficked victims and the deception and 
exploitation which they have experienced. 
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saying that they all do, even if one went so far as to say that all prostitution were 
exploitative (which the thesis does not), we might find that some women were prepared 
to accept this, so bad were their own conditions at home and, if they did, they would 
not have been trafficked. 
        Nonetheless, as regards those identified as formally trafficked, it appears the 
international regime relevant to these women is deficient – particularly in terms of 
implementation of the victim-centred obligations into the UK legislative regime. It has 
been identified that there are deficiencies in the UK NRM,1357 particularly in terms of 
the identification of victims, which clearly undermines the object and purpose of the 
anti-trafficking regime. Mistakes have also been made as regards returning formally 
trafficked victims to the origin State where she was at risk of ill-treatment, such as re-
trafficking, on return.1358 Misidentification can have severe adverse consequences for 
those who actually have been trafficked.1359  
        Furthermore, lack of access to assistance and support to those who fall short of the 
threshold of the trafficking definition, yet who have still been subject to severe 
exploitation, creates an unacceptable situation where tolerance of consent to 
exploitation is evident. There is a need for a paradigmatic shift in attitude (by those 
involved in the victim identification regime) toward the trafficked victim or exploited 
migrant – indeed, investigation into whether an individual is a putative victim of 
trafficking should take precedence over concerns regarding the individual’s 
immigration status.1360 
                                                 
1357 The Anti Trafficking Monitoring Group, n 306. 
1358 See, for example, Alan Travis, n 1025. 
1359 Such as in the case of R v O [2008] EWCA Crim 2835, although decided pre-ratification of the CoE 
Trafficking Convention, this case is illustrative of the consequences of misidentification – see J Elliott, n 
1117, also see OOO et al v Commissioner of Metropolitan Police [2011] EWHC 1246 QB. 
1360  Home Office/UK Borders Agency, n 1326. 
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        In practice, it might be that the proportion of transported women working in the 
sex trade, whose circumstances are exploitative is so great, that we should reasonably 
accept a presumption that they have been trafficked and should be protected 
accordingly (even though local woman working in the same conditions would have no 
similar, mandatory protection). If the State were able to rebut the presumption in a 
particular case, we might want to make the argument that the effect of the conditions of 
her ‘work’ and the uncertainty of the risk to the woman if returned to her national State 
were so great that, as a matter of humanitarian concession, the State should allow the 
benefits (or at least a minimum level of similar benefits) afforded to trafficked women 
on a general basis (analogous to the humanitarian right to remain sometimes accorded 
to failed refugee applicants) – but this would not necessarily be a matter of obligation 
for the State, which might very well want to retain its power to remove at once, any 
foreign ‘Belles de jour’ who came to its attention. 
        Along the same vein, the consideration of a policy of prosecutorial discretion as 
regards offences committed by the ‘consensually trafficked’ as regards, say, 
immigration offences, as is available for the formally trafficked, is suggested. 
Furthermore, it is considered that the policy of prosecutorial discretion as regards 
offences committed by victims identified as formally trafficked (and having been 
committed as a result of having been trafficked) should be a more definite and less 
discretionary policy of non-prosecution – it is difficult to sustain a ‘public interest’ 
argument in favour of prosecuting such persons.1361 It is, however, more difficult to 
sustain the same argument as regards the ‘consensually trafficked’, who – if third 
country nationals – may have ostensibly consented or willingly flouted immigration 
laws. 
                                                 
1361 To reiterate what was said in the UK Action Plan on Tackling Human Trafficking, ‘It is difficult to 
envisage circumstances where it would be in the public interest to prosecute genuine victims of human 
trafficking for immigration offences.’ Home Office and Scottish Executive, n 254, 57. 
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        It must be recognised that asking for such concessions, particularly as regards the 
‘consensually trafficked’, may not be popular with States – the UK for example 
stressed that, as regards the decision whether or not to opt in to the EU 2011 Directive, 
that is was of great importance that the UK could ‘still maintain control over our 
criminal justice system’.1362 This can be related directly to the preceding paragraph – 
the UK is clearly keen to avoid interference with its interests in terms of criminal law 
offences and corresponding sanctions.  
        The arguments advanced throughout the thesis are not intended to be about 
removing, undermining or threatening autonomy, or about doubting the validity of 
human agency to give genuine consent. This is about recognising the tensions caused 
by the need to determine consent - or lack thereof - in an incredibly sensitive and 
potentially coercive situation which is, by nature, clandestine. Accordingly, this is 
about providing a response which takes all of those things into account, and properly 
provides for not only victims of trafficking, but victims of transportation into 
exploitation. 
        It is recognised that the thesis asks for a lot. Yet, it is argued that such a position is 
justified, due to the ‘special position’ of ‘consensually trafficked’ persons, whose 
conditions of ‘work’ may be comparably as bad as those faced by the formally 
trafficked person, or who may be misidentified due to failings of the authorities charged 
with identifying them. The type of changes requested for consideration are not 
uncontroversial and would, if deemed acceptable, likely take a long time to actually be 
brought into effect, due to such concessions being somewhat of a departure from the 
                                                 
1362 Malcolm Harbour, West Midlands Conservative MEP, quoted in The Shuttle (Kidderminster Shuttle) 
‘UK Government's opt-in to trafficking directive welcomed’ 3 April 2011 
<http://www.kidderminstershuttle.co.uk/news/8946640.UK_Government_s_opt_in_to_trafficking_direct
ive_welcomed/> accessed 15 June 2011. 
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norm. Yet, these concessions are asked for solely within the isolated situation of 
ostensibly consenting transported and severely exploited individuals – it does not ask 
for an ‘open door’ policy for all smuggled sex workers. 
        The central focus of the anti-trafficking (and therefore anti-exploitation) regime 
should be exploitation, rather than consent. This thesis has argued that either consent 
should be deemed irrelevant, or – as is the preferred argument here - the middle 
category of persons who can be referred to as ‘less than trafficked, more than 
smuggled’ should be provided for by a bespoke system, considered on a case by case 
basis, so that victims are not left without access to necessary and appropriate rights and 
protections, and so that traffickers cannot rely upon consent as a defence to their 
criminality as a trafficker.  
        The destination State must tread carefully. Showing proof of coercion, 
determining the timing of consent, and/or exactly what has been consented to may at 
times serve to make an arbitrary distinction between ‘consenting’ and non-consenting 
trafficked persons, when the reality is that the cases may be so alike that little purpose 
beyond immigration control (although an important concern on the part of the affected 
State) is served by treating these individuals differently. 
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